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Abstract
The thesis investigates the politics behind the survival of members of the local state- 
based elite from the New Order regime into the new ‘democratic’ era in North 
Maluku, Indonesia. The research investigates local politics and sub-national 
government in a new province on the geographic periphery of the Indonesian state, 
where mass violence followed the fall of Suharto. The core issue examined is how, 
through a year-long violent conflict, protracted socio-economic crisis, and significant 
government and electoral reforms, the local state-based political elite in North 
Maluku survived, even thrived, during this turbulent period.
Most literature on the Indonesian democratic transition holds that widespread 
violence in regions like North Maluku was the result of a weak state and/or rising 
ethnic, religious and communal tensions. However, this case study reveals that elite 
factional politics played a central role in the conflict. It was far from a spontaneous 
communal affair and instead closely linked to rising competition between local elites 
over state positions and resources during the late New Order and the early 
democratic era. State officials were not weak in the face of a rising society, but rather 
played central roles in escalating conflict and ‘communal’ violence. Understanding 
these dynamics is essential to explaining, not only the violence, but also political 
dynamics before, during and following the conflict.
The thesis considers the political and economic role of state-based elites over a ten- 
year period and analyses the North Maluku conflict as part of a prolonged political 
struggle between different factions within the state. The most successful state-based 
elites maintained their positions through controlling state resources, including ‘post­
conflict’ aid funds, in a contracting regional economy. This control enabled them to 
distribute important resources to a fragile population -  maintaining a popular support 
base -  and to build large election campaign war-chests for ensuing democratic 
elections.
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Political biographies of major figures in North Maluku (1998-2008)
Name, 
local title
Ethnic,
religious
background
Official occupation/political posts Main period of local 
political influence
Pre-1999 Post-1999
M udaffar 
Syah, Sultan 
of Ternate
Ethnic Temate
(North
Maluku),
Muslim, latest
in line of
Temate
Sultans
Chair, North 
Maluku district 
DPRD (1997- 
1999); Chair, 
North Maluku 
district Golkar 
branch (1998-)
DPR member for 
North Maluku, 
PDK (2004-2009)
Rising power 1997-1999; 
exiled from North 
Maluku 1999; 
successfully contested 
national elections (2004); 
unsuccessfully competed 
to enter North Maluku 
gubernatorial elections, 
Golkar (2001) and PDK 
(2007)
Bahar Andili Ethnic
Gorantalo
(Sulawesi),
Muslim
Central 
Halmahera 
district regent
Central Halmahera 
district regent, 
Golkar (1999-2001)
Rising power 1990s -  
2001; leading ‘southern’ 
political figure; 
unsuccessfully competed 
to enter first North 
Maluku gubernatorial 
election, PPP (2001); 
died 2001
Thaib
Armain
Ethnic Makian 
(North 
Maluku), 
Muslim
District
secretary, North
Maluku district
(1987-1997);
Second
Assistant
secretary,
Maluku
provincial
government
(1997-1999)
North Maluku 
provincial secretary 
(1999-2002), 
elected first North 
Maluku governor, 
PDI-P (2002-2007), 
re-elected governor, 
coalition (2008- 
2012)
Rising power late 1990s; 
most senior provincial 
bureaucratic post (1999- 
2002); two-term 
Governor (2002-2012)
Syamsir
Andili
Ethnic
Gorantalo
(Sulawesi),
Muslim,
younger
brother o f
Bahar Andili
Senior local 
government 
bureaucrat 
(prior to 1999)
Temate City 
Mayor, Golkar 
(1999-2005), re­
elected 2005 for 
second term,
Golkar (2005-2010)
Rising power mid 1990s; 
leading Temate city 
official; two-term 
Temate Mayor (1999- 
2012)
Abdul Gafur Ethnic Patani 
(North 
Maluku), 
Muslim
Two-time 
Suharto cabinet 
minister 
(1980s); DPP 
Golkar member
DPR member for 
North Maluku, 
Golkar (2004-2009)
Not active in local 
politics until 2001; 
unsuccessfully contested 
two gubernatorial 
elections for Golkar
Nita Budhi 
Susanti (Boki 
Nita)
Ethnic 
Javanese, 
Muslim, 
Temate 
Sultan’s wife
No official 
position prior to 
2004.
DPD member for 
North Maluku, 
PDK (2004-2009)
Unsuccessfully contested 
Temate city elections, 
PDK (2005)
14
Chapter One - 
Introduction
Violence generally increases and becomes more salient in situations of 
rising uncertainty across the boundary. It increases because people 
respond to threats against weighty social arrangements they have built 
on such boundaries -  arrangements such as...power over local 
government.
Charles Tilly. 1
1.1 The research project
(i) The central issue
Many forms of violence occurred during the official transition to democracy in 
Indonesia, particularly in the eastern part of the country. Starting in 1999 street riots, 
large-scale ethnic and religious cleansings, ‘holy’ wars between Christian and 
Muslim groups, militia clashes and gang attacks all broke out at various stages and 
continued to flare during the ensuing years of transition. Most of these violent 
incidents have been collectively described as ‘ethnic’, ‘religious’ or ‘communal’ 
conflicts, in both the media and academic literature. From a macro viewpoint, long- 
repressed or emergent clashes between religious and ethnic identity groups appeared 
at the heart of the conflicts wreaking havoc across democratising Indonesia, with the 
state weakened by thirty years of dictatorship and unable to contain the violence.
Upon close analysis, however, each incident had its own peculiar trajectory and 
format, and the state was not always too fragile to cope with violent events. Some 
highly localised inter-ethnic fights escalated rapidly into ‘holy’ wars, which 
themselves reflected larger negotiations of state-society relations across the country. 
This was not always a spontaneous process: local (and sometimes national) political 
leaders had a close hand in the escalation of conflict from one form to another, from 
one locale to another, and between some groups and others. Many apparently 
spontaneous communal riots and ethnic cleansings bore the hallmark of elite 
factional politics, with grassroots, militia and other vigilante groups involved in 
proxy street battles. Far from being too weak to contain - or incapable of managing -
1 Tilly (2003), p.77.
2 On the evolution and meaning o f religious violence in Indonesia, see Sidel (2006).
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the violence, state officials played a part in many of the conflicts. While religious 
and ethnic identities were roused, and their mobilisation played critical roles in the 
conflicts, assuming that ‘identity’ clashes lay at their causal heart misreads the role 
and interests of local state officials in both the initiation and escalation of the 
violence.
In light of this interpretation of the transitional conflicts, the thesis explores the 
politics behind the survival of members of the local state-based elite from 
Indonesia’s New Order regime through the transition to the new ‘democratic’ era. 
The arena of the story is local politics, on the geographic periphery of the nation 
state, where national reforms played out rather differently than planned. The core 
issue examined in the thesis is how, through a year-long violent conflict following 
the official transition to democracy, subsequent socio-economic crisis, and 
significant government and electoral reforms, the state-based political elite in North 
Maluku, Eastern Indonesia, survived, even thrived, through this turbulent period.3 
The thesis aims to explore and explain the mechanisms behind the political survival 
of a particular set of factions within the local state elite, and the role that violent 
conflict played for them.
(ii) The main propositions
The main purpose of this thesis is to demonstrate the validity of three propositions 
that emerge through the examination of one regional case study in extensive 
empirical detail.4 First, an apparently ethnic and religious conflict in North Maluku, 
taking place during the immediate years of democratic transition in Indonesia, 
actually reflected a power struggle over the local state between different state-based 
elites and their affiliated political factions and proxy groups. Second, the main 
political leaders of the competing factions during the conflict were all located within 
the state, in one way or another. This means that the conflict did not reflect a weak 
and collapsing state or the rise of societal over state forces, but rather intense 
competition over control of the state, which remained central to local political and 
economic life. Third, one set of local state elites (containing several factions)
3 Eastern Indonesia refers to the broad island regions o f Kalimantan (Indonesian Borneo), Sulawesi, 
Maluku, Indonesian Papua and East Nusa Tenggara.
4 Section 1.3 outlines the research methodology.
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survived the conflict, subsequent socio-economic crises and reforms through 
maintaining control over state resources.
North Maluku had already experienced a year of economic contraction following the 
national economic crisis of 1997 and this was prolonged by the conflict, which had 
several disastrous effects on the regional economy. For several years following the 
conflict, a significant proportion of state resources -  which played a vital role in the 
regional economy - were derived from ‘post-conflict’ aid budgets, provided mainly 
by the central government, but also by foreign donors via the United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP).5 As the provincial government controlled these 
resources, post-conflict assistance funds lay at the heart of the competition in local 
politics between different state elites. In subsequent elections, despite significant 
government and electoral reforms, and ongoing socio-economic crises in the wake of 
conflict, incumbents were able to hold onto their positions as heads of the executive 
branches of the local state.
The thesis therefore acts as a corrective to several arguments that have been widely- 
made about the impact of the Indonesian democratic transition in the geographic 
periphery of the nation state, as well as the dominant explanations for ‘ethno­
religious’ violence during the transition. These arguments fall into two main 
categories. The first suggests that the Indonesian democratic transition showed the 
inherent weakness of the state, particularly on the peripheries of the country, in the 
face of rising religious, ethnic and societal (apparently ‘non-state’) political 
movements. The second posits that Indonesia showed a clear trend towards (or return 
to) ethnic, religious and ‘traditional’ identity movements in politics and society 
during the transition era, which had been long-suppressed by the New Order regime. 
In contrast to these two interpretations, I argue that the Indonesian state was shown 
to be stronger than many analysts thought. Local elites based within the state held
5 I highlight the term ‘post-conflict’ here to stress two ambiguities in the use o f this term. First, 
although by July 2000 the conflict in North Maluku was officially over, and the violence had largely 
subsided, the dynamics o f conflict and a final political settlement between the competing parties were 
not yet concluded. Second, the term ‘post-conflict’ was used widely by government and foreign aid 
officials to describe both the North Malukan situation following the end to violence and  their aid 
programmes in the region. I use the term from this point without inverted commas, but clarify, where 
necessary, the sense in which it is used. Using this term does not imply that I interpret the conflict as 
being ‘resolved’ -  in fact, the conflict continued via other means following the subsidence o f  violence, 
as the thesis explores.
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key advantages over their outside rivals, and access to state resources (and foreign 
resources channelled through the state) remained the determining factor in local 
contests for power.
The thesis also speaks to the possible impacts and risks of violence where rapid 
government and electoral reforms are pursued when democratic rules of behaviour 
are foreign to strong political elites. At the geographic margins of Indonesia, an 
enormous and hugely diverse nation-state by global standards, the state looked quite 
different than it did at the centre. The national planners of decentralisation and 
electoral reform (and their foreign supporters) had assumed that reforms would make 
the local state more accountable to the population and would minimise regional 
concentration of opposition to the central state, thus securing an orderly transition. 
But changing the rules of the political game by revising government and electoral 
laws did not produce the anticipated results.
The main argument put forward in the thesis to answer the question of how the state- 
based elite survived the transition process is the following. Under the New Order, the 
central state expanded its authority throughout the territory establishing structures of 
rule -  the local state -  in the furthest reaches of the country. These were populated by 
what came to be the local state elite (drawn from both old and new power brokers). 
Their social and economic position was dependent on access to, and control over, 
central state resources. These state-based local elites survived the transition -  with 
one particular sub-set accumulating the greatest amount of local power -  illustrating 
the staying power of the state constructed during the New Order period. Other 
members of the state-based elite, more weakly linked to the local New Order 
bureaucratic structures, did not survive. This thesis explored the dynamics of this 
process at the local level through mapping the political architecture of the local state 
and tracing the sources and dynamics of local power.
After this brief introduction to the central issues and argument explored in the thesis, 
the rest of the chapter is structured as follows. The remainder of this first section 
outlines the iterative research journey behind this project. The second section then 
situates the thesis in the main literature on conflict and democratic transition in 
Indonesia -  and beyond -  in four parts. It is important to do so to show how the
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interpretation of the transition period in this thesis differs from much of the literature. 
The first part presents a summary of the major conflicts in Indonesia during the 
transition period. The second critiques the main interpretations given for ‘ethno­
religious’ conflict in Indonesia. The third part outlines the argument presented in the 
thesis -  that the so-called ‘ethno-religious’ conflict was actually a contest within the 
state elite over state resources -  and considers the wider literature on the mechanics 
behind the political survival of state-based political elites. It then outlines the 
methodology used in the field research, including a summary of the qualitative case 
study approach, and the role of political ethnography, key informant interviews and 
documentary sources. The fourth part presents a roadmap of the thesis, outlining the 
central themes of each chapter.
(iii)Research background
I set out on this PhD project in 2004 intending to explore and assess the apparent rise 
and resurgence of so-called ‘traditional’ and ‘ethnic’ elites in local politics in 
Indonesia as a result of the dual processes of democratisation and decentralisation 
following the fall of Suharto in May 1998. In particular, what interested me was the 
apparent reclamation of political power by ‘tribal’, ‘ethnic’ and ‘traditional’ leaders 
in Eastern Indonesia, largely -  though not exclusively -  through violent means, and 
the extremely negative socio-economic impacts this appeared to be having in the 
region. Historically the most diverse and least developed part of the country, at least 
five regions of Eastern Indonesia experienced severe violence during the transition 
period, ranging from inter-religious conflict in the Maluku region to ethnic cleansing 
of migrant groups in parts of Kalimantan.6
The early years of democratisation and decentralisation of local politics and power in 
many parts of Eastern Indonesia had not matched the expectations of the Jakarta 
planners and foreign donors. The transition had not led to an immediate blossoming 
of benign civil society movements, a natural improvement in local government 
activities and economic development, or the emergence of an active and non-violent 
generation of liberal activists and non-governmental watch-dogs.7 Instead, the dual
6 The range o f transitional era conflicts in Eastern Indonesia is summarised in Section 1.2.
7 In fact, while this later took place in some of the conflict areas, in North Maluku it came largely 
during the post-conflict reconstruction period, when foreign donors specifically funded local activist
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processes of democratisation and decentralisation in many areas had apparently led 
to a reclamation of political and economic power, frequently via violent means, by a 
variety of ‘traditional’, ‘ethnic’ or ‘tribal’ figures. These figures were previously 
excluded from, or marginalised by, a highly centralised state under the New Order 
and were seizing the moment to (re)gain power. In some areas -  such as Central 
Kalimantan -  local ‘ethnic’ or ‘tribal’ leaders outside the state had the implicit 
support of branches of the local government and security forces in their violent 
seizure of power. In other areas -  such as North Maluku -  control of the local state 
and its resources was itself the central locus of conflict between state elites. Here 
different state factions fought through proxy militia groups across city streets and in 
rural areas, each representing a distinctive ‘ethnic’ group.
In 2002, several years prior to starting my PhD fieldwork, and exactly one year after 
a large-scale incident of violent ethnic cleansing in the region, I made several field 
visits to Central Kalimantan.8 I was struck by how much of the local economic and 
social fabric had been destroyed through waves of apparently communal violence 
during the first four years of democratisation and the first year of decentralisation 
The process of ‘reclaiming’ political and economic power (whether directly from the 
state or from migrant groups seen to have gained from state policies) by the 
indigenous Dayak ethnic group had destroyed large areas of important trading towns, 
major roads, markets, ports, homes and sometimes entire hamlets and suburbs. 
Important informal sectors of the economy were also devastated by the forced 
removal of the ethnic migrant Madurese community who had dominated these 
sectors -  including essential (but lower-end) parts of the transport sector, such as 
motorbike taxis and becak drivers, and manual labour in the logging and port 
sectors.9 This in turn had negatively affected trade and the broader economy. One 
year after the conflict, these sectors had not yet recovered, and the infrastructure was 
far from repaired. Socially, a great deal of trauma was expressed by members of 
different community groups (both indigenous and migrant) who had either 
participated in or directly witnessed the violence. From a macro-economic and social
groups to monitor the local government. Other regions, like Central Sulawesi, had longer histories o f 
local non-governmental organisations monitoring state activities (see Li 2007).
8I visited Central Kalimantan whilst working as a researcher on a World Bank/Government o f  
Indonesia community development project, see Smith (2005).
9 Similar processes took place during conflict in Ambon, see Adam (2008).
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perspective, the benefits of democratic transition and government reform were far 
from obvious.
Yet despite the economic and social costs of conflict, the political benefits accruing 
to the elite and local leadership from the conflict were striking. Enormous political 
gains had been made by certain elite groups through the process of ethnic cleansing 
of the (largely) migrant Madurese by indigenous Dayak.10 The process of ethnic 
cleansing had not only raised the social status of indigenous leaders, it had allowed 
them to (re) assert their claim to political and therefore economic power in the region 
-  both from migrant groups and others who had benefited during the Suharto regime. 
The relaxing of military and political control through the process of democratisation 
and decentralisation had enabled these previously marginalised leaders to seize 
control -  at least informally -  of political power. The question remained as to 
whether they would be able to sustain their new claims to power, and if this would 
translate into electoral success during subsequent elections and increased control of 
the local state. I was interested to explore whether, and how, increased control of the 
local state by ‘traditional’, or ‘ethnic’, leaders had impacted society and politics. 
With these questions in mind, I selected a field site in Eastern Indonesia to study the 
‘revived’ role of ‘traditional’ and ‘ethnic’ leaders in, and their impact on, local 
politics, society and the economy following the democratic transition.11
However, following several months of intensive fieldwork in North Maluku -  mid­
way through 2005 and during one of Indonesia’s most active local election periods 
since the transition to democracy -  the dynamics I intended to explore were no 
longer evident. Instead of witnessing and documenting the rise and possible 
maintenance of power of ‘revived’ (or ‘reinvented’) ‘traditional’, ‘ethnic’ or 
‘religious’ leaders in local politics, I was directly observing the machinations behind
10 Li (2007), pp.258-276, criticises the analysis published in World Bank field reports from this period 
-  including Smith (2005) -  as constrained by the World Bank’s neo-liberal epistemological approach. 
I was concerned that my field study had not focused enough on local politics, in particular the 
dynamics o f power during the conflict and subsequent reconstruction phase. These questions on the 
political aspects o f conflict and reconstruction during the democratic transition led directly to this 
PhD project.
11 I originally planned a comparative study across two to three conflict regions o f Eastern Indonesia, 
but the logistical and methodological constraints o f  conducting in-depth qualitative field research -  a 
method these research questions called for -  in remote conflict areas, within my PhD budget, 
eventually limited my focus to one region. See Section 1.3 on methodology.
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the political survival of state-based elites. This was despite -  or, as it turned out, 
because of -  several serious shocks to the local political, economic and social 
system. These included regime change and democratisation at the national level, 
local conflict, and localised economic and social crises following outbreaks of 
conflict. My research questions were therefore turned on their heads. I began to track 
why ‘traditional’ or ‘ethnic’ leaders had failed  to maintain their momentary rise in 
politics and seizure of new positions in local politics (which had indeed taken place) 
and the mechanisms explaining the renewed success of rival state-based elites.12
The overarching theme of the study developed into an exploration of the political 
continuity of certain branches (or factions) of the local political elite in North Maluku 
through the processes of democratic reform, conflict and crisis. Within an overall 
continuity of state-elite power, I also consider reconfiguration within the local 
political elite and examine which figures or factions were forced out and by what 
means, and which eventually triumphed. One object of the study is therefore the 
factional politics of key rivals within the local state, first through the politics of 
violence and, later, via electoral politics, looking at the rise of certain factions within 
the state due to greater access to state organisations and capital than their rivals. The 
central narrative of the thesis is therefore an exploration of the empirical dynamics 
of, and rationale behind, the process of political continuity, and the subtleties of 
change within it.
1.2 Situating the thesis in the literature
Here, I set the North Maluku conflict in the national and wider theoretical context in 
three parts. First, I summarise the ten major conflicts that took place during the first 
decade of democratic transition in Indonesia. Second, I consider the two dominant 
explanations for ‘ethnic’ and ‘religious’ conflicts as presented in the main literature 
on Indonesia.13 These include both the ‘emergence of societal forces’ and the ‘weak 
state’ argument. Third, I present an alternative explanation for the North Maluku
12 As it turned out, these ‘traditional’ leaders had been deeply embedded in the state since the colonial 
era. As such, the local political contest played out between different factions within the state.
13 Sources on conflict in Indonesia during the transition include academic and policy papers. On the 
methodological and epistemological problems posed by the crossover between policy and academic 
research on conflict in Indonesia, see Sidel (2006).
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conflict, arguing that the conflict was, at its core, a contest between local elites for 
control of the local and provincial branches of the state.
The alternative explanation I present here forms one of the main original 
contributions of the thesis: that is, interpreting the North Maluku conflict as a 
reflection of the strength of local state elites and comparative weakness of ‘societal’ 
forces during the transition period. I argue that interpreting the North Maluku 
violence as a purely ethnic or religious conflict, reflecting either the rising force of 
identity politics, or the result of a weak state unable to control these social forces -  or 
both -  neglects the major dynamics within, and motivations behind, the violence. 
These included the benefits to certain branches of the local state elite ensuing from 
violence. This analysis takes off from Van Klinken’s (2001) assessment of the role of 
the state in Maluku prior to conflict, and his (2007) analysis of the role of state elites 
in mobilising groups during conflict. I then go further, invoking concepts of machine 
politics to explain the survival of a particular faction of local state-based elites in 
political power following the conflict, and interpreting the violence as one of several 
manifestations of intra-state elite competition throughout a decade of transitional 
politics.
(i) Major conflicts in Indonesia (1996-2005)
Ten major conflicts took place during the ten years of transition from the New Order 
to democratic regime, nine of them after Suharto’s fall in 1998.14 Table 1.1 (below) 
summarises these, outlining the main divisions and conflicting groups.15 This table 
should not be read as an analysis of the causes of these conflicts. Instead, it provides 
an overview of the main organisational divides between major combatants, whilst 
recognising that these cleavages may only have been relevant at certain points in 
time. For example, the apparently local ethnic conflict in North Maluku later evolved 
into an inter-religious conflict of grave concern to many communities and 
organisations across Indonesia. Conflicts in Maluku and Central Sulawesi showed
14 I include the 1996 conflict in West Kalimantan as a transition conflict as it was so similar to the 
conflict there in 1999 and in Central Kalimantan in 2001.
15 I do not employ the frequently used ‘threshold’ method for categorising conflicts -  as used by 
Collier and Hoeffler (2001) and The University o f Maryland’s State Failure Project -  and I have not 
included numbers killed during these conflicts due to several problems with the conflict data on 
Indonesia, discussed in Chapter Four.
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similar trends.16 The main point here is to highlight the sheer number of conflicts in 
Indonesia during the important transition years -  which triggered an outpouring of 
analysis on the ‘weakness’ of the once apparently strong Indonesian state and the rise 
o f ‘ethno-religious’ violence.
Table 1.1 Major incidents of violent conflict in Indonesia (1996-2005)
No. Provincial
location
Year(s) of 
conflict
Main
divides
Major conflicting groups
1 W est Kalimantan 1996 Ethnic Ethnic Dayak and ethnic M adurese
2 Jakarta 1997-1998 Ethnic Ethnic Chinese and non-Chinese
3 W est Kalimantan 1999 Ethnic Ethnic Malay and ethnic M adurese
4 North Maluku 1999-2000 Ethnic/
religious
Indigenous and local migrant 
groups; later Muslims and 
Christians (incl. radical militant 
groups17)
5 Maluku 1999-2002 (+) Ethnic/
religious
Indigenous and migrant Muslims 
and local Christians (incl. radical 
militant groups)
6 Central Sulawesi 2000-2002 (+) Ethnic/
religious
Indigenous and migrant Muslims 
and local Christians (incl. radical 
militant groups)
7 Central
Kalimantan
2001 Ethnic Ethnic Dayak and ethnic M adurese
8 East Timor18 1975 -1 9 9 9 S tate /
separatists
Fretelin (pro-independence 
organisation); pro-Indonesian 
militants; Indonesian military
9 Aceh19 1873 -  2005 State/
separatists
The Free Aceh M ovement (GAM); 
Indonesian military
10 Papua/W est
Papua20
1961 -o n g o in g S tate/
separatists
The Free Papua M ovement (OPM); 
Indonesian military
Sources: Harvard Program on Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research (2004); International Crisis 
Group (2001b; 2002b; 2003a; 2004); Human Rights Watch (1998).
Of the ten conflicts in the table, the first seven took place largely between ethnic or 
religious groups (or both, or in sequence). Six of these occurred in Eastern 
Indonesia, including the North Maluku case studied here. The Eastern Indonesian 
conflicts were largely categorised and understood as ‘communal’, ‘ethnic’ or
16 Van Klinken (2003); ICG (2004).
17 The term ‘radical militant groups’ here refers to highly organised and trained religious militant 
groups with specifically violent aims targeted against another religious group.
18 Indonesia withdrew in 1999 following a referendum on independence. East Timor gained official 
independence from Indonesia in 2002 becoming the new nation-state o f Timor Lorosae.
19 Aceh province was under martial law between 2003 and 2004, followed by a period o f civil 
emergency status. A peace agreement was brokered between GAM and the Indonesian government in 
2005, with Aceh remaining part o f the Indonesian nation-state under special autonomy status.
20 The Papua/West Papua region gained special autonomy status in 1999, but this was complicated by 
a 2002 Presidential Instruction dividing the region into separate provinces. The Papua conflict 
remained unresolved as o f April 2009.
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‘religious’ conflicts by the academic literature, media, foreign donors and the
Indonesian government.21
Before focusing on the debate over the causes of ‘ethno-religious’ conflicts, I should 
highlight that the distinction between the three “separatist” conflicts in East Timor, 
Aceh and Papua/West Papua, and the others is a matter of degree rather than an 
absolute divide. The Indonesian government officially uses the terms “horizontal” 
and “vertical” conflict to distinguish conflicts ostensibly between communities from 
those explicitly targeted against the state.22 However, while the primary parties and 
cleavages in the Aceh, Papua and East Timor conflicts were -  and, in 2009, 
continued to be, in the Papua case -  the state and separatist organisations, other 
socio-economic, ethnic and religious tensions also underlay the violence.23 The 
main differential is in terms of the organisations officially -  or publicly -  involved 
in the conflicts: the Indonesian military and armed separatist groups were involved 
from the outset in these three conflicts. In others they were not officially involved as 
primary actors, although many argue that they were indirectly involved in various 
ways, for example in the North Maluku, Maluku and Central Kalimantan 
conflicts.24 Putting this debate over the causal nature of the ‘separatist’ versus 
‘ethno-religious’ conflicts aside, the following two sections critically explore the 
dominant explanations for die overtly ‘ethnic’ and ‘religious’ conflicts.25
21 Not all academics took this line. Bertrand (2004), for example, does not analytically separate 
‘separatist’ and ‘ethno-religious’ conflicts, arguing that they all formed part o f  a wider re-negotiation 
o f the nation state during the transition.
22 This distinction was used, for example, by senior ministerial and military officials at the Conflict 
Resolution Seminar: Security Sector Reform, British Embassy, Jakarta, 19 March 2002.
23 For example, prior to the 2005 peace agreement, much violence in Aceh was linked to logging 
competition between military and other groups, hidden below the separatist rebellion. See 
International Crisis Group (2001c), p. 10.
240 n  the role o f the military in North Maluku see Tomagola (2000); in central Maluku see Aditjondro 
(2001). On the role o f military deserters in Maluku, see Tempo, June 2002. On the role o f the security 
forces in the Kalimantan violence, see ICG (2001b).
25 This thesis uses the terms ‘religious’ and ‘ethnic’ violence distinctly. Several o f the major authors 
on ‘ethnic’ conflict -  for example, Horowitz (2000) and Varshney (2002a) -  include conflict between 
religious groups within the broad umbrella o f ‘ethnic’ conflicts. However, in the Indonesian case, as 
elsewhere, actors in ‘religious’ conflicts were able to appeal to a much wider range o f support and 
mobilisation mechanisms than purely ‘ethnic’ conflicts.
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(ii) Dominant explanations for ‘ethno-religious’ conflict in Indonesia
96There are two main explanations for ethno-religious conflict in Indonesia. 
Although each has distinctive elements, they also link closely to one another on 
several important issues: indeed, it is hard to see how one makes sense without the 
other. Thus, although I have separated them out for analytical clarity, the two 
arguments directly inform each other.
fii.il The ‘rise of society’ argument
The first set of explanations for ‘ethno-religious’ conflicts during the transition 
understands them as reflecting the emergence (or ‘re’-emergence) of societal forces 
and identity politics previously suppressed by the New Order regime. The rise of 
identity movements -  ethnic, religious or other cultural groups -  in local politics was 
seen as a direct challenge to the state by groups marginalised from (or, in some cases, 
within) the state once the ‘lid’ of the New Order was lifted. The “rise of society” 
argument can be looked at using several lenses, taking a cultural, economic or theory 
of nationalism perspective.
Within the cultural framework, one perspective on the rise of violent conflict 
between ethnic, religious or other identity groups during the transition uses a 
psychological argument about “violence as culture” in Indonesia. This perspective 
focuses on forms of learned or ritualised behaviour, apparently deeply entrenched in 
Indonesian society. These include the practices of amok, when a person seen as a 
potential threat to society is killed by a mob, and rampok macan, a fifteenth century 
Javanese practice, where potentially threatening outsiders were ‘legitimately’ killed 
in a ritual way.27 Welsh (2003) points to Columbijin and Lindblad’s (2002) analysis 
of how both these rituals helped to justify the action of villagers and result in rising 
cases of mob justice, or keroyokan, during transition.28 Welsh claims that her 
surveys demonstrate that ritual and Teamed’ behaviour encouraged rising mob 
violence in Indonesia.29 However, there are major problems with using the cultural
26 From this point I use the term ‘ethno-religious’ to describe conflicts where both cleavages took 
place, during different phases o f the conflicts, and the terms separately for incidents where only ethnic 
or religious divides were relevant.
27 Welsh (2003), p. 18, summarises the historical traditions o f  violence in Indonesia.
28 Columbijin and Lindblad (2002).
29 Welsh (2003), pp. 18-19.
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behaviour argument to explain contemporary conflict in Indonesia, as indeed in
o n
other contexts.
Robinson (1996) has illustrated the flaws in the essentialist cultural arguments for 
the post-coup massacres in Bali and Java between 1965 and 1966, an earlier but 
even more violent transition period in Indonesia. These massacres were the most 
violent incident of conflict in Indonesia’s history, where over half a million people 
were estimated to have died, predominantly in Java and Bali.31 A common theme in 
explanations for the violence at the time was that the PKI (Indonesian Communist 
Party) had disrupted harmony, order and the cultural equilibrium of Balinese and 
Javanese culture, thus triggering a natural response to expel the “intruders”.
There are several logical flaws in this argument, as Robinson highlights, particularly 
in relation to the absence of analysis of the broader national and international 
political context, as well as the critical timing of the massacres, neither of which can 
be explained by a cultural argument. While the methods of violence drew on local 
traditions -  as was also the case in the more recent conflicts during the transition to 
democracy, for example the use of head-hunting in Kalimantan -  cultural factors 
cannot account for the political or economic motivations driving involvement in, or 
leadership of, the massacres.33 Robinson demonstrates how the interaction of local, 
national and international politics created an environment where the massacres were 
made possible. In particular, he emphasizes the role of political and military leaders 
at the national and local levels in encouraging mass violence for political and 
economic ends. Robinson’s analysis of the Bali and Java massacres in the 1960s 
influences my interpretation of the contemporary North Maluku conflict, developed 
further in Section 1.2 (iii) below.
Similar flaws also apply to the cultural arguments used to explain ethno-religious 
conflicts during the contemporary Indonesian transition. For both periods, it is 
crucial to understand how ‘traditional’ or ‘revived’ cultural practices and norms
30 Huntington (1993) presents a classic primordialist, or cultural, account o f contemporary global 
conflict.
31 Robinson (1996), p .l 19-124.
32 Robinson (1996) refers to Hughes’ (1966) and Pauker’s (1968) analyses o f violence in Bali and 
Java.
33 Robinson (1996), p. 121.
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related to violence are encouraged and manipulated at particular times in order to 
legitimate acts of violence rooted, for instance, in contemporary political and 
economic interests.34 Moore (1991) has demonstrated more widely that social 
behaviour cannot be explained in terms of cultural values alone, nor can these 
values serve as the starting point of sociological explanation, because, “to do so is to 
engage in circular reasoning”.35 Using a cultural argument makes it very difficult to 
understand the fact that cultural practices change, emerge and respond to 
developments in political and economic circumstances. The transitional context was 
not simply a ‘lid lifted’ on long-dormant violent culture, but a highly politicised 
moment. Political elites and community leaders had a critical role to play in making 
these political moments important for the various groups involved and then 
mobilising them.36
A more nuanced version of the culturally based explanation for conflict adds an 
economic dimension. This argument highlights the dramatic transformation of ethnic 
composition across the outer islands of Indonesia via migration in the late twentieth 
century, and links these demographic changes with the transitional conflicts on the 
periphery. The New Order government, building on Dutch colonial development 
policies, sponsored the mass transmigration of inner islanders, from Java, Madura 
and Bali, to the less densely populated outer islands in Eastern Indonesia and 
Sumatra. This programme, combined with spontaneous migration, was designed to 
relieve population and resource pressures on the inner islands, but inevitably 
increased natural resource and employment competition in the Outer Islands.
While the New Order managed to suppress many of these conflicts, following the 
economic crisis and the collapse of centralised military government in the late 1990s,
34 The 1996, 1999 and 2001 outbreaks o f ethnic violence in West and Central Kalimantan were 
frequently described in the press as the wild acts o f head-hunters. See, for example, Jakarta Post, 28 
June 2001. Head-hunting had not been practiced in the region for decades and such primordialist 
arguments overlook the social, political and economic logic behind the violence and particular 
methods used.
35 Moore (1991), p.486.
36 W olf (1999) applies a more nuanced analysis o f cultural factors behind conflict by concentrating on 
the role elites play in creating (and sustaining) conceptions o f the self and the group, thus showing 
that conflicts between groups are not inevitable but are always dynamic and related to power 
structures.
37 See Drake (1989) on problems o f  conflicting land claims because o f transmigration, and Gamault 
and Manning (1974) on employment competition between indigenous and migrant groups in Irian 
Jaya.
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intense competition over local resources, exacerbated by cultural differences, was 
argued to have led to an explosion of inter-ethnic (and religious) conflicts. The major 
fault-lines of recent communal violence were thus considered to be between 
indigenous and ‘outsider’ migrant groups.38 This argument usefully highlights the 
role of economic inequalities and resource competition in exacerbating cultural 
differences between migrant and indigenous groups, which can then lead to conflict. 
However, it fails to explain why conflict did not break out between groups in other 
regions with similar socio-economic conditions, where economic competition 
between culturally distinct groups was also intense. Other factors therefore must also 
have been involved.39
Taking an economic analysis of the rise of violent societal movements in Eastern 
Indonesia further, other theorists linked increased violence to the impacts of the 1997 
national economic crisis.40 Post-1998 economic conditions led to increased 
competition for resources, which fuelled local grievances, which in turn led to 
violent clashes between groups. Acciaoli’s (2001) study of local conflict in Sulawesi, 
for example, illustrates how post-crisis tensions over long-standing land conflicts 
exacerbated and fuelled inter-group violence.41 However, the economic argument 
cannot adequately account for the rise in conflict in Eastern Indonesia after 1998 
without also taking dynamic local factors into account. Due to the higher population 
densities, most of the poor actually lived on Java and Sumatra following the crisis.42 
Yet these islands were not the sites of most of the violent conflicts following 1998, 
though they may have experienced increased vigilante and other forms of criminal 
violence.43 Although economic tensions certainly fuelled conflict between groups via 
competition over limited resources, local historical and institutional contexts, and
38 Bowen (2003), pp.62-63.
39 Stewart (2002) emphasizes that the economic basis o f  ‘communal’ conflict lies in inequality 
between groups within the same broad class, rather than between different classes, in her theory o f  
horizontal inequalities. However, without considering political and leadership roles in a conflict, this 
theory is limited in its ability to explain why conflicts break out between certain groups but not others.
40 Collier and Hoeffler (2001) argue that economic incentives drive conflict, but the argument is 
limited by failing to account for local political and social histories and dynamics. See Nathan’s (2005) 
and Cramer’s (2002) critiques o f the Collier-Hoeffler model.
41 A World Bank study o f vigilantism in Lampung, Southern Sumatra, also argued that higher 
unemployment among men and increased crime post-crisis has increased clashes between ethnic 
groups. See Barron and Madden (2004).
42 World Bank (2003), p. 1.
43 On vigilantism in West Java see Welsh (2003).
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changing political dynamics in relation to these, must also be accounted for in order 
to explain the rise in violence in certain areas, but not others.44
A third view of the ‘rising society’ argument situates ethno-religious conflict during 
the transition within the framework of Indonesia’s incomplete process of national 
integration. The central argument here considers how the boundaries of the 
Indonesian nation had not yet achieved hill legitimacy across the population by the 
end of the Suharto era. As the major proponent of this argument, Bertrand (2002, 
2004) claims that Indonesia entered a consolidation phase of national development 
during the transition. During this phase, groups mobilised along ethnic lines (in the 
broad sense) to contest the existing state and its political institutions.45 He argues 
that ethno-nationalist violence (within which he includes ‘religious’ violence) tends 
to occur during “consolidation” phases of a society, where agreement on the 
national form has yet to be reached and the definition of the nation and its 
boundaries are sufficiently unclear to produce uncertainty about the terms of 
inclusion for certain ethnic (including religious) groups. If the “national model” 
does not clearly encompass the full range of ethnic groups living within the nation’s 
boundaries, then conflicts emerge around forms of political representation, resource 
allocation and the preservation of cultural identities.
Bertrand (2004) in fact argues that not only the separatist conflicts, but also the 
‘communal’ conflicts in Sulawesi, Maluku and Kalimantan were attributable to this 
overarching problem of incomplete integration in the nation-state. The argument is 
convincing in the way it highlights issues of regional autonomy, resource allocation 
and political representation, by demonstrating their relevance across all conflict 
regions, not only in the separatist conflicts. What limits it is the way it 
conceptualises each regional conflict as reflecting a localised version of a
44 Von Benda-Beckmann (1999) explains aspects o f the Maluku conflict via a more grounded 
economic and institutional analysis, by linking economic disparities with regional institutional 
legacies. He argues that the causes o f violence lay in economic disenfranchisement caused by 
traditional systems o f  land ownership, rather than religious disputes and that similar patterns o f  
economic and political disenfranchisement lie behind conflicts in other areas. A deep level micro 
analysis o f the Maluku socio-economic system, such as this, demonstrates the importance o f  
examining local institutions, and not only statistical data, to understand the relationship between 
socio-economic disparities and conflict.
45 Bertrand (2004) takes a constructivist, or modernist, view o f nation building, in the vein o f  
Anderson (1983) and contra Smith (1986).
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nationwide struggle over national identity and ethnic inclusion. The issue of ethnic 
identity therefore retains the central explanatory role as the driving factor of the 
transitional conflicts, a position this thesis challenges.
All these versions of the ‘rise of society’ argument portray state-society relations in 
Eastern Indonesia as dichotomous. They also assume that state actors played a 
marginal role in the conflicts: that the locus of conflict fell within the societal realm, 
sometimes in negotiation with the state, but not within it. Both of these assumptions 
mistake state-centred and elite-driven contests for societal clashes, and overlook the 
tight competition for state -  not simply economic -  resources that formed a central 
part of transitional conflict. This competition was not something state actors 
neutrally observed: they played a key role in determining its outcome. The ‘rising 
society’ explanation also mistakenly views the state on the margins of Indonesia as 
somehow weak, ineffectual or on die verge of collapse amidst the rise of a strong 
(uncivil) society. Section 1.2 (iii) comes back to these criticisms. But first, I examine 
the other dominant explanation for conflict in Eastern Indonesia -  the idea of state 
weakness, which is closely linked to the concept of rising societal forces.
(ii.ii) The ‘weak state’ argument
The second main argument for the rise of ‘ethno-religious’ violence in Eastern 
Indonesia during the transition conceives a weakened Indonesian state following 
three decades of centralised and ‘corrupted’ rule. By the end of the Suharto era the 
state was -  according to this viewpoint -  on the brink of collapse at the contested 
geographic margins of the country, regions that were never fully incorporated or 
consolidated into the Indonesian nation state by the New Order, and/or with state 
institutions improperly equipped to deal with rising violence. This argument draws 
on several of the variations of the ‘rising society’ argument outlined above -  in 
particular the sense of a contested nation and rising inequalities between ethno­
religious groups -  and expands it, describing the institutional context in which 
societal forces were able to rampage so wildly. Without a weakened state, the 
argument goes, societal tensions and economic resentments would not have exploded 
in the way they did.
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There are two main strands to the ‘weak state’ argument, both related to weak 
democratic institutions and the risks of regime change. The first considers how 
during the process of democratisation and government reform, state forms of 
conflict management remained weak.46 As the military retreated to the barracks, 
national systems of law enforcement remained weak and corrupt, thus conflicts 
between groups broke into violence where before they were suppressed by the 
centralised security system.47 Furthermore, the emergent democratic institutions 
intended to channel political conflict were still weak, whilst ‘traditional’ forms of 
conflict mediation had been eroded by years of centralising and modernising state 
government.48 Given the widening gap between the provision of formal state 
security and an increase in political action among diverse societal groups, violent 
conflict therefore almost inevitably broke out on the margins of the state -  
especially given the range of societal tensions outlined in the previous section. 
Second, the uncertainty caused by regime change, as well as the opening of new 
political spaces and the opportunity to conduct politics by new means, also led to 
revenge attacks, such as those against the ethnic Chinese across Indonesia in 1998. 
These were perceived as revenge for ethnic Chinese economic success under the 
Suharto regime.49
One problem with the ‘weak state’ argument is that it cannot account for why some 
regions experienced increased political action in non-violent forms, while in others 
it was violent. If the state was weakened systematically across the country, this does 
not explain why certain, but not all, diverse regions of Eastern Indonesia 
experienced ethno-religious violence.50 A more nuanced version of this model 
would need to account for both formal and informal institutions responsible for 
conflict mediation and management, as the institutional systems for managing
46 Reports by the Asia Foundation (2001) and International Crisis Group (2001a; 2001c) both 
recommended the strengthening o f state conflict management mechanisms within the security sector 
as means to reduce and prevent violent conflict.
47 See International Crisis Group (2001b).
48 Evers (2001) and Guggenheim (2003) -  both then writing for the World Bank -  make this argument 
for the weakness o f village level institutions at the end o f  the New Order.
49 See Suryadinata (2005), Coppell (1983) and Purdey (2006) on anti-ethnic Chinese violence in
Indonesia during this and earlier periods.
50 Varshney et al (2004) developed a comparative study o f violent and non-violent cities in Indonesia, 
in line with the model o f Varshney’s (2001, 2002a) India study.
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conflict between groups vary widely across different regions.51 It would also need 
to map different degrees and legacies of tension between societal groups at the 
micro level -  whether based in political access and representation, economic 
inequalities, cultural differences, land use inequalities, or otherwise - to explain why 
some regions experienced violent conflict and others did not, despite similar levels 
of diversity.52 However, even these problems are not the major flaw in the argument 
in relation to the North Maluku case. The North Malukan conflict contained all 
these features -  political and economic inequalities, strong cultural differences, an 
ineffective state security system, etc. -  but it was the presence of other local 
political dynamics and interests that enabled the escalation of violence towards 
massive regional conflict, discussed further in Chapter Three.
Several authors have also argued that the decentralisation of political power and the 
(partial) redistribution of government resources to the local from the central level 
were key factors in triggering ethno-religious conflict in Eastern Indonesia during 
the transition.53 In regions like North Maluku, regional autonomy (otonomi daerah) 
and re-districting {pemekaran) -  two of the major post-Suharto local government 
reform policies, discussed further in Chapters Two and Three -  may have triggered 
the escalation of conflict between different groups over limited resources.54 
However the root causes of the conflicts and tensions between these identity groups 
long pre-dated the advent of decentralisation. This means the risks and opportunities 
posed by decentralisation and re-districting were proximate but not root causes of 
the ensuing violence. Furthermore, even if the political and governance context had
51 Varshney (2001, 2002a) argues that ‘informal’ or non-state associational channels made the 
difference between scenarios o f ethnic conflict and ethnic violence in India. However, Varshney does 
not account for the role o f the state in mobilizing groups towards violence. In contrast, Brass (1997) 
argues that state actors and the police (among other elites) can construct riots in terms o f ethnic 
violence, intensifying existing tensions and channelling them in violent ways. This thesis uses Brass’ 
analysis by examining the central role o f state actors in precipitating violence between ethno-religious 
groups in North Maluku.
52 See, for example, Von Benda-Beckmann (1999) on legal variations in socio-economic space in the 
central Maluku region and its effects on levels o f land conflict.
53 On the links between decentralisation and conflict, see Aragon (2001), Vel (2001), International 
Crisis Group (2003b) and Bubandt (2004).
54 I translate ‘pem ekaran’ as ‘redistricting’ -  following Aragon (2004) -  rather than ‘blooming’, 
which is the more direct translation. This phenomenon o f local government reform following the 1999 
decentralisation laws resulted not only in the creation o f more districts but also in the re-organisation 
o f district boundaries. The political sense o f ‘redistricting’ for electoral and financial gain is relevant 
to the North Maluku case, as elsewhere in Eastern Indonesia. See Booth (2009) for a brief history o f  
decentralisation in Indonesia.
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changed, someone had to seize the opportunity to make something political of this, 
but not everyone across Eastern Indonesia chose to do so by violent means.
The ‘weak state’ argument has usefully highlighted the absence of formal state 
intervention to prevent the escalation of ‘ethno-religious’ conflict. But -  and this is 
one of the critical problems with this literature -  why do the authors assume this 
was a ‘weakness’ of, or omission by, state organisations and actors? The argument 
assumes that the state (or state actors) failed to intervene to prevent, manage or 
mitigate conflict because it was (or they were) too weak to do so.55 However, in the 
case examined in this thesis, state actors had deep interests and played active roles 
in, indeed, substantially benefltted from, the outcomes of these conflicts. The 
following section considers this argument in more detail.
Overall, having considered the two dominant explanations for ‘ethno-religious’ 
violence and their weaknesses, I should note that certain elements of these 
explanations resonated with aspects of the North Maluku conflict. At different points, 
increased activism by, and the mobilising power of, ethno-religious leaders and 
organisations played a critical role in escalating conflict at both the leadership and 
grassroots levels. At different stages of the conflict ‘ethnic’ and ‘religious’ symbols, 
messages and histories developed by ethno-religious leaders and organisations were 
strong mobilising tools provoking participation in -  and condoning of -  violence. 
Furthermore, under pressure from local state-elites, regional branches of the state 
security services failed to prevent an escalation of violence.56 However, my 
interpretation of conflict takes a different slant on the central cause of violence in 
North Maluku.
(iii) Conflict as intra-state elite competition 
In contrast to the two explanations outlined above, in this thesis I interpret the North 
Maluku conflict as the explosive result of a bitterly fought negotiation over -  and 
articulation of claims to -  local and regional political power, based in local and 
regional branches of the state. My interpretation builds on Van Klinken’s (2001,
55 Some analysts focus on the role o f the security sector in escalating apparently ‘communal’ conflict 
in the Maluku region (see Tomagola 2000; Aditjondro 2001), but less on the role o f  the local 
bureaucratic elite, which is my interest here.
56 Chapter Three returns to these dynamics.
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2007) studies of conflict in the Maluku region (which covered both north and central 
Maluku). In his 2001 study, Van Klinken discusses the historical importance of the 
state in the regional economy under the New Order regime, as well as the problems 
of stratified access to state benefits, which were based in patronage networks 
available only to certain privileged ethnic groups. His 2007 study of small town wars 
in Indonesia returns to discuss the core role of state-based elites in mobilising 
violence in the context of ‘contentious politics’ across the Maluku region. Where my 
approach differs is that this study considers the ten-year period within which the 
conflict was situated (1998-2008) rather than examining the conflict in isolation. As 
such, I consider not only local mobilisation by state elites towards violence, but the 
de-mobilisation of violence and the transition to the post-conflict period, where intra­
state elite contest continued, first via internal contests over state resources, and 
second via (largely) non-violent electoral means. I return to Van Klinken’s 
assessment below.
The alternative explanation of conflict in North Maluku I present here -  
understanding it as an intra-state elite contest over state power -  still acknowledges 
the important mobilising role of religious and ethnic identities in the escalation of 
violent conflict (as well, in later stages, in its mitigation). Socially, psychologically 
and politically, these identities were activated with important effects. Second, this 
perspective also recognises that the official state bodies responsible for mitigating 
violence failed to do so, although this was not because they were too weak. Third, it 
recognises that, for the different groups and individuals involved, the conflict had 
many roots, meanings and effects -  it is simply not possible to discuss them all here. 
But even recognising these wider dimensions of conflict, based on the empirical 
evidence presented in the following chapters, my account sees these as contributing, 
but insufficient, explanatory factors. The defining feature of the conflict was not a 
clear-cut ethnic or religious divide, or a failing state, but a contest between state- 
based elites over control of state resources.57
57 Such contests took place in other regions o f Eastern Indonesia in non-violent forms: see, for 
example, Buehler (2008a) on South Sulawesi. It would be interesting to compare such differences in a 
further study.
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North Malukan state officials claimed neutrality during the conflict, but based upon 
the empirical analysis presented in the subsequent chapters, it is clear they played 
active roles in determining the course of violence when it was in their direct interest 
to do so. On religious violence during the Indonesian transition, Sidel (2006) argues 
-  as Keen (1998) and Cramer (2006) argue in relation to several sub-Saharan African 
cases -  that violent conflict should be understood in terms of both its destructive and 
productive consequences.58 While some North Malukan state-based elites (and their 
connected communities) suffered enormous losses due to the violence -  in personal, 
social, political or economic terms, or all four at once -  others made substantial 
gains.59
The transition period presented a major opportunity in North Maluku for a range of 
state-based elites and their affiliated groups to attempt to seize, consolidate and 
renegotiate power. As such, it is more fruitful here to analyse the politics of conflict 
during the transition period not as state failure, nor the rise of societal forces, but as 
reflecting increased competition within the state-based elite during a period of major 
structural transition and great political uncertainty. The subsequent chapters argue 
that events during the transition in North Maluku -  from transitional alliances, to 
factional fighting, to mass ‘communal’ violence and ethno-religious cleansing, to 
post-conflict reconstruction -  reflect a highly contested rather than ‘weak’ state.
Mann (2005) considers some of the benefits posed by, and opportunities that arise 
from, conflict for elites during transition periods in his analysis of the Dark Side o f  
Democracy.60 Here, Mann argues that transitional moments provide unique 
opportunities for political leaders and other elites to contest power, in ways 
impossible under an authoritarian regime. He shows the devastating effects such 
power contests, during periods of democratisation, can have on minority groups, or 
those on the thin edge of elite interests without elite protection. In this vein, and 
responding to Mann, Neuberger argues:
The process of democratisation can bring about a ‘thin democracy’ 
which stresses elections and majority rule only, unlike a ‘thick
58See, also, Feldman (1991) on Northern Ireland and Brass (1997, 2003) on India.
59 Chapters Four and Five consider the costs and benefits o f conflict to various groups.
60 See Breuilly et al (2006) for a critique o f Mann’s argument and terminology.
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democracy’ which is also based on human rights, the rule of law, 
limited government, pluralism and a democratic political culture.61
Democratisation in the post-Suharto era in North Maluku brought about the widening 
of opportunities and broadening of competition for state-based elites. In this new era, 
state-based elites not only competed for executive, parliamentary and bureaucratic 
positions, but could also compete openly in the streets, through electoral and extra- 
legal processes, namely violent contest. This ‘thin’ form of democracy enabled a 
situation in which violent conflict became a new forum for political contest within 
the elite, but without the protections for civilians and restrictions on state actors 
inherent in ‘thicker’ democracies.62
Referring back to the economic explanations for ethno-religious violence, outlined in 
Section 1.2 (i), above, certain aspects of it become relevant here, when local analysis 
of the effects of economic crisis and inter-group inequalities are tied to the particular 
political and social patterns of the state in a certain region. The stakes over 
competition for control of the local state in the Maluku region, which played a major 
role in the local economy under the New Order -  as Van Klinken (2001) and Adam 
(2008) have shown -  were greatly raised by the economic tensions and political 
opportunities posed during the transition period. These tensions and opportunities 
were exacerbated by the particular, historically embedded, local patronage systems 
that only enabled access to state positions, employment and other opportunities (e.g. 
business contracts) for certain groups.
Van Klinken’s (2001) analysis of employment patterns in the Maluku region in the 
late 1990s demonstrated that the exclusionary patronage networks behind these 
patterns go far towards explaining underlying local tensions, which then escalated 
during the transition period. He argues that in Ambon:
.. .There were a lot of young men...whose one hope for material security 
in life lay in getting a job in the public service, and who knew that to get 
one they had to have the right connections. To approach the problem of 
communal violence from below, we therefore need to .. .describe the way
61 Neuberger, (2006), p.403.
62 Snyder’s (2000) study o f the links between competitive elections in transitional democracies and 
increased potential for violence contains similar ideas.
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in which valuable goods -  such as employment in the civil service -  are 
exchanged across Maluku’s social landscape.63
Van Klinken’s stress lies on how local employment patterns underlay communal 
tension, but he also shows how these patterns were played upon by political elites. 
While Van Klinken terms his analysis “bringing society back in”, this description is 
misleading. What he actually does is bring analysis of the state, and its role in 
determining societal and economic structures, to bear on the relationship of different 
groups in Maluku and how this relationship generated violence in the region. He 
examines how public sector employment in Maluku was historically allocated 
through patronage networks based on places of residency, religion and social 
hierarchy.64 Von Benda Beckmann’s (1999) micro-level study outlined similar 
patterns. These patronage patterns dated to Dutch colonial times and had been 
perpetuated under subsequent regime periods. In central Maluku, Ambonese 
Protestants were central to Dutch rule, and survived as the main group in public 
service through the 1990s. In Temate, in contrast, the Makian and associated 
southern ethnic groups had risen within local government by the 1990s, undermining 
colonial patterns of state dominance by those associated with the Temate sultanate 
(from northern ethnic groups). In both cases, Van Klinken argues, such patterns 
created the potential for high levels of “volatility at moments of regime change”.65
Building on this analysis, but also going beyond it, it is important to consider in 
some detail how elite members of historically favoured groups -  for example, by the 
colonial regime -  were no longer the sole, or even primary, controllers of local 
government by the end of the New Order.66 Competing minority groups increasingly 
held more prominent state positions. Of particular resonance in North Maluku was 
the intra-state contest between surviving members of the old colonial, or aristocratic, 
state (representing ‘northern’ ethnic groups under the ‘traditional’ authority of the 
Temate Sultan) and other, more modem, state networks, forged under the New Order 
(representing ‘southern’ ethnic groups). As such, it is necessary to explore local 
intra-state competition -  and its ethnic and historical dimensions -  in more detail.
63 Van Klinken (2001), p.10.
64 I return to his analysis o f  the role o f the state sector in the regional economy, and expand upon it, in 
Chapters Two and Four.
65 Van Klinken (2001), p. 10. My analysis o f the North Maluku conflict in Chapter Three returns to 
discuss these patterns and the local elite’s manipulation o f them.
66 Chapter Two returns to examine this point.
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Democratic transition was a major opportunity for these competing groups to re­
negotiate control over the local state, by seizing, attempting to overthrow, or 
consolidating power-bases within the state. Violence in this setting can be seen as 
part of a rational set of actions by state-based elites and their followers to seize or 
consolidate power. Violence was not therefore a failure of the state, but part of a 
process of contest by political elites, whose elite status was rooted in different regime 
periods and different parts of the state, over control of the state.67
The literature on violence during transition in Indonesia (and beyond) highlights the 
dangers posed by democratisation. The opening up of new political and economic 
opportunities during transition gives rise to both legal and extra-legal, frequently 
violent, means of seizing these opportunities. Violent conflict does not therefore 
imply the state is weak, or that a rise in religious and ethnic politics lies at the heart 
of the dispute. It may even demonstrate that the state is strong, in the sense that fierce 
competition for control over it is due to its centrality in local political and economic 
life. It may also demonstrate that ‘religious’ and/or ‘ethnic’ political identities are 
under threat, rather than rising in power, and hence ethno-religious leaders and 
organisations attempt to revive or mobilise the power of these identities when faced 
by the threat of change.68 The evidence presented in the subsequent chapters 
supports such an interpretation.
Overall, however, the literature on violent transition in Indonesia says little about the 
longer term political consequences of the violence or political dynamics during the 
immediate transition years: how some elites survived violent episodes, why others 
were overthrown, and what kind of political system this led to following the end of 
violence. In light of the underlying tensions between groups over access to state 
resources in the lead up to conflict in the Maluku region, as demonstrated by Van 
Klinken (2001), to understand political dynamics after the conflict it is therefore 
important to analyse the role of the state in the local economy and politics after the 
violence had subsided, to see whether this had changed. In the North Maluku case,
67 See Keen (1998) and Cramer (2006) for a variation o f this kind o f analysis on civil war in sub- 
Saharan Africa. Mamdani (1996) uses this kind o f framework in his analysis o f apparently ‘tribal’ 
political conflict in sub-Saharan Africa.
68 Sidel (2006) argues that for particular phases o f religious violence in Indonesia this reflected the 
declining (not rising) power o f certain Islamic groups and ideologies in relation to the state.
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given the state’s historically central role in the regional economy, it is particularly 
important to explore how the processes of state capture of, and discretionary control 
over, central state resources were crucial factors in the survival and success of 
particular factions within the provincial and local state.69
The thesis explores how, while victory in conflict secured the positions of a 
particular faction of the local state-elite, they then needed to maintain and build on 
this power base. Given the socio-economic crisis that deepened following the 
conflict, and the range of government reforms that also followed the transition, it is 
perhaps surprising that the state-based elite managed to maintain their position of 
political power.70 I argue that they did so via a form of ‘machine politics’: by 
maintaining discretionary power over increasingly limited economic resources and 
capturing state budgets for political uses. Following the conflict, the provincial and 
local government managed large discretionary budgets flowing from emergency and 
reconstruction aid, provided largely by the central government, but also by foreign 
donors. Analysing their control of these resources helps to explain the maintenance 
and accumulation of power by certain factions within the state-based elite.
It is necessary to clarify here the kind of ‘machine politics’ at play in North Maluku, 
because of the range of interpretations and applications of the term. Machine politics 
is a form of political competition and voter mobilisation that is particularistic, 
revolving around the use of the state for personal patronage and the exchange of 
money for favours, votes, and so on. It does not necessarily entail a strictly clientelist 
structure, in a classical sense, with clearly identifiable and consistent patron-client 
relations throughout the local political system. However, elements of clientelist 
politics can play a role in this form of politics.71 Whilst certain forms of machine 
politics involve coherent political organisations with clear hierarchies and structures 
enduring over time, ‘machine politics’ in a looser sense -  the sense used here -  can 
be more fluid. The North Maluku political situation, over the decade examined in this
691 use the term ‘state capture’ - rather than ‘corruption’ or ‘misappropriation’ -  throughout the thesis. 
I do so, first, to avoid the normative connotations associated with the other terms. Second, the term 
‘capture’ implies a wide-ranging set o f state controls and influences, with a variety o f positive and 
negative effects. Subsequent chapters explore the range o f  affects ‘state capture’ had on the political 
elite, the wider population, and the regional political economy.
70 Chapters Four and Five examine these dynamics.
71 See Scott (1969, 1972) on political machines and political corruption in Southeast Asia in the 
1960s.
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thesis, was highly fluid in terms of re-negotiated clientelist relations and changing 
forms of political organisation.72 Electoral patterns, with incumbents and candidates 
moving rapidly between different parties in successive elections, indicated the 
fluidity of these relations, and thus did not reflect ‘machine politics’ in the stricter 
sense of single party machines controlling branches of the state and state resources. 
Nevertheless, elements of machine politics played key roles in determining how 
certain factions within the state-based elite were able to maintain and consolidate 
their power base, while others were not.73
Several cases of machine politics, in which state-based bureaucratic elites survived 
political or economic crises in different settings, present useful comparisons for 
examining the role of state economic power in North Maluku. Chubb’s (1982) 
analysis of urban political machines in post-war Southern Italy highlight several 
aspects of post-war economic crisis that enabled state-based elites to maintain power 
via their increased discretionary control of limited state resources. The role of local 
bureaucratic capture of reconstruction, emergency and other forms of state-aid to the 
Italian cities analysed by Chubb resembles state-elite practices identified during 
fieldwork in North Maluku. Chubb also considers the conservative nature of urban 
electorates in the poor Italian regions that underwent economic crisis and explains 
why such electorates sustain ‘corrupt’ state-elites.74 This pattern was also resonant in 
North Maluku, a point Chapter Six returns to.
Erie’s (1988) comparative analysis of machine politics in the US, from the late 
nineteenth to late twentieth century, also highlights several features of machine 
politics applicable to the North Maluku case. The supply of ‘bread’ -  the provision 
by political machines of jobs and economic benefits in the US cases -  was also a 
sustaining feature of the state-based political elite in North Maluku and I return to 
this point in the empirical analysis.
72 Chapters Four, Five and Six explore these dynamics.
73 Machine politics in North Maluku was more a ‘political machine in formation’, rather than a 
cohesive political machine in the Southern Italian or Irish American sense.
74 Chapters Four and Six explore similar dynamics to both these features o f  machine politics in North 
Maluku.
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The political tools used by electoral machines in the US and Italian contexts were of 
course, different from those that enabled the North Malukan state-based elite to 
survive, as the subsequent chapters demonstrate. In particular, a single party did not 
control the state at all levels of government in the North Maluku case throughout the 
ten year period examined in depth. However, using comparative analysis from these 
different cases helps shed light on how state-based elites can thrive on the multiple 
social, economic and political shocks and crises faced during democratic transition, 
when they control the state’s discretionary resources. This perspective helps explain 
how incumbent state-elites, based in the executive offices of the local government, 
held enormous comparative advantages over their rivals during post-conflict 
elections. Following analysis of the pre-conflict local political history of the state- 
based elite (Chapter Two), and the conflict itself (Chapter Three), Chapters Four to 
Six show how state-based elites captured government (and other) resources to 
maintain their dominant position in politics, and were enabled by the central 
government to do so.
1.3 Case study research methodology
Begin with an individual, and before you know it you find that you 
have created a type; begin with a type, and you find that you have 
created -  nothing. That is because we are all queer fish, queerer behind 
our faces and voices than we want anyone to know or than we know 
ourselves.
Fitzgerald.75
This section presents the research methodology used in the thesis. By starting with an 
individual case -  here, a region recovering from supposed ‘ethno-religious’ conflict 
during democratic transition -  I aimed to describe and analyse it in all its 
idiosyncrasies and particularities. Many of these local sights and insights were not 
immediately visible and were, to some extent, unknowable, if relying on a macro­
level perspective or secondary and statistical data alone.76 I first explain why a 
qualitative case study approach was the most appropriate research method given the
75 Fitzgerald (2003), p.3.
76 Using one case study, and analysing the meso level o f  politics, as I do here, the researcher is limited 
in terms o f  drawing the broader patterns o f transitional politics in Indonesia, which macro level or 
statistical studies may allow for. However, an inductive case-study approach to the meso level makes 
it possible to generate hypotheses and explore new areas o f theory, which was one o f  my aims here.
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research topic and issues outlined above. I then consider the main tools used to 
conduct the case study research and the selection of the main field sites. The final 
part summarises the three main research tools used to develop the case study: 
observation, key informant interviews and the collection of documentary sources.
(i) Qualitative case study method 
The central objective of this research project evolved during the field research, as it 
became clear that my initial interest in the (‘re-’) emergence of ‘traditional’ and 
‘ethnic’ leaders during the democratic transition -  and their role in ethno-religious 
conflict -  was but one part of a dynamic local political situation. As the study 
evolved I realised the importance of understanding the nature and composition of 
the local state-based elite more broadly; what was changing and what remained the 
same, rather than just studying the ‘traditional’ (colonial) component. It was 
possible to allow the research focus to evolve in this way because I had selected a 
qualitative case-study research method, which allowed the flexibility of an iterative 
approach.
Yin (2003) argues that to construct a good case study as many sources as possible 
should be used to ensure the researcher can address “a broader range of historical, 
attitudinal and behavioural issues” and to develop the strongest convergent lines of
77enquiry. The findings or conclusions of a case study constructed from multiple 
sources tend to be more convincing when based on several different sources of 
evidence. In order to construct the regional case study of local politics in North 
Maluku during the democratic transition, I covered the reform period -  focusing on 
the conflict and its aftermath -  from as many angles as possible. To do so, I used 
three sources of evidence to “triangulate” on the same research questions: political 
ethnography (observational data), key informant interviews and documentary 
sources (primarily from local newspapers and organisational reports).
Conflict is a sensitive topic in many cultures, and Indonesia is no exception. 
Discussing politics can also be a sensitive issue in Indonesia, even more so in a 
region where severe violence had caused various social, economic and political
77 Yin (2003), p.98.
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problems. To construct a case study of the politics leading up to, and evolving from, 
violent conflict required building a certain level of trust with informants. To do this 
required a relatively open-ended qualitative research methodology that was flexible 
about the availability of information on, and access to, informants, actors and 
events. Social science research on ‘ethnic’ conflict (in the broad sense) has been 
criticised for relying too heavily on national elite and official sources of data, which 
can be problematic because such sources can only provide partial information about 
a story that is rarely an elite-only problem.78 Furthermore, local elites and local 
communities may have different interests and goals than national elites, and the 
official elite picture may be different from the patterns that are unofficially revealed, 
and so forth. Sources from each of these groups will tell a different story about a 
conflict and its aftermath.
Following the example of Barth (1959), I therefore attempted to construct a political 
ethnography of the transition period in North Maluku, starting prior to the conflict, 
running through it and on into the post-conflict period, using informants from as 
wide a range of groups as possible.79 I focused on political dynamics in two towns, 
situated in two different districts in North Maluku, selecting the two most important 
in political, economic and social terms, and lying at the heart of the 1999-2000 
conflict. These were Temate (a predominantly Muslim city, and the new, temporary, 
provincial capital) and Tobelo (a majority Christian town serving also as a 
secondary provincial town). Overall, I focused my research on Temate, where 
political control was more fiercely contested at both the city and provincial level of 
politics. As such, it was where most senior political players, bodies of government, 
political organisations, and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) were based.
To understand the broad political and authority system of an area, Barth argues that 
we need to investigate both the local system and its relationship to the wider one.80 
In this vein, in order to understand the wider system of political change and 
continuity during the transition -  as well as local, regional and national ‘ethno­
religious’ dynamics, the historical role of political elites and the evolution of
78 Varshney (2002a), pp. 19-20.
79 It later became difficult to include as complete a range o f  non-elite and elite informants as I had 
planned, discussed further below.
80 Barth (1959), p. 1.
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political authority in North Maluku - 1 looked at how political elites related to social 
groups across the national, regional and local political systems. Triangulation of 
data across different sources on the same topics also enabled me to build up a 
picture of the conflict and its aftermath, and the role of different authorities in these 
two periods from multiple perspectives. I considered these issues both within and 
across different ethnic and religious communities, and from both within and 
‘outside’ state organisations. The following section provides more detail on why I 
selected the North Maluku case and the main research instruments employed.
(ii) Field site selection 
North Maluku was an ideal field site for several reasons. Before field research 
commenced, I interviewed researchers, civil servants and staff of international 
organisations working in the five major ‘ethno-religious’ conflict areas in Eastern 
Indonesia in order to establish the feasibility of an extended field research visit in 
2005. Maluku province was at this point still too sensitive, with incidents of violence 
ongoing, though it later stabilised. Central Sulawesi was considered feasible for 
shorter visits, although this situation later changed. West and Central Kalimantan 
were both feasible, but as local politics in West Kalimantan was already well 
researched, and I had already conducted research in Central Kalimantan in a previous 
role, I was keen to explore a new area.81
North Maluku was a good research location for several other reasons. First, the North 
Maluku conflict had not attracted extensive involvement of external actors in the 
violence, whether radical Islamic militant jihad  (holy warrior) groups or Christian 
militants from outside the region. The Indonesian military and police forces also 
appeared to have been less intimately involved in the North Maluku conflict than in 
other areas and were thus less likely to have had dramatic effects on the nature of it. 
As a result, the conflict stayed relatively local in scale, was less protracted, and was 
not perceived in as highly political and nationally sensitive terms by the central 
government as the Central Sulawesi and Maluku conflicts. This combination of
81 See Davidson (2003) on the politics o f  conflict in West Kalimantan. I was concerned that my 
previous research in Central Kalimantan -  with the World Bank/Government o f Indonesia -  might 
have hindered my role as an independent academic researcher (see Smith 2005).
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factors meant official research access for an extended period was more readily 
approved than for other conflict regions of Eastern Indonesia at the time.
Second, North Maluku was by far the least researched of the ‘ethno-religious’ 
conflict sites in Eastern Indonesia. It had also received less media and government 
attention. In contrast to the conflict in Central Sulawesi, for example, which had 
been extensively researched by a number of academics, local politics and conflict in 
North Maluku still contained important unanswered questions for the researcher.82 
Van Klinken (2005) highlighted the importance of elite political mobilisation during 
the North Maluku conflict, focusing on the role of a reinvigorated Sultan as a 
challenger to other local political elites. As the previous section outlined, Van 
Klinken’s studies triggered several of my research questions on die role of local 
elites and leaders within and outside the state, during and following the conflict. 
There were several further accounts of the conflict, though not all of them had been 
published at the time of my fieldwork in 2005.83 In the field, I identified several 
locally published accounts of the conflict. As with local newspaper accounts, these 
accounts tended to take a particular side in the conflict, but they also contained 
useful local detail, relevant for re-tracing and triangulating the actions of particular 
political actors. However, understanding posf-conflict political dynamics, or the 
period following the end of violence -  on which little had been written -  required 
extensive primary research, which inspired my selection of North Maluku province.
(iii)Political ethnography approach
A major constraint with the political ethnography approach is the time and 
commitment required to develop personal relationships and establish trust with local 
informants. In the end, within a seven to eight month time frame, I found it 
impossible to cover both rural and urban areas, and to interview and observe 
grassroots and elite level actors, to the same extent. I therefore focused on certain 
political actors and organisations in the two main towns of the province as it became 
clear that these places and people were at the heart of political activity during and
82 On Central Sulawesi, see, Acciaoli (2001); Aragon (2001,2002,2007); Li (2002,2007).
83 Tomagola (2000) focused on the role o f the military and the Temate Sultan in escalating the 
conflict; Duncan (2005a) focused on local motives for and understandings o f the violence; Van 
Klinken (2005, 2007) concentrated on the escalation o f violence and mobilisation strategies during 
conflict; and Wilson (2005, 2008) concentrated on understanding escalation o f conflict from ‘ethnic’ 
to ‘religious’ violence. See Chapter Three for further analysis o f these authors.
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following the conflict.84 Going beyond these towns and a local elite analysis via 
empirical methods was not logistically possible, though I was able to draw on 
secondary sources to gain more community level information.85 I applied 
comparative methods within the province in two ways: -  first, by comparing two 
towns, whose ethnic and religious composition and dynamics were different; and, 
second, by considering political dynamics, actors and institutions across different 
regime periods. The reasons for needing to focus on the elite level of local politics 
were several.
First, as a foreigner and a stranger to the region -  in the wake of recent and traumatic 
waves of ‘ethno-religious’ violence, as well as substantive corruption allegations 
against several senior politicians -  it was essential to get to know personally and 
establish trust with the main political players and their compatriots. To do so 
required time, presence and extensive travel -  both alongside these political elites, 
and in pursuit of them. Travel alongside these actors was necessary not only to be in 
the same physical place, but also to show interest and commitment to their activities. 
Substantial time had to be spent in particular places -  primarily political party 
regional headquarters, city parliament buildings, favoured cafes, the palace grounds, 
and political campaign offices -  in order to be seen, recognised and eventually 
approached or allowed in. I was lucky in that I arrived in North Maluku just as local 
election campaigns were in full swing (in May 2005). This meant not only that local 
politicians, key supporters, and political organisers were present in the regional cities 
and towns of North Maluku, but also that they were concentrated in particular places 
at certain times.
84 By considering an almost ten year time period, from the ‘pre’ to ‘post’ conflict periods, and with an 
interest in the roles and dynamics o f the elite, I ruled out an extensive focus on the community level o f  
politics. O f course, during seven to eight months in North Maluku, I spent substantial time at the 
community level, talking to non-elites and observing and participating in daily life, but this was 
largely in urban areas. Barth’s political ethnography approach would no doubt require more analysis 
o f rural community dynamics.
85 Once I had started studying particular political figures, to have followed others would have 
jeopardised access to those already selected. Further, to extend my research deeper at the community 
level would have entailed further time constraints on accessing elite key informants. Non-elite 
informants were interviewed and observed where possible. As Duncan (2005a) and Wilson (2005, 
2008) considered rural community dynamics in some detail, I draw on these sources in my discussion 
o f local society during the conflict, as well as more classical ethnographies o f the region, for example 
Visser (1989).
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At more normal times of the year -  as I was to discover later in 2005, when the 
election results were concluded -  senior local politicians, bureaucrats and other elites 
remained in regional cities and towns for short periods only, travelling frequently 
around the region or to Jakarta, on business, political and social visits.86 When senior 
politicians returned to their more usual schedules they were as likely found in 
Jakarta, as in the provincial capital of Temate. To observe and interview them 
therefore involved travel between cities and substantial time coordinating these visits 
and interview appointments.87
‘Local’ politics in North Maluku quickly began to appear less than entirely local. The 
time local politicians and business associates spent in other regions -  in particular the 
large regional hub in Makassar, the business city of Manado and the capital Jakarta -  
reflected a regional power network across state and state-affiliated organisations. 
Those who remained solely in Temate were, almost by definition, not members of 
the political elite. The real elite attended meetings, conferences and conducted 
business, in government, at party conferences, at the national parliament sessions, 
with firms, at home, regionally and in the capital. Tracking down the ‘local’ elite 
thus required extensive regional travel, time in the capital, as well as actual ‘local’ 
research.88
(iv) Three main research tools
fiv.D Political ethnography and observation
Political ethnography entails using the methods of an ethnographer: through 
observation and through acquiring detailed knowledge of people.89 Hammersley 
(1990) argues that the nature of ethnographic work requires focusing on 
understanding behaviour within an everyday context, rather than controlling the 
environment within which informants speak, or removing informants from the
86 For example, in attempting to interview an unsuccessful 2001 gubernatorial candidate, Abdul Gafur, 
I was called to his home in Temate, as well as to his parliamentary office in Jakarta at short notice. 
Air travel between the two cities takes between seven hours and two days, depending on flight 
availability. Local politicians and senior officials might make this journey twice a month. It was 
therefore necessary to be flexible in planning formal interviews (and their locations) with such elites.
87 Between May and December 2005, these were some o f my primary research activities.
88 My ESRC research budget and time-frame allowed for some travel between Jakarta, Temate, 
Tobelo and other regional cities, primarily Ambon and Makassar.
89 Crisis States Programme (2001).
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setting in which the research takes place. Primary observation and informal 
conversation were therefore two key research sources. This style of research also 
relies heavily on the interpretation of meaning in order to understand the data.90 As 
such, it was necessary to acquire the appropriate language skills and cultural 
understanding necessary to interpret meaning, and to recognise and understand 
observations.91 Political ethnography in the sense of observing local events as a 
‘participant’, though also always as a researcher, enabled the development of a 
Geertz-style “thick description” understanding of local politics.92 As outlined 
above, substantial time was spent at local events, in favourite haunts, at informants’ 
homes and offices, and travelling with them. Much data was gathered during the 
waiting and travelling periods, and certainly more than during the more formal 
interview process alone.
fiv.iO Key informant interviews
Key informant interviews with elites were useful for several reasons. Firstly, as Yin 
argues, formal interviews with targeted respondents enabled me to focus directly on 
the research questions.93 City and district level political and business elites had 
higher educational levels and wider experience of the Indonesian political system 
than informants at the village and community levels. They were also more likely to 
be informed about both the impacts of conflict at a ‘meso’ level (the city, district or 
regional level) and the process of government in the region. I used ‘semi-structured’ 
interviews with key informants, following “a consistent line of inquiry” whilst also 
allowing a free-flowing stream of questions.94 This approach enhanced my chances 
of acquiring information from the respondents’ perspective, rather than my own; but 
it was also an appropriate method for interviewing elites in Indonesia, with whom a 
certain amount of deference and formality is necessary.95 Elite interviewing also
90 Hammersley (1990).
91 The first stage o f fieldwork involved intensive Indonesian language study in Yogyakarta, following 
preparatory courses in London and Indonesia. I also worked with a local research assistant when 
interviewing some informants.
92 Geertz (2000).
93 Yin (2003), p.86.
94 As recommended by Yin (2003), p.89.
95 While conducting elite level interviews it was necessary to allow the informant to direct the line o f  
enquiry before inserting directed questions into the interview. This was particularly the case for 
interviews with senior government officials, community leaders and religious figures. As such, an 
open interview structure made more sense than a formalised interview procedure with these particular 
informants.
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allowed me to gain access to varied business and political networks and enabled 
introductions to further informants in a ‘snow-balling’ process.
However, as Yin highlights, there are several dangers with relying on key informant 
interviews alone.96 First, initial interviews ran the risk of bias on behalf of both the 
interviewee and interviewer. These interviews were not always useful beyond acting 
as a formal introduction, as trust was not yet established. Where possible, repeated 
interviews, especially when conducted in different settings, helped reduce this 
problem. Second, the more interviews I conducted, the more inaccuracies or 
contradictions became evident. In fact, the more times I asked a particular question 
the more confusing the response often became.97 Cross-referencing and 
triangulating interviews and research sources (for example, contrasting respondents’ 
reports of their actions or views with reports from local newspapers and other local 
observers on their actions or views) helped to clarify these problems, but they were 
not always resolved, as is noted at appropriate points in the text. Third, interviewees 
sometimes responded with the answers they wished me to hear. On the controversial 
topics of particular actors’ roles in corruption and violence this problem was to be 
expected. Cross-referencing sources (across interview and documentary sources) 
was essential to build up as broad and accurate a picture of political events and the 
key actors involved as possible. However, I am not sure that the second and third 
problems could ever have been completely resolved within an eight month field 
research time frame, in such a region -  if  at all.98
96 Yin (2003), p.86.
97 For this reason, I am hesitant about studies where interviews are conducted only once and within 
very short time spans on issues such as conflict, corruption and political campaigns.
98 For example, one key informant (with whom I spent substantial periods o f  time) repeatedly denied a 
direct relationship to the key players in the conflict or direct knowledge o f  conflict events. Only in a 
final meeting -  having known this informant for eight months -  was it revealed that a close family 
member was one o f the main leaders o f  the Islamic jih a d  involved in the later phases o f the conflict 
(this was confirmed by other sources). There were many possible reasons for this:- embarrassment at 
family involvement; family loyalty; that family involvement contradicted the informant’s main 
argument that ‘outside provocateurs’ (not North Malukans) were largely responsible for leading the 
violence; and/or simply that it had taken eight months to gain sufficient trust for this piece o f  
information to be revealed. Perhaps the fact that I was leaving meant the informant was able to reveal 
what he knew without fear that I would pursue the issue (or those involved) further. For this reason, 
the final two weeks o f field research were some o f the most productive in discussing the most 
sensitive research themes: violence and corruption.
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(rv.iiri Documentary sources
Reviewing written documents and archival sources formed an essential -  though 
frustrating and incomplete -  part of field research. Written materials enabled (some) 
analysis of local and national government policy and statistics on the North Maluku 
region over time -  from the pre-conflict period, through the conflict, to the period 
following the end of violence -  without recall problems, which can restrict 
information available from interviews. Yin (2003) argues that archival resources are 
especially useful for case study construction as they are stable (can be reviewed 
repeatedly) as well as broad (covering longer time spans) and exact (precise details 
of a certain policy or event).99 Yin, however, is describing an ‘ideal type’ of 
archive, unavailable in a region like North Maluku, which was poorly administered 
for decades, then devastated by regional conflict, and had new local government 
administrations established for only one year as of 2005.100 As such, both 
parliamentary and executive reports were limited and difficult to access. As a newly 
established province, government records prior to 1999 were also unavailable 
locally -  it was necessary to travel to Ambon (the former regional capital) to locate 
them, which involved establishing new government acquaintances.101 As a result of 
this, NGOs were sometimes better sources of legal, government policy and 
statistical documents than the government bodies themselves. However, their 
archives were also inconsistent, and their own reports were often interpretations, 
rather than original copies of, local government policies.
99 Yin (2003), p.86.
100 Researching the early modem and late colonial period through archival sources would be 
(relatively) simpler, thanks to the careful documentary work o f  colonial-era and post-colonial 
historians on the former Spice Islands, for example Andaya (1993). Researching documents produced 
over the previous twenty years is more challenging, both in terms o f identifying written records and 
actually accessing them. This is in part due to the limited nature o f this material but also storage 
problems. Several local parliamentarians complained about the problems o f documenting and 
archiving local government policies and programmes due to a lack o f  experienced local personnel. 
One o f the problems o f a rapidly decentralising state was that local administrators did not have the 
training to record and store local government policy documents. For example, to access provincial 
reports, it was necessary to establish close personal relations with local parliamentarians who then 
enabled access via their personal copies.
101 Even in Ambon, a more established regional government, accessing government archives for the 
previous ten years was challenging. Many non-governmental and religious organisations maintained 
their own small libraries and archives, which were usually more accessible than government records. 
However, the main university library in Ambon (the largest in the Maluku region) had been burned 
down (twice) during the conflict, destroying many local archives. The Catholic Church library was 
protected during the conflict and remained the best archival resource in Maluku in 2005.
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In summary, I used four main sources of documentary evidence. Firstly, 
government reports, where available, covering political, economic and social topics. 
These included provincial, city and district parliament reports, executive body 
reports from the provincial and local government levels, statistical reports, electoral 
reports from regional Elections Commissions, as well as national government 
reports on North Maluku (accessed from BAPPENAS, the National Development 
Planning Board). Secondly, local NGO reports -  in particular from Temate and 
Tobelo organisations. These included reports on the conflict, statements to the local 
press, reports to their international donors and local newsletters. Thirdly, reports 
from international agencies with field offices in North Maluku during or following 
the conflict period. These included reports on specific themes -  economic 
reconstruction, peace-building and so on -  and also general progress reports on 
donor activities in the region.102 Finally, two local newspapers, the Malut Pos and 
the Temate Pos. Archives of these local newspapers were accessible via the editors’ 
private collections.
Local newspaper articles were useful records of local views during the conflict, as 
reflected at the time. These views were not repeated or reported in as strong terms by 
key informants during interviews, taking place five years after the conflict, so the 
newspapers offered valuable insights to perspectives on and events of the recent past. 
Coverage of local corruption of post-conflict aid and reconstruction funds was also 
wide. These articles ranged back to 2000, when aid funds had originally started to 
flow to the region. As such, local newspaper reports on the topics of conflict and 
corruption were useful sources. However, one must also be cautious with these 
reports as they were published in poorly-funded local newspapers, and the local 
journalists had limited investigative training. Articles were often hard to penetrate 
and the research involved was sometimes suspect or biased. Nevertheless, they 
provided a particular insight to local politics over the past ten years, which was 
unavailable from any other source.
102 UNDP was the main source o f  officially published reports on the North Maluku region. 
International NGOs, including the International Consortium for Refugees and Displaced Persons 
(CARDI), Save the Children Fund-UK (SCF-UK) and World Vision International (WVI), also 
provided internal data, but which I am unable to cite here.
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I did not use national or international media sources on the North Maluku conflict in 
any detail as they were limited and biased in their coverage (later coverage on 
elections was better). Duncan (2005a) writes that “despite the pivotal nature of the 
violence, the North Maluku conflict has received far less attention than the conflict in 
Ambon.” 103 In part, this was due to the less developed media in North Maluku than 
in Ambon at the time of the conflict. Temate and Tidore were still only district 
capitals, and the other major sites of violence -  Tobelo, Galela and Malifut -  were 
parts of smaller sub-districts. As such, local newspapers provided only patchy and 
generally biased coverage. Most national journalists also produced biased coverage, 
usually researched via secondary sources, not on-site interviews and observations.104 
Local newspapers, despite their problems, proved better sources on local themes.
The overall method described here enabled the reconstruction of local political 
dynamics over an approximately ten year period (1998-2008). Interviewing and 
collecting local documentary sources enabled reconstruction of the recent past, and 
observation enabled insights into the political present. Using both methods meant it 
was eventually possible to understand how local elites had survived the multiple 
crises affecting the region, and how and why they campaigned successfully in 
subsequent local elections. From the triangulation of sources, I could follow their 
tactics from multiple angles -  their own, supporters, detractors, enemies, contractors, 
business partners, families, communities, etc. From these different perspectives it 
was then possible to identify and distil overall patterns. I aim to show in the 
proceeding chapters how this kind of political society had evolved, and how, through 
a series of deep crises and major reforms, certain political elites survived through and 
thrived on the economic, social and political turbulence, contrary to expectations.
1.4 Overview of chapters
The final section of this introductory chapter provides a roadmap to the thesis. 
Chapters Two and Three cover the colonial and post-independence history of North 
Maluku, moving through to the transition and conflict period up to 2000. Chapter
103 Duncan (2005a), p.54.
104 Duncan (2005a), pp.54-55.
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Two presents a political history of North Maluku, from circa 1450 (the arrival of 
Islam in the region), through the early modem and colonial era, towards the end of 
the Dutch and early republican periods. It then focuses on the establishment and 
expansion of the New Order regime between 1966 and its official end in 1998. This 
chapter draws on the major historical and political works on the region, and 
Indonesian politics more broadly, but also uses some interview sources. Chapter 
Three picks up on the late New Order period, giving a more detailed political history 
of the build up to and process of transition and conflict in the region between 1998 
and 2000. This chapter focuses on the role of local political elite in the conflict, and 
the impact the conflict had on them, in political terms and draws largely on empirical 
research, with reference to the major scholars and debates on the contemporary North 
Maluku conflict.
Chapter Four first outlines the regional socio-economic crisis left behind in the wake 
of conflict, including economic crisis, social disruption and population displacement. 
This context sets the scene for the arrival of post-conflict emergency and 
reconstruction aid from the central government, the policies behind it, and its 
political and economic impacts on the region. The central focus of this discussion is 
the capture of government aid by the local state elite and how this shored up their 
political position. Chapter Five then discusses the use, impact and policy behind 
foreign sources of post-conflict reconstruction aid, channelled largely via the UNDP 
Recovery Programme for North Maluku, which was run in conjunction with the 
provincial government. The local politics and capture of these aid funds are 
examined in both chapters, based on data gathered from observational and interview 
sources, triangulated with documentary evidence from local newspapers, government 
and non-governmental reports. The capture of these aid funds by officials in the 
executive and parliamentary bodies of local government -  at both the provincial and 
local levels -  is analysed and compared in the context of central government 
emergency legislation and local government reform. These two chapters set the scene 
for the survival of incumbents, and particular factions within the state, in local and 
provincial elections between 2001 and 2008, which is examined in Chapter Six.
The dynamics of local elections turned out to be heavily influenced by incumbents’ 
access to and control over the aid resources described in Chapters Four and Five. The
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concept of machine politics becomes particularly useful here, both in unravelling the 
results of the 2005 Temate city and 2007 gubernatorial elections, and the role that 
government funds played in electoral dynamics and the survival of certain factions 
within the state-based elite. Electoral results support some of the central arguments 
of the thesis -  that unfettered access to post-conflict aid funds and control of the state 
political machine enabled the success of certain state-based elites in local elections. 
Chapter Seven concludes the thesis, summarising the key findings of each chapter, 
the over-arching argument, and highlighting several of the wider implications that 
may be drawn from the thesis.
Overall then, the following chapters present a description and analysis of the survival 
of certain factions within the local New Order state-based elite through successive 
opportunities and crises arising from the transition period, which they used to 
consolidate local political power. The first opportunity came via national level 
political transition, including the opening up of administrative and local government 
reform, and the subsequent triggering of -  and space for -  ‘ethno-religious’ conflict. 
Each set of local state elites played a key role in, and used, the democratisation 
moment and subsequent conflict to their political advantage. However, all factions 
could not ultimately win power, and some were eliminated, thus reconfiguring the 
local state-based elite. The dramatic socio-economic collapse that followed the 
conflict and subsequent capture of government and donor reconstruction aid formed 
the second opportunity, also successfully controlled by a certain faction of state- 
based elites. Finally, local electoral reform and the capturing of competitive elections 
by the same set of state-based elites led to their cementing of formal power over the 
region.
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Chapter Two - 
The origins of the local political elite: 
a brief political history of North Maluku (c.1450 -1998)
Introduction
The central narrative of this thesis explores continuity and reconfiguration within the 
state-based political elite in North Maluku, starting from the end of the Suharto era 
and running through the first decade of the new democratic regime. In her study of 
the bureaucratic elite in Java, Sutherland (1979) demonstrates several continuities in 
forms of political order and authority between the colonial and post-independence 
periods. Similarly, in North Maluku, strong patterns of continuity run between the 
political elite in power in the new democratic era and the New Order past. This 
chapter shows how local politics in North Maluku at the end of the twentieth and 
early twenty-first centuries -  and in particular factional divides within the local 
political elite -  were rooted in the political legacies of the Dutch colonial and more 
recent New Order regimes.
The core of the thesis, grounded in empirical field research, discusses the major local 
political events between 1998 and 2008. These include the establishment of the new 
province of North Maluku in 1999 and the subsequent year-long phase of violent 
conflict (Chapter Three), the protracted socio-economic crisis and arrival of state and 
foreign aid that followed (Chapters Four and Five), and the contest for power 
between different factions of the state-based elite throughout the decade in elections 
(Chapter Six). To set the events discussed in the subsequent chapters in their 
historical context, and to demonstrate that intra-elite factional divides in local politics 
were not something new, but were instead rooted in the influences of different 
regimes, this chapter outlines the political history of the different branches of the 
local political elite.
In relating the political history of the North Maluku political elite to post-1998 
political dynamics, a key theme emerges -  the importance of external sources of 
regime, or state, authority and legitimacy for the maintenance of local leadership.
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External authority played a role in establishing both the Temate Sultan (during the 
early modem period) and subsequent state-based elites (during the post­
independence period) as the dominant players in local politics in their times. The 
contests between the various European powers and the eventual establishment of 
Dutch colonial rule deeply affected the role and authority of the North Malukan 
sultans, ultimately providing the Temate Sultan with the role of regional leader in the 
colonial period. Understanding how Dutch colonial rule influenced the Temate 
Sultan’s authority -  in particular how it embedded the Sultan within the Dutch 
colonial state -  helps to illuminate some of the later problems he faced in the late 
twentieth and early twenty-first century, as he attempted to ‘re-claim’ and re­
negotiate local political power against other (newer) forms of state-based elites.
The nature of external state authority and legitimacy, and the Sultan’s relationship to 
the state, was transformed by the New Order government, which produced a new 
political elite, based in the expansion of the modem bureaucratic state to the Outer 
Islands.105 The parallel decline in the political authority of the Temate Sultan -  a 
process which had started under late colonialism, but was exacerbated in the post­
independence period -  as the new ‘modem’ state elite rose in influence, was matched 
by the revival of Temate town as a new regional centre under the New Order. 
Temate’s revival was also related to the New Order’s gradual expansion of a 
modernised, centralised state system and corresponding economic development 
policies on the geographic periphery. These dual processes produced a local 
bureaucratic elite rooted not in the old colonial order and its ‘traditional’ sources of 
authority, but in authority emanating from the economic and political power of the 
modem state. Intra-elite factional divides in the late and post-Suharto eras were thus 
embedded in competition between different branches of the local elite, who sprang 
from different parts of the state, forged during different regime periods. As such, as 
far as is possible, analysis of local politics in North Maluku is related here to changes 
in national state dynamics and their effects at the local level.106
105 This process took place earlier in other parts o f Indonesia. Under late Dutch colonial rule, during 
the 1920s and 1930s, an indigenous elite emerged in Java, tied to modem state developments, such as 
mass education and literacy, and in opposition to colonial and/or aristocratic forms o f power. See 
Anderson (1983); Taylor (2003), pp.279-281; Vickers (2005).
106 Here I follow Chubb (1982). She argues, “One o f  the shortcomings o f much research on local 
politics has been the assumption that either specific social groups or the local community as a whole
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The chapter is structured in four parts. The first considers the main legacies of 
colonial rule and the early republican periods for the political elite in power at the 
end of the New Order. It sketches North Maluku’s political history over 450 years, 
from the arrival of European traders in 1511 to the establishment of the New Order in 
1966. The main focus here is on, first, the impacts of colonial competition and the 
rise of the North Malukan sultans under the early period of colonial rule; and, 
second, how the North Maluku sultans then declined in importance during middle 
and later colonial rule, and the Temate Sultan was gradually incorporated into the 
centre during the early republic.
The second section looks at the establishment of the New Order between 1966 and 
the late 1980s, covering five inter-related issues: the expansion of the central state; 
the national and local rise of the Golkar political organisation; the creation of a new 
local political elite; the incorporation of the Temate Sultan into central branches of 
the state and withdrawal from local politics; and the developmental aspects of the 
New Order state and its effects on the regional economy.
The third section considers the changing dynamics of the late New Order period, 
from 1990 to 1998, linking national and local political dynamics, and covering three 
key issues relevant to the official transition to democracy. These were: the 
beginnings of the attempted ‘return’ of the Temate Sultan (starting in the mid- 
1990s); the rise of the ‘southern’ ethnic faction in local politics, tied to the rise of 
modernist Muslim organisations within Golkar; and, the rising power of the southern 
Makian ethnic group in local government. The fourth section concludes by 
summarising the main political legacies of these different regime periods for the 
local elite emerging at the end of the New Order.
2.1 Colonial rule and the early republic (c.1450-1965)
It is one of the ironies of history that the Moluccas -  for the 
possession of which four European nations contended, at the cost of 
much blood and treasure -  have now faded into insignificance.
can be studied in isolation....[but] it is impossible to understand either the local economy or local 
politics outside the broader context o f national politics and policy.” (p.9)
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Holland gained the glittering prize, only to find it turned into dust and 
ashes in her hands.
Foster (1967) . 107
Between the early sixteenth and the late eighteenth centuries, contests to control the 
spices produced on the tiny islands of Temate and Tidore and their affiliated regions 
drove four major European colonial powers -  Portugal, Spain, Holland and Britain -  
into successive wars. The European taste for expensive spices -  particularly cloves, 
nutmeg and mace, which at that time grew only in the Maluku islands -  and the 
colonial race to dominate not only trade in, but production of, these spices, had 
enormous economic, cultural and political impacts on North Maluku. In particular, 
the political legacies of colonialism continued to resonate in early twenty-first 
century politics -  450 years after the first arrival of European colonialists.
By the early twentieth century Maluku was no longer a major concern o f the 
European powers. The Dutch had ruined the economy of the northern parts o f the 
Maluku islands by forcibly destroying indigenous crops and concentrating clove 
production and trade in Ambon, further south, thereby marginalising the North 
Malukan sultans. General Macarthur briefly occupied Morotai Island, in the most 
north-easterly reaches of the Maluku archipelago, and the Japanese part of 
Halmahera (the largest island in the region) during the Pacific war. Aside from this 
dramatic interlude on the world stage, following the demise of the North Malukan 
spice trade in the seventeenth century, no external force had as significant an impact 
on the north Malukan islands as the Dutch authorities in the early colonial period, 
until the establishment of Suharto’s New Order regime in the late 1960s. This first 
section briefly presents North Maluku’s pre-New Order political history, focusing on 
the main legacies relevant to late twentieth century political dynamics and the 
political elite dating from the colonial and early Republican periods.
107 Foster (1967, p.xi). The decline o f the northern parts o f  Maluku under Dutch rule was hardly 
incidental, as the chapter shows.
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(i) Colonial competition and the rise of the sultans
Evil and strife are endemic to Maluku, for the clove though a creation of 
God, is actually an apple of discord and responsible for more afflictions 
than gold.
Barros and Castanheda (c. 1551).108
Before the fourteenth century, the eastern reaches of island Southeast Asia fell 
outside the main international trade routes and were not regularly visited by foreign 
traders from Asia or Europe; the cloves, nutmeg and mace from the Spice Islands 
were traded by local merchants who tapped into regional trade networks. Until the 
late fifteenth century Muslim traders in Asia dominated the spice trade overland from 
Melaka (a Malay Muslim kingdom) via Cambay (through Gujurati Muslim traders) 
to Egypt (through the Muslim Mamluks) and onwards into Europe. It was via the 
Muslim trading routes that Islam first reached the north Malukan islands, with the 
conversion of the North Malukan kings to Islam during the mid-fifteenth century.109 
The rise of the North Malukan sultans into superior local political roles began with 
their Islamic conversion. Andaya (1993) shows how the arrival of Islam in the 
northern Malukan islands significantly altered ‘traditional’ concepts of power, with 
an external source of authority (and therefore power) coming into primacy.110 This 
process undermined the role of local lords and more indigenous concepts of power 
and began the consolidation process of hierarchical rule around the sultanates, which 
was later strengthened by the European colonialists.111 Local politics evolved in 
response and relation to external regimes from the arrival of Islam in the mid- 
fifteenth century onwards.
Christian Europe eventually sought to end dependence on its religious enemies for 
spices, by finding a more direct and cheaper source via a sea route to Asia, with
108 Barros and Castanheda were official chroniclers o f the Portuguese court in the mid sixteenth 
century. Along with Couto, these three provided the earliest systematic accounts o f the spice- 
producing Malukan islands. See Andaya (1993), pp. 10-14.
09 Amal (2002, pp. 122-131) concludes that the Islamic conversion o f the North Malukan sultans took 
place around the 1430s. Andaya (1993, p.57) dates the conversion o f the Temate sultan in the last 
quarter o f  the fifteenth century. Taylor (2003, p.66) estimates it at c.1460.
110 Gibson (2005) discusses the theme o f external authority and its impact on local elites with 
reference to Makassar, in South Sulawesi, arguing that local concepts o f  authority were successively 
influenced by external authorities, from the Indie period onwards.
111 Andaya (1993), p.241.
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Portugal leading the way.112 The Portuguese arrived in Maluku in late 1511, marking 
the beginning of a 450 year history of occupation and bargaining between European
1 1 «j
powers and Malukans. European colonisation had four significant legacies for 
contemporary political dynamics that continued to resonate in local politics at the 
end of the twentieth century.
First, colonialism centralised and concentrated local political power in the 
‘traditional’ sultanates. Second, the process of inter-colonial competition -  and 
eventual alignment with the ascendant Dutch -  secured the dominance of the Temate 
Sultan above the other three sultanates (with the gradual erosion of two of them). 
These two legacies were never forgotten by the Temate Sultan’s family, and the 
memory of this period of political prowess was called upon during the 
democratisation process at the turn of the twenty-first century. Third, the sultans 
increasingly relied on an external mandate and the financial and political support of 
external sources of power in order to maintain their own local authority. Fourth, the 
contests between the colonial powers over Temate and Tidore ensured the creation 
and maintenance of a north-south political and cultural divide in North Maluku. The 
third and fourth colonial legacies were also still resonant in late twentieth to early 
twenty-first century local politics, as subsequent chapters demonstrate.
The broader experience of the North Maluku region was, of course, unexceptional in 
the almost complete restructuring of the concepts and organisation of local political 
authority under colonial contest and rule.114 Pemberton (1994) and Sutherland (1979) 
document the dramatic impact of Dutch rule on Java, from the early years of 
intervention by the VOC (Dutch East India Company), to the subsequent 
establishment of a formal colonial government after 1800 (with a brief interruption 
of British rule between 1811-1816), until the arrival of the Japanese and collapse of 
the Dutch East Indies empire after 1942.115 According to Sutherland, even some of
112 Andaya (1993), pp.2-5.
113 Andaya (1993) provides the best history o f this period. Amal’s (2002, 2003) history is also useful. 
See also Ricklefs (2001, pp.73-83) on the colonial struggle for hegemony in Eastern Indonesia more 
generally (c. 1630-1800).
1,4 This process was started under the pre-colonial influence o f Islamic culture and conversions, but 
the focus here is on the colonial impact.
115 On examining Javanese archives in Solo, Pemberton (1994, p.20) writes, “...it was here...that I first 
began to get a real sense o f  the extraordinary impact o f  Dutch rule in Central Java...Traces o f Dutch 
colonial power were, inescapably, everywhere...”.
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the most prominent twentieth century scholars of Indonesian political culture, 
including Anderson, underestimated the extent to which the ‘ideal type’ of Javanese 
state and ‘traditional’ concepts of power embodied in the native bureaucratic elite 
(themselves a largely colonial construction) were not a pre-colonial but colonial 
formation.116 Outside the Dutch East Indies, similar colonial processes impacted 
local concepts and structures of authority.
Mamdani (1996) discusses similar processes in sub-Saharan Africa, focusing on how 
the mechanisms of late colonial rule enabled the construction of ‘traditional’ rulers, 
ethnic and racial elites, which were later viewed as indigenous />re-colonial 
categories. Meeker (2002) similarly shows how the Turkish ‘aghas’ -  an apparently 
socially embedded, not political or state-based, elite -  were not ‘traditional’ at all, 
but had emerged out of the Ottoman Empire’s Tanzimat state reforms of the 
nineteenth century. The politicisation, strengthening and centralisation of power in 
the North Malukan sultanates during the early centuries of colonial competition and 
conquest -  and the invention of their ‘traditional’ rule -  thus fits into a broader global
117pattern of colonial impact.
Dutch rule in Java (at the colonial centre) was generally more concentrated and 
organised than in the Outer Islands, which were more loosely ruled via the local 
aristocracy. It was not until the early twentieth century that a more systematic form 
of bureaucratic control was imposed -  for example, in South Sulawesi -  but Maluku 
was different.118 The monopoly over Malukan spices was such a central part of the 
Dutch project in the East Indies that the region was always, as Ellen (1983) notes, a 
“centre on the periphery”. As such, Dutch rule had a lasting impact on the region.
In the pre-colonial period, Andaya (1993) argues that the North Malukan sultanates 
held diffuse positions in local society, and their power was balanced by other local 
leaders and centres of authority. The sultans were only one group of many figures 
and bodies of ‘traditional’ authority, and not necessarily the most powerful or richest. 
Andaya shows how the mutual exchange between the European powers and the
116 Sutherland (1979), p. 160, on Anderson (1966), pp. 95-101.
117 See Hobsbawm and Ranger (1983) on the ‘invention’ o f tradition.
118 See Amal (1992), p.13, on South Sulawesi.
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sultanates helped centralise and strengthen the powers of the Tidore and Temate 
sultanates during die early colonial period, first via strategic trading deals and later 
through establishing close relations with the formal Dutch administration after 1800 
(when the VOC period ended). Economic and political power over the local 
population was thereby centralised hierarchically in the sultanates, rather than 
mediated via other leaders and trading relationships, as it had been previously.119 
This process was in the sultans’ interests, as it raised their position over alternative 
leaders and provided guaranteed incomes from the Dutch administrators. It was also 
the only lens through which the Europeans understood local power systems. The 
decentralised, less hierarchical leadership patterns indigenous to the region were 
incomprehensible to and incompatible with the interests of the Europeans. They 
preferred dealing with a central authority figure -  akin to their own monarchical 
systems -  mling over a dependent population via a hierarchy of leaders. This was 
precisely the system established through interaction between European powers and 
the sultanates.
The colonial process of centralising power in the sultanates from the sixteenth 
century onwards thereby embedded the sultanates in an external source of authority. 
The colonialists required the acquiescence of the sultans to maintain control of the 
spice trade and the sultans required the colonialists to legitimise and maintain this 
newly centralised local power structure. The process of external legitimation of local 
rulers started by the Islamisation of the Malukan ‘kings’ in the fifteenth century was 
reinforced by the European concept of kingship. The Europeans’ regulation of local 
society via a hierarchical political system, headed by the sultans, aided their primary 
goal of control and regulation of the spice trade. The legitimation of local political 
authority by external sources was reinforced under the Republic of Indonesia from 
1949. In all three periods local power holders relied on an external source of 
authority to maintain their power and legitimacy. This process continued in the 
contemporary period, where local elites drew their political power from the external 
authority and resources of the central state (see Chapters Four and Six).
119 In interviews, M. Adnam Amal, the North Malukan historian, discussed the ‘dualist’ system of rule 
that operated under the Dutch in North Maluku (Interviews, Temate, May and September 2005). The 
Sultanate and Dutch governance systems operated in parallel, although ‘instructions’ came from the 
resident Dutch administrators. This Dutch residency system was supported by the Temate Sultanate 
right up to the Republic (with a brief interlude under Japanese occupation).
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Late-sixteenth century contests between the Portuguese, Spanish and Dutch also had 
lasting impacts on the cultural and political dynamics of the region. The Portuguese 
were expelled by the Temate Sultan in the late sixteenth century, after which the 
Spanish invaded in 1606. The Temateans appealed to the Dutch, who took control of 
the northern and eastern half of Temate island. The Spanish retained the southern 
half of Temate, as well as Tidore island, as the Tidore Sultan remained a Spanish 
ally. The important cultural and political divide across Temate, still clearly 
identifiable in the early twenty-first century, has its roots in these colonial wars of the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. These wars reinforced local differences as 
partners and alliances were sought, and divides enforced, in order to control as much 
of the spice trade as possible. Even after the Spanish left in 1663, the northern half of 
Temate was treated as a ‘self-ruled entity’ of the Temate Sultan by the Dutch, while 
the southern half, along with Tidore, was mled directly.120 Immigrant traders mostly 
settled in the south of the city, including Europeans, Arabs, Chinese and 
Makassarese.121
The Tidore sultanate gradually fell into obsolescence after backing the Spanish 
against the ascendant Dutch in the seventeenth century. However, the decline of the 
Tidore sultanate did not end regional cultural and political divides. Three centuries 
later, the 1998 restoration of the Tidore sultanate still carried symbolic meaning for 
the local ‘southern’ population.122 In the nineteenth century the boundary between 
the Temate Sultan’s region of influence (in the northern part of Temate island and 
the north and western reaches of Halmahera), and the region to the east and south 
(including the southern part of Temate, Tidore and the southern half of Halamahera, 
nominally under the Tidore sultanate) was administratively formalised by dividing 
Halmahera into northern and southern halves.123 When Central Halmahera district 
was created in 1990 it was carved out of North Maluku district, again along 
North/South boundaries. Although the southern region fell outside the Temate 
Sultan’s direct zone of influence, it was periodically mled indirectly by the Temate
120 Van Klinken (2007), p .l 14. The shift o f  authority from control over people to control over territory 
was an important one enabled by Dutch colonial rule.
121 Hanna and Alwi (1990), pp.238-239. Linguistic differences dating from this period remained in 
2005, with communities in the north still speaking the Temate language, while those in the south 
spoke their own ethnic languages.
122 Hanna and Alwi (1990), p.135; Van Klinken (2007), p .l 15. See Chapter Three on the ’restoration’ 
o f the Tidore sultanate during the 1999 to 2000 conflict.
123 Van Klinken (2007) p .l 14.
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Sultanate.124 These historical links and partitions between North Malukan 
communities, and the Temate Sultan’s perceived loyalty to particular communities, 
were still present in the late twentieth century.125 These colonial-era communal splits 
were then mobilised by elites and fiercely contested during the conflict of 1999- 
2000, as Chapter Three demonstrates.
A brief note on the colonial economy is also helpful here because of the continuation 
of certain forms of colonial economic policy in later periods. First, the Dutch 
systematically monopolised the spice trade, culminating in the 1652 treaty between 
the Temate Sultan Mandar Syah and the VOC, prohibiting the production of cloves 
anywhere except Ambon and other districts strictly controlled by the Dutch. Ruthless 
enforcement of the treaty largely destroyed indigenous spice production in the 
northern islands, though small scale production survived.126 This was devastating to 
the local economy and significantly undermined the regional position of the North 
Maluku sultans, who became of little interest to the Dutch, as well as losing their 
main source of income.127 From this point onwards, the North Malukan elite were 
dependent on external rulers without leverage on their part, with the riches of their 
islands destroyed by their colonial masters. It was not until the establishment of the 
New Order, and its extensive rural development policies in the poorest regions of 
Indonesia (which even reached some of the most remote parts o f north Maluku), that 
an external regime made any attempt to develop the region beyond a subsistence- 
level economy.128
(ii) Late colonialism to the early republic 
Four key trends emerged during the late colonial to early republican periods relevant 
to late twentieth and early twenty-first century North Malukan politics. First, late
124 Van Klinken (2007), p .l 14. For example, Makian people from Makian island were formerly under 
the Sultan o f Bacan’s sphere o f influence, but this sultanate eventually fell under the Temate Sultan’s 
authority. In the contemporary period Makians question this historical affiliation with the Temate 
sultanate. Interview, Abdul Kahar Limatahu, retired judge, 2 June 2005, Temate.
125 Later, I use the terms ‘northern’ and ‘southern’ as short-hand for ethnic groups from north Temate 
and North and West Halmahera (the ‘north’) and those from south Temate, Tidore, Central Halmahera 
and related islands (the ‘south’). They are not generally described locally as such, but by their specific 
ethnic names.
126 Ricklefs (2001), p.75.
127 Hanna and Alwi (1990), pp. 156-158.
128 Section 2.2 returns to this point. See Booth (1992), pp.37-38 and Booth (2003), pp.189-192, on the 
impacts o f the New Order’s extensive rural development policies, largely via the INPRES schemes, in 
Eastern Indonesia.
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colonial rule saw the continued development of Ambon and marginalisation of the 
north of the Maluku region to a regional hinterland. Second, the Temate Sultan lost 
further local authority, with his gradual incorporation into central state organisations. 
Third, while north Maluku was not directly involved in the regional rebellions of the 
1950s, it was geographically close to Ambon and North Sulawesi, and thus was 
perceived as a political risk for the Republic and denied independent provincial 
status. Fourth, religious, nationalist and aristocratic political parties, as elsewhere in 
Indonesia, were popular in the 1950s following independence; however, by 1957, 
and the beginning of Sukarno’s ‘Guided Democracy’ period, the relative freedom of 
political parties was crushed and channelled into a ‘one-party’ system. This policy 
was subsequently expanded by the New Order government over the following 
decades.
Under late colonialism, Ambon continued to expand its regional political and 
economic position. This was largely due to Dutch concentration of the clove industry 
and therefore capital and administration in Ambon from the late seventeenth century 
onwards. However, the concentration of economic power and political authority in 
Ambon was not the only factor leading to its rise as a regional power;.it also 
benefited from special roles and preferences given to the largely Protestant 
Ambonese by the Dutch authorities, especially via Ambonese incorporation into the 
KNIL (Royal Dutch Army) and the educational and bureaucratic promotion of 
Protestant Ambonese in the local administration.129 Following the destruction of the 
indigenous clove industry neither the North Maluku sultans, nor remaining natural 
resources, served the strategic or economic interests of the Dutch: the north Malukan 
region declined into peripheral status.
During the early to middle twentieth century the political authority of the Temate 
Sultanate continued to wane through various administrative and political upheavals. 
In 1914, the Sultan was dethroned by the Dutch as part of a modernising
129 On the development o f  the clove industry, Dutch army and local bureaucracy in Ambon, see 
Chauvel (1990) and Taylor (2003). The legacies o f this promotion o f the Protestant Ambonese within 
the Dutch administration led both to Ambonese disadvantage under the early phases o f the new 
republic (with the crushing of the pro-Dutch independence movement, the RMS), but also to lasting 
advantages via promotion in the local civil service. These latent advantages have been argued to be 
one o f the crucial underlying factors behind ethno-religious conflict in the late 1990s in Ambon (see 
Van Klinken 2001).
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administrative policy; he was then restored to power in 1929, following the 
communist uprising of 1926-27, which persuaded colonial conservatives to maintain 
‘traditional’ authorities in the interests of regional stability.130 Due to the historical 
links between the Temate Sultanate and the Dutch administration, Sultan Iskandar 
Djabir Mohammad Sjah had an uneasy relationship with the rising Indonesian 
nationalist movement through the 1930s and 1940s.131 During World War Two, with 
the help of the Dutch, the Temate Sultan and his family were exiled to Australia, a 
move that did not endear him to the Indonesian nationalists.132 From the late 1940s 
to mid 1950s the Temate Sultan was only a minor figure in regional politics and did 
not play a leading nationalist, federalist, or separatist role, unlike other Eastern 
Indonesian political figures.133
Unlike Ambon and Manado, Temate was not a critical centre of resistance to the new 
Republic during the 1950s regional rebellions.134 While the RMS (South Maluku 
Republic) rebellion in Ambon in 1950 and the PRRI (Revolutionary Government of 
the Republic of Indonesia) rebellion in Manado in 1957 had minor political 
repercussions in Temate, they did not cause significant dismptions and the northern 
part of Maluku was incorporated relatively peacefully into the new Indonesian 
state. The region briefly struggled to be recognised as a separate administrative 
province within the Republic, but this movement was quickly suppressed by
130 Van Klinken (2007), p .l 14. Benda (1966) discusses the changing dynamics o f Dutch rule -  from 
greater autonomy for the regions and native administrators, to re-centralisation and the application o f  
a hard-line policy against political freedom from 1927 -  in the last decades o f the Dutch empire. 
Sutherland (1979) argues that the retreat from reform in the last decades o f Dutch rule actually began 
in 1918 (pp.86-87).
131 The Indonesian nationalist movement began its rise between the 1920s and 1930s. See Anderson 
(1983) and Vickers (2005).
132 Hanna and Alwi (1990), p.267; interview, Temate Sultan’s sister, July 2005, Temate.
133 For a detailed history o f  Eastern Indonesian politics between the establishment o f the State o f  
Eastern Indonesia and its eventual dismantling (1946-1950), including the tensions between 
federalists, separatists and pro-unitary forces, see Anak Agung (1996). While the Sultan sat in the 
sixth cabinet o f  the State o f East Indonesia, prior to its incorporation into the (unitary) Republic o f  
Indonesia in August 1950, this role did not appear to have had lasting effects on the politics o f  the 
region. See Anak Agung (1996), p.707, 843. Fraassen (1999), pp.57-58 -  cited in van Klinken (2007), 
p.l 14 -  asserts that the Temate Sultan was placed under house arrest by the new Republic during this 
period -  due to his apparent proximity to the separatist rebels in south Maluku -  but Hanna and Alwi 
(1990) dispute this, and Anak Agung (1996) does not refer to it either.
134 Although the North Malukan region’s geographic proximity to the major sites o f  regional rebellion 
in the 1950s meant that it was viewed with some suspicion by the new Republican government, it was 
a relatively minor and remote region in what later became the wider Maluku province, and was not a 
centre o f resistance. This meant that the military did not have a great presence in the region at this 
time, or indeed, during the subsequent decades.
135 Hanna and Alwi (1990), pp.269-270. On the rise o f  regional rebellions against the new Republic, 
see Feith (1962), pp.487-494.
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Jakarta.136 The immense geographic area covered by Maluku province under the 
early Republic -  indeed, right up to the end of the New Order, the province stretched 
from the southern Philippines to the northern tip of Australia -was difficult to 
administer, but Jakarta prevented any moves towards its break up, viewing it as 
‘dangerous localism’.137
Van Klinken (2007) goes so far as to argue that, “Rebellion is not a characteristic of 
the political scene in Temate.”138 But the relative passivity of the North Maluku 
region during the 1950s -  compared to other regions of Eastern Indonesia -  was 
directly related to the legacies of several centuries of brutal repression of local 
warfare and rebellion during the early colonial era. Regional repression was 
continued by the policy of political and economic marginalisation of the region under 
Ambonese control during the late colonial era, a policy which survived into the new 
republic.139 The political will to create a separate province was not resurrected until 
the onset of the reform movement in 1997, discussed in Chapter Three.
Aside from the regional rebellions in the 1950s, the new Republic faced other serious 
political challenges. Feith (1962) demonstrates the central inadequacies of the 
parliamentary democracy system between 1953 and 1957, where political 
factionalism rose via an increased role of party politics, as reflected in the 1955 
election results. Four parties (PNI, Masjumi, NU and PKI) gained substantial votes 
nationally, but none of them won sufficient for a majority.140 For their part, North 
Malukans voted overwhelmingly for religious parties, with (Islamic) Masjumi 
gaining 45 per cent, and (Protestant) Parkindo 22 per cent. The ‘Guided Democracy’ 
period which followed this brief experiment in parliamentary democracy re­
centralised political authority and cmshed (‘unified’) alternative political 
organisations, which Sukamo viewed as threatening to national unity. The creation of
136 Interviews with retired civil servant, Ibrahim Effendi, and North Maluku DPRD member, Saiful 
Bahry Ruray, July 2005, Temate. Both had relatives who were imprisoned for advocating for a 
separate province in the early republic.
137 Van Klinken (2007), p. 109.
138 Van Klinken (2007), p. 109.
139 In contrast to Temate, by the late colonial period Ambon was a regional economic centre and 
political hub, with close links between the Dutch army and Ambonese Protestant elites. Hence Ambon 
was the site o f  a furiously contested transition during the independence wars and only eventually 
incorporated under great duress by the Indonesian Army into the Republic. See Hanna and Alwi 
(1990), pp.269-271, and Chauvel (1990).
140 Feith (1962), pp.556-578.
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Golkar -  an ‘umbrella’ political organisation -  during the Guided Democracy period 
was intended to overcome party political divisions by ‘unifying’ a divided electorate. 
Golkar incorporated some of the nationalist party networks on the Outer Islands -  
particularly PNI -  and Masjumi was later banned, thus changing (again) the 
emergent political dynamics in the Maluku region.141
The Temate Sultanate as a source of local political authority was not completely 
eliminated by the early republic, but the nature of rule -  and the Sultan’s role within 
it -  had begun to change dramatically with the gradual establishment of a unitary and 
centralising Indonesian state. The Dutch had first strengthened, then undermined, the 
role of the North Malukan sultanates, eventually concentrating regional political and 
economic power in Ambon and weakening the regional influence and role of the 
Temate Sultanate. The post-independence government then consolidated this 
process, retaining Ambon as the regional hub of Maluku province. It was not, 
however, until the establishment of Suharto’s New Order, from 1966 onwards, that 
North Maluku felt the full political and economic impacts of incorporation into the 
unitary Indonesian state.
2.2 The establishment and expansion of the New Order (1966-1990)
Since the days of the old sultanate Temate has served as economic, 
political and cultural centre of the surrounding island world of the 
North Moluccas....After a long period of decline and disintegration 
which continued into the first two decades of Indonesian 
independence, Temate was able to revive most of its former functions 
as a “centre on the periphery.”
Kiem (1993).142
The first section of the chapter showed that the Dutch administered colonial authority 
in North Maluku via indirect mle was concentrated in the Temate sultanate. The 
early republic did not dismantle ‘traditional’ (or, colonial) political organisations and 
authority completely, but instead began to incorporate them into the centrally 
administered political system. Under the gradual establishment of the New Order
141 Van Klinken (2007), p .l 10, citing Alfian (1971) pp.157-160.
142 Kiem (1993, p.47) referring to Ellen (1983).
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regime, following Suharto’s takeover in 1965 and official inauguration as president 
in 1966, the Temate Sultan was then incorporated more forcefully into national state 
political organisations, especially Golkar. Conversely, local branches of central state 
and political organisations extended into and assumed greater power at the local 
level, widening access to political leadership to previously marginalised local ethnic 
groups, which this section explores.
Economic development -  particularly on the geographic periphery of the country -  
was a central priority of the new government, partly as a means to build a stable 
unified state. As such, the policies of the New Order began to transform the North 
Malukan economy and political system from the mid-1960s onwards.143 The New 
Order’s economic development strategy in the Maluku province in some ways 
revived colonial strategies, via the expansion of extractive industries such as logging 
and mining. However, other aspects of New Order policy in Eastern Indonesia 
focused specifically on local economic development.144 The establishment and 
expansion of the New Order in North Maluku was therefore a continuation of past 
policies, via the continued process of external rule and the central role of an 
extractive economic policy, but it also offered something new -  via the expansion of 
infrastructure and other public services into previously remote rural areas. The New 
Order also aided the rise of non-aristocratic elites, through the growth of educational 
facilities and civil service employment. Several of the key figures in late twentieth 
century politics emerged from this period as a result.
The main goal of the New Order regime was to secure political order via a forced 
‘national consensus’. Nishihara (1972) observes that while Sukarno had also aimed 
to achieve this consensus, he had ultimately failed. Following the contentious and
143 This section draws heavily on Van Klinken (2007) and Kiem (1993) as two o f  the few sources on 
North Malukan (particularly, Tematean) politics and the local economy during the New Order regime. 
Pannell and Von Benda-Beckmann (1989) also consider some political issues indirectly through their 
edited volume on resource management in the Maluku region.
144 The Inpres scheme, providing special grants for infrastructure development in the poorest regions 
o f Indonesia, is the main example o f  the New Order’s regional development policy that had marked 
impacts at the community level. I do not discuss the nature o f such impacts at the community level 
here, as it goes beyond the scope o f the thesis, but note there is disagreement as to the benefits o f the 
New Order’s local development strategies in the poorest regions o f  the country. Booth (1992, 2003) 
argues there were measurable improvements via the Inpres scheme in the poorest regions; Leith 
(1989) presents the negative consequences o f New Order development policy in rural areas o f  north 
Maluku, mostly via the transmigration scheme; Ellen (1983) argues the New Order had very little 
influence beyond the semi-urban areas o f  Maluku.
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rebellious early decades of the republic, the New Order’s centralising and unifying 
strategies, policies and organisations -  ranging from outright political intimidation to 
coalition building -  meant that by the first general elections of the New Order in 
1971, Golkar (an organisation formed by Sukarno but which then became the New 
Order state’s political vehicle) secured a massive electoral victory.145 Just five years 
into the new regime, Indonesia was already a one-party state, with the ‘orderly’ state 
finally triumphing over ‘disorderly’ society.146
Whilst the establishment of the New Order regime produced some significant 
political changes, there were also some important continuities with Sukarno’s ‘Old 
Order’ during the early republic. At the national level, the early years of the New 
Order saw a continuation of the Old in terms of political activity, structures and 
leadership.147 What was genuinely new was the extension of centralised, stratified 
and hierarchic state rule, which could be clearly seen by the 1971 elections, with 
local elites carving out their own empires w ith in  -  not against -  the military and 
bureaucratic structure. The key organisations behind this new form of rule were 
Golkar, the expanding bureaucracy (with its focus on regional economic 
development), and the military’s territorial command. These central features of the 
New Order had important political impacts in North Maluku by concentrating local 
power in branches of the expanding and modernising state. The “old” elites attached 
to the Temate Sultanate were therefore pushed outside the mainstream of local 
politics.
Five issues dominated North Malukan politics during the establishment of the New 
Order regime and contributed to the direction of local political dynamics in the post- 
Suharto period. These were the extension of the central state’s presence and 
controlling mechanisms; the national and local rise of Golkar; the creation of a new 
local political elite; the incorporation of the Temate Sultan into central branches of 
the state, and withdrawal from local politics; and the developmental effects of the 
New Order on the regional economy.
145 Nishihara (1972), p.56.
146 Anderson (1966).
147 Reeve (1985), pp.263-265. Crouch (1978) also makes a strong case for Old and New Order 
continuity by showing how the Army leadership o f the New Order had been an integral part o f  the Old 
Order. Reeve goes further, in his analysis o f Golkar’s roots, and argues that the, “concepts o f  political 
activity and structures used to implement them were also such an integral part” (p.265).
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(i) The expansion o f  central state organisations 
The New Order period saw the extension, transformation and modernisation of the 
state’s political organisations across the country. MacAndrews (1986) argues that the 
relationship between central government and provincial authorities changed in two 
significant ways during this period: -  first, the authority of central government was 
gradually established throughout Indonesia; and, second, a degree of authority was 
gradually devolved to provincial governments. Both trends contributed to state 
stability by encouraging regional development and re-defining relations between 
central and local authorities. As a state focused on stability and development, the 
New Order at first pressed for strong central government controls over local 
government to improve security. But the regime eventually recognised provincial 
political and economic demands in order to ensure the co-option of, rather than 
resistance from, local branches of government, giving provincial government a 
degree of autonomy over regional decision making.148
Under New Order administration, the North Maluku region comprised two districts 
in the north of Maluku province, geographically far removed from the provincial 
outpost of the central government in Ambon. The military played a central role in the 
Ambon provincial government -  but in the northern part o f the province, they had a 
lesser presence and it was the extension of the bureaucracy, rather than the military, 
that was notable during this period. The provincial government in Ambon 
successively endorsed North Maluku’s two district regents, with minimal recorded 
political protest at the local level.149 The district capitals of Temate and Tidore 
became the local hubs of New Order government and political organisation. Outside 
these towns, the rural, forested and mountainous territory also saw the expansion of a 
local state presence, mostly as a result of the expansion of logging, plantations, 
mining and transmigration in Halmahera in the 1980s.150
148 MacAndrews (1986), p.9.
149 Wilson (2008), p.65.
150 Spyer (2000) and Leith (1989)’s ethnographies o f peripheral regions o f  Maluku during the late 
New Order outline the impacts o f  New Order policies on remote rural communities via -  amongst 
other schemes -  regional development programmes, state education, health clinics, resettlement 
programmes and the imposition o f  the national language; but these regions were not the focus o f my 
study. On the impact o f the state in rural parts o f central Maluku, see Von Benda Beckmann (1989). 
On the impacts o f transmigration on remote rural parts o f north and central Halmahera see Bubandt 
(1989) and Leith (1989).
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The locally centralised nature of state authority in the district capitals -  themselves 
often several days travel from the next administrative branch of government at the 
sub-district level -  mirrored the centralised and hierarchical nature of state authority 
in Jakarta.151 What changed under the New Order regime was that the local elites and 
the source of their authority were increasingly concentrated in state bureaucracy and 
Golkar, the state political organisation, as opposed to being linked to the ‘traditional’ 
(colonial) elite.152 This process also had an ethnic dimension, with the political 
decline of the northern Temate ethnic group (linked to the Temate Sultan) and the 
rise of the southern Makian group (who benefitted from newly opened educational 
and other public services, explored further in later sections).
Golkar became one of the main vehicles for imposing and maintaining state 
uniformity and political loyalty during the New Order. The three ‘pillars’ of the New 
Order -  the bureaucracy, military and Golkar -  were not wholly separate 
organisations, but merged into and evolved out of one another, with Golkar as the 
official ‘political’ organisation.153 The civil service was also increasingly affiliated to 
Golkar in the early phase of the New Order, as all civil servants were automatically 
members of Korpri (Organisation of Indonesian Civil Servants), a senior organisation 
within the Golkar family.154 By the mid 1970s, civil servants were ‘urged’ not to join 
any political party (Golkar membership did not count as party affiliation, even 
though Golkar ‘competed’ in elections).155 In this way, the military leadership 
controlled the bureaucratic sector of government and gained increasing influence 
over the political sector. For the local elite, climbing the Golkar and bureaucratic 
ladders was the major route to socio-economic mobility.
151 On the minimal penetration o f  the state beyond sub-district centres on the periphery o f Maluku 
during the New Order, see Ellen (1997).
152 This process started under late colonial rule on Java, particularly during the 1920s and 1930s, with 
increased indigenous access to education and the bureaucracy (see Vickers 2005 and Taylor 2003). 
The process started later in North Maluku.
153 In different parts o f the country, different pillars played primary roles. In North Maluku, the 
bureaucracy and Golkar appeared to have played a far greater role in local administration and politics 
than the military pillar o f the New Order regime, which contrasts to Ambon, where the military played 
a central role, in large part due to the area’s contentious history with the unitary republic.
154 This policy greatly aided Golkar’s electoral victory in 1971. See Reeve (1985), p.333.
155 Reeve (1985), p.336. Golkar was never recognised as a political party by the New Order, despite 
having many features o f a party. See Boileau (1983), p .l 10.
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The local elite were sufficiently embedded in -  and suppressed enough -  by the 
political organisations and hierarchy of the New Order to voice only mild resentment 
of Ambonese provincial control.156 The district elite (largely indigenous Muslims) 
carved out their own local niches of control under the senior Ambonese (and 
therefore largely Protestant) administration, but they still sought their own province. 
In 1971, President Suharto was persuaded by the local elite to visit Temate to discuss 
North Malukan provincial status. During this visit, it was agreed that following the 
1971 elections the issue could be pursued, though it was later dropped.157 Any 
significant movement to create a new province was subdued until the reformasi era 
in the late 1990s. According to Van Klinken, the major factor contributing to overall 
political stability and the absence of much political activity in North Maluku 
throughout the New Order was the dependence of the regional economy on central 
government funds -  discussed further below.158 These links between local and 
central government -  and therefore budgetary and other government decisions -  were 
mediated through the civil service and, therefore, Golkar.
(ii) The national rise and role o f Golkar as a “political machine ”
While usually identified as a New Order creation, as with the other key pillars of the 
regime, Golkar -  the acronym for Golongan Karya, ‘functional groups’ -  had its 
roots in the Sukarno period. Sukarno had encouraged a loose confederation of 
occupational (‘functional’) groups of all kinds, including civil servants and becak 
(tricycle taxi) drivers, to forcibly create a ‘unifying’ national force in politics against 
the competitive electoral politics of the era, which he saw as threatening the unitary 
state. The idea of parliamentary representation of functional groups was supported by 
the army as early as 1957, primarily as a counter-balance to the PKI (Indonesian 
Communist Party), but also to exert influence on mass organisations affiliated to 
other ‘ideological’ political parties.159 The functional groups gained seats in the DPR
156 Interview, Khairun University and LIPI researchers, 5 May 2005, Temate.
157 Apparently, it was agreed that if, after the 1971 elections, the newly elected local government still 
sought a new province, Jakarta would approve it. However, the incumbent bupati (district government 
chief) Yacob Mungsu, who had undermined previous attempts to create a new province in the early 
1960s, was re-elected and cancelled the plan, apparently with persuasion from Ambon. See Wilson 
(2008), p.89.
158 Van Klinken (2007), p .109. Chapter One introduced one o f the central arguments o f the thesis, that 
as the possibilities for contest over control o f these state resources within the state rose in the late 
1990s, so this ‘stability’ o f the New Order period imploded. Chapter Three returns to discuss this 
point.
159 Nishihara (1972), p. 17.
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(National House of Representatives) from 1960 onwards. In October 1964, with the 
anti-PKI labour federation, SOKSI, at its core, an alliance of occupational groups 
established a joint secretariat under Army leadership, referred to as Sekber Golkar 
(the Joint Secretariat of Golkar).160 Following the 1965 coup, the federation grew 
into a more unified (though always factional) political organisation designed to 
unofficially represent the military in elections, but without operating as an official 
political party.161
Political restrictions and intimidation were integral parts of the government’s efforts 
to build up Golkar’s influence over other political organisations in the late 1960s. 
Some scholars argue that, in the wake of the 1965-1966 massacres, following the 
attempted coup and during the transition to the New Order, the emphasis on Golkar’s 
concern for economic development and its denunciation of ‘party politics’ had 
popular appeal. Reeve (1985) argues that the urban educated class, including many 
students, were attracted by the New Order government’s focus on development, 
which was stressed by Golkar. Further, he argues that following the 1965 coup there 
was great distrust of ‘politics’ at the village level and Golkar appealed to villagers on 
the basis of its focus on stability and authority.162 While this may have been true for 
some, the overall rise of Golkar was hardly a benign process, and was not only based 
in populist appeals.163
Golkar became a useful vehicle for social mobility of technocrats and intellectuals in 
the new regime, thus the government’s political wing had the advantages of official 
channels and facilities. The organisation also grew rapidly as a result of strong 
support from the Departments of Defence and Security and Home Affairs.164 As a 
result of these combined efforts, by the 1971 elections, Golkar secured 63 per cent of 
the vote.165 Incorporating key elements of the bureaucracy into Golkar, intimidating 
and suppressing other political movements, and excluding Muslim political
160Soksi (All Indonesia Organisation o f Socialist Functionaries) was an anti-PKI labour federation, to 
which all workers and officials o f government-run plantations and industries belonged. Nishihara 
(1972), p.17.
161 Nishihara (1972), p .l. See Tomsa (2009) on the factional nature o f Golkar since its creation.
162 Reeve (1985), pp.298-299.
163 See, for example, Ward (1974) on Golkar’s connections to secret police activities in Java.
164 Suryadinata (1989) p.126.
165 Nishihara (1972). p.42.
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organisations (discussed further in Section 2.3), meant that, by 1987, Golkar scored a 
record 73 per cent of the vote.166
During the New Order’s high period, between the 1970s and 1980s, Golkar acquired 
many of the features of a political machine, “in that it represents a large scale effort 
by elite groups to manage the problem of rapidly expanding political participation, 
while at the same time retaining control over state policy.”167 According to Boileau 
(1983), political conditions in Indonesia in the late 1970s and early 1980s “required” 
machine-style incentives aimed at ‘transitional’ populations and emerging local 
political leaders.168 Golkar may have been ‘officially’ “neutral” towards different 
identity and ideological groups, but in practice it drew on whichever groups would 
aid the regime to maintain power, whilst being fervently anti-leftist, and (until the 
1990s) anti-Islamic. It maintained and consolidated power by buying off local 
‘interests’, a colonial practice that survived into the post-Suharto era169 and 
providing material incentives, “in the form of contracts and favourable allocations of 
development projects, in return for support.”170
Nationwide, during the first two decades of the New Order, political power was 
consolidated and concentrated in the urban elite based in regional towns and cities 
via several routes. First, the regime either repressed or incorporated alternative 
political organisations within Golkar.171 Second, Golkar was embedded within the 
civil service, creating a loyal corps of civil servants during election periods, and for 
the administration of everyday life. Third, the local elite became dependent on their 
connections to the state bureaucracy for social and economic mobility. These tactics 
sank deep into local political culture and the operational mechanisms for both 
governing and contesting elections. As Golkar retained influence in the bureaucracy 
and discretion over government funding in the post-New Order period, these political
166 Suryadinata (1989), pp.l 13-114.
167 Scott (1972), p. 145.
168 Boileau (1983), p. 113.
169 Chapter Four explores how the post-Suharto administration in North Maluku continued these 
practices. See also Van Klinken (2008), Buehler (2008b) and Mietzner (2008) on new versions o f this 
old political strategy in the post-Suharto era.
170 Boileau (1983), p.113.
171 For example, Golkar incorporated Sukamo-era political party networks such as the PNI, which had 
been popular in the Outer Islands.
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tactics continued to influence local politics through to 2005 (and beyond). Chapters 
Four and Six return to these issues in the post-Suharto era.
(iii) The local rise and role o f Golkar
In the 1971 general elections, Golkar successfully contested North Maluku district, 
though not the rest of Maluku province.172 Van Klinken (2007) argues that although 
intimidation and manipulation contributed to Golkar’s success in North Maluku -  as 
with other regions -  “the result could not have been achieved without local elite 
cooperation.” 173 Golkar’s dominance in the regional parliaments in North Maluku 
grew throughout the 1970s and 1980s.174 This reflected the consolidation of the 
executive (bureaucratic) wing of government and military power over alternative 
political organisations. Political resistance from PPP (the (Islamic) United 
Development Party) was ineffective, even in southern Temate, which strongly 
identified as a Muslim area from the 1970s onwards.175 Until the 1990s Golkar 
crucially managed to incorporate and retain different religious groups in Eastern 
Indonesia through its various repressive and incentive mechanisms. Section 2.3, on 
the late New Order, shows how the broad political and religious coalition housed 
within Golkar gradually began to fall apart in North Maluku, as it did nationally.
In local politics, two senior North Malukan politicians’ career trajectories illustrate 
the central roles of the New Order state and the Golkar political organisation in the 
rise of a new local political elite. The first, Abdul Gafur, was bom and raised in 
Temate, and ethnically Patani (a central Halmahera ethnic group), was perhaps the 
only North Malukan to reach the top ranks of Golkar and government during the
172 O f the 25 constituencies in 1971, Maluku province contributed the least to the national Golkar 
victory, with only 32 per cent in Ambon city and an average o f  47 per cent in the district areas 
supporting Golkar. Ambon was the only provincial capital where Golkar did not win. Nishihara cites 
then mayor o f Ambon, M.H. Manuffy, who argued that Golkar lost because there had been no active 
campaign and candidates were selected from outside the province, who had little familiarity with local 
conditions. This stood in contrast to Parkindo, the nationalist party, who won the region overall 
(Nishihara 1972, p.48). This electoral defeat in Ambon, combined with the risks o f  instability, could 
explain why Golkar later increased its efforts in the Maluku region, eventually achieving dominance 
in North Maluku.
173 Van Klinken (2007) p .l 10.
174 Van Klinken (2007) p .l 10, citing Kiem (1993), p .l88.
175 In 1973 the New Order state forced the amalgamation o f various Islamic parties into PPP, along 
with the fusion o f several secular nationalist and Christian parties into PDI. This constrained 
movements within political Islam and gave Golkar huge political advantages. See Sidel (2006), pp.56- 
57.
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New Order.176 He started his career with the armed forces, serving as a doctor with 
the Air Force. In the mid-1960s he was a leading member of a student group 
challenging Sukarno over his close relations with the PKI, buying him early favour 
with the Suharto regime.177
Gafiir then entered national politics in 1972, first becoming a Golkar member of 
parliament, and later a cabinet minister, where he served twice as Minister of Sport. 
Later he served as Deputy Speaker in parliament and then Representative for 
Aceh.178 He was also a secretary and member of DPP Golkar (the Golkar Executive 
Board) from 1978-1988, as well as a member of the ‘Daily Board’ of Golkar’s 
Supervisory Council.179 His national political career declined in the late 1980s, 
following accusations of corruption in the Ministry of Sport.180 His connections to 
certain factions in the national Golkar political elite served him for two decades in 
national politics, and later enabled him to raise the financial and political capital to 
contest the first and second North Maluku gubernatorial elections in 2001 and 2007 
(see Chapter Six).
Jusuf Abdulrachman, an ethnic Makian, was from the same political generation as 
Abdul Gafiir. He also grew up in Temate, though he pursued a local rather than 
national political career. In 1964 he joined Golkar and between 1967 and 1969 
studied in Malang, in East Java, at one of Indonesia’s elite universities. He rose up 
through local branches of Golkar, eventually becoming vice-chair for North Maluku 
in 1974. From 1979-1984 he was regional chairman of Golkar, a highly influential 
local position. Later he became rector of Khairun University -  the only state 
university in North Maluku during the New Order -  another powerful local position. 
During the late New Order, Abdulrahman headed the regional branch of ICMI (the 
Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals Association), an organisation whose rising 
importance in national politics was mirrored locally. Affiliation with this group was
176 Interviews, Abdul Gafiir, 17 October 2005 (Temate) and 30 November 2005 (DPR-RI, Jakarta).
177 Interview, Saiful Bahry Ruray, Deputy Speaker, DPRD North Maluku, July 2005, Temate.
178 Interviews, Abdul Gafiir, 17 October 2005 (Temate) and 30 November 2005 (DPR, Jakarta).
179 Suryadinata (1989), pp. 153,156, 157.
180 Interview, Tommi Legowo, CSIS, Jakarta, 20 September 2005.
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strategically important for local elites seeking to maintain (or gain) political 
influence under the late New Order period (discussed further in Section 2.3).181
The career trajectory of these two North Malukan political figures -  and the rise of 
other important ‘southern’ local political leaders in the late New Order period- 
demonstrates the importance of holding elite positions within Golkar and the
1 89bureaucracy in order to achieve national and local political power. It also shows 
how members of previously marginalised ethnic groups were able rise to prominence 
via the routes of education, membership of Golkar, and career trajectories through
1 83the bureaucracy, rather than associations with ‘traditional’ authority. This was a 
significant change in local politics, previously dominated by the Sultanate’s elite. 
The incorporation of the Temate Sultan into Golkar also demonstrated the New 
Order’s success in co-opting and marginalising potential political alternatives to 
central state-based power in North Maluku.
(iv) The co-option o f  the Ternate Sultan 
The primary concern of the New Order was political stability. A repressive and often 
ruthless regime with political opponents, the New Order also achieved stability via 
the co-option and incorporation of other sources of political authority within New 
Order organisations, rather than eliminating them.184 The Temate Sultanate’s role 
had already been weakened by late Dutch colonial rule via the move of regional 
power to Ambon, with the relocation of the clove trade, and, later, the rise of a non- 
aristocratic elite in government during the early republic. This was followed by the 
New Order’s policy of ‘incorporating’ and co-opting the old colonial elites.
181 Interviews, Jusuf Abdulrahman, 1 June 2005, Temate; Ariswan, Golkar MP, Temate City 
DPRD, 12 July 2005, Temate.
182 Section 2.3 and Chapter Three returns to discuss these three local political figures in more detail.
183 Again, this process took place earlier in other regions o f Indonesia, where indigenous non- 
aristocratic elites accessed education and parts o f the bureaucracy via the rise o f  the modem state in 
the late colonial period. See Anderson (1983); Taylor (2003), pp.279-281; Vickers (2005).
184 Van Klinken (2007), p .l 13, also makes this point. On the subject o f New Order brutality, 
Pemberton (1994, p.7) argues that, at least in Central Java, the Suharto regime’s quarter century o f  
“essentially undisturbed rule” cannot be accounted for only by considering its “forceful means o f  
suppression”. Whilst repressive and occasionally extremely bmtal (for example in the occupation o f  
East Timor), the regime strategically incorporated many political alternatives and used more “muted 
forms o f repression” to maintain political stability with a relatively small security force, when 
compared to the size o f the population (Pemberton, 1994, p.7).
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Sultan Haji Mudaffar Syah II succeeded his father as Temate Sultan in 1975. From 
that point, until the late 1990s, he was a key part of the North Malukan Golkar 
coalition, but this ‘local’ political role was largely conducted from his base in 
Jakarta, where the central state kept a close watch over him. The Sultan was 
periodically flown back to Temate to appear at election rallies on behalf of Golkar,
1 K5but did not hold any official position in the local state bureaucracy. The New 
Order thus managed to tap into the Sultan’s influence as a ‘traditional’ ruler, 
ensuring his local followers were loyal, by extension, to the state, yet without giving 
him any official position. District military commanders also cultivated good relations
1 R6with the Sultan as a means to maintain the support of his subjects.
Golkar’s incorporation of the Temate Sultan from the 1970s reflected the New 
Order’s policy of aggressively including, “every possible group and influential local 
figure” within the organisation, so long as it served the interests of political success 
and undermined political alternatives.187 Thus while Golkar was part of the state’s 
modernising machine, in that it was largely secular and focused on promoting state 
bureaucratic power, the organisation used ‘traditional’ bodies of authority as a means 
to ‘neutralise’ political opposition and divisions when it was advantageous to do 
so.188 The important issue here is the extent to which the Temate Sultan’s 
incorporation within the political organisations of the New Order in the centre 
weakened his local political authority, which had important effects on his subsequent 
attempts to ‘return’ to power in North Maluku.
Several observers of North Malukan politics argue that by the middle phase of the 
New Order, due to the massive exercise in state centralisation and uniformity, the 
local political authority of the Temate Sultanate had been destroyed. Fraassen (1984) 
argues that by the 1980s the customs of the Temate sultanate ‘survive only in
185 Van Klinken (2007), p .l 14. This situation was somewhat different to that in other Eastern 
Indonesian provinces; for example, in South Sulawesi, the local aristocracy was drawn into the local 
state bureaucracy, thereby saving the local nobility from political marginalisation. See Magenda 
(1989), p.914.
186 Van Klinken (2007), p.109, citing Fraassen (1987), pp.l, 60-65.
187 The Sultan o f Yogyakarta and a son o f  the Sultan o f Solo were also targeted by this policy. On this, 
see Reeve (1985), pp.298-299.
188 Boileau (1983), p.120. Boileau (1983, pp.l 13-114) argues that Golkar, with its unifying, 
hierarchical structure, and tight relationship to the army, closely resembled a corporatist political 
organisation, much like the PRI in Mexico.
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folklore, not as politically significant elements.’189 Van Klinken (2007) supports this, 
“the New Order finally swept...(the sultans)...away. In its place came a uniform, 
centralised administration.”190 But these authors over-emphasise unity within both 
the state administration and Golkar. In fact, Golkar was always highly factionalised -  
as Tomsa (2009) demonstrates -  with multiple elements competing at different levels 
of the state and political organisation. The Temate Sultan’s attempted ‘return’ to 
local politics from 1997 onwards shows that he had managed to survive the New 
Order as a cultural, even political, figure, though -  as Chapters Three and Six 
demonstrate -  his authority had been seriously weakened.
While the local political authority of the Temate Sultan had waned under the New 
Order, it had not been completely destroyed. Rather, it was channelled in new ways 
via his association with Golkar.191 Wilson (2008) argues that, “the Sultan of Temate 
was co-opted by the central government, although (...), retained a great deal of 
cultural influence and...political power.” 192 A local observer commented:
It doesn’t make sense to talk about the ‘revival’ of the Temate 
Sultanate since reformasi, because it seems like the role and the power 
of the Sultan never really died out, at least in North Temate and parts 
of North Halmahera.193
Over the Maluku region, the New Order administration had not managed to eliminate 
all alternative sources of political authority on this geographic periphery of the nation 
state, although it had penetrated further than any previous regime. As highlighted 
earlier, the New Order state had still only partially penetrated the most remote and 
rural areas of Maluku. Ellen’s (1997) ethnography of the central Malukan hinterlands 
demonstrates the shallow nature of New Order administration in the far reaches of 
the state, where its influence extended only to the urban and trading centres. He 
argues that in contrast to the social reality and political relations on Java under the 
New Order, in a province like Maluku:
189 Van Klinken (2007), p.109, citing Fraassen (1984), p.781.
190 Van Klinken (2007), p. 111.
191 The Sultan’s expulsion from Golkar following the 1999 to 2000 conflict, and his explicit support o f  
Christians during the conflict, eventually destroyed him politically at both the national and local 
levels.
192 Wilson (2008), p.55.
193 Interview, Tobelo adat leader, 30 May 2005, Temate.
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...vast distances and small populations, histories of local political 
autonomy with only loose supra-local federations, where the 
domination of native sultanates and other centres of regional influence 
have been weak and periodic, and where effective incorporation into 
the Dutch colonial state (...) came rather late, provides a very different 
kind of experience.194
In North Maluku, in some of the more remote rural areas, certain northern ethnic 
communities continued to support the Temate Sultan culturally, and even politically, 
into the early twenty-first century. These bases of ‘traditional’ political support 
proved readily mobilised towards intensive and violent political action during the 
1999-2000 conflict, showing that the political influence of the Sultan had survived 
the New Order in some areas. Although the Sultan eventually failed to achieve 
regional political success in the transition period, his continued local influence prior 
to 1999 was palpable. Chapters Three and Six return to this dimension of North 
Maluku’s political story.
(v) State-led economic development
“Politics no, development yes.”
- Golkar slogan, 1979} 5
Changes in North Malukan politics during the New Order regime were closely linked 
to the regime’s economic as well as political strategy. Even though the northern part 
of the province benefitted less than Ambon, the provincial hub, from economic 
packages, the impacts were significant after fifteen years of neglect during the early 
republic.196 The memory of New Order development strategies, particularly 
following the regional economic crisis preceding, and then exacerbated by, the 
conflict of 1999-2000, continued to play a role during the 2005 elections, with strong 
local recollections of Golkar’s policy of “filling stomachs”.197 North Malukan 
branches of the party regularly reminded people of New Order economic stability 
during the 2005 local elections and with local economic crisis still affecting the 
region in 2005, it was a contributing factor in the popularity and eventual re-election
194 Ellen (1997), pp.79-81.
195 “Politik tidak, Pembangunan ya” -  cited in Boileau (1983), p .l 10.
196 Kiem (1993), p.55.
197 Interview, Tommi Legowo, CSIS, Jakarta, 20 September 2005. Chapter Four discusses the regional 
economic crisis between 1999 and 2002.
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of several Golkar incumbents.198 The main economic policies affecting the North 
Maluku region during the first twenty five years of the Suharto era were urban 
development, infrastructure, public service provision, transmigration and logging.199
Under the New Order, improvements in transport links and extensive government 
investment meant that Maluku province became a net exporter of local products, one 
of only two Eastern Indonesia provinces to do so.200 The development of the fishery 
and agricultural sectors for export and local consumption also meant that by the mid- 
1980s regional poverty was relatively low.201 In the northern part of Maluku the 
main driver of economic growth was logging, aided by the establishment of a large 
plywood processing factory in Sidangoli, west Halmahera, within close reach of 
Temate.202 By the 1970s these developments meant Temate moved from being a 
quiet and neglected town towards, “rapidly becoming a part of Indonesia.”203 Temate 
was by then linked by air and sea to Ambon, Manado, Makassar and Jakarta. Thus, 
while still on the periphery of the nation state, and continually one of the poorest 
regions of the country, North Maluku was no longer completely isolated from the 
economic benefits, infrastructure and state apparatus of the Indonesian government. 
The Inpres schemes, targeted at the poorest regions of Indonesia, which started in the 
1970s, were also cmcial for bringing infrastructure development to rural areas across 
Maluku.204
Despite these important regional economic developments, Kiem (1993) argues that 
New Order development in Maluku resulted in “modernisation without 
industrialisation”.205 Many of the workers needed in the key industrial sectors, such 
as plywood manufacture and frozen fish exports, were brought in from outside the
198 The irony is that it was the same local Golkar figures in power during the conflict and subsequent 
economic crisis that campaigned on their ability to maintain security and development. This fact was 
conveniently omitted during local election campaigns. See Chapter Six on this point.
199 For more details on the socio-economic impact o f transmigration in rural areas o f North Maluku, 
see Leith (1989) and Bubandt (1989). Increased development o f the mining sector followed in the late 
1990s, with the construction o f a highly lucrative goldmine in Halmahera (see Chapter Three).
200 Kiem (1993), p.55.
201 Meyer and Hardjodimedjo (1989), p.558.
202 Wilson (2008), p.63.
203 Van Klinken (2007), p. 109.
204 See Booth (1992, 2003) on the role o f Inpres schemes in regional economic development in the 
poorest areas o f  Indonesia during the New Order.
205 Kiem (1993), p.60.
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region.206 Aside from infrastructure and public services, economic development was 
largely extractive in nature and did not directly benefit the local population (as with 
colonial era policies). However, the New Order differed from previous regimes in 
that some benefits of its economic and state expansion policy accrued to the local 
educated elite. According to Van Klinken (2007), economic development and the 
benefits available to the local state elite were two of the major factors that kept North 
Maluku stable throughout the New Order period.207
By 1990, following expansion in the civil service bureaucracy and public services, 
local government employed 38 per cent of Temate residents.208 With such a large 
proportion of the population reliant on the state for both employment and social 
mobility this resulted in almost guaranteed electoral support for Golkar. This reliance 
of the urban population on state employment continued to have important political 
effects in the post-New Order period, particularly after regional economic crisis 
devastated North Maluku, with state-based incumbents holding major advantages in 
competitive elections (though by this time, they were no longer necessarily 
associated with Golkar).209
A sizeable service sector also developed in Temate during the New Order period to 
cater to the local government, as well as regional forestry, mining and other 
industries.210 Large numbers of migrants moved to Temate to work in the 
burgeoning service and government sectors. Predominantly Muslim, they mostly 
migrated from Tidore, Makian and other southern North Malukan islands, along with 
migrants from South Sulawesi. These Muslim migrant groups tended to settle in the 
southern part of the city, the historical immigrant quarter. Particular groups -  
including Makian migrants from within the North Maluku region -progressed 
quickly via access to improved education services into the government bureaucracy 
and the educated elite. Their rise had important political implications, discussed in 
section 3.3 on the late New Order period.
206 Van Klinken (2007) p. 109.
207 Van Klinken (2007), p. 109.
208 Statistics cited in Kiem (1993), p.60.
209 See Chapter Four on the local population’s post-conflict economic reliance on the local state, and 
Chapter Six on the factors behind incumbents’ success in local elections.
210 Wilson (2008), p.65.
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The steady process of urbanisation in Temate during the New Order produced an 
urban middle class who were directly dependent on the government for their socio­
economic status. Van Klinken (2007) argues that while this pattern was a ‘recurring 
feature’ of provincial towns off Java, it was particularly strong in the Maluku region. 
Despite the New Order’s overall goal of ‘unification’, access to government 
employment was stratified -  to a degree -  across local ethnic and religious groups, 
and via membership of particular political organisations, leaders of which 
preferentially recruited members of their own groups. In Ambon, stratification 
followed colonial patterns, with the Protestant Ambonese dominating the civil 
service.211 In North Maluku, the colonial pattern was overturned, with many senior 
local bureaucrats and Golkar officials coming from the Makian and affiliated 
‘southern’ ethnic groups rather than those affiliated with the Temate Sultanate from 
the colonial period. While other ethno-religious groups were represented in local 
government bodies (for example, Tobelo Christians), they did not fill the elite ranks. 
This range of ethnic groups all formed part of the local elite coalition during the first 
two decades of the New Order, but, as the opportunities to contest local government 
rose in the 1990s, cracks within the coalition deepened and widened. Section 2.3 
returns to this topic.
During the first twenty-five years of the New Order regime the role of the state in the 
local economy and political system was therefore gradually transformed in North 
Maluku. It was not a revolutionary period -  regional and local power structures were 
not completely overhauled -  but, nonetheless, significant changes took place. The 
North Maluku region continued to be marginalised from the regional political and 
economic hub of Ambon, where the provincial government was dominated by 
Ambonese Protestants (as under the late colonial period), and many of the centrally 
extractive economic policies of the colonial era continued (with logging replacing 
clove production, for example). However, the North Maluku elite managed to carve 
out their own regional empire and there were significant new benefits for the local 
educated urban elite from the development process.212
211 See Taylor (2003), p.289, on the incorporation o f Ambonese Protestants into the colonial 
government from the mid 1800’s onwards.
212 North Maluku was in this way a microcosm o f the national political scene during the first decades 
o f  the New Order, where the old PNI-affiliated aristocrats took orders from the Christian (Catholic) 
generals, cabinet ministers and so on, but managed to carve out their own niche.
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The Temate Sultan remained in the political elite via his incorporation into Golkar, 
but without an official state role. This usefully captured the support of certain groups 
in North Maluku for the New Order, by tying them to the state via their loyalty to 
‘traditional’ leadership, but also gradually marginalised the Sultan from holding 
autonomous economic or political power. In the urban centres, elite ranks of the state 
bureaucracy, particularly in the executive bodies of the state -  all affiliated with 
Golkar -  became the predominant ‘political’ force. A new local educated elite class 
evolved via employment in the expanding bureaucratic and public service system. 
The provision of state funds for regional development and the expansion of the civil 
service cemented the central roles of Golkar and the state bureaucracy in local 
politics. The New Order regime thus established political control from the centre 
over the periphery not only via repressive measures, but also by providing economic 
benefits to the local elite and channelling political activity via Golkar.
However, by the late New Order, several divisions could be seen to be emerging 
within the local governing coalition in North Maluku. Certain factions, particularly 
the southern ethnic groups -  more closely affiliated with rising ‘modernist’ Muslim 
organisations in politics -  grew increasingly vocal. Other local ethnic groups also 
began to lobby for improvements in their position. State economic policies had not 
benefitted all equally, and the balance between different groups within the governing 
Golkar coalition became increasingly shaky as the potential for local government 
restructuring and increased access to state control rose towards the final years of the 
regime. These local tensions reflected national political conflicts, as the following 
section explores.
2.3 Rising factional competition under the late New Order (1990-1997)
In the 1990s national political dynamics shifted as a generation of urban Muslim 
intellectuals, networked into modernist Islamic organisations and intent on raising 
the economic and political position of Muslims, rose through the national political 
ranks. Whilst Golkar was firmly established as the dominant political organisation in 
North Maluku, it was comprised, as elsewhere, of different factions. The rise of
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modernist Islamic political movements in Jakarta in turn influenced North Malukan 
political developments, in particular the growing divides between the ‘northern’ and 
‘southern’ factions within the local Golkar coalition.213 By the mid-1990s, political 
tensions in North Maluku had coalesced around two issues.
First, the ‘northern’ groups -  including ethnic Temateans, and groups historically 
affiliated with the Temate Sultan -  perceived the local government as too dominated 
by the southern Makian and their affiliates and they sought to (‘re’) assert their 
historical position. Second, the alternate ‘southern’ faction, affiliated to increasingly 
powerful ‘modernist’ (or ‘orthodox’) Islamic networks, many of them Makian, 
feared that the Temate Sultan (who represented ‘traditional’, non-orthodox Islam) 
was attempting a grand ‘return’ to local power. Rather than reflecting conflict 
between two genuinely ideologically opposed Islamic factions within the Golkar 
coalition, the contest was more importantly centred on which (ethnic) faction could 
claim greater control over local state offices. The factional split reflected the 
historical divisions between the old colonial-aristocracy, headed by the Temate 
Sultan, and the new class of educated urban elites from the south, deeply embedded 
in the expansion and development policies of the New Order state.
National political dynamics
To set the rise of political factionalism in North Maluku in context, it is important to 
remember national political developments during the same period. From the Darul 
Islam rebellions in the 1950s, Muslim organisations had posed a potential threat to 
central government attempts to forge a ‘national political consensus’ across multi­
religious Indonesia. As an alternative electoral power base, the political power of 
Muslim organisations continued to worry the central government, and, in particular, 
the military, through the 1970s, as groups of students and Muslim intellectuals again 
challenged the government over the role of Islam in politics.214 For two decades, the 
government dealt with this clash through a combination of political exclusion of 
ostensibly Islamic parties from electoral politics, and attempts to incorporate the
213 The rise o f  Islam in Jakarta corresponded to the New Order’s overall failure to sufficiently develop 
economic opportunities for the majority Muslim population, who also resented their domination by 
the small Christian elite, who were strongly represented in the national wings o f  the government. 
Further sections pick up this theme.
214 See Suryadinanta (1989), pp,75-88, on Golkar, PPP and the 1977 electoral challenge to Suharto.
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main Islamic groups into Golkar. Re-launching Sukarno’s pancasila ideology (the 
official secular state ideology) in 1975 was one such exclusion/incorporation method, 
with the central government ostensibly encouraging a ‘unifying’ consensus, whilst 
excluding Islamic parties from the political system.215
Following the 1977 elections -  when PPP, the coalition Islamic party, challenged 
Golkar’s electoral hegemony -  the government passed various laws to reduce PPP’s 
capacity to use an Islamic message to gain votes. By the 1982 elections, Suharto’s 
legislative exclusion of PPP had increased Golkar’s vote to 64 per cent, with PPP the 
majority party in Aceh alone.216 But despite this marginalisation of PPP -  by this 
point the only legal Islamic party -  and tighter political controls imposed against 
students and Islamic groups, Golkar still viewed PPP as a threat and stepped up its 
efforts to ‘de-Islamise’ politics completely by the 1987 elections.217
First the central government forced PPP to accept pancasila (the official state 
ideology) as their sole political ideology, implemented via the ‘Pancasila Bills’ 
following the 1982 general elections. Nahdatul Ulama (NU) -  the largest grassroots 
Muslim organisation in Indonesia -  then left the political umbrella of PPP, 
undermining PPP’s electoral position further.218 By 1985, even NU and 
Muhammidiyah, the other major grassroots Islamic organisation (with a more 
‘modernist’ or ‘orthodox’ focus), had officially accepted pancasila as their ‘sole’ 
ideology.219 The ‘mass organisations’ bill of 1985 then forbade Islam from being an 
alternative political ideology to pancasila, thus blurring PPP’s distinctive electoral 
Islamic identity.220
Five general elections into the New Order regime, Golkar appeared to have 
consolidated itself as the only legitimate political organisation, following successive 
policies to exclude and repress Islam as a political force.221 But Indonesian society 
became increasingly Islamic into the 1980s, and some Muslim groups strongly
215 Suryadinata (1989), p.91.
216 Suryadinata (1989), p.99.
217 Suryadinanta (1989), pp. 89-100.
218 Suryadinata (1989), p. 104.
219 Suryadinata (1989). p.107.
220 Suryadinata (1989). p. 107.
221 Repression o f  Islam as a political force followed on the bloody repression o f  Communism, an even 
larger political movement in the mid 1960s See Robinson (1996).
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999disagreed with Islamic organisations’ capitulation over the pancasila law. The 
educated urban Muslim community were increasingly frustrated with the exclusion 
of Islam from politics, particularly when Christians were comparatively well 
represented in the most strategic arms of government -  including the military, 
cabinet, senior ranks of Golkar and the national parliament (DPR). The economic 
success of ethnic Chinese conglomerates -  who also tended to be Christian -  further 
demonstrated, for many Muslims, the regime’s favouritism toward the minority 
Christian community over the comparatively poor Muslim majority.223
Suryadinata (1989) correctly predicted that Golkar would eventually have to respond 
to this rise of Islam in society, especially as many senior Golkar figures were 
themselves becoming increasingly orthodox in practice and appearance.224 Aware of 
increasing social frustrations, and concerned by the rising popularity of Islamic 
groups, the late Suharto regime chose a different tack. This time, the government 
moved, as Sidel (2006) observes, to “capture and claim for itself much of the
99 ^attractive power associated with the institutions and idiom of Islam.” Several 
significant changes then took place in the 1990s, with an increasing role for Islamic
9 9 ^
figures and groups in national politics.
One of the first moves by the regime was incorporation of some of the educated 
urban elite Muslim community at the highest levels of power through supporting the 
creation of the Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals Association (ICMI). Established in 
1990 by a collection of students from Brawijaya University in East Java and other 
urban modernist Muslims, ICMI was a lobbying group designed to raise the position 
and profile of Muslims at the highest levels of business and politics. It won the 
political support of B.J. Habibie, the powerful Minister of Technology and one of
222 Wilson (2008), pp.79-80.
223 Sidel (2006) p.51.
224 Suryadinata (1989), p.129-130.
225 Sidel (2006), p.61.
226 Other national level changes also reflected the rising influence o f  Islamic groups: for example, 
leadership changes in the Indonesian military in 1993 saw the rise o f  Faisal Tanjung, a Muslim 
general. This demonstrated a major change in Suharto’s tactics regarding Islam and the military. See 
Tomagola (2000).
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Suharto’s closest allies, reflecting an important sea-change in national politics and 
New Order policy.227
By the 1990s, an increasing number of top New Order officials were also graduates 
of HMI (the Muslim Students Association). The primary organisation for Islamic 
students on campus since the 1960s, HMI was the main political vehicle for aspiring 
young politicians favouring the modernist Islamic theme.228 Along with a state-based 
youth organisation, KNPI (the National Committee for Indonesian Youth), HMI 
produced a large number of top-ranking Golkar figures during this period.229 Akbar 
Tanjung, an HMI graduate and Golkar’s powerful national chairman during the 
1990s, ensured that HMI graduates rose through the local ranks of Golkar.230 This 
shift in national political dynamics also changed the opportunity structures for local 
politicians in North Maluku. Association with ‘modernist’ Muslim organisations -  
not only the state bureaucracy and Golkar -  began to enable entry into local politics. 
Simultaneously the usefulness of associations with the ‘traditional’ Sultanate waned 
even further. The two main political factions within the North Maluku elite were 
therefore increasingly opposed.
Local political dynamics
During the last decade of New Order rule, Temate, the regional capital of North 
Maluku, was governed by a, “modernising elite, unified in grand coalition under 
Golkar, symbol of Suharto’s hegemony.”231 In 1997, the North Maluku region voted 
for Golkar by around 85 per cent of the local vote: North Maluku district elected 
Golkar at 83 per cent, and Central Halmahera district at 87 per cent.232 By the end of 
the New Order, the region had therefore been governed for over 25 years by a local 
Golkar coalition, with most of the district elite at its heart. But given the shifts in 
national politics in the 1990s outlined above, and increasing opportunities to contest 
local political power via the potential for government reform towards the end of the 
New Order, critical fractures appeared within this local elite coalition. This section
227 Tomagola (2000), pp.6-7. Suharto was also becoming increasingly ‘Islamic’ in appearance and 
practice during this period.
228 Van Klinken (2007), p .l 15.
229 Van Klinken (2007), citing Hefner (2000) and Shiraishi (2002).
230 Interviews, Golkar members, Temate, May-September 2005.
231 Van Klinken (2007), p. 108.
232 Van Klinken (2007), p .l 10.
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considers the roots of the divides between the different factions, linking local 
tensions to the national dynamics outlined above, during die period leading up to the 
beginnings of the end of the New Order regime.
(i) The *return ’  o f the Ternate Sultan
In the mid-1990s, with the rise of the ‘reform’ era, the Temate Sultan sought to 
reclaim his family’s historical position in North Malukan politics by manoeuvring to 
become the lead figure in the ‘northern’ Golkar faction, directly challenging the 
Makian-dominated state bureaucratic elite.233 As the previous section explained, the 
Sultan had not been completely eliminated as a local figure of authority by either the 
colonial or post-independence regimes, but his position had been marginalised. He 
also lacked an official role in the local state, which he needed to gain local political 
power.
The Sultan was, for some groups, still a notable figure of authority, but he also 
commanded a private militia, the Pasukan Adat, a so-called ‘traditional guard’, 
which he later expanded via youth groups and used to intimidate political rivals.234 
Throughout the 1990s, the Sultan became more active in seeking a separate province 
for North Maluku, a popular and unifying local goal, which both the northern and 
southern faction supported. He also promoted the role of adat (tradition or custom) in 
politics, which, while popular with his own community, was anathema to the 
southern faction and their supporting ethnic groups.235
In 1995, the Sultan was one of the prime movers behind a national political 
movement to establish an Indonesian conference of sultans, a fomm he used to 
promote himself nationally and locally.236 Along with other ‘traditional’ leaders 
across Indonesia, the Sultan was gradually positioning himself to bring a ‘return’ to 
‘traditional’ political authority and customary law in North Maluku. By restoring 
‘traditional’ authority within regional government -  something gradually undermined 
through the post-independence period -  the Sultan hoped to restore the Temate
233 Chapter Three outlines the Sultan’s attempted ‘return’ to local politics.
234 Wilson (2008), p. 68. Chapter Three expands on the Sultan’s use o f youth and militia groups.
235 Van Klinken (2007), p .l 14. See Davidson and Henley (2007) on the rising adat movement in 
Indonesian politics in the 1990s.
236 Van Klinken (2007), p .l 15.
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Sultanate to the heart of political power in the new province. However, as the Sultan 
remained outside both the local bureaucracy and the rising political wings in Golkar, 
he was politically weak. He therefore sought to ‘re’-assert his local power base by 
appealing to the local population as a ‘traditional’ local ruler. Whilst initially, the 
North Maluku district chief backed the Sultan, his support eventually collapsed as 
internal divisions within the local Golkar coalition grew increasingly fractious. The 
following sections highlight these divisions, examined further in Chapter Three in 
the build up to local conflict in 1999.
(ii) The rise o f the ‘southernf political faction
Kiem (1993) writes that during the 1990s conservative (or orthodox) ‘modernist’ 
Islam spread widely in North Maluku, particularly in Temate, following the 
establishment of Islamic schools and foundations by Muhammadiyah, one of the 
largest Islamic organisations in Indonesia.237 Under its influence, he argues, many 
young Muslims in Temate became increasingly opposed to the ‘traditional’ Islamic 
practices in the communities connected to the Temate Sultanate.238 Resentment 
against the Sultan’s rising power in local politics was rife among the political elite. 
The Sultan represented ‘traditional’ communities and religious minorities (including 
the Protestant population) that the students and newer political elites were excluded 
from. Whilst the influence of these communities were on the wane, nationally and 
locally, they were still viewed as threatening, particularly as the nature of the central 
state came up for debate during the reform period. The student community -  many of 
them with a southern ethnic background -  and the ‘southern’ political elite saw new 
opportunities in the rise of Muslim organisations in national politics. A collection of 
elite ‘southern’ groups therefore strongly resisted the Temate Sultan’s resurgence of 
power in local politics, which became an explosive issue in 1999.239
From the 1960s onwards, political culture and authority evolved quite differently in 
the south of Temate and the southern regions of North Maluku than in the northern 
part of the city, Temate Island and Halmahera. As the first section of the chapter 
showed, the southern part of Temate island and Tidore were historically (nominally)
237 Kiem (1993), p. 107.
238 Kiem (1993), pp. 111-112; p.l 16.
239 See Chapter TTiree.
92
under the influence of the Tidore Sultan, whose power waned under Dutch rule. The 
incumbent Sultan of Tidore died in 1967 and he was not replaced until the conflict in 
1999. In contrast, the Temate Sultan, while politically co-opted via his relocation to 
Jakarta by the New Order, still remained at the centre of cultural order in his region 
of influence in the north, including both Christian and Muslim communities, albeit 
with waning levels of political influence at the local level.240 In the absence of a 
Tidore Sultan to counter-balance the Temate Sultan within the same over-arching 
cultural and political framework -  as had been the case historically -  a different 
cultural (and political) trend evolved in southern Temate in the late twentieth
241century.
The new political affiliation in southern Temate and the southern regions drew on 
two factors: rising ‘modernist’ Islamic trends and organisations in national politics 
(which were less salient in the Sultan’s ‘traditional’ heartland) and improved access 
to state employment. The central themes of the evolving political identity of the 
educated elite in the southern part of Temate were middle-class democracy, 
cosmopolitanism and a more ‘modernist’ practice of Islam.242 This movement 
reflected the national trend towards the increasing popularity of a more modernist 
form of Islam away from ‘traditional’ Muslim leaders, such as the sultans.243 But it 
also reflected the rise of a new urban educated class who were not connected to the 
old ‘aristocratic’ (northern) sources of power. As the Temate Sultan sought to 
‘reclaim’ local power, he faced opposition from a faction that was better connected 
to the local state -  and had no ties to the ‘traditional’ authority of the Sultanate.
In the mid-1990s, the leading southern political figure was Bahar Andili, the regent 
of the new Central Halmahera district, which had been created out of North Maluku 
district in 1990. His younger brother, Syamsir Andili, later the Temate mayor, was 
also a leading local bureaucrat, rising to greater prominence during the transition
240 See Visser (1989) on the cultural and economic ties between ‘traditional’ indigenous communities 
in Halmahera to the Temate Sultanate in the 1980s.
241 See Andaya (1993).
242 Van Klinken (2007), p .l 15.
243 Van Klinken (2007), p .l 15.
93
period.244 Bahar’s experience and senior position in the local bureaucracy gave him a 
vital source of political authority. Prior to becoming chief of Central Halmahera 
district, he had directed BAPPEDA, the regional branch of the State Ministry for 
National Development Planning (BAPPENAS). As the holder of successive senior 
local bureaucratic positions, he was therefore a well-known and powerful local 
patron of state resources.
Bahar was not only well-connected in the regional bureaucracy; he was also popular 
and well connected via other political groups. He had been a leading member of the 
regional branch of the National Committee for Indonesian Youth (KNPI) in the 
1980s and through this had won great popularity by inviting a famous Indonesian 
football player to North Maluku -  an unusual event in North Maluku that people still 
remembered in 2005.245 Rising posts within local bureaucracy gave Bahar extensive 
control of local government budgets, thereby creating an extensive patronage base 
and political support both in the civil service and with outside contractors. Given the 
importance of local government in economic and employment terms in North 
Maluku, holding senior bureaucratic positions equalled high political status.246
Whilst Bahar and the Temate Sultan were members of the same overarching ruling 
coalition, embedded within Golkar, each therefore headed quite different political 
and social factions within the organisation. Van Klinken (2007) and Wilson (2008) 
argue that Bahar’s many HMI-affiliated supporters, coming predominantly from 
Temate’s southern migrant community, as well as southern ethnic groups in Central 
Halmahera, added to his political strength. Saiful Bahry Ruray -  HMI alumnus, and a 
rising star in local politics in the late 1990s -  also reported that HMI alumni were an 
important influence in the political movement against the Temate Sultan within local 
branches of Golkar.247 Van Klinken (2007) describes this group as the emergent
244 In the 2005 local elections, Syamsir (the incumbent) successfully ran against Nita, the Sultan’s 
fifth wife, for Temate mayor. This election mirrored these earlier political conflicts between Bahar 
and the Sultan in the late 1990s. Chapters Three and Six discuss these two contests in more detail.
245 Interview, local journalist, June 2005, Temate.
246 Chapters Four, Five and Six return to expand on this point.
247 Interview, Temate, 19 October 2005.
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‘challenger elite’ to the political power and ‘symbolic primacy’ of the Temate 
Sultan.248
By the end of the 1990s, the contest between the social and political networks of 
these two political factions came to a head, and increasingly mapped onto rising 
‘ethnic’ clashes in local politics. The merger of local and elite inter-group contests 
played a central role in the eventual escalation of the North Maluku conflict of 1999- 
2000, discussed in Chapter Three. The eventual conflict dynamic forced most key 
players in local politics behind the anti-Sultan faction, in support of Bahar and the 
other leading figures in the southern elite. Before Bahar played the conflict to his 
advantage, however, it was his position as one of the most senior local bureaucratic 
figures that was his major source of political strength.
(iii)The political rise o f  the Makian ethnic group
If you want to find Temate people, go to Gamalama market;
If you want to find Tidore people, go to Bastiong Market;
If you want to find Makian people, go to the Governor’s office.
Temate saying.249
During the later phase of the New Order in North Maluku, members of the Makian 
elite become one of the more important groups in local politics. Out of the three 
‘southern’ ethnic groups rising in influence through the 1990s -  the Makian, Tidore 
and Sanana groups -  the Makian had the greatest social and political influence, via 
better representation in the civil service and more senior bureaucratic positions.250 In 
the 1960s and 1970s many Makian communities had migrated to Temate to access 
education facilities unavailable on the more remote North Malukan islands. Temate
248 According to Van Klinken (2007, p. 116), this grouping was the major oppositional force to the 
Sultan’s group in the 1990s. See also Kiem (1993), p .103. Tomagola (2000) presents an alternative 
interpretation o f  the rival alliances. He argues that in the mid-1990s a group o f HMI alumni took 
control o f the local chapter o f Golkar and, at first, supported the Sultan by selecting him as regional 
Golkar chairman. He argues that this strange but strategic Golkar alliance -  o f the ‘modernist’ Islamic 
faction and the Sultan’s followers -  held out against Bahar’s faction until the conflict o f  1999. In the 
wake o f the eventual defeat o f  the pro-Sultan (and Christian) forces during the conflict, local elites 
would have been eager to re-write any initial alliances to the Sultan’s faction, and what was eventually 
a solid factional divide between those for and against the Temate Sultan had been more fluid. 
Tomagola’s analysis could therefore be right. However, the majority o f  local analysts and informants 
disagreed with this interpretation.
249 “Cari orang Temate, di Pasar Gamalama; cari orang Tidore, di Pasar Bastion; cari orang Makian, 
di Kantor Gubunor” -  local saying repeated by Abdul Kahar Lima Tahu, 2 June 2005, Temate.
250 Wilson (2008), pp. 66-67.
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residents considered the new migrants ‘backward’ at the time, due to their lack of 
education and different culture.251 However, by the 1990s, the Makian were 
reportedly the most educated and successful ethnic group in North Maluku. Despite 
comprising only nine per cent of the local population, Makian MPs constituted 17 
per cent of the new provincial parliament in 1999.252 The first elected governor of 
North Maluku, Thaib Armain, was Makian, as were many of his senior advisors.253
Jusuf Abdulrahman -  one of the local elite who had benefitted from the New Order 
expansion of education -  was one of the highest ranking members of the southern 
elite by the 1990s. As Rector of Khairun University, regional chair of Golkar for a 
period, as well as chairman of MUI (the Indonesian Council of Islamic Scholars) for 
North Maluku and a local ICMI leader, he held influence across all the main political 
organisations. Himself half-Makian, Abdulrahman argued:
Following independence the Makian rose up in power in North 
Maluku. There are three reasons for this: they study hard, they work 
hard, and, because they are from a small volcanic island with a high 
population, they tend to migrate, searching for a better life. All the 
leading government figures in North Maluku are Makian now, thanks 
to this.254
One of the main reasons for the rising importance of the Makian group in local 
politics was the way their community prioritised education, which enabled state 
employment, both of which had expanded under the New Order. The Makian were 
thereby strongly represented in both Golkar and the local bureaucracy, giving them 
an advantage in local politics. Another key informant argued that ethnic patronage 
played a key role in Makian advancement through the civil service, “(the Makian) 
have very strong clan links and work hard to protect each other’s jobs. One of the 
reasons they dominate politics now is because of this.”255
By the 1990s, the top leadership o f Khairun University and most local government 
departments were dominated by Makian bureacrats. Thaib Armain -  later the first 
elected North Maluku Governor -  was the district secretary (sekretaris daerah) of
251 Wilson (2008) citing field interviews, p.66.
252 Figures cited in Wilson (2008), pp.66-67.
253 Chapters Four and Six discuss Thaib’s rising role in local politics from late 1999 onwards.
254 Interview, Jusuf Abdulrahman, 1 June 2005, Temate.
255 Interview, local NGO staff, Temate, 5 May 2005.
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North Maluku district between 1989 and 1997, giving him a ten year hold over 
appointments and promotions within the local civil service. He was later appointed 
provincial secretary (sekretaris daerah) for North Maluku province in 1999, the most 
senior provincial level bureaucratic post. A decade at the top of the local bureaucracy 
meant he amassed a wide range of clients and political supporters, placing him in an 
influential position at the end of the 1990s, when competition over control of the 
local state increased and the new provincial government was established.256
By the end of the 1990s, conflict had increased between the different political 
factions based within the local state, located in different wings of the overarching 
ruling coalition under Golkar, and appealing to different local ethnic groups. The 
contest for power between these factions was exacerbated not only by the opening up 
of a new political era at the end of the Suharto regime, and the potential for great 
changes in national and regional government, but also by the local development of a 
new goldmine in north Halmahera in 1997. The prospects of greatly increased local 
government revenues from the mine further added to the economic stakes of conflict 
between the different factions.257
On one side of the contest was the rising ‘southern’ faction, led by Bahar Andili, 
Central Halmahera district chief. This faction was linked to HMI, the influential 
Muslim student group whose graduates had grown increasingly powerful in Golkar, 
rooted in the top echelons of local bureaucratic power, and fiercely opposed to the 
Temate Sultan’s political resurgence. The ‘northern’ faction, headed by the Sultan, 
stood in opposition. While also contained within Golkar, this faction was more 
dependent on ‘traditional’ ties, dating back to the colonial era, with communities in 
the northern parts of Temate and Halmahera and was less closely linked to the higher 
branches of the local state bureaucracy. Between 1997 and 1999, these two factions 
briefly united behind the movement to create a new province in North Maluku, but 
by late 1999, this coalition had dramatically fallen apart, as Chapter Three explores.
256 Chapters Three, Four and Six explore Thaib’s rise to greater power in local politics due to 
increased control within the regional bureaucracy.
257 See Chapter Three, Section 3.3, on escalating tensions between different ethnic and political 
groups from 1998 onwards over access to employment in the goldmine and revenues derived from it.
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2.4 Conclusion
In conclusion, I summarise the legacies from each of the three main historical 
periods outlined in this chapter on the North Malukan political elite, including the 
creation of strong local factions within the state-based elite. First, the arrival of Islam 
in the mid-fifteenth century, and subsequent European colonisation between the 
sixteenth and eighteenth centuries, left several important legacies for North Malukan 
politics. This period centralised and concentrated local political power in the 
sultanates, first via their conversion to Islam and second via their relationship with 
colonial powers. Colonial competition eventually led to the dominance of the Temate 
Sultanate over the other three North Malukan sultanates, as the Dutch emerged as the 
triumphant colonial power. The Temate Sultan, from this point onwards, relied on 
the financial and political support of external sources of power (especially the 
colonial regime) in order to maintain local political authority. The contests between 
the colonial powers over Temate and Tidore also created a ‘north-south’ political and 
cultural divide in North Maluku, which continued to be relevant into the late 
twentieth century.
Second, the late colonial to early republican eras marked the beginning of the decline 
of the Temate Sultan -  from a position of supreme local authority to a minor regional 
role, and then towards gradual incorporation into the central state, thereby 
marginalising the Sultan in local politics. Another important feature of this period 
was that although North Maluku was not a centre of the 1950s regional rebellions 
against the new unitary republic, it was geographically close enough that the region 
was denied independent provincial status. This meant the northern reaches of Maluku 
continued to be governed from Ambon, as under the late colonial period, proving a 
source of frustration to the North Malukan elite. Then, during the brief period of 
parliamentary democracy in the 1950s, religious and aristocratically-based political 
parties were popular in North Maluku -  as elsewhere in Indonesia -  but this was not 
to last. Sukarno’s Guided Democracy period, and its extension via the establishment 
of the New Order, led to the triumph of ‘state’ over ‘societal’ political organisations, 
alongside the dual-policy of exclusion and incorporation of Muslim and aristocratic 
organisations into state-run politics.
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Third, the establishment of the New Order regime had several lasting impacts on 
North Malukan politics. First, the New Order extended the central state’s presence 
into the region through the expansion of state bureaucracy and public services. 
Second, the rise of Golkar nationally extended into North Maluku and enabled the 
creation of a new local political elite connected to the state bureaucracy, and housed 
within Golkar, rather than local forms of ‘traditional’ authority in the sultanates. 
Third, in the context of an expanding and centralising state, and with the rise of 
Golkar membership as the central mode for political, social and economic mobility, 
the Temate Sultan was increasingly drawn into the centre, and away from local 
politics. Fourth, the New Order state placed a central emphasis on economic 
development policies in the Outer Islands. This had important modernising effects on 
the regional economy and social structure of North Maluku, ensuring a revitalisation 
of Temate as a “centre on the periphery”, and placing access to the state bureaucracy 
at the centre of local success.
Finally, in the late New Order period, national political dynamics shifted again. A 
class of educated urban Muslims rose through the national political ranks, and the 
New Order’s anti-Islam policy shifted course. This national shift also changed local 
political opportunity structures. Within Golkar locally, as nationally, the governing 
coalition in North Maluku grew increasingly divided as different factions began to 
compete over control of the local state. In North Maluku, the dominant ‘southern’ 
faction was led by Bahar Andili, the district chief of Central Halmahera district. This 
southern alliance was deeply embedded in the top echelons of local bureaucratic 
power and with a wide network of elite supporters and patronage loyalties, based in 
their capacity to access and disburse state resources, had a solid political base. 
However, they faced a rising challenge from the Temate Sultan.
The Sultan’s re-emergence in local politics reflected a national movement re­
claiming a role for ‘tradition’ in local politics. His group was also networked through 
Golkar, but was more dependent on ‘traditional’ communal ties, appealing to the 
northern ethnic groups, and incorporating the Christian minority. This faction was 
more weakly linked to the higher branches of the local state bureaucracy. When the 
Sultan claimed a Golkar parliamentary position in the North Maluku district 
legislature in 1997, this signalled his official challenge to the southern elite.
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Overall, under both Dutch rule and the Suharto regime, local elites were deeply 
integrated into powerful, authoritarian, external state structures. As this central 
authority weakened towards 1998, and as factional politics increased locally (as 
nationally), both factions within the North Maluku political elite saw their chance to 
gain and consolidate local power. This rising factional contest sets the stage for the 
violent events that followed the official end to the New Order in May 1998. Chapter 
Three, which follows, on local political events during the transition period of 1998- 
1999, and the subsequent year of severe violence, covers these dynamics in detail.
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Chapter Three - 
From political coalition to ethno-religious violence: 
intra-elite conflict and reconfiguration in North Maluku (1998-2000)
Introduction
The New Order officially ended when B.J. Habibie succeeded Suharto as the third 
Indonesian President in May 1998. The new government quickly proposed greater 
regional fiscal and political autonomy as one of its major reform policies to improve 
local governance and appease growing regional discontent. As Chapter Two showed, 
at the end of the New Order, the North Malukan political elite was comprised of a 
collection of factions, united overall within Golkar, but growing increasingly 
competitive towards the end of the 1990s. For each faction, the transition moment 
offered a unique opportunity to secede from Maluku and form a new province. By 
1998, this historic goal was imbued with the political and economic incentives 
inherent in the prospect of greater regional autonomy. North Malukan students and 
activists, the Temate Sultan, top-ranking state bureaucrats and party bosses all united 
in the ensuing lobbying effort to create a new province. This introduction briefly 
summarises the rapid transition from local elite coalition to intra-elite sponsored 
violence, before the chapter analyses the details of these events.
Two of the most senior political rivals in the North Maluku elite, Mudaffar Syah -  
the Temate Sultan and newly appointed chair of the North Maluku district parliament 
-  and Bahar Andili -  the powerful and popular district regent of Central Halmahera -  
worked together throughout 1998, alongside student activists, to advocate for a new 
province. By October 1999 the elite-student coalition had succeeded: President 
Habibie signed North Maluku into law as the first new province in the post-New 
Order period, just before losing office. However, as the lobbying process intensified 
between 1998 and 1999, intra-elite divides within the local political coalition 
widened and the two opposing factions sought to shape the composition, location and 
leadership of the new province around their own interests. Using a combination of 
electoral and extra-legal means, the Temate Sultan rapidly amassed local political
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positions, becoming chief of the North Maluku branch of Golkar. By the middle of 
1999 the Sultan was the leading candidate for the North Maluku governorship, but 
his rise was vigorously challenged by the ‘southern’ faction.
Tensions between the two elite factions escalated alongside rising inter-ethnic 
clashes in the north of Halmahera (the largest island in North Maluku). With the 
prospect of local administrative reorganisation via regional autonomy, the southern 
elite backed the creation of a new sub-district for a large community of Makian 
migrants living in the north of Halmahera, on the Temate Sultan’s ‘traditional’ 
territory. The Makian group had gained considerable influence in the local state 
under the New Order, as Chapter Two highlighted, and sought to promote Makian 
interests at both the elite and local levels. The new sub-district proposal was opposed 
from the outset by the locally indigenous Kao community -  a majority Christian 
group, historically affiliated with the Temate Sultan.258 However, while the Temate 
Sultan symbolically protected all North Malukan Christians, including the Kao, this 
small indigenous group lacked formal political representation and leverage and their 
(initially) peaceful protests were ignored.259
In October 1999, just as the new province was inaugurated, “localised” conflict 
between the Kao and Makian groups spilled into Temate with the dramatic arrival of 
around 10,000 Makian from north Halmahera, forcibly evacuated following Kao 
attacks in retaliation for the Makian student group supported destruction of several 
Kao villages.260 By November, Temate city had imploded into street riots between 
pro-Makian (southern) and pro-Kao (northern) groups. The conflict increasingly 
acquired a religious dynamic as the Kao were associated with Christians, although 
original fractures were not along religious lines. By the end of November, the entire 
Christian minority of Temate and Tidore had been forcibly expelled and evacuated. 
Under pressure from the political elite, local security forces abandoned attempts to 
prevent attacks on the Kao and Christian communities. By the end of December -  
only six months after leading the race to become governor -  the Temate Sultan was
258 The Kao community was approximately 90 per cent Protestant and 10 per cent Muslim.
259 See Duncan (2007) on the problems posed by regional autonomy for small indigenous ethnic 
communities, including the Kao. Because o f a lack o f  elite political representation in local 
government, they have consistently lost out in decisions affecting their livelihoods.
260 I say ‘localised’ here because it is my contention that the conflict between these two groups was 
never entirely ‘local’, although violence was initially contained at the local level.
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forcibly evacuated. He never recovered his political position and popular support of 
this period, as Chapter Six later demonstrates.
From the initiation of localised inter-ethnic violence during the provincial lobbying 
process in August 1999, to the eventual declaration of a national civil emergency in 
North Maluku in July 2000, this was the most violent period in the region’s post­
independence history. By some accounts the North Maluku conflict caused more 
deaths than any of the other major incidents of ‘communal’ violence during the ten- 
year transition period, and almost equalled death rates in the Aceh conflict.261 
Between one fifth and one third o f the local population of 700,000 was displaced 
during the conflict, contributing to a severe local socio-economic crisis.262 The later 
phases of violence in the northern reaches of Halmahera had national political 
implications, triggering the foundation of Laskar Jihad, and other radical militant 
Islamic groups, which then launched attacks in several parts of Eastern Indonesia.263
Over five hundred years of trading and colonial history had created a richly multi­
ethnic region comprised of tens of different ethnic and religious groups. As Chapter 
Two outlined, Temate was a multi-ethnic city long prior to European colonisation, 
with traders from the Middle East, Southern China and Java resident alongside local 
ethnic groups from the thirteenth century onwards. But this long history of regional 
cosmopolitanism was overturned in a matter of weeks. Just one month after the 
provincial inauguration, the new capital, Temate, was strictly divided between ethnic 
Temateans and their northern kin, in the north, and southern ethnic groups and their 
affiliates, in the south, with militia barriers between the two zones. The long resident 
(predominantly Christian) ethnic Chinese were expelled alongside Christian civil 
servants, business families, religious leaders and ordinary residents, leaving only 
Muslim residents behind.
261 Varshney et al (2004). While problematic (the Varshney study relied on local newspapers to 
estimate deaths from communal violence, whose coverage was unreliable), the study’s figures are at 
least indicative o f the conflict’s impact.
262 See Chapter Four on the socio-economic affects o f the conflict.
263 The activities o f outside groups like Laskar Jihad  exacerbated conflicts in several parts o f Eastern 
Indonesia. The International Crisis Group (2000a), p.7, claimed the group played a role in the North 
Maluku conflict, although it is unlikely they had a significant impact. See Wilson (2008). See Hasan 
(2002) on the origins o f the group.
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This chapter explores the major political events and phases of conflict escalation 
between 1998 and 2000, the first two years of democratic transition in North Maluku. 
It focuses on two central points: first, the role of the state-based political elite in 
initiating and escalating violence; and, second, the effects of conflict on local elite 
composition. I explain how the local elite coalition moved so rapidly from collective 
action, towards creating a new province, to the sponsorship of inter-group violence, 
with the aim of eliminating factional rivals and accumulating power. I outline the 
political use of ‘ethno-religious’ violence by the state-based elite on both sides of the 
conflict.264 In terms of explaining overall political continuity o f the local state-based 
elite in North Maluku -  the central issue of the thesis -  I demonstrate that it is also 
important to account for reconfiguration within the local elite. Finally, and linking 
back to the literature discussion in Chapter One, I demonstrate that the conflict was 
ultimately a contest within the state-based elite, and not a contest between ‘state’ and 
‘society’.
The chapter is structured as follows. Section One frames the chapter within the 
literature on the relationship between national democratic reforms and changing 
dynamics in local politics (linking back to Chapter One), as well as the main 
scholarly debates on the North Maluku conflict. Section Two covers the gradual 
fracturing of the local elite coalition over the selection of the provincial capital and 
governor and increased contest over other potential state resources. Three outlines 
the initiation of inter-ethnic conflict between the Kao and Makian groups in north 
Halmahera, a ‘localised’ conflict in which political activists and state elites were 
closely involved and Four the three subsequent phases of violence, as the conflict 
escalated towards province-wide religious violence. Section Five concludes with an 
assessment of the local elite’s role in the conflict and its consequent effects on the 
composition of the local elite.
264 The conflict, during different phases, appealed to local political activists and community 
participants, whose goals were sometimes aligned with the political elite’s, but this angle is not my 
focus here. See Duncan (2005a) on the motivations behind communal participation in the violence. As 
with ethno-religious violence elsewhere, at key points o f die conflict, the goals o f the elite, the mob, 
and other activists overlapped. At these critical junctures, the conflict escalated rapidly. See Brass 
(1997).
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3.1 The North Maluku conflict in context
Those screaming for blood and revenge in the crowd are making use 
of slogans provided to them as a justification for actions that serve 
either their interests or those of their political organisations, or for 
which they are paid, partly in cash and partly by the loot they gain -  
under the cover provided by the crowds so massed, by the 
justification given for the violence, and by the near certainty that they 
will escape prosecution.
Brass (2003).265
Before turning to the escalation of political conflict to mass violence in North 
Maluku, at the end of the twentieth century, this section first frames these events 
within two areas of debate on the transition period in Indonesia. First, I locate the 
conflict in the wider context of post-1998 national government reforms -  in 
particular how these reforms changed the nature of competition over the local state. 
The North Malukan conflict does not stand in isolation, but makes sense against a 
backdrop of shifting terms and parameters of competition for local power within the 
state. Second, I frame my interpretation of the North Maluku conflict in relation to 
the positions of the main scholars on the issue.266 My interpretation differs from 
previous research in its emphasis and the time period considered. My focus is on the 
role of the local state-based political elite from the outset -  on those providing the 
slogans, the cover, the motivation and justification for mass violence. I also interpret 
the conflict as one event in a series of political negotiations within the state-based 
elite over control of the local state, over a ten-year period, rather than as a discrete 
event.
(i) The impact o f regional autonomy
In 1999 President Habibie’s government passed a series of laws on regional 
autonomy, transferring the majority of fiscal and political powers to the local (i.e. 
district and city) levels of government. These reforms were central in creating new 
opportunities to contest local politics during the transition period. Political pressure 
to devolve greater power to regional governments, particularly in resource rich 
regions, had been growing since the mid-1990s, as Bowen (2003) and McCarthy 
(2004) have described in detail. For the central government planners, regional
265 Brass (2003), p.362, on the role o f  political elites in Hindu-Muslim violence in India.
266 For details o f key events during the conflict, I am reliant on the ample research conducted by other 
scholars, whilst also drawing on my own fieldwork. See Chapter One on research methodology.
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autonomy (also known as decentralisation) was a means to stabilise the democratic 
transition, following national economic crisis, by making local government more 
accountable, and transferring government resources more directly, to the local 
population.267 It was also a way to minimise regional rebellions, as power was 
transferred to the local level of government, rather than more powerful provincial 
units -  conceivably independent units of government.268 Districts and cities offered 
just enough local autonomy to satisfy local demands for greater autonomy, without 
threatening the central government’s authority.269
The planned transfer of both political authority and fiscal revenue control to local 
governments, under the 1999 regional autonomy laws (Laws 22 and 25/1999), 
dramatically changed the nature of -  and interest in -  sub-national government, by 
raising the competition stakes at varying levels of the state elite.270 For local elites, 
the reforms were a major opportunity to reconfigure local government in their 
interests, and to better and more directly access the political and economic resources 
of the Indonesian state. Regional autonomy reforms triggered an outward and 
downward shift of political power and competition, later exacerbated by the 
electoralisation of local state power through the opening up of the party political 
system from 1999 and the implementation of direct elections from 2005.271 
Importantly, for North Maluku, regional autonomy also presented the opportunity to 
revise administrative boundaries and form new regional governments via pemekaran, 
or re-districting.272
Regional autonomy legislation required that a new district should be created from 
three or more existing sub-districts. This meant each level of administrative 
boundary revision had important effects on the standing of political coalitions up and
267 Decentralisation and regional autonomy are used inter-changeably in the Indonesian context.
268 Separatist movements in Aceh and Papua, for example, tended to map onto provincial boundaries.
269 Duncan (2007), p.717.
270 Law 22/1999 on Regional Governance and Law 25/1999 on the Fiscal Balance between the Central 
Government and the Regions were later revised, respectively, by Law 32/2004 on Regional 
Administration and Law 33/2004 on the Fiscal Balance between the Central Government and the 
Regional Government. The initial 1999 laws transferred an unprecedented degree o f discretionary 
political and budgetary powers to the district and city level o f government, which directly threatened 
the traditionally far-reaching powers o f the gubernatorial level o f government. President Megawati 
sought to retrench some o f  the powers awarded to the local level to the gubernatorial level o f  
government through the 2004 revisions.
271 Buehler (2008a) considers this process in South Sulawesi.
272 Chapter One raised the definitions o f pemekaran: I use redistricting, following Aragon (2004).
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down the government hierarchy. As Duncan argues, the regional autonomy 
legislation dramatically, “increased the prestige and profitability of local politics.”273 
Several of the main analysts of Eastern Indonesian politics link increased local 
competition over access to and control over new local government resources to the 
escalation of ethno-religious violence during the transition, as Chapter One 
discussed.274 In North Maluku, the prospect of regional autonomy triggered an 
escalation in competition between different groups over the possibility of newly 
available government -  and other -  resources, as this chapter further explores. I 
argue here, however, that it was the local political elite’s use of the new opportunities 
for restructuring power, and the manipulation of local grievances towards these elite 
ends, that formed the driving force behind the dramatic escalation of incidents to 
mass violence, rather than communal level competition.
(ii) The scholarly debate over the North Maluku conflict 
Within the main scholarly analyses, there are several variants on why the principal 
lines of friction fell as they did during the North Maluku conflict. The debate is less 
one of outright disagreement, and more a matter of degree -  but the nuances are 
important for understanding the different ways the conflict is understood, and where 
this thesis stands, in contrast.275 One area of contention is over who the main 
organising groups were in the conflict during its peak (November-December 1999). 
A second point relates to the degree of organisation -  or spontaneity -  in the rapidly 
escalating violence and a third is over how ‘local’ the initial phase of ethnic conflict 
really was.276
On the first issue, analysts generally agree that the organisational divide during the 
first phase of conflict fell between the (migrant) Makian and (indigenous) Kao ethnic
273 Duncan (2005a), p.59. ‘Regional’ here refers to provincial level government and ‘local’ to city 
and/or district level government. The two terms are frequently mixed up, especially as ‘regional 
autonomy’ generally refers to decentralisation to the city/district and not provincial leveL
274 See, for example, Bubandt (2004), Aragon (2001), Vel (2001), and International Crisis Group 
(2003b).
275 1 am indebted to the work o f the scholars discussed here; my interpretation o f the conflict was only 
possible because o f their detailed earlier work.
276 The key authors disagree -  to some extent - on the root causes o f  conflict, but my focus here is on 
how and why the conflict escalated, rather than its deeper roots. See Chapter One on debates over the 
transitional conflicts in Eastern Indonesia.
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communities in the north of Halmahera.277 There is some debate over the role of the 
political elite in enabling this ‘local’ conflict to escalate, which I come to below. But 
there are at least four different interpretations of the principal organisational divides 
at the conflict’s peak, when violent incidents rapidly escalated between groups 
towards the end of 1999. These are divisions through political party competition, the 
‘modemist’/ ’traditionalist’ split within the local Muslim community, the historical 
divide between the Temate and Tidore sultanates, and an ethnic divide between 
northern and southern groups. In fact, that all these divides were possible, but 
sometimes merged, shows that local identities were relatively fluid, depending on the 
political context of events.278
In the first interpretation, Duncan (2005a) emphasises party competition and 
affiliation at the elite level, arguing that the contest between the pro-Sultan and pro- 
Bahar factions fell along party/religious lines between Golkar, the secular party for 
which the Sultan stood, and PPP, the Islamic party, backed by Bahar. However, this 
interpretation misrepresents party politics in the late New Order. Chapter Two 
demonstrated how during the New Order, Golkar was less a distinctive party and 
more an overarching form of political organisation within which political factions 
competed. Within the North Maluku branch of Golkar, the more ‘modernist’ leaning 
Muslim groups were closer to Bahar Andili’s faction, and the more ‘traditionalist’ 
groups favoured the Sultan, but both fell within the same overall ‘party’ organisation. 
Bahar appealed both to PPP and Golkar supporters, and ‘party’ politics was not a 
critical elite or community division.
The second perspective, reflected in Van Klinken’s (2007) analysis, stresses the 
contest between different factions of the local Muslim political elite. Van Klinken 
argues that the two main factions drew on the rivalry accumulating through the 1990s
277 When I refer to the ‘Kao’ and ‘Makian’ ethnic communities I do not assume that they were 
undifferentiated groups, without social inequalities or complex power structures operating at the micro 
level. However, my research focused on the meso, not micro level, o f local politics, and 
differentiating within these groups went beyond the scope o f this thesis. See Duncan (2005a; 2007), 
for example, on micro dynamics within the Kao community.
278 Local identities -  particularly ethnic and religious identities -  grew more fixed as the conflict 
escalated, thus providing evidence for the argument that conflict creates ‘ethnic’ identity, rather than 
the other way around. As the violence subsided, and conditions ‘normalised’, inter-ethnic political 
dynamics changed again. For example, during the 2007 gubernatorial elections fractures within the 
‘southern’ ethnic groups grew more politically salient than the north/south divide. See Chapter Six.
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between the Islamic ‘traditionalists’, connected to the Temate Sultan, and the Islamic 
‘modernists’, supporting Bahar Andili.279 He argues that Bahar’s supporters formed a 
“challenger elite” to the Temate Sultan’s ‘traditional’ authority throughout this 
period, and aligned with a ‘modernist’ interpretation of Islam, which was 
increasingly influential in Temate (particularly among migrant groups) from the 
1970s onwards, as well as linked locally to the expansion of the New Order state.280 
Van Klinken (2007) describes the increasingly popular modernist version of Islam as 
the “counter-theme” to the more ‘traditional’ (aristocratic) practices of the Temate 
Sultan and his followers.
With hindsight, however, the political significance of this “counter-theme” prior to 
1999 -  and the creation of the new province -  is debatable. Before the reform 
moment it was not clear that a ‘modemist’/ ‘traditionalist’ divide was the dominant 
political fault-line among the local elite, although it played a role in factional 
competition. It was only when competition over the benefits and resources flowing 
from the reorganisation of local government -  in particular, the creation of the new 
province -  increased that an ‘ideological’ clash moved to the forefront of local 
politics. Even then it played out largely within the overarching Golkar coalition. The 
use of ‘religious’ differences as a mobilising tool between Muslim communities 
played a central role in the escalating violence between pro and anti-Temate Sultan 
groups in Temate city, but it was not an over-riding source of contest prior to this 
point.
A third interpretation places the historical (cultural or colonial) division between the 
Temate and Tidore sultanates at the centre of the conflict. Alhadar (2000) argues that 
this historic rivalry re-appeared during the initial phase of the conflict, when Temate 
groups supported the Kao, and Tidore communities supported the Makian, with each 
seeking to gain influence in their respective areas.281 Alhadar argues that the Tidore 
community feared the resurgence of their ‘traditional enemies’ in Temate. This
279 ‘Traditional’ here refers to the less-orthodox strand o f Islamic practice in Indonesia, linked closely 
to pre-Islamic history. The ‘modernist’ (‘orthodox’) strand links more closely to Middle Eastern 
interpretations o f Islam.
280 Van Klinken (2007), p. 116. ‘Traditional’ here refers to the colonial roots o f the Temate Sultan’s 
authority. The post-independence New Order regime enabled the rise o f  local groups not connected to 
the Sultanate in North Maluku. Chapter Two discusses the colonial roots o f ‘traditional’ authority.
281 The International Crisis Group (2000b) also presents this interpretation.
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chapter demonstrates, however, that the political ‘restoration’ of the Tidore Sultan by 
the Temate Sultan’s main rival, Bahar Andili, in the midst of rising community level 
conflict was a calculated political move. This counter-restoration (designed to match 
the Temate Sultan’s resurgence during the late 1990s) deliberately invoked long- 
buried local historic symbolism, inspiring the southern ethnic groups to support the 
anti-Temate Sultan political faction. History was re-imagined and revived by 
political leaders, not spontaneously invoked.282 Concerns over ‘ancient’ rivalries 
between the two Sultanates became relevant only in the face of heightened contest 
over the benefits that would flow from leadership over the new provincial 
government.
The fourth interpretation of the main dividing lines within the conflict relates to the 
contest for power between the northern and southern ethnic groups, which links to 
(and overlaps with) the previous perspectives. As with the Muslim 
modernist/traditional and Temate/Tidore dividing lines, the ethnic clash between 
northern and southern groups was represented and driven forward by their elite 
leaders. The Temate Sultan historically represented the ‘northern’ ethnic groups, and 
the rival faction was headed by a triumvirate of ‘southern’ leaders, with Bahar Andili 
at the forefront. Tomagola (2000), Van Klinken (2007) and Wilson (2008) all 
emphasise this critical dividing line. These ethnic divisions, along with the other 
dividing lines, became increasingly important during the conflict, acting as a 
mobilising force, rather than being a characteristic of inherently opposed groups. 
Given the legacies of both the New Order period -  where the Makian and affiliated 
southern ethnic groups had increasingly benefitted from state jobs and patronage, in 
contrast to the fading role of the northern groups -  and the colonial era -  when the 
Dutch favoured northern groups under the Temate Sultan’s influence -  historical 
divides between local ethnic groups were some of the easiest for elites to mobilise 
and ‘activate’ during the conflict period.283 I therefore pay close attention to these 
ethnic fault-lines in the following discussion of the different phases of local conflict 
escalation.
282 See Hobsbawm and Ranger (1983) on the re-invention o f  tradition.
283 Mamdani (2001) makes similar arguments for ethnic conflict in Rwanda.
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On the second issue of contention -  again a relative point of debate -  almost all 
scholars of the North Maluku conflict agree that the political elite had strong interests 
in, and played critical roles in organising, the conflict from its outset. Some hold one 
faction of the elite more responsible than the other: for example, Tomagola (2000) 
places greater blame on the Temate Sultan; Nanere (2000), in contrast, holds the 
southern elite leaders more responsible. Only Bubandt (2001, 2002) regards the 
escalation of conflict towards province-wide religious violence as a largely 
spontaneous grassroots process, emphasising crowd and communal response to 
rumours and provocation in the context of great insecurity arising from changing 
national and regional dynamics. Whilst the changing national context is a vital part 
of understanding why the conflict took place, the degree of organisation by opposing 
sides within the elite, and their deep interests in conflict escalation, disproves these 
‘spontaneity’ claims.
Finally, on the third area of contention, Wilson (2005, 2008) views the initial phase 
of violence between the Kao and Makian groups, as genuinely local in origin, 
although he recognises the active role of the political elite in perpetuating and 
escalating later phases of violence between the two groups. He dismisses an elite- 
level analysis of the first phase of the conflict, arguing that this was related to local 
land and economic disputes, both historically and geographically situated, rather than 
elite level conflicts over provincial positions. But Wilson acknowledges that the 
southern political elite supported the initial outbreak of conflict, through active 
support of Makian organisations. Their actions show that the political elite cannot be 
entirely separated from the initial phases of ‘communal’ or ‘local’ violence, even if 
an elite lens fails to account for the deeper roots of this early phase of the conflict 
(which is not my task here).
The main difference in my perspective on the conflict, as it relates to the overall 
thesis, is that I see the conflict period as one of several key events in the decade-long 
period of democratic transition (from 1998 to 2008) in North Maluku, rather than 
examining it in isolation, as the above analysts have. If the conflict was part of a 
longer-run intra-elite contest over local state power, carried out in different forms 
over the ten year transition period, as this thesis holds, then the crux of my analysis 
must centre on the actions and motivations of the political elite. Chapter Two
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discussed the first phases of this intra-elite contest, with the rise in factional 
competition within the local Golkar during the late New Order. This chapter outlines 
the shift from inter-factional contest towards outright violence between proxy groups 
sponsored by the political elite. Following the end to violence in mid-2000, the 
contest returned to intra-factional competition over state positions, through election 
contests, and was largely carried out in non-violent ways (examined in Chapters Four 
to Six). Only with the elite’s strong interest in aiding the escalation of violence in 
order to accumulate power and eliminate rivals could it have reached such severe 
levels. But once the genie of mass violence was out of the bottle, it was hard to 
contain -  as the Temate Sultan learned to his ultimate political cost.
3.2 From elite allies to enemies (May 1998 -  August 1999)
The movement to create a new province temporarily unified the North Malukan 
political elite towards the same goal, between mid-1998 and mid-1999. But 
underneath their superficial unity, severe tensions grew between the two main 
factions, the northern and southern elite. The key points of contention were the 
location of the future provincial capital and the selection of the first provincial 
governor, decisions which would determine political and economic power in the new 
province. Between August and October 1999 intra-elite conflict grew in Temate, as 
‘ethnic’ conflict simultaneously escalated in north Halmahera. The two conflicts 
quickly and explosively merged, with the elite factions drawing on the localised 
ethnic conflict and magnifying it to their political advantage. This section covers the 
three key phases in the evolution from factional alliance towards increasingly hostile 
and eventually outright conflict.
(i) Unifying elite interests in the new province
Despite the factional nature of the local governing coalition in the late 1990s -  as
outlined in Chapter Two -  the political elite were unified in their desire to gain
independence from the Maluku provincial government in Ambon. Both factions
sought the greater political prestige that would accme from creating a new province,
as well as the new sources of development funding from the central government that
would result. On top of these incentives, the eventual law to establish the new
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province was, as Van Klinken puts it, “a building contractor’s dream. Not merely a 
slew of new government offices, but an entirely new provincial capital city would 
be up for tender.”284 Not only infrastructure contracts, but also new civil service 
posts would be created. Both of these would largely be allocated by the governor, 
making it a highly lucrative and strongly contested post. A new province also 
created scope for establishing new districts, district capitals, and sub-districts, all of 
them requiring their own offices and infrastructure and creating employment 
opportunities in contracting and the civil service. Until the central government 
agreed to a new province, contests over the benefits posed by these new posts were 
(partially) submerged in the lobbying process.
In 1997, a North Malukan youth organisation proposed the separation of the North 
Maluku region from Maluku province, re-igniting a historic goal of the local elite. 
The ‘Maloko Kie Raha Students Association’ organized a symposium on the 
proposal, attended by some of the highest ranking local elites -  the Temate Sultan, 
Bahar Andili and Syamsir Andili, along with central government representatives. 
Then Maluku Governor Saleh Latuconsina also signalled his support for the creation 
of a new province.285 Gaining Ambon and Jakarta’s support for a new province was 
essential, so the students focused on lobbying the highest levels of the regional and 
national political elite who had an interest in North Maluku.
One of the leading figures in the lobbying group was a popular student leader and 
HMI activist, Saiful Bahri Ruray.286 Saiful obtained the backing of Bahar Andili, the 
‘southern’ faction’s leader, and his team proposed a new North Maluku province at a 
Jakarta conference with Home Affairs Ministry and Senate (MPR) delegates, gaining 
national recognition at the time.287 In December 1998, a group called the FPPMU 
(North Maluku Youth, Pupil and Student Fomm) travelled to Ambon and Jakarta to 
lobby members of the provincial government, backed by senior administrators and
^ O O
parliamentarians from both North Maluku and Central Halmahera districts. The 
Maluku governor and several provincial parliamentarians agreed to support the
284 Van Klinken (2007), p. 112.
285 Wilson (2008), p.46.
286 Saiful later served in the North Maluku DPRD (2004-2009).
287 Van Klinken (2007), p .l 11.
288 Van Klinken (2007), p .l 11.
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students’ goal, reflecting the group’s high level support in the regional bureaucracy. 
Subsequently, two district parliamentary delegations were set up, supported by the
980two district regents and the newly inaugurated Temate Mayor, Syamsir Andili. 
These groups together lobbied Jakarta from January 1999, targeting the national 
legislators, cabinet ministers and Home Affairs officials who would ultimately 
decide the province’s fate.290
President Habibie’s government reform agenda (combined with his Eastern 
Indonesian heritage) posed a unique window of opportunity for the North Malukan 
elite.291 But as Habibie’s main rival, Megawati, the head of PDI-P, rose in popularity 
through 1999, the local elite feared their window would close -  it looked 
increasingly likely that Megawati would replace Habibie as president in the October 
1999 session of the MPR.292 When Habibie offered the East Timorese a referendum 
on their future relationship with Indonesia, in January 1999, the North Malukan 
activists knew they had to act fast.293
Facing forceful opposition from Megawati and PDI-P, Habibie had an electoral 
interest in creating a new pro-Golkar province, which would lead to him gaining 
extra seats in the upcoming MPR session. Extra votes would be critical for remaining 
President. On 23 April 1999, the Justice and Law Enforcement Council, a legal 
reform board headed by Habibie, agreed to divide Maluku province into two after the 
June 1999 election.294 Just a few days before Habibie lost the presidency, he signed 
Law 46/99, thereby creating the new province of North Maluku on 4 October 1999. 
By this point, however, the main factions in the apparently unified North Malukan 
political elite were already in open conflict with each other.
(ii) Mounting local factional tensions 
Throughout the lobbying process of 1999, the North Malukan governing coalition 
clashed over who would lead the new province and the location of the new capital.
289 Wilson (2008), p.46.
290 Van Klinken (2007), p .l 12, Wilson (2008), p.46. The Ministry o f Home Affairs continued to 
intervene in North Malukan politics in the 2001 and 2007 elections (see Chapter Six).
291 Van Klinken (2007), p .l 12.
292 In 1999, the president was still elected by the MPR and not directly by popular vote.
293 Van Klinken (2007), observed that students led, “demonstration after demonstration -  each time 
they sensed a hesitation in Jakarta”, p. 112.
294 Van Klinken (2007), p .l 12.
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The first North Malukan governor was to be selected by the new provincial 
parliament, which itself would be set up with members of the existing district 
parliaments. These district parliaments were about to be contested in the first post- 
Suharto local elections in June 1999. The two main contenders for the governorship 
were the Temate Sultan and Bahar Andili, with Thaib Armain -  a senior local 
bureaucrat from the North Maluku district administration and an ethnic Makian -  a 
third contender. Chapter Two outlined rising factionalism in local politics in the late 
1990s. I now return to these developments as they evolved between 1998 and 1999, 
focusing first on the southern faction, and then on increasingly violent actions by the 
northern faction.
Supporters of Bahar Andili, the Sultan’s main competitor, fell into several groups. 
Although Bahar was not an ethnic Makian (his family was from Gorontalo, 
Sulawesi), he had close personal and political ties with the Makian community, who 
were the leading ethnic group in local politics.295 One of the main organisations 
backing Bahar was the ethnic student association Makayoa, formed between ethnic 
Kayoa and Makian students at Khairun University and STAIN, the Islamic college, 
both in Temate.296 Bahar was also supported by members of the influential HMI and 
KNPI student groups. Among the wider population, his support base was rooted in 
the migrants in the south of Temate city, and across the southern region. His younger 
brother, Syamsir Andili, the newly inaugurated Temate mayor, had his own local 
bureaucratic and Golkar support base, bringing wider support to Bahar’s 
candidacy.297
The other faction within the ‘southern’ political elite was led by Thaib Armain. At 
this point in the intra-elite contest, Thaib was still less powerful than either of his 
rivals (by 2002 he had manoeuvred into the lead, see Chapters Four and Six). From 
1989 to 1997 Thaib was the regional secretary of North Maluku district, the chief
295 Van Klinken (2007) and Duncan (2005a) both report that Bahar and Syamsir Andili were Makian, 
but local informants reported they were ethnically Gorontalo (from Sulawesi). Syamsir’s wife was 
Makian, and both politicians had developed extensive networks with the Makian community.
296 This organisation was central in lobbying for the creation o f a new Makian sub-district on 
Halmahera, discussed in Section 3.2.
297 Contrary to Wilson’s (2008) analysis, Syamsir did not put himself forward for the provincial 
governorship against Bahar in 1999. The two brothers were reportedly very close and the younger 
brother would not have run against his older and well-respected senior sibling (interviews in Temate 
2005; personal correspondence, Temate researchers, August 2008).
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district bureaucratic post after the bupati, or regent. He was then posted to the 
provincial administration in Ambon (1997-1999) where, as the first provincial 
assistant, he collected a range of supporters from within the administrative hierarchy, 
as well as support from migrant groups in the south of Temate.298 His appeal 
stretched into north Halmahera; until November 1999 he worked closely with Hein 
Namotemo, a leading Christian bureaucrat from that region.299 Thaib’s support 
network thus broadly fell within the southern group, but his bureaucratic connections 
across North Maluku district meant his support base drew in some northern 
communities (‘traditionally’ though not always supporters of the Temate Sultan).300 
Nonetheless, the main division between the Temate Sultan and Bahar Andili’s 
factions -  at this stage of the conflict -  fell along largely ethnic lines. This division 
grew wider as the Temate Sultan’s faction became increasingly aggressive.
Chapter Two outlined how, during the New Order, the Temate Sultan was officially 
removed from a local governing role in the North Maluku region, whilst being 
incorporated into Golkar at the national level. The Sultan served a useful purpose for 
the New Order’s military leadership in the Maluku region by guaranteeing local 
support from his ‘traditional’ followers among the northern ethnic groups. Via his 
Golkar association, the Sultan accumulated a degree of prestige within the local 
Golkar hierarchy -  but had no official power. In 1997 he launched his campaign to 
secure a more official role in local politics: part of his plan to ‘restore’ political 
authority to the Temate Sultanate. He was first elected to the chairmanship of the 
North Maluku district parliament, and then accumulated further positions through a 
variety of official and violent means.301
Throughout 1998, local student groups demonstrated against local government 
offices. Some of the earlier protests were led by local branches of KNPI and HMI. 
While both groups were loosely affiliated with the ‘southern’ faction of Golkar, at this
298 Thaib also gained military allies during his posting in Ambon, which later proved useful in the 
2007 gubernatorial elections (see Chapter Six).
299 Interview, Hein Namotemo, Tobelo, 4 July 2005.
300 This situation changed as ethnic conflict in north Halmahera escalated, and the northern and 
southern factions grew increasingly polarised, as later sections discuss. The support o f North 
Halmahera ethnic groups later returned to Thaib during the 2007 gubernatorial election, with Hein as 
the new North Halmahera district regent (see Chapter Six).
301 Interview, Temate Sultan, July 2005, Temate; correspondence, local researchers, Temate, August 
2008.
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point affiliations were not concrete.302 Some southern students still regarded the 
Sultan as an ally against the ‘corrupt’ North Maluku district regent -  though they 
grew increasingly suspicious of his intentions. Several student groups protested 
frequently against alleged corruption by the North Maluku district regent, retired- 
colonel Abdullah Assagaf (a senior local Golkar official). In June 1998 demonstrators 
including members of Gemusba, the Temate Sultan’s youth support group, went 
further and occupied and destroyed Assagaf s Temate office. No reprisal was made 
against the activists by local security forces -  even when they attacked the top local 
government officer -  which demonstrates that their actions were supported by figures 
within the governing elite. The Sultan -  above all -  stood to gain from these 
attacks.303
In December 1998, the Sultan sought the chairmanship of the North Maluku district 
branch of Golkar. However, another candidate’s selection (Abdul Kahar Limatahu, 
a retired judge, high-ranking local bureaucrat, and respected clan elder from another 
leading local family) infuriated the Sultan, who ordered his palace guards to 
surround and threaten the hall where the election was taking place.304 The guards 
were so effective that a ‘correction’ in the Sultan’s favour was issued almost 
immediately. Limatahu claimed he was harassed and temporarily kidnapped by 
the Sultan’s militia guard in order to prevent any retaliation.306 The Sultan’s tactics 
did not bode well for the approach he would take against his factional rivals in the 
upcoming gubernatorial contest.
The Sultan’s “youth” -  or more aptly, militia -  group, Gemusba, grew increasingly 
powerful in the following months. In the Temate riots that broke out in late 1999, 
the Sultan’s guards and Gemusba were grouped under the overall organisation of 
the ‘Yellow Troops’ (Pasukan Kuning), reflecting the traditional yellow colour of 
the Temate Sultanate. According to the Sultan, the group consisted of loyal villagers
302 Van Klinken (2007), p .l 11.
303 Van Klinken (2007), p .l 11, supports this claim.
304 Interview, Tamrin Tomagola, February 2005; interview, Abdul Kahar Limatahu, Temate, May 
2005.
305 Van Klinken (2007), p .l 16; interview, Abdul Kahar Limatahu, May 2005, Temate. The guards also 
included members o f  the Sultan’s youth organisation, Gemusba.
306 Interview, Abdul Kahar Limatahu, May 2005, Temate.
117
from his heartland in the north of Temate.307 However, Van Klinken asserts that the 
guards and Gemusba groups were neither grassroots nor ‘traditionally’ based in the 
villages, but were instead closely connected to branches of the local military and the 
pro-Sultan wings of Golkar youth organisations in Temate.308 The group’s impunity 
from security force action during the ensuing riots -  and their defence of the 
Sultan’s political interests -  shows they were far from spontaneously rioting 
‘traditional’ villagers.
Already heading the North Maluku district parliament, following his election to 
district chair of Golkar, the Temate Sultan was now in a strong position within the 
local political elite. Holding these two positions meant he would choose who would 
go forward to the June 1999 elections on the North Maluku district Golkar ticket -  
these candidates would in turn select the new provincial legislators, who would 
then, ultimately, select the governorship. Having loyal followers on the ticket would 
buy the Sultan the best chance of becoming governor. By mid-May 1999, the initial 
Golkar candidate list for the district elections excluded all the Sultan’s rivals from 
the alternative coalition.309
The Sultan had rapidly moved from a largely symbolic leader of the northern ethnic 
Temate, Kao and Tobelo groups, towards claiming the top political post in the new 
province. Standing for governor, he could place his ethnic supporters at the 
forefront of the new administration, with all the political and economic benefits this 
would bring.310 His rise thus posed a direct challenge to the southern bureaucratic 
and political elite. The antagonism between the two elite political factions -  divided 
along ethnic lines -  grew more intense from this point. With the introduction of his 
militia into the political process, the Temate Sultan played a direct role in escalating 
violence in local politics.
307 Interview, Temate Sultan, July 2005, Temate.
308 Van Klinken (2007), p .l 17.
309 Even Saiful Ruray - the lead student activist behind the new province - was excluded from the list. 
Van Klinken (2007), p .l 16.
310 Van Klinken (2007), p .l 16.
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(Hi) Local elections and provincial claims 
In the midst of the provincial lobbying process, the first local elections since the end 
of the New Order held a special importance for the local elite. As highlighted above, 
these elections would determine the composition of the district parliaments, which in 
turn would select the new provincial parliament: and this new parliament would elect 
the new governor. In North Maluku district, Golkar, headed by the Temate Sultan, 
took 17 out of 40 district parliament seats.311 While this was under half Golkar’s 
previous vote, they still held twice as many seats as the next party (PDI-P won eight), 
thereby retaining control of North Maluku district for the Sultan. In Central 
Halmahera district, Golkar also came first, with 11 out of 40 seats, PPP second (with 
five), and PDI-P third (with four).312 While, for the first time in decades, Golkar no 
longer held a majority in either local parliament, it was still the largest faction in both 
local legislatures and the dominant local political organisation. With the Temate 
Sultan heading the lead faction in the North Maluku district parliament, and Bahar 
Andili leading the Central Halmahera rival group, competition then escalated further 
between the two Golkar factions over the provincial capital and governorship.
The Sultan lobbied for the new capital to remain in Temate, his historical capital. 
Precisely because of this affiliation, the southern faction wanted to relocate the 
capital temporarily to Soasio, on Tidore island -  the capital of Central Halmahera 
district -  and then permanently to Sofifi, a small village in Central Halmahera. 
Realising the southern faction would never agree to Temate, the Sultan eventually 
proposed Sidangoli, a port in northwest Halmahera (and still within his historical 
realm of influence). Thaib Armai -  in collaboration with Hein Namotemo, the 
powerful north Halmahera bureaucrat -  initially supported locating the capital in 
Temate, but then proposed an alternative in the northern part of Halmahera. Bahar 
and Thaib together opposed the Sultan’s proposal to name the province with the 
traditional-sounding title Moloko Kie Raha.313 The Sultan also proposed that the 
province seek special regional status, known as Daerah Istimewa, due to its Sultanate 
history -  but this was also opposed by Bahar and Thaib. Both the Sultan’s key 
opponents resisted any attempts by him to make political advances based on claims
311 Wilson (2008), p.76.
312 Wilson (2008), p.76.
313 Wilson (2008), p.47.
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of ‘traditional’ authority (which they could not assert), rather than bureaucratic or 
ethnic affiliations (which they could).314
The new provincial law (Law 46/1999) ended up reflecting the interests of both the 
main factions. The province was eventually named North Maluku (Maluku Utara), 
not the ‘traditional’ Moloko Kie Raha. The capital was to temporarily remain in 
Temate, but would eventually relocate to Sofifi in Central Halmahera -  within the 
‘southern’ area (this move was eventually delayed).315 The law stated that a new 
provincial parliament would be established via special local elections, and that this 
parliament would in turn elect the new governor.316 As a result of the ensuing 
conflict, these two cmcial steps to determine the new governorship and
' l l ' T
administration of the new province were delayed until 2001.
While intra-elite contest mounted in Temate over the leadership and location of the 
new provincial capital, localised ethnic conflict escalated on Halmahera. This was 
not an isolated incident and had important connections to elite level rivalry between 
the northern and southern factions. The inter-ethnic dispute over new territory for the 
migrant Makian community in north Halmahera did not at first significantly affect 
elite- level political relations. However, as the elite Makian supported the claims of 
the migrant Makian group in Halmahera, it was always against the Sultan’s interests 
to support the new Makian sub-district. The Temate Sultan was ‘traditionally’ 
affiliated with the Kao ethnic group and he wanted to prevent further Makian 
expansion into his ‘traditional’ northern realm. When the entire Makian population -  
of around 10,000 people -  of the Kao-Malifut area was deliberately forced out in 
October 1999, elite level and ‘localised’ conflicts merged. Factionalism between elite 
political groups rapidly transformed into inter-group street violence, with the elites 
mobilising opposing sides. This then escalated into waves of ethnically-targeted 
attacks -  which later became religious attacks, as the conflict spiralled across the 
province.
314 Wilson (2008), pp.47-48. Later, Bahar ‘restored’ the long dormant Tidore Sultan by appointing a 
distant relative o f the Tidore Sultanate’s family as a new Sultan: a shrewd political move to gain him 
‘traditional’ votes in the south.
315 As o f 2008, the capital had not been re-located to Sofifi (reported by M. Syaril Sangaji, as read in 
Malut Pos, August 2008).
316 Van Klinken (2007), p .l 12.
317 Chapters Four and Six consider elite dynamics after 2000.
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3.3 The merger of elite and local conflicts (August-October 1999)
From the beginnings of conflict between the Kao and Makian migrants in north 
Halamhera, the Kao were at a political disadvantage. The Kao -  majority Protestant, 
but with a small Muslim minority -  historically fell under the ‘traditional’ realm of 
the Temate Sultan. But aside from the Sultan’s indirect support, they had almost no 
representation at the district level, with only one Kao member in the North Maluku 
district parliament. In contrast, the Makian community was well represented in both 
Central Halmahera and North Maluku district parliaments, as well as across the 
regional bureaucracy and they also had links to Makian student activists in Temate 
and Ambon. Even though the initial conflict between Kao and Makian in Halmahera 
appeared to focus solely on local land issues, the Makian elite had a strong interest in 
ensuring Makian success. Crucially, they also used the situation as leverage against 
the Temate Sultan, as this section explores.
(i) Background to Kao-Makian conflict 
In 1975, with the threat of volcanic explosion, the Maluku provincial government 
began the re-location of the entire Makian community from Makian Island, to the 
Kao region of north Halmahera, some several hundred miles away. The region was 
apparently chosen for its low population density and perceived land availability.318 
Over the next five years, over 6,000 Makian were relocated from their home island, 
many of them forcibly. The indigenous population in the Kao area was 
predominantly ethnic Kao, practicing subsistence farming and fishing, with some 
small scale copra production. Initially, the Kao reportedly welcomed the Makian 
migrants, seeing them as victims of an imminent natural disaster, and shared land and
<1 I  Q
gardens with the newcomers.
By 1999, over 16,000 Makian were living in 16 Makian villages in the southern part 
of Kao sub-district, an area known as Malifut. From the very beginning, the 
provincial and local government failed to clarify the legal status of the land occupied 
by the Makian migrants. The Kao believed the Makian were ‘guests’ on their
318 Protestant community members claimed the Makian group was relocated to north Halmahera in 
order to prevent Christian expansion in the Maluku region, as well as to assert Makian control over 
natural resource revenues.
319 Wilson (2005; 2008).
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‘traditional’ lands, without permanent settlement or land-use rights. In contrast, the 
Makian believed they were official transmigrants, relocated onto government land 
for their use. The different perceptions of local rights to the use and ownership of the 
land became a source of great tension when the Makian eventually sought to 
establish official rights to the land they inhabited and cultivated. Inter-communal 
tension was exacerbated in the mid 1990s, when gold was discovered and the NHM 
goldmine built in the Kao region of north Halmahera.321
Prior to the mine’s establishment in 1997, and the re-organisation of local 
government in the late 1990s, the two communities had lived alongside each other 
for two decades without major tension, but also without social and political 
integration. The Makian migrants increasingly resented their position within the Kao 
sub-district administration, especially without official status on local land. The 
reformasi era of the late 1990s presented the ideal opportunity for the Malifut-based 
Makian community to propose the creation of a new Makian sub-district in the Kao 
region. Makian leaders and activists began to press for the creation of their own 
administrative sub-district in 1998, with support from the Makian elite. Underlying 
the local motivation to create a separate sub-district was the search for more secure
799land tenure as well as the opportunity to claim benefits from the NHM goldmine.
The NHM goldmine, known as Gosowong, was established in Halmahera in 1997. 
Prior to the conflict the mine employed between 300-500 local staff, alongside 
international and other Indonesian technical staff.323 The company provided some 
community schools, health clinics and sports facilities, and also developed a new 
port and roads across die Kao region. This infrastructure development was primarily
320 For a detailed background on Makian relocation to Malifiit see Wilson (2008) pp.52-55.
321 Exploration by the Australian mining company Newcrest, in conjunction with PT Aneka Tambang, 
one o f the leading Indonesian mining companies during the New Order, led to the discovery o f high- 
grade gold ore deposits in the Kao region in 1996. A joint-project to develop the site as an open-cast 
mine was signed in April 1997 between Newcrest Singapore (holding 82.5 per cent o f the company) 
and PT Aneka Tambang (holding 17.5 per cent) under the authority o f a new company Nusa 
Halmahera Mineral (NHM). Interviews with NHM staff, Temate and Tobelo, July 2005. Two open­
cast mines were then developed in the Kao area. The site (known collectively as Gosowong) 
represented the third largest source o f revenue to the parent company Newcrest -  one o f  the world’s 
ten largest mining companies - in 2008. See Newcrest Mining Concise Annual Report (2008), p.63.
322 Collier and Hoeffler (2001) would argue that the roots o f  this ethnic conflict lay in ‘greed’ over 
natural resources, but the role o f political elites in escalating the search for local revenue towards 
outright violence also needs to be accounted for.
323 Wilson (2008), p.58, reports the mine employed 500 local staff; interviews I conducted reported 
around 300 (interviews, NHM staff, Temate and Tobelo, July 2005).
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for the mine’s benefit, but both the Kao and Makian communities used the local 
roads. As the Gosowong mine was set up under New Order government policy, 
mining revenues were transferred directly to Jakarta, with only a small percentage 
returning to the Maluku government, and even less re-distributed back to local 
governments.324 The public facilities and jobs provided by the mine were therefore, 
the only tangible benefits from the mine to the local community prior to government 
reform. However, proposed regional autonomy legislation stood to change revenue 
structures in favour of local governments -  and, therefore, in theory, local 
communities -  with a greater percentage of mining revenue due to return directly to 
the districts in which mines and other extractive industries were located. Thus, the 
promise of future revenues played into the search for greater local administrative 
control by the Makian community at both the local and elite levels.325
Inter-community tensions were also raised in the late 1990s over the local 
employment practices of NHM, with over 90 per cent of local staff hired from the 
Makian community.326 While local employment in the mine was miniscule compared 
to the sub-district population -  with less than 500 employed from a population of 
around 44,000 -  it was still symbolically important.327 The combination of the 
promise of future benefits from the mine and the unevenly spread actual benefits of 
the late 1990s contributed directly to rising tensions between the two groups. Added 
to this volatile situation, the southern political elite in Temate and Tidore had strong 
interests in creating a new Makian sub-district, as this would aid their political and 
economic negotiating position.
324 These New Order policies eventually contributed to rising regional resentment o f  Jakarta by the 
end o f the New Order, as highlighted in Section 3.1.
325 According to Law 33/2004, on Revenue Sharing from Natural Resources, 20 per cent o f mining 
land rents and royalties go to the central government, 16 per cent to the provincial government, 64 and 
32 per cent (respectively) to the producing district, and 32 per cent o f land rents (only) to the other 
districts in the the province. See Duncan (2007), p.729. However, following decentralisation, and the 
establishment o f  the new district government in North Halmahera in 2004, the full mining revenue 
shares officially allocated to the producing district government were not transferred. This was due to 
continued provincial level capture o f local government budgets (see Chapters Four and Five).
326 NHM staff reported that while they had originally intended to hire equally from the two local 
communities, the Makian were more educated and skilled, so they preferred to hire Makian staff. 
Following the conflict, the mine reportedly enforced a policy o f hiring equally from both communities 
to avoid local tensions (Interviews, NHM staff, Temate and Tobelo, July 2005).
327 In 1999 Kao sub-district had an ethnic Kao population o f 26,704 with around 16,000 ethnic 
Makian, totalling around 43,700: Wilson (2008), pp.53-54, BPS (2001).
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(ii) The drive fo r  a new Makian sub-district
Towards the end of 1998, Makian student groups began the lobbying process to forge 
a new Makian sub-district. As with the larger student group lobbying for a new 
province, this smaller group also had elite Makian backing. Prominent members of 
the southern elite -  including the leading local politicians, but also figures such as 
Jusuf Abdurahman, the former rector of Khairun University -  sponsored the 
students’ travel to Jakarta to lobby the Ministry of Home Affairs (the agency 
responsible for determining new administrative boundaries). A collection of Makian 
and Kayoa students (an ethnic group culturally close to the Makian) formed the 
Makayoa ethnic organization, “to defend Makian and Kayoa interests”, including 
lobbying for the creation of a new Makian sub-district.328 From the outset, therefore, 
Makian and other southern political elites were involved in the main source of 
tension between the two groups, with a direct interest in local Makian success.
In early 1999, following the elite-supported student lobbying efforts, the North 
Maluku district parliament agreed to support the creation of a new Makian sub­
district.329 The district regent, Abdullah Assagaf, then formally requested central 
government approval. In May 1999, the “Makian sub-district in Malifut” was created 
via Law 42/1999 -  including all the migrant Makian villages as well as two Kao. 
District government teams were subsequently sent to inform the Kao, who had not 
been involved in the formal decision making process, about the new Makian sub­
district on their ‘traditional’ homelands.330
Leading up to the creation of the new sub-district, tensions rose between the local 
Kao and Makian communities. Villagers reportedly started to carry machetes for 
protection and posting guards outside homes and gardens.331 From April 1999, 
Makian villagers informed their Temate relatives that they felt under threat from Kao 
who opposed the new sub-district plan and requested their support.332 The fact that 
local Makian received extensive support from Temate relatives and ethnic
328 This group later played a role in escalating violence during the Kao-Makian clashes. Interviews, 
student activists, June 2005, Temate; correspondence, Temate students, August 2008.
329 Wilson (2008), pp. 59-60.
330 Van Klinken (2007), p .l 18.
331 Van Klinken (2007), p .l 17. It was not clear whether this took place among Kao or Makian 
villagers (or both).
332 Van Klinken (2007), p .l 17.
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organisations, which were linked closely to the Makian political elite, further 
demonstrates that the eventual conflict was never a solely ‘local’ or ethnic affair and 
that the political elite were involved, at least indirectly, from the outset. In August, 
Makian groups (some of them based in Temate) attacked Kao villages: the first 
major violent incident in the ensuing waves of inter-ethnic and, later, inter-religious 
conflict.333
The motivation behind southern elite support of the lobbying process to create a new 
Makian sub-district came from two sources. One was the elite Makian goal to assert 
greater Makian control over the North Malukan government, from the provincial 
down to sub-district level. The second, related, concern was the potential increase of 
revenues to local government from the NHM goldmine, following the 
implementation of the 1999 decentralisation laws, which they hoped to steer towards 
Makian interests. The local Makian community in Malifut sought control of their 
own sub-district in order to secure their land tenure and to enable greater access to 
future economic opportunities from both the local government and the NHM mine. 
Their motives were linked to the broader elite Makian goal -  from within the 
southern alliance -  to increase control generally over local and regional government, 
thereby ensuring a greater share of future government revenues for the Makian 
elite.334
Linking back to the discussion in Chapter One, from this analysis on the beginnings 
of the North Maluku conflict, it is clear that a ‘religious’ element was far from being 
at the forefront of escalating tensions. In contrast, the ethnically organised patronage 
claims to benefits from the local state were central to the dispute from its outset. 
Ascribing a religious dimension to the causes of, or motivations behind, the North 
Maluku conflict in its early stages therefore misinterprets the roots of the problem.
(Hi) Escalating inter-ethnic violence 
The new Makian sub-district was unsurprisingly rejected by the Kao community for 
three key reasons. First, the new sub-district was located on what they considered
333 Wilson (2008) claims that the Makayoa group were directly involved in this first violent incident, 
although their members dispute this (correspondence, Temate students, August -  September 2008).
334 See Van Klinken (2007), p .l 18, who presents a similar argument.
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‘traditional’ Kao territory, which they believed the government had no right to re­
distribute. Second, they also sought a greater share of potential future NHM 
goldmine revenues for their community, and believed a new Makian sub-district 
would block this. Third, the proposed sub-district contained two Kao villages, thus 
splitting the local Kao community in two. However, without elite-level support, Kao 
efforts to resist the legislation via formal channels were futile and so they took 
informal grassroots action. This started peacefully, in early 1999, with the Kao 
blocking the arrival of the Makian sub-district ‘inauguration team’, along with the 
new sub-district head, thus delaying the official sub-district inauguration. However, 
when Makian groups responded by razing the two Kao villages, the subsequent 
fighting left several dead on both sides and hundreds of Kao displaced.335
Following the Makian attack on the Kao villages, Kao village leaders spent two 
months requesting assistance from the North Maluku district parliament, demanding 
the removal of the Makian community and the re-building of the two razed villages. 
They also lobbied the Temate Sultan, but no official response was forthcoming.336 
Without elite representation, the Kao community had little success in approaching 
the district legislature and local government officials. A top-level Temate delegation 
-  including the district regent, police chief and Temate Sultan -  eventually visited 
the Kao region to discuss the problem, but achieved little. The Temate Sultan -  the 
Kao’s ‘traditional’ leader, or figurehead -  was apparently distracted by preparations 
for the provincial inauguration, and his plans to become governor.337 Later, this 
initial phase of conflict worked in the Sultan’s interests by mobilising Kao support 
behind his own political ambitions, but at this stage he was not actively involved in 
defending Kao interests. Meanwhile, the district parliament held that as the new sub­
district was already authorised by the central government, the Kao would eventually 
be forced to accept it.338
By October 1999, the Kao formed a local militia group to respond directly to the 
Makian attacks. This Kao “defence group”, led by Benny Bitjara, a prominent local
335 Wilson (2008).
336 For detail on the sub-district’s creation and failed government response to initial attacks on Kao 
villages, see Wilson (2008), pp.59-64.
337 Wilson (2008).
338 Wilson (2008), p.64.
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figure, was intended to protect Kao homelands from further Makian incursions.339 
Following a small clash between Makian and Kao villagers over access to local 
gardens, the Kao militia attacked and razed every Makian village in the area, 
destroying most buildings -  aside from mosques and some schools -  and forcing the 
entire Makian community to flee. The local Makian community totalled around 
10,000 people -  over one quarter of the total population of North Maluku district -  
and their forced mass evacuation reportedly overwhelmed local security forces. 
Rather than intervening and trying to stop the violence, they simply aided the Makian 
evacuation.340 Several people died in the clash and the entire infrastructure of the 
local Makian community was destroyed.341
The majority of these Makian villagers fled to Temate via trucks and boats, provided 
by the local security forces and the Temate city government, under Syamsir Andili’s 
leadership. The Temate Sultan strongly resisted the relocation of the Makian 
displaced to Temate -  though he could not prevent their arrival -  and this was 
interpreted by the displaced Makian community as proof of collusion with the Kao, 
even though he had not actively intervened on their side. The Sultan’s decision 
rallied the northern ethnic groups around him, and further alienated him from the 
southern groups. The arrival of over ten thousand displaced people placed huge 
pressure on both the Temate government and the local communities who had to feed 
and shelter them. With an original population of around 152,000, the city expanded 
by almost 10 per cent practically overnight.342 The next phase of the escalating inter­
ethnic conflict was set in motion as displaced Makian began to attack Kao properties 
in Temate.
The Makian arrival in dramatically changed the nature of inter-elite political 
competition in the city. From a largely non-violent, though increasingly fraught, 
factional political contest over control of the new province, elite political competition 
now switched tracks. The political elite increasingly engaged grassroots and other
339 On the significance o f traditional lands to the Kao, see Duncan (2005).
340 Makian groups claimed the district security forces defended Kao interests from this early point 
(correspondence, Temate students, August-September 2008); however, it is not clear why the security 
forces would have defended the Kao instead o f protecting the better connected Makian community. It 
is possible that Kao connections to the Temate Sultan dissuaded the security forces from intervening, 
but this could not be substantiated.
341 Wilson (2008), p.66.
342 BPS (2001), p.73.
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organisations into direct physical clashes. Street battles between pro-Makian and Kao 
groups were supported by both sides of the political elite, who also prevented 
intervention by local branches of the state security forces.343 The Makian and pro- 
Makian members of the elite -  Bahar Andili, Syamsir Andili and Thaib Armain -  
aided the establishment of Makian ‘support’ groups, ostensibly to help the displaced 
community, but which also acted as pro-Makian vigilante groups.344 On the Temate 
Sultan’s side, while he had at first failed to support the Kao, he eventually realised he 
could use the situation to his advantage by mobilising ‘traditional’ supporters behind 
him and against the southern faction. Violent actions by the Temate Sultan’s 
‘traditional’ militia and youth support groups therefore escalated rapidly during the 
following two months.
Recalling Brass (2003), on the mobilising forces behind “communal” violence in 
India, while the elite and community levels may initially hold different interests in 
ethnic conflict, under conditions when their goals coalesce, ethnic riots prove their 
most deadly and escalate rapidly. The political elite deliberately exploited the 
subsequent nine-month period of violence for their own ends, gaining vital political 
capital by directly supporting particular sides from the August -  but particularly from 
the October clashes -  onwards. In doing so, both sides won the support of highly 
motivated grassroots organisations, and rallied militant factions behind them. The 
next section explores how the initial phase of inter-ethnic violence escalated towards 
inter-religious violence across the province. The results of the next phase of violent 
conflict dramatically -  and permanently -  reconfigured the political elite.
3.4 Religious violence and elite reconfiguration (November 1999-July 2000)
Following the forced displacement of the Makian community from north Halmahera, 
localised ethnic conflict escalated rapidly into inter-religious violence in three main
343 That the local political elite were able to prevent security force intervention reflects that the 
balance o f power in the local government in North Maluku was weighted towards the bureaucracy. 
However, it may also reflect the fact that the military had limited interests in preventing local conflict 
from escalating in 1999. See Aditjondro (2001). Under the New Order, there was a tradition of 
security forces allowing (or enabling) local conflict to play itself out, only stepping in to mop up 
afterwards. This process played a role in securing ‘order’, by boosting the position o f  the security 
forces, and so the central state.
344 Wilson (2008) defends this claim.
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phases across the province. The first phase -  in Temate and Tidore in November 
1999 -  was initiated almost immediately after the arrival of the displaced Makian. 
The second phase -  simultaneously affecting both Temate city and the Tobelo/Galela 
region -  ran throughout December 1999. The third, final, and most prolonged, phase 
-  across the north of Halmahera -  ran for five months, between February and July 
2000.1 concentrate here on the first two phases of violence in Temate and Tidore as 
they had the greatest effects on the political elite. While more severe, the subsequent 
phases had less impact on the political elite, which had already been reconfigured by 
that stage.345
(i) The first wave o f  religious violence 
By October 1999, the new province was established and the elite coalition had 
fractured openly between the Temate Sultan and his three leading political opponents 
from the southern alliance -  Bahar Andili, Thaib Armain and Syamsir Andili. As 
chairman of the North Maluku district parliament, the Temate Sultan was able to 
block the provision of government assistance to the displaced Makian in Temate. 
This put him in direct conflict with the Temate Mayor, Syamsir Andili, who had 
organised the Makian evacuation from Halmahera, and then provided much of the 
emergency assistance to the displaced population via his city administrative budget. 
Political coalitions across the northern and southern factions -  such as that forged 
temporarily between die Tobelo leader Hein Namotemo and the Makian bureaucrat 
Thaib Armain -became impossible from this point.346 Two distinct groups were now 
clear at both the elite and local levels. The student/youth groups affiliated to the elite 
factions, Gemusba (pro-Temate Sultan/northern groups) and Makayoa (pro- 
Makian/southem groups) increasingly engaged in street battles against each other 
across the city, along with other ‘grassroots’ organisations.347 Sporadic fighting
345 For a detailed exposition on the waves o f  religious violence, see Wilson (2008).
346 Hein was later elected the first official district regent o f  the new North Halmahera district in 2005. 
In 2007 he supported Thaib’s re-run for the governorship. Chapter Six considers their renewed 
alliance.
347 Informants in Temate refuted claims that Makayoa members were involved in organised fighting 
against either the Kao or Christian groups, arguing that while members may have been involved 
‘spontaneously’, they were never an organised militia group. However, Wilson (2008) ascribes a 
crucial role to Makayoa in the more organised attacks on Kao and Christians from October 1999 
onwards. On balance, it is likely that Makayoa was involved in the November and December attacks 
in some way. However, the group was never a systematic fighting force, unlike the jih ad  militia, 
organised from January 2000, which some Makayoa members later joined.
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between the opposing groups in Temate gradually grew more organised, especially 
as the political elite prevented official security force intervention.
Following their arrival in Temate, some displaced Makian attacked Kao and 
Christian homes, shops and churches there. Whilst the Kao were not exclusively 
Christian (and claimed throughout the conflict that they opposed the Makian for 
ethno-cultural and not religious reasons), around 90 per cent of them were 
Protestants. As such, they were easily constmed as a ‘Christian’ enemy, and other 
Christian (non-Kao) communities were quickly painted as Kao-loyalists. Members of 
the displaced Makian community who launched the early phases of anti-Christian 
attacks in Temate were directly encouraged by mid-level Temate city and North 
Maluku district politicians.348 During these first clashes, the Temate police forces 
intervened and arrested around 35 pro-Makian rioters.349
The southern faction of the political elite reacted immediately to these arrests, 
demanding their release. Top level political intervention against police action set the 
tone for the rest of the North Maluku conflict: from here-on the police intervened 
less and less.350 Wilson (2008) reports that the delegation demanding the release of 
the Makian rioters included Thaib Armain (by this point Regional Secretary for 
North Maluku province, making him the highest ranking local bureaucrat in the new 
provincial administration351), Yunnas Abbas (First Assistant to Thaib, and the 
second highest ranking local bureaucrat), Syamsir Andili (Temate Mayor), and other 
prominent Makian community leaders and mid-ranking officials. The pro-Makian 
rioters were quickly released by the police.
Pro-Sultan groups also attacked Makian and nominally pro-Makian areas with 
impunity. As the Makian internally displaced persons (IDPs) rioted and attacked
348 See Wilson (2008), pp.81-83, on the involvement o f mid-level Makian bureaucrats and politicians 
in encouraging violent action.
349 Wilson (2008), p.82.
350 On several further occasions local security forces prevented acts o f  violence and intervened to 
prevent incidents from escalating - each time succeeding. However, political intervention from the 
local political elite swayed the security forces against further intervention. See Wilson (2008).
351 The Ministry o f Home Affairs appointed ‘care-taker’ governors until the first provincial parliament 
gubernatorial elections, initially scheduled for 2000. These elections were delayed until 2001 due to 
the conflict, and postponed again to 2002, due to alleged corruption in the first round. See Chapter 
Six.
352 Wilson (2008), p.83.
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Christian homes and property, the Temate Sultan’s ‘traditional’ guard, or militia, the 
Pasukan Adat (Yellow Troops) rampaged through the centre and north of the city, 
nominally ‘defending’ Christian and Kao people and property. Security forces also 
failed to prevent this group’s increasingly violent and intimidating behaviour against 
ordinary residents. Both Makian IDPs and ordinary Temate residents -  who may 
ordinarily have viewed the Sultan as a local figure of authority -  now felt under 
threat from the pro-Sultan forces. The security forces failed to prevent escalating 
violence on either side, despite the fact that at this point, it was only a relatively 
small (and mostly unarmed) set of groups involved in street clashes. The security 
forces were either unable to take sides, unsure as to which group was going to 
succeed as the provincial power holder, or had interests in allowing the conflict to 
escalate.353 As Brass (2003) argues, once rioting groups know they have political 
immunity for their actions, they become increasingly violent. ‘Ethno-religious’ 
conflict escalated, in this case, as a direct result of elite protection of rioters and the 
failure of security forces to intervene to prevent further clashes.
It was in the midst of the street fighting between the pro-Makian and pro-Temate 
Sultan groups, that Bahar Andili, the Central Halmahera regent, “restored” the 
Tidore sultanate, appointing a distant relative of the long defunct Tidore sultanate’s 
family as the new Sultan.354 In so doing Bahar enhanced his political position by 
adding ‘traditional’ legitimacy to his position as leader of the southern faction, and 
invoking a historical legacy of tension between the Tidore and Temate sultanates. In 
the midst of rising street violence between the pro-Makian/southem and pro- 
Kao/northem groups, this was a provocative move because of its symbolic 
mobilising power. This kind of elite action during the first phases of the conflict -  
deliberately designed to rally supporters and increase animosity towards the 
opposing side -  undermines ‘spontaneous’ analyses of inter-religious violence in 
Temate and Tidore.355
353 It was unclear from field evidence why there was such limited intervention from local security 
forces, though unwillingness to alienate the potential victors may have contributed to it. See 
Aditjondro (2001) and Tomagola (2000), who interpret the military’s role in the enabling the Maluku 
conflicts to escalate as being in their direct political and economic interests.
354 Wilson (2008).
355 See, for example, Bubandt (2002).
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Inter-religious violence then grew in scale and crossed locations when an 
inflammatory letter was circulated: the so-called ‘Bloody Sosol’ letter, reportedly 
written by a Protestant minister, defined areas of Temate for Christians to defend. 
Declared a forgery at the time by the local Protestant ministry (a claim supported by 
expert witnesses), it was nonetheless a useful tool for elite level pro-Makian 
supporters. Pro-Makian parliamentarians and other local leaders deliberately 
circulated the letter.356 The newly appointed regent of North Maluku district, Rusli 
Andiaco, was reportedly intimidated by members of the local government and 
parliament and refused to reject the letter. Riots followed on Tidore, during which a 
Protestant pastor was stabbed to death at a meeting attended by local politicians and 
bureaucrats. Over 30 other Christian residents of Tidore were killed in the ensuing
'1 C H
night of riots, forcing Tidore’s Christian minority to evacuate to Temate.
As the displaced Christian population of Tidore arrived in Temate, the Temate 
Sultan’s militia group continued to rampage against the southern migrant community 
in the city. In escalating street clashes, although the Sultan’s forces momentarily held 
control of the city centre -  including the main port, roads and central markets -  they 
were eventually forced back. By the end of November the Christian population of 
Temate was forced to relocate to the north of the city, where they sheltered in the 
Temate Sultan’s palace, military barracks and with local residents. Subsequently, the 
entire Christian population was evacuated from Temate, mostly to North Sulawesi, 
with a few travelling to Tobelo, where a substantial North Malukan Christian 
community lived.358 Although the Muslim political elite from all spectrums remained 
largely intact at this point, the Temate Sultan was in an increasingly vulnerable 
position having lost a large group of supporters, and the ‘religious’ element of 
conflict was now at the forefront, with the Sultan on the losing side. Over the 
following month, the Temate Sultan gradually lost both the ‘ethno-religious’ conflict 
playing out on the streets and the elite political contest. By December 1999, his
356 Wilson (2008).
357 Wilson (2008), pp.84-88. Six years after the Tidore massacres, in 2005, Christians were still unable 
to (or chose not to) return to Tidore.
358 Wilson (2008), pp.88-89. See Duncan (2005b) on the Christian IDPs evacuated to North Sulawesi.
132
political position -  which had appeared so strong in June, when he was the leading 
gubernatorial candidate -  was destroyed.359
(ii) Escalation o f religious violence 
Inter-religious violence then escalated rapidly in two different locations 
simultaneously: Temate city and the Tobelo/Galela region of north Halmahera. 
Although sparked by separate incidents, these conflicts were both set in the context 
of increasingly violent clashes between northern and southern ethnic groups in 
Temate and Tidore, and the rapidly escalating religious dimension of the violence. 
The ensuing violence was particularly devastating in Tobelo and Galela, where 
extended families contained both Christians and Muslims, and in some cases killed 
each other.360 By the end of 1999, the entire province was segregated along ethnic 
and religious lines, and the political elite had been permanently reconfigured.
Through November and into December 1999, attacks grew between what was by this 
point called the Pasukan Kuning (Yellow Troops) -  an amalgamation of the Temate 
Sultan’s ‘traditional’ guard and pro-Temate Sultan groups -  and the pro-Makian 
groups. As Ramadan drew to a close, the pro-Makian groups attracted more Tidore 
and other southern members and began to call themselves the Pasukan Putih (White 
Troops), in reference to their collective Muslim identity.361 The main fracture line in 
the conflict was at this point still between indigenous Muslim groups, despite the 
anti-Christian attacks in Tidore, with the more ‘traditional’ Muslim community from 
the northern groups behind the Yellow Troops, and defending Christians, and the 
more ‘orthodox’ migrant Muslim communities from the south supporting the White 
Troops.362 Despite the ‘spontaneous riots’ argument put forward by Temate residents 
to explain this period of violence, the organisation of the two groups, as well as their 
immunity from arrest or security force intervention, reflects the close hand of the 
political elite.363 By December, the atmosphere had deteriorated to such an extent
359 By 2007 -  almost a decade after the incidents described here -  the Temate Sultan was still unable 
to recover the political position he had reached by mid-1999, and the southern elite continued to 
dominate most senior political and bureaucratic positions (see Chapter Six).
360 Interviews with victims o f the December 1999 massacres, Tobelo, July and December, 2005.
361 Wilson (2008), p. 130.
362 Temate residents recalled this wave o f violence as the most traumatic as Muslims had attacked 
Muslims. Interviews, May- December 2005.
363 Temate residents - both Makian and Temate - asserted the conflict was still largely ‘spontaneous’ 
at this point. But, as highlighted earlier, wider evidence does not support this interpretation. See, also,
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that it was relatively easy for political leaders to mass groups into rapid action, with 
the results frequently blamed on the other side, provoking a cycle of further revenge 
attacks.
It was not long before the Sultan’s Yellow Troops were overwhelmed. The newly 
‘restored’ Tidore Sultan intervened, brokering a temporary ‘cease-fire’ from the 
White Troops, whilst the Temate Sultan’s troops surrendered. The symbolism of the 
(new) Tidore Sultan intervening to restore peace between Temate and Tidore groups
-  a leadership role dominated by the Temate Sultanate for several centuries -  held 
great appeal to the southern migrant groups, a fact that Bahar Andili, the puppet- 
master of the Tidore Sultan, would have been acutely aware of. The Temate Sultan 
subsequently ‘surrendered’ and was evacuated to Manado, in North Sulawesi, ending 
his political career. Whilst he later attempted to regain local power via electoral 
means, these attempts all failed, as Chapter Six explores. The White Troops had won, 
bringing the southern political faction -  headed by Bahar, Thaib, and Syamsir -  into 
uncontested regional power.364
With the Temate Sultan’s evacuation, the elite contest for provincial power between 
the northern and southern factions was effectively resolved. However, this did not 
mean the North Maluku conflict was over. By this point, a chain reaction had been 
set off invoking both ethnic and wider religious identities. Inter-group violence 
escalated to new levels across the province, first in Tobelo, north Halmahera. After 
the October attacks by Kao on the Malifut Makian villages, ethnic Tobelo (a majority 
Christian group) prepared for revenge attacks on Tobelo town by resident Makian 
and Tidore migrants. The Muslim community was increasingly nervous, for although
-  at that point -  they formed a majority in Tobelo, the town was surrounded by 
Christian villages, and the Kao forces had not yet disbanded.365 Wilson (2008) 
demonstrates how preparation for revenge attacks on both sides meant mass Muslim- 
Christian violence became increasingly inevitable.
Wilson (2008) p .131-132. Temate informants, however, reported that from February 2000, with the 
declaration o f jih ad  against North Malukan Christians, the conflict grew more organised, with the 
outright support o f the southern political elite for the jihad. Interviews,Temate, May-December 2005.
364 Later this triumvirate came apart during the first gubernatorial elections, which Thaib initially 
contested against Bahar (see Chapter Six).
365 Wilson (2008), pp.99-101.
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As riots escalated between the Yellow and White Troops in Temate and Tidore, this 
was no longer a localised Kao/Makian conflict, but instead came to symbolise a 
wider and deeper religious identity clash. Escalating tensions in Tobelo forced the 
removal of the local camat (sub-district administrative head), who was viewed by the 
Christian population as pro-Muslim. A high-level delegation from Temate -  
including the interim ‘care-taker’ Governor, Surasmin (appointed by the Ministry of 
Home Affairs); Rusli Andiaco (newly appointed North Maluku district chief); and 
the Temate Sultan (this was just prior to his fall) -  had travelled to Tobelo in early 
December to mediate but failed to prevent the escalation of violence over the 
following few weeks, leading to devastating consequences in the Tobelo and Galela
366regions.
The Muslim community launched a ‘preventive’ attack on Tobelo in December, 
believing a Kao one imminent. Muslim groups held the city for a few days, shocking 
Christian residents. A counter-attack was then launched by the Kao militia, led by 
Benny Bitjara (who had led the ethnic cleansing against the Makian in October). 
Protestant pastors in Tobelo and the surrounding villages blessed weapons and 
warriors in church services, officially sanctioning violent action for the first time in 
the conflict.367 During the counter-attack, the Muslim population was forced out of 
Tobelo and surrounding villages. Several massacres took place in mosques, where 
hundreds of families took shelter, and many Muslim women and children were 
attacked by Kao and Tobelo militia.368 Local security forces again failed to 
intervene. The displaced Muslims who survived fled to Temate, and the conflict then 
escalated further north to Galela, where the largely Muslim population of Soasio 
town was attacked by Kao-Tobelo forces and was again forced to evacuate. During
366 Wilson (2008), p. 106. The damage caused by the conflict was still evident in 2005, with many 
charred buildings remaining in Tobelo (including churches, mosques, homes, plantation buildings, 
factories etc), inflammatory graffiti still covering walls, and previously mixed communities living in 
segregated areas.
367 North Halmahera was the original site o f Christianity’s arrival in Indonesia, via the mid-fifteenth 
century Catholic missions, and the region thus held great significance to both the Catholic and 
Protestant communities. Protestant pastors believed they were defending their community and  the 
birthplace o f Christianity in Indonesia. See Wilson (2008). Interviews in Tobelo and Temate with 
Catholic leaders also reported this.
368 Stories o f atrocities such as beheadings and the eating o f human organs abounded at this time. Such 
attacks were later largely blamed on the ‘Forest Tobelo’, indigenous highland groups from north 
Halmahera. However, Duncan (2001; 2005a) argues the Forest Tobelo were a useful scapegoat, and 
were in no position to dispute these claims. Later they actually used the stereotype to help defend their 
villages against loggers and other unwelcome guests.
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these attacks in north Halmahera, ethnic and clan groups divided along religious 
lines, with family members and hamlet communities attacking each other. As such, 
the nature of violence in north Halmahera had changed dramatically by late 1999.369
North Halmahera Muslims who survived the Tobelo and Galela attacks were 
evacuated to Temate at the end of December, just after the defeat of the Temate 
Sultan’s Yellow Troops. At this point, even ethnic Temate members of the disbanded 
Yellow Troops -  who up to this point had defended ethnic Kao and Temate 
Christians -  turned their support towards the ‘White Troops’, as family members 
from North Halmahera reported Christian violence against Muslims. Political and 
community leaders started to instigate a new form of religious warfare. A large jihad  
(or Islamic holy war) militia force was recruited and trained by religious and political 
leaders in Temate and Tidore, from February 2000 onwards, to respond to the north 
Halmahera attacks. Outrage at the violence of the attacks on Muslims in north 
Halmahera in fact led to a nationwide call for jihad  against Christians in the Maluku 
region, with the foundation of radical militant Islamic groups on Java, including 
Laskar Jihad.370
By the end of December 1999, the North Maluku conflict had become an ‘all-or- 
nothing’ confrontation, with limited room for ordinary community members to 
negotiate or escape its consequences, leading to the most extreme forms of religious 
cleansing and violence. Identity, history, doctrine, ideology -  both local and global -  
fused on each side of the conflict. The conflict was no longer confined to a local 
intra-elite contest over control of branches of the state, and political actors at the 
local, regional and national level capitalised on this locally brewed violence and
“^ 71exploited it for their own interests.
369 Interviews, victims o f  the north Halmahera massacres, July and December 2005, Tobelo. In 2005, 
the locations o f bodies o f victims o f these massacres were still being identified, via unofficial 
community processes. Because many o f those who knew where bodies were located were potentially 
implicated in the violence, the identification process had been long delayed because o f fears o f  
revenge attacks. I interviewed several men who had only recently discovered the location o f their 
family members’ bodies, five years after the massacres, following assistance from their neighbours.
370 See International Crisis Group (2000a) and Hasan (2002) on Laskar Jihad.
371 Scenes from the north Halmahera massacres later featured in Islamic jih ad  recruitment videos in 
Indonesia and further afield, even to Yemen, illustrating the global mobilisation networks involved in 
religious violence when local, regional and international interests merged (recruitment videos 
witnessed by author in Temate and Jakarta, 2005).
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(Hi) The fina l phase o f  religious violence 
The final phase of violence followed the expulsion of the Christian community from 
Tidore and Temate, the exile of the Temate Sultan, and the subsequent arrival in 
Temate of displaced Muslims from Tobelo and Galela in December 1999. Student, 
youth, community and other groups in Temate and Tidore were then organised into a 
much larger Islamic militia, or jihad  group, still known as the White Troops, with the 
explicit goal of removing the Christian population from North Maluku province, 
particularly from the Kao and Galela regions -  the historic heartland of Christianity 
in Maluku. Over 4,000 -  and possibly up to 10,000 -  jihad  fighters were recruited, 
trained and dispatched in a five-month long wave of clashes between the Muslim
'in0)
militia and Christian villagers in north Halmahera. Christian villages held out 
against the White Troops for some months but were eventually defeated, fleeing to 
Tobelo, the last Christian stronghold in North Maluku. In July 2000 -  almost one 
year after the first clashes on Halmahera -  the central government finally ordered 
Civil Emergency status in North Maluku, closing ports, airports, major roads and 
dispatching further military support to the provincial government.373
3.5 Conclusion
The chapter has demonstrated how the North Malukan political elite moved from a 
tenuous, though effective, coalition across different factions within Golkar -  
advocating for a new province -  to the sponsorship of ethno-religious violence 
against each other in the battle for power in the new province. The contest between 
elite factions sharpened as the new province approached inauguration, and localised
372 Many reports and informants claimed that radical Islamic militant groups from around Indonesia 
were involved in the fighting in North Maluku, for example, International Crisis Group (2000a). 
However, while a few national radical militant figures were recorded at mosques in north Halmahera 
rallying troops (video evidence attested to this), field evidence did not support the claim that 
thousands o f outside fighters were involved. Instead, the majority o f  fighters were most likely North 
Malukan, with locals rejecting the ‘assistance’ o f  outsiders. Outsiders were later blamed for the 
violence in order that communities could reconcile with themselves after the atrocities.
373 As with the failure o f the local security forces to respond effectively to escalating violence, it was 
unclear why the national level took so long to respond to the conflict with effective military action. It 
is possible that national elites intended for the conflict to bum out o f its own accord, having other, 
more pressing, conflicts to deal with in East Timor and Aceh. Aditjondro (2001) and Tomagola (2000) 
argue it was in the military’s direct interests to allow the Maluku conflicts to escalate in order to 
preserve a central role for the military in the national government, a territorial role to ‘maintain’ order, 
and to protect their regional financial interests.
137
ethnic clashes escalated towards wider ethnic and, later, religious confrontations, 
sponsored by the elite factional leaders. The escalation of violence from the local to 
the provincial level was tied directly to the escalation of political interests of the 
state-based elite in controlling the new province. Later, the conflict took on its own 
momentum, as wider issues and problems merged, even after the intra-elite contest 
was resolved through the elimination of the Temate Sultan from local politics. The 
political elite gradually lost control of the increasingly polarised conflict, as other 
leaders and interest groups -  religious, political, even national -  became involved.
The configuration of the elite political leadership was dramatically altered by the 
conflict, with the southern political faction successful, and the northern defeated. 
This was not a pre-ordained outcome -  at several points the northern faction gained 
significant ground. At the beginning of conflict the Temate Sultan held a range of 
powerful local political positions, acting as chair of the North Maluku district 
parliament and regional head of Golkar. These posts put him in a strong position to 
lobby to become the first North Maluku Governor, but sponsoring the northern ethnic 
groups in the conflict, and defending the Christian minority, against superior 
southern -  and militant Muslim -  forces, led to his downfall. The southern 
triumvirate of Bahar Andili, Thaib Armain and Syamsir Andili triumphed.
In light of the competing explanations for the transitional conflicts in Indonesia 
(outlined in Chapter One), the chapter has shown how the North Maluku conflict was 
a contest for political power within the state-based elite. The four leading figures in 
the North Malukan political elite at the end of the New Order were all situated within 
branches of the local executive and legislative bodies of government. Each sought 
greater power in local politics by securing leadership over the new provincial 
branches of the state. The North Maluku conflict did not therefore reflect a political 
clash between societal rebels and the state, or societal groups against each other, 
though ethnic alliances played a mobilising and dividing role in violence. At the elite 
level, it was crucially a political contest between different state factions, created and 
embedded in different branches of the state bureaucracy during different regime 
periods, as Chapter Two demonstrated.
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The immediate process of democratisation and local government reform in the North 
Maluku region triggered this bitter inter-elite contest, and the stakes grew higher with 
the potential of new regional economic resources, and the establishment of the 
Gosowong goldmine. The contest spiralled into mass violence over several phases of 
conflict escalation and the political elite’s prevention of security force intervention. 
Prior to government reforms and the opening up of the local political system after 
1998, such a contest would have been inconceivable in local politics. As such, the 
local government reforms of the democratic transition enabled reconfiguration within 
the state-based political elite, but no societal ‘outsiders’ challenged and entered the 
formal political sphere at this point -  despite initial appearances, with the ‘return’ of 
the Temate Sultan to local politics.374
Seeing his opportunity to ‘re-claim’ political power during the transition moment, the 
Temate Sultan -  nominally representing the ‘northern’ faction in local politics -  
extended his political reach through 1999, amassing political positions in the North 
Maluku district parliament and party system. He did so through a variety of means, 
including intimidation and violence and in doing so, threatened the other elite 
members of the state coalition, affiliated to the southern communities of North 
Maluku. Rivalry over the location of the new provincial capital and selection of the 
first governor reflected elite concerns over which ethnic group would ultimately gain 
power. Provincial power would determine political and economic patronage for the 
ensuing years, thus forming a critical fracture line. As tensions mounted over which 
group would succeed, the Sultan’s increasingly aggressive tactics rallied the southern 
faction. The forced displacement of ten thousand Makian villagers -  an ethnically 
‘southern’ group -  to the provincial capital cemented inter-group rivalry at both the 
elite and community levels. This signalled the moment when the southern elite 
changed track and worked against the Temate Sultan via their own proxy militia and 
community groups.
By the end of 1999, intra-elite conflict had therefore mapped onto and merged with 
‘communal’ conflict (which, in itself, was never only a ‘local’ problem). This was a
374 Chapter Two outlined why the ‘sultans’ must be understood as state-embedded figures, not societal 
elites, due to their reliance on (even creation by) the Dutch colonial regime, and subsequent 
subordinate incorporation into the New Order regime.
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far from spontaneous process, as the political elite and community and political 
leaders encouraged their affiliated street and youth groups towards acts of violence 
against the opposing side. Both sides acted directly to prevent intervention from the 
local security forces, demonstrating that the rising violence did not reflect state 
weakness but competing interests within it. The elite coalition finally came apart 
in November 1999, and, by December, religious violence had forced the removal of 
all Christians from Temate and Tidore, and the evacuation of the Temate Sultan 
from his seat of power. The southern bureaucratic faction had won. Thus, the 
political leaders who emerged from the conflict in mid-2000, holding the senior 
political positions and chief bureaucratic posts, were almost the same as those in 
power before the transitional reforms and prior to the conflict, with one critical 
exception: the Temate Sultan had been removed from the local political elite.
In light of the wider debate on ethno-religious conflict, the findings of this chapter 
support the theses presented by Snyder (2000) and Brass (1997; 2003). Political 
competition over control of the state during conditions of democratisation played the 
critical role in enabling the escalation of ethnic and then religious tensions towards 
outright inter-communal violence.376 Whilst the actors themselves involved in the 
riots between late 1999 and mid-2000 had many reasons to fight, and as ethnic and 
religious dimensions of the conflict reached increasingly hardened positions, the 
elites played an essential role in driving localised tensions to this point. Snyder, in 
particular, stresses that under conditions where democratic institutions are weak, but 
the bureaucracy is strong, this kind of ‘communal’ violence evolves rapidly and 
forcefully. North Maluku, with its powerful bureaucratic and political elite in contest 
with each other, but weak democratic institutions to manage such situations during 
the transition period, serves as a test case of the dangers posed by rapid 
democratisation and government reform.
375 That the state bureaucratic elite, and not local branches o f the military, played the dominant role in 
local politics during this period could reflect several features o f national politics. It is possible that the 
national elite, including the military, wanted local elites to “fight it out” within the state, thus ensuring 
the survival o f the strongest faction within the state and continued state integrity. It is also possible 
that the military was so unsure o f  its position within the new democratic government that regional 
conflicts were allowed to escalate in order to guarantee the military’s role in the new era. Further 
research would be required to develop this analysis further.
376 See Snyder (2000), p.29 and 32, on the rising chances o f  war and nationalist conflict during the 
early stages o f democratisation.
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Chapter Four -
Economic and political dynamics behind the strength and survival of 
the bureaucratic elite in post-conflict North Maluku
It is essential to understand who controls the public financing system 
in conflict areas in Eastern Indonesia because those people drive local 
politics.
377Regional public finance expert, Makassar.
Introduction
The impact of the year-long conflict in North Maluku was felt on multiple fronts. 
Around 3,000 people died and thousands more were seriously injured. Over 150,000 
and up to 250,000 people were displaced -  between one fifth and one third of the 
local population -  some of them permanently to other regions.378 Hundreds of 
villages and large parts of the major towns were burnt down, and areas that were 
rebuilt were permanently segregated. Hundreds of churches and mosques were also 
destroyed; and markets, ports, factories, major roads, fishing fleets, plantations and 
storage facilities damaged by burning and looting. The combined destruction of the 
infrastructure of the regional economy, the displacement of the local population, and 
the eventual closure of major roads and ports by the Indonesian military, contributed 
to regional economic crisis. Communities in urban areas were also overwhelmed by 
displaced relatives looking for shelter and employment. Rural communities lost their 
livelihoods and the planting, harvesting and sale of agricultural goods was seriously 
disrupted for the duration of the conflict.
After almost one year of escalating violence, the central government authorised civil 
emergency status for North Maluku in June 2000. Until this was lifted in 2003, this 
decision gave the interim, and then elected, Governors of North Maluku complete 
authority over the regional government. It also enabled the transfer of emergency and 
‘post-conflict’ aid from central to provincial government.379 After outlining the
377 Interview, Makassar, 4 October 2005.
378 See Section 4.1 on the difficulties o f establishing accurate figures on those killed and displaced.
379 While it is unusual to describe internal government resource allocation o f emergency or other funds 
as ‘aid’ - a term normally reserved for international development or humanitarian funds - this is how it 
was described by the Indonesian government (the official term was pembantuan, which translates as
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broad socio-economic affects of the conflict, this chapter explores the national, 
provincial and local government dynamics behind state capture of central
i o n
government aid funds. Field research findings indicated that this took place 
predominantly at the provincial level of government, in the Governor’s office and 
provincial level agencies under the Governor’s authority.
Arriving in the provincial capital, Temate, in May 2005 -  five years after the 
imposition of civil emergency status, and two years after it was lifted -  several sights 
and events immediately indicated that state capture of government aid funds (as well 
as other sources of aid funds) had taken place. Soon after I arrived, I witnessed 
several protests organised by students and civil society groups against the alleged 
corrupt use of emergency aid funds intended for IDPs by the Governor’s office. 
Students from the Muhammidiyah movement, Khairun University and Temate 
Islamic University had formed an anti-corruption coalition, claiming that over 54 
billion rupiah (approximately six million US dollars) had been illegally appropriated 
by the Governor’s office.381 They protested regularly outside the Temate courts and 
provincial government offices with coverage in the local press.382
Reports in local newspapers between 1999 and 2005 indicated that many protests had 
taken place over alleged corruption in the use of the emergency and post-conflict 
government aid funds. Articles from 2004 reported on protests organised by local 
civil society groups against alleged corruption by the Governor’s office, as well as 
the slow legal investigation into different corruption cases by the provincial 
government.383 When asked about the most popular local news stories, the editor of 
one local newspaper replied, “Our newspaper has mainly covered corruption issues
‘aid’). ‘Post-conflict’ is also a translation o f the Indonesian term paska konflik, which refers both to 
the period after the emergency phase (2003 onwards) and the aid funds allocated after this point. In 
Chapter One, I highlighted the problematic use o f the term ‘post-conflict’. Here, I use it with reference 
to the official term for this time period and the post-emergency aid funds distributed then. I do not 
emphasise the term unless it varies from either o f these meanings.
380 ‘Local government’ refers to district and municipal administrative and executive offices o f  
government (pemerintah kabupaten/kota). Provincial (propinsi), district and city parliaments are 
referred to as such. ‘Local politics’ refers to the activities o f any of these bodies.
381 See Ternate Pos, 27 January 2005. Conversion at July 2007 exchange rates.
382 Malut Pos, 2 June 2005.
383 Malut Pos, 30 November 2004.
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since the conflict. This is because of all the money for the refugees that went
• • »384missing.
The student and NGO-led anti-corruption demonstrations were not the only 
indication of state capture of emergency and post-conflict aid funds. There was also 
the visible problem of conflict-damaged infrastructure, with the charred remains of 
formerly paved roads, houses, mosques, churches, warehouses and factories in the 
larger towns and in villages located in the conflict’s various epicentres. Newly built 
smart villas for senior government officials and their business clients lined the more 
pleasant streets of Temate, in sharp contrast to the generally simple housing 
conditions, and in even starker contrast to the charred building remains in other parts 
of town. Parades of luxury cars during government sponsored functions were another 
incongruity in a town where most people travelled by motorbike. One local activist 
in Temate commented:
After the conflict the government financed a lot of reconstruction 
projects. But maybe 40 per cent of the aid for these projects went 
missing. People say 54 billion went missing from the government 
projects for public works, reconstruction, IDPs.555
During further investigations, I visited the squalid pengungsi (IDP) barracks in 
Temate -  temporary shelters set up in 1999, where thousands still lived in 2005 -  
and I interviewed relief workers and residents.386 I also visited pengungsi camps in 
Tobelo, located around the Catholic Church compound, and the temporary shelters of 
other IDPs living in and around North Halmahera. The IDP, camp-worker and 
government officials I interviewed reported a lack of investment in the rehabilitation 
of IDP communities and indicated that substantial proportions of government aid 
funds for IDPS had not reached the officially intended ‘beneficiaries’. One member 
of the Temate city parliament reported:
The provincial government was responsible for the refugees. There 
were thousands of households displaced here. But because of all the 
financial interests of the provincial government in the refugee 
problem, it is not yet solved. The pengungsi are still here.387
384 Interview, Editor, Temate Pos, 28 June 2005, Temate.
385 Interview, Diahi staff member (local NGO), 3 June 2005, Temate.
386 In Indonesian the word pengungsi refers to both ‘internally’ displaced people and refugees who 
have crossed national borders.
387 Interview, Golkar MP, Temate City DPRD, 22 June 2005, Temate.
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During seven months of fieldwork, the politics and mechanisms behind local 
government capture of the emergency and post-conflict aid funds gradually emerged,
T O O
revealing the way local machine politics operated. It became clear that whilst there 
were definite winners and losers from the conflict, the result was not only determined 
by the religious identity of local residents. Local benefits or losses from the conflict 
also depended on people’s relationships to civil servants in the provincial 
government. The closer a person was related to -  or the higher a person was seated in 
-  the provincial government bureaucracy, the more likely that that person had made 
political and financial gains from the conflict following its official end. Close 
connections via family or business relations to members of the provincial 
government enabled access to the central government emergency and post-conflict 
aid funds. In the immediate years following the conflict, these funds were one of the 
primary sources of government revenue to the province. Control over and subsequent 
capture of these aid funds led to a concentration of economic and political power in 
the provincial government, the details of which this chapter explores.
The chapter is structured as follows. Section 4.1 gives an overview of the socio­
economic situation in North Maluku following the conflict, to set the inflow of 
emergency and reconstruction aid funds in context. The subsequent sections then 
discuss government activities in response to the crisis at different levels. Section 4.2 
explores the dynamics behind the central government’s response to the crisis. It also 
considers some of the methodological challenges of estimating aid sums to North 
Maluku (for comparative estimates of these funds, see Annex A). It then outlines the 
two main phases of the national government’s response, and for each considers the 
rationale behind why the national government enabled (or ignored) provincial state 
capture of the emergency and post-conflict funds, a process of which they were 
aware.
The following two sections consider the provincial and local government responses 
to the crisis. Section 4.3 explores the provincial mechanisms behind state capture of 
government aid funds. This section considers three factors concentrating power in
388 Fieldwork required prolonged local observations and repeated interviews with provincial, local and 
central government officials, local journalists, civil society activists, former public servants, provincial 
parliament members, academics, students and members o f local and international non-governmental 
organisations. See Chapter One on research methodology.
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the Governor’s office following the conflict: -  the impact of emergency legislation; 
the limited roles of the provincial parliament and other provincial level government 
and non-governmental bodies; and the technical limitations (or ‘limited capacity’) of 
the provincial government. Section 4.4 examines the fragility of local (sub­
provincial) government bodies in contrast to the powerful provincial level of 
government following the conflict, analysing the limitations of the newly established 
district and city governments. Comparing the national, provincial and local 
government responses to the conflict and management of aid funds enables a layered 
picture of the extensive aid capture by the provincial government. Chapter Five, 
which follows, then considers specific case studies of provincial and local state 
capture of international aid funds (much of which also flowed through branches of 
the North Maluku government) to complement the findings here.
4.1 Socio-economic crisis in the wake of conflict
Before analysing the political dynamics behind emergency and post-conflict aid from 
the central government to North Maluku province, this section summarises both the 
immediate impacts of and the wider socio-economic context following the year-long 
conflict.389 I cover six key areas: -  (i) conflict-related deaths and displacements; (ii) 
ongoing regional economic contraction; (iii) the impact of internal displacement; (iv) 
agricultural sector decline; (v) regional infrastructure and business destruction; and 
(vi) the regional employment situation.
(i) Death and displacement figures 
As with most incidents of conflict, no conclusive figures are available on the 
numbers who died during the violence: estimates vary between 2,000 and 3,500 
dead. The North Maluku provincial government estimated that 2,004 people died and 
1,769 were injured as a result of the conflict between October 1999 and March
389 I refer here to the wider socio-economic ‘context’ following the conflict, rather than the direct 
‘impact’ o f  conflict. Local informants -  and national analysts, see Swisher et al (2004) - argued that 
the post-2000 North Maluku economic crisis was a direct result o f  the conflict. However, without 
comparative data from similar regions o f Eastern Indonesia which did not go through conflict, it is 
hard to establish the precise causal links between the conflict and its economic effects. Analysing the 
comparative data is beyond the scope o f this thesis, but it would be interesting to do so in further 
research.
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2000.390 In 2003, the Provincial Governor’s Office pronounced a final estimate of 
2,083 deaths as a result of the conflict.391 One UN-sponsored study of collective 
violence in Indonesia (based on newspaper reports rather than official government 
figures) calculated that 2,794 people had died.392 Wilson (2008) reports between
3,000 and 3,500 deaths too place as a result of the conflict. He argues that the official 
figures excluded deaths between March and June 2000, when numerous incidents 
produced large losses of life.393 Even using the low estimates means the North 
Maluku conflict was one of the bloodiest in Indonesia since the 1965-1966 
massacres, rivalling death rates in the Aceh and East Timor conflicts.394
Figures of those displaced as a result of the conflict are similarly disputed, with the 
most commonly cited ranging between 150,000 and 250,000. The Governor’s Office 
estimated approximately 250,000 people were affected, 199,605 displaced within the
‘I Q f
province, and 48,015 to other provinces. The UNDP estimated 166,318 were 
displaced.396 With an original population of approximately 780,000, between one 
third and one fifth were displaced, based on these estimates.397 This severe level of 
local displacement contributed to several of the more severe socio-economic 
problems North Maluku experienced following the conflict.
(ii) Overall regional economic contraction 
Prior to the conflict, and following the national economic crisis between 1998 and 
1999, the regional economy of North Maluku shrank dramatically, with regional 
growth rates contracting to almost minus 17 per cent (see Annex A, Table A.l). This 
followed a decline of eight per cent between 1997 and 1998, in line with the national 
economic crisis, after three years of steady decline in regional growth. In contrast to 
the national rebounding of the economy by 2000, however, the North Maluku
390 Figures cited in Van Klinken (2001), pp.2-3.
391 Figure cited in Wilson (2008), p.3.
392 Varshney et al (2004).
393 Wilson (2008), pp. 1-3.
394 Van Klinken (2001), p.2.
395 Figures cited in Wilson (2008), p.3. Again, the final IDP figures were probably higher as the 
government compiled these figures before the end o f  the conflict.
396 UNDP (2001).
397 North Maluku population figures from BPS (2001).
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economy did not begin to recover until 2001. Local informants and external analysts 
ascribed the continued regional crisis in North Maluku to the conflict.398
Many different factors played a determining role in the extended contraction of the 
North Malukan economy. For example, a delayed impact of the national economic 
crisis is likely to have deepened local recession, along with ongoing contraction in 
the local building industry.399 Without regional comparative data from similar but 
non-conflict regions it is difficult to conclude that conflict was the main driver of 
regional economic decline.400 However, its multiple effects on the local population, 
infrastructure, business, agricultural and employment situation likely played a 
contributing role to the regional economic crisis, as the following sections illustrate.
(Hi) Displacement o f the local population 
During the conflict, thousands of displaced North Malukans fled to the major towns, 
Muslims to Temate and Christians to Tobelo. Thousands of Christian North 
Malukans, including most of the local ethnic Chinese population, were also 
evacuated to neighbouring provinces, in particular North Sulawesi (a majority 
Christian region).401 The population of Temate rose dramatically, to between
152,000 and 180,000, with the arrival of displaced people from across the province, 
even though around 15,000 fled to Tobelo.402 Shelter and food were immediate 
priorities, but the provincial and local government later assisted the return or 
resettlement of many of the displaced population, though thousands remained 
displaced in 2005. The continued presence of the displaced strained both local 
government and community resources. Later sections of this chapter discuss the 
problems of government assistance to the IDP population.
398 See Swisher et al (2004). In interviews with local government officials, parliamentarians and 
economists, the conflict was cited as the major reason behind the dramatic economic collapse in North 
Maluku; in contrast the official provincial reports on the economy did not refer to the impact o f  
conflict (see, for example, North Maluku Provincial Government 2002).
399 Van Klinken (2007), p. 110, discusses the effects o f the national economic crisis on the building 
sector in the wider Maluku economy and the potential political effects this had on regional Golkar 
coalitions, given the dependent relationship between Golkar officials and building sector contractors.
400 Further research to obtain comparative regional economic figures would enable this comparison, 
but it went beyond the scope o f  this project.
401 See Duncan (2005b) on the displacement o f  North Malukan Christians to North Sulawesi.
402 Wilson (2008), p.3 provides the higher figure; BPS (2001), p.73, the lower estimate.
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Almost all the local Christian (including ethnic Chinese) population were forced to 
flee or were evacuated from the province although some remained in Tobelo and 
surrounding majority Christian areas. Local informants argued that due to the 
important role of local ethnic Chinese in key sectors of the regional economy, their 
departure caused major economic problems. One Temate city official argued:
At the time of the conflict we had two big problems here: so many 
refugees and no Chinese in the economy. They all fled, but they 
controlled the distribution and trading networks. Temate is the centre 
of port trade and transit for the whole province. So when Temate was 
hit by the conflict, everything began to shut down. By the year 2000 
the economic problems here were huge and inflation was very high.403
However, in contrast to this local official’s view, it is important not to exaggerate the 
role of the ethnic Chinese in the North Malukan economy prior to the conflict, 
especially as the data on this issue are poor. The local ethnic Chinese population was 
likely to have been relatively small, and other locals would have easily taken over the 
small-scale trading and distribution businesses run by ethnic Chinese after their 
departure.404 As one economist observed, following the anti-Chinese riots in Jakarta 
in May 1998, when the ethnic Chinese population was held responsible for the 
economic crisis by many sectors of the population, it was highly unlikely that the 
departure of 100,000 Chinese could explain the huge increase in the prices of basic 
goods during the crisis, which was more likely attributable to the dramatic decrease 
in the value of the Indonesian rupiah.405 Similarly, in North Maluku, it was unlikely 
that the departure of (what was probably) a small percentage of the fleeing Christian 
population was a major contributing factor to the regional economic crisis, though it 
may have contributed to the interruption of trading and distribution networks. In this 
case, as nationally, it was politically expedient for local politicians, officials and the 
ordinary population to blame the minority Chinese population for ongoing economic 
problems, while other factors were likely to have played a more significant role.
403 Interview, Temate City Government Secretary, 19 October 2005, Temate.
404 Pre-2000 data on local population ethnic composition is extremely difficult to obtain, making it 
hard to verify the size o f the local ethnic Chinese population prior to the conflict. Discussions with 
Anne Booth, Indonesian economy expert, School o f Oriental and African Studies, London, August 
2008.
405 Former Cabinet Minister and economist Kwik Kian Gie, cited in Purdey (2006), p. 177. Indonesian 
ethnic Chinese certainly dominated the private sector o f the economy and headed the majority o f the 
top 300 conglomerates in the Indonesian economy prior to the national economic crisis (Backman 
2001, pp. 84-91), but estimating the extent to which the departure o f  wealthier ethnic Chinese during 
the crisis effected the overall economic situation is controversial.
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These factors include the overall displacement of the local population and the 
subsequent disruption of the agricultural sector, as well as the widespread destruction 
of regional infrastructure.
(iv) Agricultural sector decline
Conflict and displacement had severe effects on the agricultural sector. In 2001, 
agriculture and forestry accounted for 42 per cent of the North Malukan regional 
product, comprising the single largest sector in the economy.406 As the driver of the 
regional economy, employing the majority of the regional labour force before and 
after the conflict, disruption to the agricultural sector during the conflict led to major 
problems for the rural population.407 Farmers evacuated their homes and abandoned 
fields and crops during the conflict. Others who did not -  or could not -  evacuate 
were unable to sell their produce as local trading networks closed down, and 
transportation to outside markets was restricted.408 Prices of key local commodities 
fell drastically as local markets collapsed. For six months following the conflict, 
copra, cloves and nutmeg (three important local agricultural products) could not be 
sold locally or shipped due to a combination of fear of travel, transportation 
restrictions and lack of buyers. Many farmers -  like local fishermen -  focused on 
producing goods for subsistence only, not wider sale.409 Food crops, estate crops and 
the forestry sub-sector were also dramatically affected.410 North Maluku’s regional 
economy outside small urban centres was dominated by small businesses, informal 
trade, farming and fishing -all of these sectors felt the impact of conflict.411
(v) Destruction o f regional infrastructure and businesses
Public buildings (including schools and government offices), markets, roads, ports, 
fishing boats, plantations, fields, warehouses, private homes and religious buildings 
were all targeted during the most violent phases of the conflict. According to the 
Provincial Governor’s Office, over 18,000 houses, almost 100 mosques, over 100
406 North Maluku Provincial Government (2002), p.7.
407 Swisher et al (2004), p.4. I focus on agriculture here as the dominant sector in the regional 
economy, but other sectors were also impacted by the conflict, including trade (three per cent decline); 
manufacturing (10.5 per cent decline); banking and business support services (7.6 per cent decline); 
and fisheries (figure unavailable). See Swisher et al (2004), pp.5-6.
408 Swisher et al (2004), p.4.
409 Swisher et al (2004), p.5.
410 Swisher et al (2004), p.5.
411 Swisher et al (2004), p.5.
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churches and over 100 schools were destroyed during the violence.412 Many villages 
were completely burned down. In 2005, whilst many villages, roads and market 
facilities had been rebuilt, other buildings and infrastructure had not. One of the 
reasons for the lack of reconstruction in some areas, but speedy recovery in others, 
was due to the way the emergency and post-conflict reconstruction funds were 
allocated by the provincial government, as subsequent sections of this chapter, and 
Chapter Five, explores further.
During the conflict, large and medium sized enterprises were closed, as employees 
remained at home, fled or were evacuated. Some of the larger and more prominent 
businesses were attacked and their infrastructure and assets destroyed during the 
conflict, including PT GAI, a large banana plantation in Galela, North Halmahera 
district -  located in the epicentre of one of the later waves of the conflict.413 This 
plantation did not re-open following the conflict, which was a major loss to local 
employees as well as the overall agriculture sector. Other plantations, fisheries and 
mines were also attacked and temporarily ceased operations, including the 
Gosowong goldmine, the largest operation in the province. However, the mining 
sector renewed operations relatively quickly, due to the remote setting of most and 
the provision of security by the police and armed forces.414
(vi) Post-conflict unemployment
Officially, unemployment was 7.53 per cent in 2004, but interviews and observations 
indicated that this figure underestimated urban unemployment.415 Staff at the North 
Maluku Statistics Bureau suggested that the region may have had one of the highest 
urban unemployment rates in the country.416 For example, in Temate city in 2003, a 
local government report estimated urban unemployment at 50 per cent.417 Those who 
had work were employed mostly in the public sector, followed by small household
412 Cited in Wilson (2008), p.3.
413 Interviews and observations at the plantation site, July 2005. See also Swisher et al (2004), p.5.
414 Swisher et al (2004), p.6. The security sector did not provide this kind o f protection to civilians or 
small scale businesses.
415 Bureau Pusat Statistik (BPS) Maluku Utara (2004), p .l.
416 Interviews, BPS and Temate city government officials, May-June 2005, Temate.
417 Temate Cooperatives, Industry and Trade Office (2003), p.149.
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industries, timber processing plants, port industries, hotels, fishing, agriculture and 
tourism -  sectors which recovered somewhat following the conflict.418
Chapter Two outlined the important role of public sector employment in the urban 
economy of the whole Maluku region during the New Order regime -  and the 
stratified nature of access to the public sector. Van Klinken (2001) estimates that 
21.6 per cent of the urban Malukan workforce -  more than double the national 
average -  were employed in the civil service in 1998.419 Following the national and 
regional economic crisis (1997-1999), and with rising unemployment due to the 
contraction of economic activity in urban areas of Maluku (including building and 
contracting services), the public sector became an even more critical source of local 
employment. When the conflict put further stress on the regional economy, urban 
dependence on public sector employment rose even higher.420
In 2005, at the time of field research, unemployment was particularly high among the 
urban youth population; large groups of young men idled on almost every street 
comer in Temate. In interviews, they reported that the most available form of 
employment was poorly paid work in the informal sector, particularly as motorbike 
taxi drivers. When jobs were advertised at the Temate police headquarters, long 
queues of young men far outstretched the availability of jobs. All government-based 
job advertisements revealed huge local demand.421 These high levels of 
unemployment and overall dependence on the public sector for both employment and 
business contracts in urban areas gave the provincial government great influence, as 
subsequent sections explore.
Overall, North Maluku faced a severe socio-economic situation in the wake of the 
conflict. Mass population displacement interrupted local agricultural production and 
trading. Infrastructure and large and small enterprises were targeted during the 
conflict, and recovery took several years, affecting trading, transport and the mobility
418 Temate Cooperatives, Industry and Trade Office (2003), p. 149.
419 Van Klinken (2001), p .l 1, citing BPS (1998) data. North Maluku was still part o f Maluku province 
at this time, so the Maluku statistics cover both regions.
420 Adam (2008) discusses the impact o f conflict on the Ambonese economy and outlines the 
problematic legacies o f  stratified access to the informal economy as well as other forms o f  
employment in the city.
421 Observations o f and interviews with young men: May-June, September-November, 2005, Temate.
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of the local population. Unemployment in urban areas soared, partly as a result of the 
continued contraction of the economy, but also because of increased competition for 
jobs between IDPs and locals.422 The public sector grew even more important as a 
primary source of employment, business contracts and other forms of socio­
economic welfare (for example, the provision of materials and funding for rebuilding 
houses) in the post-conflict period. The government’s role in North Malukan society 
and the economy increased, as a result of the crisis in the wake of conflict, and also 
due to deliberate government policies.
4.2 Central government dynamics of aid funding
In the context of regional crisis, this section considers the central government’s role 
in providing emergency and post-conflict aid to North Maluku. The first part 
estimates the total amount of central government aid funds to the province, and 
discusses the methodological and political problems in obtaining these data. The 
second analyses national politics between 1999 and 2002 -  the civil emergency 
period in North Maluku -  and outlines the rationale behind central political decisions 
taken on aid funding during this time. The third looks at the official post-conflict 
phase between 2003 and 2007. Within each official ‘phase’, I consider the reasons 
behind limited monitoring of aid funds by the central government, as well as the 
implications the terms and conditions attached to the aid funds had on the 
concentration of power in the new North Maluku Governor’s office.
(i) Estimating central government aid 
Central government emergency aid to North Maluku flowed in four main waves, 
reflecting the four official stages of emergency and post-conflict recovery in the 
region (see Annex A, Table A.2 for details). As a central government official from 
the Ministry for National Development Planning (BAPPENAS) reported, “The 
budgets for the IDPs and other post-conflict programmes are very difficult to trace, 
even for the central government ”423 Of the different aid budgets to North Maluku,
422 Similar patterns marked Ambon following the conflict. See Adam (2008).
423 Interview, senior BAPPENAS official, 24 May 2006, Jakarta. Subsequent tables also use 
comparative aid budget data from the North Maluku DPRD.
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aid allocated during the military and civil emergency periods (1999-2003) was the 
hardest to trace for a combination of methodological and political reasons. It would 
have been necessary to access internal government budget documents from over 
twenty different ministries, including the Ministry of Finance, BAKORNAS -  the 
central agency responsible for government emergency responses at this time -  and 
the Ministry of Home Affairs, as well as the provincial government’s budget 
records.424 In 2000 alone, at least four regions of Indonesia were under military and 
civil emergency status, producing a highly complex and unusual budgetary situation 
at both the national and provincial levels. As the corrupt use of government aid funds 
was under investigation in several provinces in 2005, including North Maluku, this 
also meant such data were highly sensitive at both the national and provincial levels 
during the field research.425
Estimates of the aid budget during the emergency years (1999-2002) were calculated 
from BAPPENAS figures (see Annex A, Table A.2). BAPPENAS was not the 
ministry responsible for central government aid funds to North Maluku during the 
emergency period -  they took over management of so-called ‘special’ funds to the 
region (as nationally) in the post-conflict period. However, they provided data on 
government aid flows to North Maluku during the emergency years. Where possible, 
I compared the BAPPENAS data to provincial parliament data, as well as figures 
from local non-governmental sources. Provincial parliament figures were likely to 
have been compromised by political interventions, but they served as an official 
record of provincial aid funds for certain periods.426 Non-governmental figures were 
problematic due both to their restricted access to official figures, and because of 
careless presentation.427 For the official post-conflict period (2003-2007), 
BAPPENAS provided data on the aid sums transferred to the provincial government, 
which varied, however, from the provincial parliament’s data (see Annex A, Table 
A.5 for comparative estimates).428
424 Obtaining research access to the aid budgets o f these different ministries proved impossible.
425 Even with direct access to official data from the emergency period, there was no guarantee the 
figures would have been recorded accurately.
426 Aid budget data was not available from the North Maluku Governor’s office in 2005.
427 In none o f the data provided by local non-governmental organisations was there any discussion of 
the methods behind how they had acquired the data, nor how they had calculated the total figures of  
aid and their corruption estimates.
428 I am grateful to the senior BAPPENAS officials who shared aid data and openly disclosed the 
problems with the post-conflict funds they managed.
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The problems of tracing which agencies and line ministries were in charge of which 
funds, at which stage, and for what size of budget, reflects more than a 
methodological problem. It also likely reflects a deliberate political strategy to keep 
this data obscure. It was not only difficult for a foreign researcher to trace these aid 
funds: it was also hard for the central government agencies in charge of them. This 
fact indicated the strong likelihood of provincial state capture of the aid funds, as 
well the lack of control the central government had over the process.429 The 
empirical evidence presented in this chapter therefore serves as an illustration of the 
amount of aid flowing into North Maluku between 2000 and 2007, rather than 
precise estimates. The main point is to describe and analyse the political mechanisms 
behind provincial state capture of aid funds as no government agency or non­
governmental monitor was able to state exactly how much aid had been transferred 
and subsequently captured.
To gain a sense of the importance of the overall provincial government budget in the 
North Maluku regional economy, I compared the Gross Domestic Regional Product 
(GDRP) and overall provincial government budgets across three provinces -  North 
Maluku, West Java and East Nusa Tenggara (NTT) -  between 2000 and 2004 (see 
Annex A, Table A.3). When the provincial budgets are converted into percentages of 
regional economic product (see Annex A, Table A.4) the data show that the regional 
government budget played a much larger role in North Maluku’s post-conflict 
economy, compared to the other two provinces.430 In North Maluku, the provincial 
government budget played a relatively important role as a percentage of GDRP, but 
it had only a small role in West Java’s regional economy during the same period; 
NTT figures fell in between the two.
429Interview, senior official, BAPPENAS, 24 May 2006, Jakarta.
430 It is useful to compare North Maluku to West Java because central government budget allocations 
to Java have tended to be much lower than those to eastern provinces by the New Order and post-New  
Order governments. This is despite the fact that population sizes are far larger in all the Java 
provinces, and (though political factors also play an important role in these budgetary allocations) 
because the domestic products o f the Java provinces have always been much higher than in the 
Eastern provinces, with Java thus appearing to require less overall assistance from the central 
government. Booth (2003; 2009) discusses the political problems o f  these large central government 
allocations to the Eastern provinces when compared with the smaller allocations to Java, given that 
the poverty affected populations are actually bigger in Java. NTT province serves as a second 
comparison to North Maluku because o f its location in Eastern Indonesia, with a similarly small 
population and GDRP (when compared to other Indonesian provinces), but which did not experience 
conflict during the democratic transition and did not therefore receive special aid budgets.
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It is then possible to compare North Maluku’s regional domestic product in contrast 
to the provincial government budget and two estimates of the provincial aid budget, 
the first from the provincial parliament (DPRD) and the second from BAPPENAS 
(see Annex A, Table A.5).431 Further, North Maluku’s total provincial government 
budget can then also be seen as a percentage of GDRP (see Annex A, Table A.6), 
with aid budgets as percentages of both the total provincial budgets and GDRP for 
various years following the conflict. Using provincial parliament figures, the aid 
budget varied from between 25 and 50 per cent of the total provincial budget. As a 
percentage of GDRP, it contributed between five and eight per cent. Using the 
BAPPENAS figures, in contrast, it contributed between five and 27 per cent of the 
total provincial budget, and between 0.5 and five per cent of regional product. If the 
provincial parliament’s figures are correct, the aid budget between 2002 and 2004 
represented a substantial proportion of the total provincial government budget, 
forming an important source of provincial income. Even if the lower BAPPENAS 
estimates are correct, the aid budget still represented a substantial proportion of the 
provincial government budget in the post-conflict period, averaging between one 
quarter and one third of the total (with the 2002 exception).
The data on aid funding from both sources were potentially inaccurate due to 
political manipulation of the figures, but it was still likely that the provincial aid 
budget formed a significant proportion of the provincial government budgets during 
the post-conflict period. As the provincial government budget played a substantial 
role in the overall economy of North Maluku during this period (as it had done 
during previous periods), it is therefore relatively safe to assume that the aid budgets 
also played an important role in the North Malukan economy. Control of these funds 
was concentrated in the Provincial Governor’s office -  the politics of the provincial 
management of these funds is the subject of the following sections.
(ii) Emergency aid funding (1999-2003)
Towards the end of 1999, as the North Maluku conflict escalated, a state of military 
emergency was declared in the province. As such, preliminary emergency funds were
431 It was unclear whether the provincial aid budgets were recorded as part o f the total provincial 
government budget, or separate funds on top o f the regular budget (sources contradicted each other), 
so, following the advice o f regional economy experts, I have analysed them as part o f overall 
provincial budgets.
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transferred by BAKORNAS (the national emergency and disaster response agency) 
to SATKORLAK (the provincial branch of this agency, under the Governor’s 
control). The main wave of emergency funding followed the declaration of a civil 
emergency in Maluku and North Maluku by President Wahid on 26 June 2000.432 
This presidential decision, known as Kepres 88/2000, officially placed the Governors 
of Maluku and North Maluku in total control over managing the civil emergency in
i • • 433their respective provmces.
Owing to the conflict and post-conflict situation, between 1999 and 2002 the 
governorship of North Maluku was held by two ‘caretakers’, appointed directly by 
the Ministry of Home Affairs rather than locally elected. These centrally appointed 
governors were directly supported by the regional military, police and justice chiefs, 
and had far greater authority than in non-conflict provinces following the end of the 
New Order.434 The burgeoning sense of local political power explored in Chapters 
Two and Three -  which had been resurgent from the end of the Suharto era, risen 
through the creation of a new province in 1999, and continued throughout the 
subsequent conflict -  was thus officially retrenched back into the hands of the central 
government, via the Governor’s office.
Yet even with official control of the Governor’s office lying in Jakarta, this did not 
mean the central government held practical control over its actions. Thaib Armain, 
one of the main leaders of the southern bureaucratic political elite in North Maluku, 
was appointed Regional Secretary to the Governor during the conflict. This 
bureaucratic position ranked him second or third to the Governor in terms of regional 
political and administrative control, and in terms of local influence, he was even 
more powerful.435
To understand why the central government did not directly control how the 
Governor’s office managed and spent the emergency and post-conflict aid funds, it is
432 Presidential Declaration Number 88/2000 (2000).
433 Presidential Declaration Number 88/2000 (2000), Paragraph Three.
434 Presidential Declaration Number 88/2000 (2000) authorised the following figures to assist the 
Governors o f Maluku and North Maluku provinces: - the Pattimura Region Military Commander (the 
territorial military commander o f the Maluku region), the Maluku and North Maluku Region Police 
Chiefs, and the Chief Justice o f  Maluku.
435 Different sources reported that as Regional Secretary (or Provincial Chief o f  Staff) Thaib was the 
second or third most powerful regional bureaucrat. Most informants agreed he was on the rise.
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worth recalling several aspects of national politics from the time. When President 
Wahid declared civil emergency status for the Maluku region, the central 
government also faced a looming conflict in Central Sulawesi, and ongoing battles 
with separatist movements in the East Timor, Irian Jaya (later renamed Papua) and 
Aceh regions. The following year, communal violence broke out in Central 
Kalimantan, following severe violence in West Kalimantan two years previously. 
North Maluku was therefore just one of six ongoing conflicts in mid-2000, with three 
of them manifested largely between Christian and Muslim groups, and three regions 
threatening to break away from the central state.436 The stability and security of the 
Indonesian nation state on the eastern and western margins of the country was 
therefore at a critical juncture.437
While most of the country remained stable and non-violent, these six conflicts put 
the central government under great strain in political and security terms, and also 
from an economic perspective. The restoration of foreign investment was a national 
priority following the monetary crisis of 1997-1998, but investors were discouraged 
by widespread insecurity. Many foreign and co-owned assets (which provided the 
central government with a large percentage of its tax revenue) were located in 
conflict regions: for example, Indonesia’s largest goldmines were situated in Papua, 
various oil and gas plants in Aceh, and North Maluku contained the small but 
lucrative NHM goldmine. It was therefore in the interests of central government to 
quickly restore regional state security in the whole Maluku region amidst what 
appeared to be civil chaos. Declaring a civil emergency, putting the Maluku and 
North Maluku Governors in complete charge of their provincial governments (with 
regional military, police and legal support) and pumping emergency funds into both 
Governors offices formed the backbone of central government policy in restoring 
regional government control to these restive areas.
436 See Chapter One (Table 1.1.) for a summary o f conflicts during the democratic transition period.
437 This is not to say that the Indonesian nation state faced collapse at this time. Across most provinces 
the central government was unchallenged. However, the fact that six severe civil and military conflicts 
were ongoing in 2000 showed that the central state struggled to provide basic levels o f security and 
public services in these regions - key functions o f  any state. The central government’s response to 
military and civil emergencies in these areas reflected genuine concern for overall national security. 
See Bertrand (2004) and Sidel (2006) on the deeper meanings o f these conflicts for the composition o f  
the Indonesian nation state.
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In contrast to the urgency of restoring regional government control, monitoring 
regional government management of emergency funds was not a priority. Several 
central government officials in fact argued that it was in the direct interests of central 
government to unofficially enable regional government elites’ access to these funds 
as doing so ‘bought back’ regional government support to the centre at a time of 
great unrest.438 Whether intentional or not, central government’s relaxed control of 
provincial management of the aid funds contributed to a situation ripe for state 
capture of these funds by provincial government offices. This pattern was echoed 
across North Maluku, Central Sulawesi and Maluku provinces.439 As funds 
authorised under Kepres 88/2000 were outside the regular budget (which required 
national parliamentary approval) they were also removed from standard central 
government monitoring procedures at the time.440
In summary, two central government actions led to the concentration of economic 
and political power in the North Maluku Governor’s office. First, during the civil 
emergency, the central government centralised state power in the Governor’s office 
and secondly, it failed to monitor its actions, leaving the Governor and his senior 
staff with great regional political and budgetary discretion. A third central 
government decision compounded this situation. The devolvement of complete 
provincial control to the Governor’s office coincided with the implementation of 
nationwide decentralisation in 2001. Alongside the creation of a new provincial 
executive and legislature in North Maluku, many other new local government offices 
and parliaments were also being set up. As these local governments were new, 
‘caretaker’ regents were put in control until local elections could be held. These 
regents were appointed by and directly under the Governor’s authority, without 
autonomy over their local government budgets. The combined effect of central 
government emergency policy and the implementation of decentralisation thus gave 
the Governor’s office unprecedented power over the entire government system in the 
new province -  and its budgetary resources. The implications of this concentration of
438 Interview, senior official, BAPPENAS, 24 May 2006, Jakarta; personal correspondence, senior 
BAPPENAS official, 5 September 2006.
439 See Aragon (2007) on the corruption o f aid funds in Central Sulawesi; interviews, members o f the 
provincial parliament and civil society organisations, Ambon, October 2005; interviews, non­
governmental organisations who had operated in Central Sulawesi and Maluku during the post­
conflict period, October-December 2005, Jakarta.
440 Interview, BAPPENAS official, 24 May 2006, Jakarta.
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power in the Governor’s office, and how it led to extensive capture of aid funds, is 
analysed in Section 4.3.
(iii)Post-conflict aid funding (2003-2007)
By 2003, the civil emergency in North Maluku was officially over and the official 
phase of post-conflict ‘recovery’ began. The crucial legislation on post-conflict aid 
was issued by President Megawati via Presidential Instruction Number 6/2003 
(Inpres 6/2003). This instruction authorised the disbursement of post-conflict 
recovery and reconstruction funds for the whole Maluku region (covering both 
Maluku and North Maluku provinces) for a three year ‘intervention’ period. Inpres 
6/2003 provided a special source of government budget {Dana Alokasi Khusus), 
additional to the routine government budget allocations for provincial and local 
government {Dana Alokasi Umum).u l  At the national level, Inpres 6/2003 funds 
were reportedly channelled via 20 line ministries on top of their regular central 
budgets.442
Central government funding for Inpres 6/2003 came from two sources: -  the De­
concentration (<de-konsentrasi) and Contingency Funds {Cadangan Umurri). The De­
concentration Fund was dispersed by ministries and central government departments 
to their provincial level branches, while contingency funding was allocated through 
the normal budgetary process in the national parliament (DPR), directly to provincial 
parliaments (DPRD). Due to the strengthening of DPR controls over -  and tighter 
BAPPENAS management of -  Inpres funds, these were much more closely 
monitored than the previous tranche of emergency funds. Nevertheless, as the Inpres 
6/2003 funds were substantial for a small province like North Maluku, and 
represented an important component of the regional budget, access to them was 
highly contested and their management highly political.443
According to BAPPENAS officials, there were several problems with transferring 
Inpres 6/2003 funds to the provincial governments of Maluku and North Maluku, and 
ensuring they were spent on planned projects. First, Inpres 6/2003 funds were
441 Personal correspondence, regional public expenditure advisor, World Bank, 8 May 2006, Jakarta.
442 Personal correspondence, regional public expenditure advisor, 4 October 2005, Makassar.
443 Personal correspondence, regional public expenditure advisor, World Bank, 8 May 2006, Jakarta.
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delayed by the Presidential Secretariat. This led to subsequent discrepancies between 
ministerial and departmental planning cycles, so the funds did not come online until 
the new fiscal year in 2004.444 In the interim other ‘transitional’ funds were also used 
by the North Maluku provincial government for aid programmes. As such, it remains 
unclear precisely how much was transferred to North Maluku between 2003 and 
2004 (see Annex A, Table A.2, for estimates).445 Post-conflict recovery projects 
during this period may also have been financed by the Deconcentration Fund. These 
funds were allocated via the Social Department and implemented by the provincial 
government, meaning this tranche of funding was not closely monitored.446 In 2004 
post-conflict recovery funds allocated via Inpres 6/2003 finally began to flow. 
However, even then, in BAPPENAS’s view the funds were “not well socialised and 
less supported by ministries and departments”, meaning they were, “not effectively 
implemented.” Inpres 6/2003 funds were therefore re-allocated to the 2005-2007 
period, although some had already been spent by the provincial government.447
Part of the funding for Inpres 6/2003 came from the Central Reserve Budget, or 
Contingency Fund. This was a central budget for post-conflict recovery and 
reconstruction as well as natural disaster recovery. The Central Reserve Budget was 
a much fought over funding source for regional governments in post-conflict and 
disaster-affected areas. It was also a sensitive issue for the central government. For 
example, the fund could be used for IDP resettlement projects, demonstrating that 
even by 2004 - a general election year, and precisely when it wished to demonstrate 
successful handling of regional conflicts - the central government had still not 
resolved regional IDP problems. Then Coordinating Minister for Social Welfare 
Jusuf Kalla stated the final allocations for IDPs would be commissioned by 2005 
from the Reserve Budget.448 His statement did not mean the IDP problem would be 
solved by the deadline -  but it indicated to provincial governments that this special 
IDP funding would eventually dry up. Provincial governments then found other
444 Personal correspondence, BAPPENAS, 5 September 2006.
445 The data was contradictory for allocations to North Maluku between 2003 and 2005. Best estimates 
are presented in Annex A (Table A.2.).
446 Personal correspondence, BAPPENAS, 5 September 2006 .1 did not have access to these budgets.
447 Interview, BAPPENAS official, 24 May 2006, Jakarta; personal correspondence, BAPPENAS, 5 
September 2006. It unclear whether Inpres 6 funds had been spent on non-Inpres 6 sanctioned 
activities by the local government in 2004, though this was hinted at.
448 Personal correspondence, BAPPENAS, 5 September 2006.
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funding sources -  from Inpres 6/2003, as well as parts of their regular budgets -  to 
cover post-conflict activities through to at least 2007.
Of all three streams of government funds to the North Maluku provincial government 
during the post-conflict period -  Inpres 6/2003, the Contingency Fund, and the 
regular budget -  the Inpres fund was the largest.449 Management of the Inpres funds 
presented many problems for BAPPENAS officials due to its political nature at both 
national and provincial levels of government, as well as the difficulties posed in 
tracking its expenditure (which Section 4.3 returns to). One senior BAPPENAS 
official commented:
It is very difficult to manage the Inpres 6 funds through the ministries. 
Although it is very clear in the Inpres 6 statement that the money is for 
the recovery process, when we try to evaluate what Inpres 6 was used 
for, we see the budget has been used for all kinds of non-conflict 
things...You could say the budget goes “out of track.” The local 
government in North Maluku seems to be looking for another kind of 
purpose for the fund, for example, building a new government 
office.450
Although BAPPENAS was responsible for coordinating the post-conflict recovery 
action plan financed by Inpres 6/2003, local government agencies had their own roles 
to play. The funds were jointly -  though not equally -  distributed between Maluku 
and North Maluku. Bargaining over how and where the funds could be spent was a 
lengthy, complex and highly political process between both provincial governors and 
BAPPENAS (as well as with local bureaucrats in their respective provinces). The 
provincial level development planning agency, BAPPEDA, was mandated to 
coordinate Inpres 6/2003 plans at the provincial level. BAPPEDA officials then 
undertook extensive negotiations with other provincial authorities, including 
branches of line ministries and staff in both the provincial governors’ offices over the 
planned allocations of these funds. Plans were then submitted to BAPPENAS in 
Jakarta, who proposed them to the relevant central government departments and 
ministries. After this process -  all of which involved personal and political 
interventions -  the activities and funding agreed by both provinces and the central 
government (the so called Inpres 6/2003 Annual Action Plan) was then submitted by
^Interview, BAPPENAS official, 6 May 2007, Jakarta. Figures for the other funds were not 
available.
450 Interview, 24 May 2006, Jakarta.
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BAPPENAS to the Parliamentary Budgetary Committee, with a copy to the Ministry 
of Finance, who then approved it.
One BAPPENAS official, in charge of managing the Inpres 6/2003 budget, 
explained:
You can see that allocation of Inpres Funds is a complex bargaining 
process across a triangle of the Maluku provinces, the central 
government -including BAPPENAS, ministries and departments -  and 
the national parliament.451
Determining where central government aid would be spent, and, more importantly, 
who would spend it, involved complex bargaining processes between central and 
provincial government authorities, as well as between provincial level agencies under 
the control of both provincial governors’ offices.452 The large budgets of the aid 
funds allocated for North Maluku -  the smallest Indonesian province in terms of 
GDRP and population -  just as the region was struggling to emerge from the 
extended economic crisis meant the provincial and local contest to access these funds 
was highly contested and deeply political.453 During the civil emergency period, the 
concentration of power in the Governor’s office meant the Provincial Secretary (the 
most senior provincial civil servant) had the greatest control over these aid funds -  
determining how and where they would be spent and by whom. Bureaucrats in the 
Governor’s office and provincial agencies had a great deal of discretion over aid 
expenditures up to end of the civil emergency period in 2003. Once the civil 
emergency was lifted, activists, local government bodies and the wider population 
(including IDPs) had more freedom to protest against provincial government actions, 
as Section 3.4 discusses further.
The accumulation of financial resources (for both personal and political activities), 
political favours, business clients, and so forth, by those occupying the Governor’s 
office during the emergency and post-conflict period had notable effects on local 
politics over the subsequent years. Chapter Six discusses the electoral dynamics
451 Personal correspondence, senior official, BAPPENAS, 5 September 2006
452 1 did not trace the political ramifications o f provincial state capture o f aid funds in Maluku in the 
same depth as in North Maluku, but Chapter Five highlights some o f the problems faced by Malukan 
parliamentarians and NGOs who tried to monitor aid funds. BAPPENAS officials also hinted that the 
patterns o f state capture in both provinces were very similar.
453 BPS (2001).
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following the concentration of power in the Governor’s office from this time -  in 
particular the political entrenchment of Thaib Armain, the chief provincial 
bureaucrat, as one of the most powerful regional political players. His election to the 
governorship in 2002 (and re-election in 2008) was closely linked to the position he 
held in the Governor’s office, and his discretionary control over these aid funds, 
during the post-conflict period. The next section discusses the provincial dynamics of 
government aid capture in more detail.
4.3 Aid capture in the Provincial Governor’s office
You have to look at political conflicts to understand what is wrong 
with the economy here -  because the political system is dominant.
Political and government interests set the economic agenda here.
Economics lecturer, Khairun University.454
During the emergency period, economic and political power was concentrated in the 
Provincial Governor’s office by a variety of means with only minimal checks and 
balances on its operations from the national and local level, state and non-state 
actors. This section turns to the provincial mechanisms behind state capture of 
emergency and post-conflict aid and examines several aspects of why the newly 
established provincial parliament and other provincial level government bodies, 
together with the non-governmental sector, were ineffective in controlling the 
provincial government. Three key factors at the provincial level explain why aid 
capture so readily took place: -  the impact of emergency legislation; the constrained 
role of the provincial parliament, legal and civil society sectors; and, limited 
‘technical capacity’ to manage complex emergency funds in the provincial 
government.
(i) The impact o f emergency legislation
The Governor still has the most important role in the regional 
government and controls everything, followed by the Vice Governor 
and the Sekda (Provincial Chief of Staff). Civil servants and members 
of parliament have a role but it’s not as important as these three -  
because they control the budget. The provincial parliament is
454 Interview, 29 September 2005, Temate
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supposed to monitor the government.. .but in reality they are also 
involved in the process of corruption.
Local activist, Temate. 455
During the emergency period (1999-2003), a series of North Maluku Governors -  
first appointed by the central government and later elected -  controlled the provincial 
government. It was only when President Megawati declared North Maluku a ‘post- 
conflict’ region, with the issuing of Inpres 6/2003, that the highly centralised 
management of regional government administration was relaxed. During the four 
year emergency period, the Governor’s office had tight control over all government 
emergency expenditures.456 This was despite the implementation of the 2001 
decentralisation laws nationwide, which had (in many other non-emergency regions) 
cut out the provincial level by transferring the majority of sub-national fiscal 
functions to local governments.457 North Maluku’s special situation -  as with other 
emergency stricken regions -  meant the Governor’s office retained the central role in 
budgetary and political terms.
In some respects, the emergency situation meant the organisation of provincial 
government looked like a repeat of New Order style sub-national government in 
Eastern Indonesia: a centrally appointed figurehead officially controlled the 
provincial government, with all local government positions under the Governor’s 
direct authority. Even during the first gubernatorial elections, informants reported 
that the highly militarised atmosphere in Temate during the 2001 to 2002 
gubernatorial election cycle felt more like a New Order-era “election” than a free and 
open local one.458 But whilst the central government had an interest in controlling the 
gubernatorial office, and were officially ‘partners’ in the post-conflict reconstruction 
process, the previous section demonstrated that central control -  at least in budgetary 
terms -  was largely superficial. As such, provincial government officers had a great 
deal of discretion over their political activities and budgets.
As Chapter Three explained, the new Governor’s office was highly contested prior to 
-  indeed, leading to -  the conflict, reflecting local elite perceptions that this office
455 Interview, local NGO member, 30 September 2005, Temate
456 Interview, regional government finance expert, Makassar, 4 October 2005.
457 See Chapter Three for an outline o f decentralisation legislation.
458 See Chapter Six.
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was the central prize of regional political power.459 Whilst emergency legislation 
temporarily removed the Governorship from ‘local’ hands, local state elites still 
controlled the highest levels of bureaucratic office and therefore the aid funds 
officially ‘coordinated’ by the Governor’s office.460 In 2002, Thaib Armain, the 
provincial chief of staff, and one of the most powerful figures in the provincial 
administration, was pronounced the first locally elected Governor.461 Local 
informants connected Thaib’s success with his unique access to the emergency and 
post-conflict aid funds (locally known as the pengungsi -  IDP -  funds) during his 
time in the Governor’s office:
The former ‘caretaker’ Governor Effendi is under investigation for 
corruption of the pengungsi funds. This could also happen to the current 
Governor because he was Sekda (provincial secretary) at that time, and so 
he had control and authority of the funds. This position meant he would 
have signed off on all the ‘deals’ with the temporary Governor of the time -  
that was when the refugee money was all going missing.462
Members of a local NGO involved in monitoring the provincial government, were 
dismayed at the extent to which power was centralised in the Governor’s office 
following the conflict, despite national promises of local government reform. These 
informants reasoned that successive Governors deliberately exploited confusion over 
the role of different government bodies during the emergency and post-conflict 
periods to their advantage, leading to extensive provincial corruption of aid funds.463 
The head of one international organisation, who had worked in North Maluku during 
the emergency period, reflected on this problem:
When our organisation started operations in North Maluku, we 
focused on working with IDPs in West Halmahera district, but to do 
this we had to work with the provincial level. Now, things have
459 Chapters Two and Three outlined how with the onset o f  the reform era, North Malukans in the 
Jakarta elite ‘returned’ to contest local politics, including the Temate Sultan and former New Order 
Minister Abdul Gafur. Gafur unsuccessfully contested against Thaib in the North Maluku 
gubernatorial elections in 2001/2002 and again in 2007/2008. See Chapter Six on electoral politics.
460 The first provincial governor elections were originally scheduled for 1999, but were then 
suspended due to the conflict and eventually delayed until 2001. In the meanwhile, two central 
government figures were appointed temporary (‘caretaker’) governors by the Ministry o f Home 
Affairs: Surasmin (appointed in 1999), followed by Effendi (appointed in 2000).
461 See Chapter Six.
462 Thaib was the ‘current’ Governor referred to here. Interview, retired judge, 2 June 2005, Temate.
463 The implication o f this statement was that if  die organisation had been required to work ‘with’ the 
provincial government they would have been exposed to extensive corruption. Interview, members o f  
local NGO, 30 September 2005, Temate.
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changed a bit because of increased autonomy at the district level, but 
when we started it was still the emergency phase of government and it 
was very centralised. But at least for us we didn’t have to put money 
through the provincial government. That would have created even 
more problems for us.464
A staff member from an organisation managing IDP rehabilitation projects in North 
Maluku after the conflict ascribed the continued power of provincial government 
officials after the emergency period to their direct access to the emergency funds. 
This informant argued that the North Maluku political pattern was not unique and 
was repeated across the three main sites of conflict in Eastern Indonesia due to the 
concentrated powers in the provincial governments of Central Sulawesi, Maluku and 
North Maluku.465 Further down the chain of command, he reported that local level 
officials also benefited from access to these funds:
From the Governor down to the district, everyone in the government 
has gained from the IDP funds. The head of DinSos (the Social 
Department) became an unofficial treasurer for the provincial 
government, especially for the Governor. In Poso, before the election, 
the Bupati (district chief) was the former head of Dinsos, and very 
corrupt. So he had a lot of financing for later elections.466
Chapter Six further discusses how local electoral dynamics were influenced by the 
extensive capture of aid funds by the North Maluku provincial government. Before 
that, however, I consider the remaining factors enabling extensive provincial 
government capture of aid funds.
(ii) The roles ofprovincial parliament, legal and civil society sectors 
The provincial parliament served only as a limited check on the power of the 
provincial executive for several reasons in addition to the fact that its independence 
was weakened by the emergency legislation. One of these was the confusion between 
various laws on decentralisation and the role of the provincial parliament, another, 
the strong likelihood of collusion between the parliament and executive offices.
The Deputy Speaker of the North Maluku DPRD commented:
464 Interview, Programme Director, International NGO, 31 October 2005, Jakarta.
465 Aragon (2007) also discusses the politics o f corruption o f emergency aid funds in Central 
Sulawesi.
466 Interview, Regional Programme Manager, International NGO, 1 November 2005, Jakarta.
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First there was Decentralisation Law 22/99, which meant that the local 
parliaments could impeach a regent or the governor through the annual 
report. But then Megawati passed Law 31/04 and this law reduced the 
powers of the parliament and said they cannot impeach the Governor 
or the regent... they can only look at the administration in the annual 
report and nothing else. This has seriously curtailed our power to 
monitor the Governor.467
One of the main intentions of the 1999 decentralisation laws was the strengthening of 
parliamentary control over the regional budgeting process, at both the provincial and 
local levels of government. However, by 2004, the national legislation on balances of 
power between provincial and local executive and legislative branches of 
government were in direct conflict, following President Megawati’s approval of 
several laws which overturned several aspects of the 1999 decentralisation 
legislation.468 From 2004 onwards it was therefore unclear which body of 
government held ultimate authority over the budgetary process, although a degree of 
power appeared to have been returned to the provincial executive.469
An already confusing national legislative situation, in the context of an emergency 
afflicted and recovering post-conflict region, further enabled the making of deals 
between the provincial parliament and Governor’s office over the use of aid funds. 
One local informant reported:
There have been no significant changes since decentralisation here.
The local parliaments are not yet strong and they remain subordinate 
to the executive at each level of government. The local parliament 
should control the local budget, but it doesn’t. The executive still 
keeps all the strength over the budgets....There are a few people in 
parliament who have tried to monitor the executive in the past. These 
guys monitored the 2004 budget and were sure there had been big 
corruption because they were not allowed to see the budget reports.
But they did not follow through with the police and the courts. So 
there are many suspicions that deals were made between the 
parliament and the Governor over the budget.470
This key informant was one of the few civilians in North Maluku closely involved 
with monitoring the provincial budgeting process during the post-conflict period. He
467 Interview, Deputy Speaker, DPRD, 30 September 2005, Temate. Chapter Three refers further to 
the contradictory decentralisation laws.
468 See Chapter Three (footnote no. 270).
469 Personal correspondence, regional public finance expert, Makassar, August 2006.
470 Interview, head of local NGO, 30 September 2005, Temate.
167
reported that there had been many indications of corruption between 2004 and 2005 
alone, which his organisation was attempting to trace. However, because no NGO 
could access the official budget reports of the provincial government, it was difficult 
for NGOs and ordinary residents (including IDPs) to establish how government aid 
funds had been spent, and to assess how much had potentially gone astray. While the 
DPRD could theoretically take action against the Governor’s office through the police 
and judicial system, parliament members failed to pursue these routes. This NGO 
informant claimed, “We suspect that the Sekda (Provincial Chief of Staff) bought the 
MPs off after their opposition to the Governor’s office died out.”471
On top of collusion between the provincial parliament and the Governor’s office, 
provincial level legal bodies also appeared to have been involved with capturing aid 
funds. Local newspapers reported on the problems faced by local NGOs attempting 
to obtain information on ongoing corruption cases. One local organisation, 
Gamalama Corruption Watch (GCW), questioned the slow progress of the corruption 
case against the Governor’s office through the Provincial State Attorney’s office. 
Apparently there was some confusion between the State Attorney’s office and the 
Provincial Attorney General’s office over the issuing of investigative proceedings 
against the Governor’s office. One local newspaper implied that collusion between 
the State Attorney’s and Governor’s offices had prevented the case from going 
forward.472
Even if the DPRD had monitored the Governor’s office, some informants believed 
this would still have been an insufficient check on the provincial executive’s use of 
aid funds. In Ambon, a senior member of the city DPRD reported on similar 
problems in Maluku:
The government system needs to be sorted out, there are so many 
interventions from the executive office into the parliamentary 
system...To prevent this we need to get students, the community and 
other stakeholders, like NGOs, all involved in the anti-corruption fight 
because without working together we can’t do it. We (the parliament) 
can’t work alone to improve the government, all elements of society 
have to work together.4 3
471 Interview, local NGO member, 30 October 2005, Temate.
472 Malut Pos, 30 November 2004.
473 Interview, PDIP member, Ambon DPRD, 12 October 2005, Ambon.
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Prior to the increase in local political activity from 2003 onwards, following the 
official transition from ‘emergency’ status, civil society monitoring of provincial 
government had been restricted to the activities of a few grassroots and IDP 
organisations in Temate. These groups were politically weak and dependent on small 
sums of international funding to survive, even after the emergency legislation was 
lifted.474 The more powerful “civil society” organisations, based in regional branches 
of national political and religious movements, such as Muhammidiyah, were closely 
tied to different branches of the local executive, whether for funding or political 
support. As such they did not act independently and had little interest in acting 
against the provincial executive.475
After emergency status was lifted in 2003, so too were some of the controls on local 
political activities. From this point, the provincial parliament and NGOs in Temate 
grew more actively involved in challenging ‘corruption’ in the provincial 
government. The end of emergency status also meant the large number of military 
personnel stationed in North Maluku was gradually reduced, leaving a large presence 
only in parts of North and West Halmahera, thus reducing the ‘militarised’ 
atmosphere that had followed the conflict.476 In July 2003, the Governor’s office 
officially handed over regional security from the military to the regional police, 
reflecting the official end to military backing of the provincial government. 
Demonstrations against the Governor’s office had been rising up to this point and 
grew thereafter.
In June 2003, just prior to the lifting of civil emergency status, thousands of IDPs 
rallied at the Governor’s office in Temate in protest over the failed delivery of their 
long-promised assistance packages and the fact that they still awaited resettlement or 
assisted return to their original homes.477 Waves of these demonstrations, led by IDP 
groups and the NGOs supporting them, continued against the provincial government
474 Many Temate-based local NGOs were dependent on UNDP for their funding, which is interesting 
as UNDP also provided one o f  the main sources o f aid captured by the provincial government, which 
these NGOs then monitored (see Chapter Five on the role o f the UNDP).
475Interviews, members o f religious and local non-government organisations, June to December 2005, 
Temate.
476 The sub-district areas o f Tobelo, Galela, Kao, Malifut (North Halmahera district) and Jailolo (West 
Halmahera district) were still considered sensitive enough to warrant a continued military presence at 
least up until 2005. UNDP (2003), p.2.
477 UNDP (2003), p. 19.
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through 2004 and into 2005. By December 2004, local journalists were increasingly 
active in following alleged corruption cases against the Governor’s office. The State 
Prosecutor’s office also re-opened a corruption case that had previously been closed 
by the provincial Attorney General in 2003. A special team was set up to investigate 
the case but they had failed to present any findings. In response to questions from the 
local press on their slow investigation, the North Maluku State Prosecutor retorted, 
“The lamb is not even caught, yet you’ve already asked for the sate (cooked meat 
skewers). ”478 Local activists asserted that delays in the court proceedings were the 
result of collusion between the Prosecutor, Attorney General and Governor’s offices, 
and there were few reasons to suggest they were wrong. The Regional Police Chief 
promised to pursue the case, but the activists were not hopeful of any progress.479
Of course, local NGOs sometimes had their own political interests in challenging the 
provincial government over corruption charges, whether because they were 
politically linked to the Governor’s competitors, or for other reasons. In 2004, 
Governor Thaib publicly complained that the ‘anti-corruption’ demonstrations 
organised by local activists were a ploy to discredit him to the benefit of their 
preferred political alternatives.480 The Governor might have had a point -  subsequent 
investigations in 2005 by the provincial parliament were related to undermining his 
political support in favour of other candidates. But even if local NGOs supported the 
Governor’s political opponents, this does not disprove his involvement with 
capturing the aid budget.
By 2005, the local political situation was slowly beginning to change. The provincial 
parliament had launched an investigation into the expenditure of emergency aid 
funds by the provincial government.481 Critical monitoring of the executive by the 
same parliament members demonstrated a degree of independence in the previously 
passive DPRD. Actions by anti-Thaib factions in the DPRD were politically located 
in the run-up to the first direct-gubernatorial elections schedule for 2007, with 
different party factions attempting to discredit Thaib (representing PDI-P). The 
Golkar faction, in particular, favoured alternate candidates to Thaib for the 2007
478 Malut Pos, 22 December 2004.
479 Malut Pos, 22 December 2004.
480 Malut Pos, 21 December 2004.
481 North Maluku Provincial Parliament (2005).
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gubernatorial election. As such, the parliamentary investigation into the Governor’s 
capture of aid funds reflected a return to factional competition and intra-state elite 
struggle in local politics. Chapter Six returns to this topic.
(unlimited provincial administrative capacity 
A third possible explanation for why central government aid to the provincial 
government was readily captured by government staff was that new provincial staff 
had limited technical expertise in managing such large and complex funds. Both 
local NGO staff and MPs considered this one of the explanations. However, whilst 
the technical expertise of the new provincial public servants may have been limited, 
this does not mean they were politically or financially incapable of managing the 
aid budget to their own advantage.
As a newly created province, the Governor’s office was largely staffed by 
previously more junior level officials, rapidly promoted by the Ministry of Home 
Affairs in order to create a new provincial administration. One regional public 
expenditure expert commented:
In North Maluku, before it became a province, the senior civil servants 
in the city and district offices were mostly posted in from Ambon. This 
means the capacity of local civil servants in North Maluku is still very 
low after the conflict. People got promoted too fast without university 
degrees -  so they don’t have the capacity to head the provincial 
government offices.482
Technical inexperience in monitoring government budgets in the new provincial 
parliament also meant the executive body could easily exploit its control over the 
budget. A senior provincial parliament member reported:
The regional budget was delayed in 2005 because of problems with the 
Governor’s office. Local economic development is so dependent on 
the budget, but if the budget is delayed then nothing can be done.
Another problem is that over 70 per cent of the provincial budget is 
used for operational matters -  that is, not directly on economic or 
social development, but just on the salaries and offices and other costs 
of the officials. Because of these kinds of problems, we have asked for 
support from university professors. We want them to help with legal 
drafting in the parliament to monitor the executive. Before, new laws
482 Interview, regional public expenditure expert, 4 October 2005, Makassar.
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used to come from the executive and we would approve them, but now 
the parliament is responsible.
That provincial government offices and the DPRD were staffed by relatively 
inexperienced officials and new parliamentarians, and given the complexity of the 
aid funds (outlined in Section 4.2), partially explains why the aid funds were easily 
appropriated by provincial officials. The North Maluku region was a neglected 
collection of three local government authorities within the larger Maluku province 
for over three decades under the New Order regime. Becoming a new province 
promised an improvement in local government. One provincial parliament member 
explained:
I was one of those lobbying to make North Maluku district part of a 
new province. I wanted to improve public services that had been so 
neglected by the Ambon government. We could only do this by 
becoming a new province.48
In late 1999, with the new provincial government established for only two months 
and the new parliament not yet organised, the conflict swept away many of the 
prospects for a new kind of local government administration. Local officials had not 
held such senior positions before. With the range of post-conflict crises for the new 
provincial government to manage -  the rise in unemployment, destruction of regional 
infrastructure and services, and decline in agricultural and industrial production -  
alongside the complications of the ongoing decentralisation process during the 
emergency period, it is understandable that centrally provided aid funds were not 
effectively managed. But the local state elites in charge were far from politically 
inexperienced, meaning their capacity to manage provincial and other branches of 
government should not be underestimated.
Chapter Three demonstrated how political action by local elites led to the creation of 
the first new province in Indonesia -  this was no small political feat during the 
national democratic transition. Competition between the same political elites over 
control of the new government was also one of the main drivers of the violence 
following the creation of the new province. The lengthy political experience of the 
local political elite during the New Order would have prepared them well for
483 Interview, Deputy Speaker, North Maluku DPRD, 19 October, 2005, Temate.
484 Interview, Deputy Speaker, North Maluku DPRD, 30 September 2005, Temate.
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organising new government budgets in ways that were advantageous to them. 
Denying the capacity of these local state elites to manage government budgets means 
overlooking their deeply rooted and extensive patronage networks, which extended 
from the provincial government into the local business community, and also into 
other levels of government personnel. Despite a lack of technical experience in 
administering large and complex aid funds, especially during a genuine economic 
and social crisis, government officials were readily able to exploit systemic 
weaknesses in the local government system to their personal and political advantage. 
The next section examines problems in local government, which concentrated power 
in the Governor’s office even further.
4.4 Constraints on local government
The previous sections have established that the combination of emergency 
legislation, with simultaneous limitations in the provincial parliamentary and legal 
systems, and limited civil society monitoring of the provincial government prior to 
2003, led to the concentration of regional political and budgetary power in the North 
Maluku Governor’s office. This gave the Governor’s office almost complete control 
of the regional budget, enabling extensive state capture of the aid budget with a 
minimum level of oversight from either national or provincial authorities. Finally, it 
is important to consider why the local level of government also failed to act as a 
counter-balance to the provincial government’s power. The 1999 decentralisation 
laws were intended to empower the local levels of government (including city and 
district governments) in budgetary and political decision making in the regions. 
However, as this chapter has argued, the potential this legislation had for increasing 
the role of local government was undermined by the authorisation of emergency 
status to North Maluku in 2000. The resultant transitional status of local governments 
in the region meant that with only a few exceptions, they failed to fulfil an 
independent government role.
The government budgeting system was in upheaval across Indonesia following the 
2001 implementation of decentralisation. According to national legislation, the 
provincial level of government was no longer mandated to provide public services, or
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receive funds for this purpose, but in practice they often did. Regional public 
expenditure experts reported that almost all provincial governments in Eastern 
Indonesia (not only those in conflict areas) carried out some public service activities, 
for example, running local healthcare services.485 Across Eastern Indonesia this 
situation had triggered conflicts between the provincial and local branches of 
government over resource and revenue sharing procedures. Revenue sharing 
legislation was further complicated in 2004 when yet more decentralisation laws 
returned a degree of authority to the provincial level, which had previously been lost 
to the district level via the 1999 laws, causing confusion between the different levels 
of government over both their functions and their budgets.486
Government financing conflicts and confusions affected all of Eastern Indonesia in 
the post-decentralisation era, but in North Maluku -  as in Maluku and Central 
Sulawesi -they were compounded by the concentration of power in provincial 
governors’ offices by the emergency legislation. Up to at least 2003 the provincial 
governments in all three provinces had a huge amount of discretion over government 
budgets. In North Maluku, the provincial government also benefitted from other 
sources of regional income, for example, from mining sector revenues. Under normal 
circumstances these revenues would have been shared across the provincial and local 
governments.487
In early 2003, five new local government authorities were officially established in
/ o o
North Maluku, taking the total of local governments to eight. However, it took 
several more years to make these local government bodies fully operational and
485 Interview, regional public finance expert, 4 October 2005, Makassar.
486 Interview, regional public finance expert, 4 October, 2005, Makassar.
487 It was not only aid funds that failed to reach the local governments. Revenue generated by the 
NHM goldmine in North Halmahera district was officially meant to be shared across all local district 
and city governments o f North Maluku from 2003 onwards, with a percentage share going to the 
provincial government. See Chapter Three (Section 3.3 iii) for more details on revenue sharing
agreements. The new North Halmahera district government (where the mine was located) regularly
issued complaints to the NHM mining company over the reduced revenue share they actually received 
when compared with what they were promised in the legislation -  it was routinely cut by the 
provincial government. The district government demanded the goldmine send their revenue share 
directly, but the company was unable to do this as it contravened legal agreements with the central 
government. Interview, External Affairs manager, PT NHM, Temate, 29 September 2005. See, also, 
Duncan (2007) on revenue sharing problems in North Maluku between the local and provincial 
government.
488 This followed parliamentary ratification and Presidential approval o f  a bill to create six new 
districts and two new city municipalities in North Maluku province on 25 February 2003.
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independent of the provincial government. Local newspaper reports, and interviews 
with local NGOs and international donors indicated that local government offices 
were largely -  if not completely -  ineffective from the time of the conflict until well 
into 2005. This was partly because local government offices were overseen by 
‘caretaker’ administrators, who were directly under the control of the Governor’s 
office. Before local parliamentary elections in 2004 and the first direct local 
executive elections in 2005, local government bodies were still unable to make or 
implement policies in the local legislatures and administrative branches of local 
government independently from the provincial level.
An economic assessment of the post-conflict situation in North Maluku (sponsored by 
UNDP) found that the ‘transitional nature’ of local government bodies meant they had 
failed to manage economic reconstruction or recovery programmes in their areas, with 
the provincial level responsible for most of these activities.489 One UNDP staff 
member reported that the transition period had confused the provincial and local 
government financial system, leading to multiple conflicts over who was responsible 
for what. The staff member reported, “There are so many problems and conflicts 
between the provincial, city and district governments. The government system just 
doesn’t work here.”490 The provincial government, for their part, claimed that district 
governments were in “too much disarray” to be usefully involved in the post-conflict
491reconstruction process.
A combination of the unclear legal and staffing status of local government bodies and 
their exclusion by the provincial government from decision making over the aid 
budget, marginalised local governments throughout the emergency period and even 
into the post-conflict phase. Only the Temate city administration headed by Mayor 
Syamsir Andili, a historically and politically well established administration, stood 
any chance of managing its own local government affairs, given the stronger legal and 
political position of the Governor’s office. One staff member of an international 
organisation, who had worked extensively with IDPs in North Maluku following the 
conflict, commented:
489 Swisher et al (2004), p.30.
490 Interview, UNDP staff member, 30 May 2005, Temate.
491 Swisher et al (2004), p.32.
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IDP aid funds would be much better handled by the district or city 
government, not the province. Their scope of their operations is 
smaller and they understand better the environment. One of the key 
problems is that the money goes straight to the province and not 
directly to the local government. This makes a problem between the 
local governments and the province because the local government 
can’t fix the problem -  they don’t have the money or the resources to 
do so if all the money goes to the province.492
A related issue further contributed to problems at the local government level. Under 
the New Order regime, most district and sub-district officials had tended to live in 
Temate city, not in the locations of their local government posts. Prior to the creation 
of the new province and district government offices, local officials benefited from 
maintaining close proximity to the Temate-based government offices, for both 
political and financial reasons. Following the conflict, their interest in staying ‘close’ 
to Temate branches of government only increased, as the budget of the new 
provincial government swelled with aid funds during the regional economic crisis. 
Financial and political interests in the aid funds thus also played a role in keeping 
local government actors quiet. One of Indonesia’s most experienced conflict 
analysts, who had carried out several studies in North Maluku following the conflict, 
reported:
There is still a very big ‘interest’ to be a government officer in North 
Maluku -  especially during the post-conflict period when there were 
all the reconstruction funds and development funds to be accessed 
from the provincial and city government....There were very big 
problems of corruption of the reconstruction and IDP funds.493
While weak, however, the local government did not remain silent forever. The most 
vocal critic of the provincial government was Syamsir Andili, the Temate Mayor and 
formerly one of Thaib Armain’s main bureaucratic allies in the southern elite 
faction.494 The Temate city government was one of only three functioning local 
government bodies prior to the end of the emergency period in 2003. The other two 
(the North Maluku and Central Halmahera district governments) had been severely 
affected by the conflict’s political, social and economic fall-out. Whilst the Temate
492 Interview, Project Manager, CARDI-Maluku, 10 October 2005, Ambon.
493Interview, Arifah Rahmawati, Centre for Conflict and Peace Studies, Universitas Gadja Mada, 
Yogyajakarta, 4 May 2005.
494 See Chapters Two and Three on the southern alliance.
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city government had some discretion over their city government budget, the city’s 
access to aid funding largely depended on the Governor’s office. Negotiations over 
city government funding thus took place between Thaib and Syamsir, competing with 
access to the provincial aid budget.495
As one of the leading members of the southern political faction, which was 
triumphant during the conflict, Syamsir held a degree of political influence far beyond 
his official position as a head of the city government. This meant his negotiating 
position with Thaib was stronger than it was for other local government heads, who, 
heading transitional local government bodies, and without Syamsir’s experience at the 
head of a local government, did not share his political advantages. Increasing tensions 
between these two state elites reflected a new intra-elite political contest following the 
conflict.
By 2004, the Temate Mayor and members of the city parliament started to openly 
criticise the Governor’s office over its management of the IDP funds in Temate.496 
One strong supporter of Mayor Syamsir, a senior Golkar member of the Temate city 
DPRD, stated:
The district and city government understand the (IDP) problem better 
than the provincial government because they know the community, but 
the provincial government won’t let the funding go to lower levels of 
government because of all the money they get themselves from these 
funds. For example, the city government was able to rehabilitate the 
churches in Temate, but we could not solve the refugee issue. If it 
were up to me, the Muslim refugees would go home and then the 
Christians can come back to their houses. But as the money to resettle 
people is already “eaten up” by the provincial government, there is no 
way to solve the problem.497
Prior to 2003, and the lifting of emergency legislation, the city government staff and 
members had no clear legal mandate to challenge the provincial government’s 
activities, though they did so informally. Following provincial parliamentary elections 
in 2004 and direct elections for local government heads in 2005, however, the local
495 The contest between these two former southern allies further increased in 2005, with Syamsir 
supporting alternative candidates in planned gubernatorial elections (see Chapter Six).
Swisher et al (2004), p.32.
497 Interview, Golkar member, Temate DPRD, 22 June 2005, Temate. The term “already eaten” 
(sudah makan) implied not only that the IDP money had already been spent, but that it been spent on 
unofficial activities unrelated to the IDPs (by the Governor’s office).
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government’s challenge to the Governor’s office became much stronger. Temate 
Mayor Syamsir’s rivalries with his former ally Governor Thaib were rooted not only 
in access to aid funds, but also in political clashes between Thaib and the Mayor’s 
brother -  Bahar Andili -  who had contested Thaib in the initial candidate selection 
during the first gubernatorial election in 2001, but later died.
Recalling the analysis of local factional politics in Chapters Two and Three, Thaib, 
Bahar and Syamsir -  the southern elite triumvirate both before and during the conflict 
-  were the biggest players in regional politics. By 2005, the rivalry between the 
Mayor (Syamsir) and the Governor (Thaib) over local power overlapped with the city 
government’s frustration with provincial capture of aid funds, which curtailed city 
funding. The Mayor found willing allies in the city government and parliament to 
back his campaign against the Governor. Syamsir’s supporters were not only 
frustrated by corruption in the Governor’s office, but also because unofficial 
campaigning for the next gubernatorial elections (scheduled for 2007) had started. 
Intra-elite rivalry between these officials during local and gubernatorial elections is 
further discussed in Chapter Six.
In conclusion, on problems at the local government level, the main point to highlight 
is that official changes to the legal status of local governments (in theory giving them 
more power) was an insufficient means of enabling local governments to challenge 
the political and financial power of the Governor’s office. Personal and political 
interests in challenging the Governor’s position were also necessary to enable local 
challenges to provincial power. The frustrated financial interests of city 
parliamentarians and bureaucrats finally motivated them to act against the Governor 
who had so long controlled their budgets. In North Maluku, at least, local government 
reforms were insufficient tools for challenging entrenched state elites and corrupt 
governmental processes, especially in an emergency situation.
4.5 Conclusion
The North Maluku conflict left in its wake a socio-economic crisis across many 
spheres of regional life. Approximately three thousand people died and between one
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fifth and one third of the regional population was displaced, causing great social and 
economic disruption. Following national economic crisis, the regional economy 
continued to contract after the conflict, and this was likely due to the combined 
impact of internal displacement, infrastructure and local business destruction, 
security risks and related restrictions on the agricultural sector, which contributed to 
high levels of urban unemployment. The combined effects of socio-economic crisis 
led to increased dependence on die provincial and local government for social 
welfare and economic reconstruction, for both the large displaced community and the 
population as a whole.
Emergency and reconstruction aid funds provided by central to provincial 
government formed a substantial part of the overall provincial government budget in 
the post-conflict period, which itself formed a substantial part of North Maluku’s 
regional economic product when compared with other regions of Indonesia. With the 
overall regional economy in crisis, centralised control over substantial aid revenues 
(with limited monitoring by central government) gave the provincial government 
unprecedented power. With control over both the political and fiscal aspects of 
government centralised in the provincial governor’s office by emergency legislation, 
senior officials in the Governor’s office turned the post-conflict crisis situation to 
their advantage.
Central government aid was officially intended to assist conflict-affected 
populations, in particular the displaced population, but it instead served to strengthen 
the power, and support the interests, of elites in the executive branch of the 
provincial government. Extensive provincial government capture of aid funds was 
enabled by ineffective monitoring and control over the Governor’s office from the 
central, provincial and local government bodies officially mandated to play this role. 
Officials in the central government reported that controlling provincial state capture 
of aid funds was not a national priority and it may even have served central 
government interests in restoring regional security at the time. The provincial 
parliament was new and did not yet have sufficient legal or political independence to 
monitor provincial spending. Suspected collusion between the parliament, executive 
and the legal branches of provincial government compounded this situation. Civil 
society organisations were also restricted in their capacity to confront provincial state
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capture of aid funds given the emergency legislation and an overall atmosphere 
restricting political activity. The combined ineffectiveness of other branches of 
government and the civil society sector in restricting the activities of the provincial 
government led to an entrenchment of power in the hands of senior provincial 
bureaucrats. Thaib Armain, the provincial chief of staff and later the first locally 
elected Governor, benefitted most from this situation.
Intra-govemmental dynamics in North Maluku began to change in 2004, following 
the lifting of emergency status in 2003, and with legislative elections finally taking 
place, giving eight local parliaments (five of them new) independence from the 
provincial government. Political manoeuvrings preceding the 2005 local executive 
elections also contributed to a change in atmosphere with increased dissent among 
various bodies and levels of government. As the local political system evolved, with 
a general rise in parliamentary and local government activism, fissures appeared 
between the different levels of government, and within and between political rivals 
over claims to local authority. This point recalls one of the central issues highlighted 
in Chapters Two and Three: the importance of understanding the factional nature of 
local politics in order to interpret local political patterns.
Following the 2005 elections the potential for change in what had been a closed and 
centralised regional political system since the conflict opened up even further. Direct 
local elections for city and district heads, known as pilkada, promised to further 
empower local governments with a direct mandate from the local population.498 With 
popularly elected, rather than appointed, leaders in place, city and district 
governments had started, by the end of 2005, to demand greater controls over their 
budgets from the provincial government. Intra-elite contest over access to, and 
control over, state resources subsequently grew fiercer, as Chapter Six further 
explores.
Overall, the provision of extensive powers to the new provincial government, with 
provincial officials holding almost unfettered access to the large government aid 
budget, does not appear to have been an accidental event for the central government.
498 Erb and Sulistiyanto (2009) discuss the varying impacts o f  and politics o f local direct elections.
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The fears of further religious radicalisation during the later phases of conflict (when 
the conflict escalated beyond the control of local political elites), which potentially 
provoked challenges to state authority, appear to have factored into the central 
government’s decision not only to concentrate aid funds in the new provincial 
government but aslo to allow provincial officials to act as they saw fit with these 
funds. The central government effectively “bought” back regional government 
loyalty and state stability through the restoration and centralisation of regional state 
control in both the political and economic spheres.
Recalling the comparative cases introduced in Chapter One, the North Maluku case 
echoes similar patterns to the survival of ‘machine politics’ in other post-crisis 
contexts. In the post-war Southern Italian cases analysed by Chubb (1982), local 
government bureaucrats benefited politically from periods of economic depression 
and social crisis because of their discretionary control over increasingly limited 
resources. Economic hardships served to strengthen, rather than undermine, the 
popular support base of the political Christian Democrat machine in Southern Italy, 
through the discretionary powers held by the party machine over government 
spending, and the provision of jobs and other patronage benefits in a shrinking 
economy where government resources were increasingly important to the local 
population. Similarly, in the urban areas of Temate, the local population was already 
long dependent on state-based employment and business contracts. This dependency 
only increased following the conflict as other sources of revenue and employment 
were lost due to prolonged agricultural and industrial sector decline. This process 
underlined, rather than undermined, the power of state-based elites in North Maluku.
This chapter therefore provides one of the answers to the central issue explored by 
the thesis -  the continuity of the local state-based elite in power in the context of 
reform, conflict and crisis. Certain factions in the local state elite managed not only 
to hold onto, but to deepen their political power base despite significant socio­
economic crisis and complex government reforms. They did so via their centralised 
control over aid budgets throughout a period of at least five years, if not more. The 
institutions of patronage established during the New Order years, operating between 
local government officers at different levels, and their local societal and business 
clientele, were temporarily shaken by the series of economic and social crises during
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and following the conflict. This system was then restored -  even strengthened -  
through the provincial government’s largely unchallenged control of aid funds, 
which enabled a degree of political continuity and stability among the state-based 
elite. By 2005, important fissures and contests within the North Maluku state-based 
elite began to emerge over access to and control over aid funds. As local political 
structures began to change following the end of the emergency period, intra-state 
elite rivalry rose again to the fore. The thesis returns to discuss this point in Chapter 
Six.
This chapter has explored the national, provincial and local dynamics of 
government aid funding and state capture of this aid in order to understand how the 
provincial government was so readily able to capture aid funds. Strengthening the 
dependence of the local state-based political elite on central aid funds following the 
conflict at the least ensured the guaranteed support of the North Malukan elite for 
the Indonesian nation-state during a time of great transition and upheaval. In effect, 
the central government overruled its own reform legislation, and concentrated 
power in the Governor’s office in order to buy off potential troublemakers and 
restore state control in a restive region. The following chapter returns to this point, 
and develops it further, through analysing particular case studies of local state 
capture of international aid funds channelled through the North Maluku 
government.
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Chapter Five - 
Further patterns of state capture in North Maluku: 
the use of UNDP ‘Recovery Programme’ funds by state officials
It’s the same old corruption story in North Maluku as it is in Ambon. 
No one monitors the implementation of IDP projects, the government 
says no more money is left for IDPs.. .but there are still plenty of IDPs. 
I would estimate that, at the most, no more than 70 per cent of the 
actual budget for IDPs was spent on the IDPs. For example, when you 
visit the IDP camps, the food they have is always less than half of 
what was budgeted by the local government. It made it worse that the 
government arranged so many IDP projects through private contractors 
who were always connected to the government. They were not the 
right people for the job. But they knew the right people in the 
government.
NGO staff member, Jakarta.4"
You have to see the links between power and politics in public 
expenditure -  and the government budgeting process. The result of 
public finance allocations in Maluku is power, after all.
Regional public finance expert, Makassar.500
Introduction
This chapter expands on the dynamics of provincial state capture of aid funds 
outlined in Chapter Four, and reiterates the role of state-capture in enhancing the 
political and financial strength of provincial government officials in North Maluku. 
The chapter examines several specific cases and overall patterns of collusion and 
rent-seeking within expenditure of aid funds provided by the United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP) for North Maluku. The UNDP’s ‘recovery, 
reconstruction and rehabilitation’ programme for the Maluku region was 
appropriated by several parts of the provincial and local governments for projects 
serving their direct interests, rather than those of the intended ‘beneficiaries’, the 
IDPs and other communities severely affected by conflict.
499 Interview, Regional Programme Manager, international NGO, 1 November 2005, Jakarta.
500 Interview (the informant had formerly worked for UNDP Maluku), 4 October 2005, Makassar.
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The UNDP’s ‘post-conflict’ reconstruction and recovery programme for Maluku 
and North Maluku provinces -  hereafter the Recovery Programme -  consisted of 
funds of between US$12-19 million.501 The Recovery Programme received major 
contributions from the Dutch, Japanese and British governments (via the 
Department for International Development (DFID)) and the European Union (EU). 
As with central government funds, estimating precise figures of UNDP aid funds to
C M
the region was problematic -  the first section of the chapter discusses this issue.
The Recovery Programme had four official goals (outlined in full in Section 
5.1.iii.), including the return of IDPs, and the rehabilitation of infrastructure and 
public services.503 One of the main purposes of this chapter is to highlight the 
disjuncture between the organisation’s stated policy goals, and actual funding 
outcomes, following provincial and local state capture of the UNDP’s aid funds in 
North Maluku.504 The chapter also examines some of the benefits of state capture to 
post-conflict reconstruction, as well as its costs to the local population.
Chapter Two demonstrated how the state played a major role in North Maluku’s 
regional political economy under the New Order regime; Chapter Four showed how 
this pattern was repeated in the years following the conflict. Economic and political 
power was concentrated in the provincial government following the conflict, and the 
factional elite dominating the Governor’s office held ultimate control of government 
revenue flowing into the province. This particular political economy proved an ideal 
setting for enabling the disjuncture between the UNDP’s policy and practice. 
However, state capture of specific projects, as well as the broader patterns of 
provincial and local government influence, was overlooked in the official UNDP and 
donor assessments. This chapter does not analyse the reasons why the UNDP and aid 
donors overlooked these patterns, as it goes beyond the scope of this thesis, but 
focuses on what happened and its impacts on regional political dynamics.505
501 As in Chapter Four, ‘post-conflict’ carries several meanings here. It was used as an official term 
for ‘reconstruction’ and ‘rehabilitation’ projects by both the Indonesian government and the UNDP. It 
also describes the time-period after the North Maluku conflict officially ended.
502 1 am grateful to the UNDP staff members willing to be interviewed, and the data they provided on 
the Recovery Programme budget.
503 UNDP (2004), p.2.
504 In some cases, but not all, state capture o f the UNDP aid funds was easy to identify because UNDP  
and donor logos marked the sites where funds had been spent, even when the UNDP headquarters in 
Jakarta and donor governments were apparently unaware o f  some o f  these projects.
505 There are at least four possible reasons why the UNDP and aid donors ‘overlooked’ state capture 
o f aid funds. One, they may simply have failed to observe these patterns due to limited political and
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As with central government funds, the provincial government used the UNDP aid 
funds for many reconstruction and recovery purposes, and allocated certain funds to 
local government bodies that also carried out reconstruction projects. However, they 
were also, and sometimes via the same means, used to secure the political and 
economic power base of state-based political elites in both provincial and local 
government bodies. This was done via several routes: the extraction of rents via 
inflated bids, kick-backs to parliamentary and executive officers involved in 
brokering deals, issuing of contracts based on personal or political connections, and 
the commissioning of projects serving the interests of state elites -  including 
branches of the military. The intended UNDP ‘beneficiaries’ (the displaced and 
directly conflict-affected community) sometimes only benefitted incidentally. 
Examining patterns of distribution of the UNDP aid funds by the provincial and local 
government enables a broader understanding of the extensive nature of state capture 
of aid funds outlined in Chapter Four. As such, this chapter helps to explore the 
sources of power behind the provincial and local state-elite, and their political 
machines, and therefore contributes to explaining their continued survival in local 
politics.
The chapter is structured as follows. The first section provides an overview of the 
UNDP’s Recovery Programme, estimating overall financing and summarising its 
main policies. The next two consider how the Recovery Programme ran in practice, 
analysing specific project examples and comparing project outcomes with stated 
programme goals. These sections draw on cases from both North Maluku and 
Maluku provinces, as the UNDP funds were distributed across both provinces 
simultaneously and similar patterns of state capture took place in each. Section 5.2 
examines IDP-related projects; Section 5.3 examples of public infrastructure
strategic interest in monitoring aid expenditure in the Maluku region. Two, they may have 
strategically ignored these patterns for political reasons, to ensure continued partnership with the 
Indonesian government. Three, state capture may be the general rule o f post-conflict aid programmes 
in places with strong state elites, meaning it is implicitly recognised by donors, if  not explicitly dealt 
with in policy terms. Fourth, along Fergusonian lines, the absence o f  attention to or acknowledgement 
o f local state elite capture o f  aid funds may reflect something deeper and more structural in the 
discourse, logic and practice o f donor agencies. In this sense, overlooking state capture is not 
deliberate or inadvertent, but a structural effect o f a certain practice o f development that makes such 
concerns irrelevant, even unthinkable. Ferguson (1994), Keen (1994), Mosse (2005) and Marriage
(2006) explore such issues in relation to specific African and Indian aid projects. It would be 
interesting to explore these alternative explanations for the UNDP’s and donor’s ‘oversight’ o f state 
capture in respect o f the case analysed here, but further research would be necessary to do so, focusing 
on the politics o f donor aid in Indonesia.
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projects. The fourth section then summarises the overall costs and benefits of aid 
capture for different sectors of the population. The final section summarises the main 
explanatory factors why UNDP aid funds were so readily captured by the provincial 
government.
5.1 The UNDP’s Recovery Programme financing and policies
This section has five parts. The first compares North Maluku’s Gross Domestic 
Regional Product (GDRP) with aid from the central government and UNDP between 
2001 and 2004. This comparison provides an indication of the importance of aid 
funds to the regional economy in the post-conflict period. The second provides 
overall estimates of UNDP programme funds for North Maluku. The third part 
summarises the primary objectives of UNDP’s aid programme to the Maluku region. 
The fourth outlines UNDP’s planned aid interventions and the fifth presents an 
overview of the use of UNDP aid funds in practice. The following sections then 
analyse two types of post-conflict project funded by the UNDP Recovery Programme 
in more detail.
(i) Comparing regional product and aid budgets 
UNDP financed the second largest source of emergency and post-conflict aid for 
North Maluku, following Government of Indonesia (GOI) central aid funds to the 
region. UNDP aid funds were around one quarter of the size of the central 
government’s aid package over a comparable four-year period, from 2001-2004 (see 
Annex B, Table B.l for details). Whilst representing only just over one per cent of 
GDRP over this four year period, the Recovery Programme still played an important 
economic and political role in the context of North Maluku’s small regional 
economy, especially given that control of these funds was largely in the hands of the 
provincial and local government.506
Prior to the conflict, the North Maluku regional economy had been in gradual 
decline, before collapsing during the national economic crisis -  but it contracted even
506 North Maluku had the smallest provincial GDRP o f all Indonesian provinces from 2001-2003 (BPS 
Maluku 2005).
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further following the conflict, as Chapter Four outlined. The UNDP’s Recovery 
Programme funds therefore played an important role for the provincial government 
as one of the few external sources for regional finance.
(ii) Estimating UNDP Recovery Programme financing 
As with central government aid data, estimating the UNDP programme budget for 
North Maluku was difficult: data varied across the official reports and that provided 
in interviews with UNDP staff often varied from the official documentation. The 
budgetary data discussed here therefore includes low and high budget estimates, 
based on a triangulation of data from different sources (see Annex B, Table B.2).507 
The Recovery Programme initially focused on conflict impacted areas of Maluku and 
North Maluku provinces, but later expanded to cover projects in Southeast Sulawesi, 
where some IDPs from the Maluku region had resettled (see Annex B, Table B.3 for 
provincial funding estimates for the three regions).
UNDP first started emergency response operations in Maluku province in 1999 and 
in North Maluku in late 2001. The Indonesian government drafted a ‘Master Plan’ 
for post-conflict recovery in North Maluku in February 2001, with the overall aim of 
‘rehabilitating’ the province via both government and non-government aid 
programmes. In conjunction with the central government, UNDP then developed a 
three-year programme aiming to, “promote the return of internally displaced people 
(IDPs) and support the basic rehabilitation of social and physical infrastructure 
within the context of reconciliation and peace-building.”508 The ‘Conflict Prevention 
and Recovery Unit’ was established in mid-2001 in UNDP’s Jakarta office to 
officially oversee and administer the Recovery Programme in both provinces. Actual 
programme work started in late 2001.
The biggest donor to the overall Recovery Programme was the Dutch government, 
followed by the EU, the Japanese UN Trust Fund and then DFID, each contributing 
over US$1 million. Six other donors made contributions under US$1 million (see 
Annex B, Table B.4). By 30 June 2004, the Recovery Programme had approved 83
507 By triangulating data from different sources - including official, non-governmental and newspaper 
estimates - 1 established patterns o f  state capture, as with Chapter Four.
508 DFID (2003), p.24.
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project activities for Maluku and North Maluku provinces, with a total cost of 
US$11.1 million. Another US$1.3 million was earmarked in 2004 for projects still 
officially in development but not yet spent.509 The total programme budget therefore 
fell between US$12.34 and US$19.13 million, depending on which period, region 
and costs were included (these varied across different donor agency reports).510 In 
UNDP’s final “progress report” to the Recovery Programme’s donors, the UNDP 
stated that almost US$7.5 million from the total programme budget had been 
allocated to North Maluku province (see details in Annex B, Table B.3).
(iii) Official Recovery Programme objectives 
Both the structural organisation and main objectives of the Recovery Programme 
were difficult to interpret from official reports. According to the official 
documentation, the Recovery Programme was designed as a UN-Govemment 
“partnership”:
The Programme is a partnership between the United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP) and the Government of Indonesia.
UNDP’s Government counterpart for the Programme is the Ministry 
of Human Settlement and Regional Infrastructure (KTMPRASWIL).
The Programme is implemented in partnership with a range of 
partners, including Government Departments at the provincial and 
district levels, UN agencies, international NGOs, Indonesian civil 
society organisations, Village Councils, and others.511
The Recovery Programme was designed by the UNDP to work across different 
sectors in order to “complement efforts of the Government and civil society to support 
longer-term peace building and sustainable development” in the Maluku region.512 
The overall objective was to “facilitate the realisation of socially and economically 
sustainable communities living cooperatively together in freedom from fear and
509 UNDP (2004), p.2.
510 Different figures were reported across the UNDP’s progress reports, donor reviews and during 
field interviews with UNDP staff. One o f the reasons it was difficult to get a definitive figure on 
programme funds was that key programme staff at UNDP, and the other donor agencies, had either 
moved on to other countries by the time o f field research , or because they were employed as 
temporary consultants. Another reason for the discrepancies, relating to controversy over the 
Recovery Programme’s eventual results, is discussed in the following section.
511 UNDP (2004), p.2.
512 UNDP (2004), p.2
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violence.”513 This “overall objective” was broken down into four “programme 
objectives”:
1.The return of internally displaced people into key communities in an 
atmosphere of reconciliation;
2. The basic rehabilitation of community level physical infrastructure and 
provision of effective public services in key areas;
3. The initiation and growth of social and economic activity with a particular 
focus on the most vulnerable;
4. The strengthening and formation of good governance capacities at local 
levels that promote inclusive and accountable institutions for effective 
decision making and Programme implementation.514
What the UNDP-Govemment “partnership” and the implementation of the stated 
objectives meant in practice, varied at different levels of government and in different 
regions of North Maluku. The vagueness of the policy language and objectives 
quoted above may have been a contributing factor towards the open-ended use of the 
programme’s funds by provincial and local government officials. The following 
sections return to this issue by identifying some of the relationship patterns and 
outcomes of the programme at the provincial and local levels of government.515
(iv) Planned Recovery Programme operations 
In North Maluku, UNDP Jakarta decided to implement the Recovery Programme 
themselves, via a ‘direct execution’ approach. Officially, this meant that rather than 
passing overall authority for programme management and implementation to 
provincial or local government agencies, or to local NGOs (both of whom were 
official Recovery Programme ‘partners’), the UNDP planned to manage and operate 
the programme directly. According to UNDP documentation, this decision was taken 
for two reasons. First, the UNDP viewed the North Maluku government as a party to 
the conflict and, as such, wanted to avoid working directly through the provincial and 
local branches of government. Second, the UNDP management decided that local 
NGOs were too weak to be able to manage programmes alone.516
513 UNDP (2004), p.2
514 UNDP (2004), p.2. Perhaps one o f the reasons it was difficult for UNDP to fulfil its programme’s 
goals was the vagueness o f this policy language, making it difficult for field staff to know precisely 
what they were meant to implement.
515 National level donor-govemment relations are beyond the scope o f  this study.
516 UNDP (2003), p.23. This intention was confirmed in an interview with then chief o f the Conflict 
Prevention and Recovery Unit, UNDP Jakarta Country Office, who had overall responsibility for the 
Recovery Programme; May 2006, UNDP Country Office, Jakarta.
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The UNDP’s rationale behind ‘direct execution’ of their post-conflict programme 
was controversial in principle (it also failed in practice, as further sections discuss). 
First, even if the UNDP believed provincial and local government agencies were 
direct parties to the conflict, it was not clear why this meant they should therefore not 
play a role in implementing UNDP’s post-conflict programme, especially as it was 
meant to be a ‘partnership’ with the government.517 Second, while local NGOs were 
few in North Maluku, their capacity to manage projects could have been developed 
by UNDP from the outset (as, in the end, it was, in some cases).518
In practice, UNDP’s ‘direct execution’ approach varied and the following sections 
explore some of the reasons for this. Some projects were directly implemented and 
managed by UNDP staff in various district sites; some were managed by provincial 
or local branches of the North Maluku government and/or international NGOs; others 
were jointly administered between UNDP provincial and field office staff and 
different branches of the provincial and local governments; while still others were 
handed over entirely to local NGOs. Even in cases where the UNDP officially 
managed certain projects, branches of the provincial or local government remained 
influential in decision-making over funding allocations, specific project financing, 
contracting and implementation -  for example, over the choice of contractors to build 
roads, electricity projects and so on. Subsequent sections explore several cases in 
more detail to illustrate this point.
(v) Assessing overall Recovery Programme outcomes 
By mid-2005 some, though certainly not all, IDPs in North Maluku had returned to 
their original areas of residence (although usually not to their original homes); some 
infrastructure and public services had been rehabilitated to a basic standard and some 
small-scale economic activities re-started, although the pre-conflict levels of 
plantation agriculture, mineral extraction and local-level industrial activity had not 
been fully restored. The first three of the UNDP’s Recovery Programme goals,
517 See Chapter Three on major parties to the conflict. See Wilson (2005, 2008) and Van Klinken
(2007) for detailed discussion o f major parties to the conflict at different phases o f conflict escalation.
518 Further expansion on these points is not directly relevant here, but they form a crucial part o f the 
debate on the problems o f donor-led post-conflict reconstruction and recovery programmes that 
circumvent local government and non-governmental organisations. See Evans (2008).
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outlined above, appeared to have been met, albeit at a basic level. However, 
establishing precisely what or who enabled these results was complicated.
Establishing clear chains of causality between a donor funded programme and societal 
or economic changes in a population is always complex -  particularly in separating 
out so-called ‘programme’ and ‘non-programme’ effects -  even if  sophisticated 
evaluation procedures are in place (which was not so in this case).519 Where Recovery 
Programme objectives matched actual changes in the North Maluku region, it was 
more likely to have been the result of Indonesian government projects active at the 
time -  this is because UNDP funds were widely used by provincial and local 
government agencies as part of their broader post-conflict project activities. 
Provincial and local government use of UNDP aid funds took place with and without 
the explicit consent of the UNDP, depending on the actual project and agency 
responsible. This fact makes it especially difficult to measure the specific impact of 
UNDP funds, given that they were blended into other government projects, some of 
which were also in collaboration with local and international NGOs, and not all of 
which the UNDP was aware of.
In several of the cases explored in the next two sections, even when UNDP Recovery 
Programme funds were directly attributed to having funded particular post-conflict 
rehabilitation or reconstruction projects, the projects were operated quite differently to 
the planned mechanisms outlined in the UNDP’s policy documents. Projects 
frequently evolved via unplanned channels. For example, the actual, as opposed to 
‘intended’ project beneficiaries (the most vulnerable and conflict-affected 
communities), were generally members of the local elite, based within or outside 
branches of the local and provincial government. Extensive capture of the Recovery 
Programme’s resources by the provincial -  and, to a lesser extent, local branches of -  
government meant large proportions of programme funds were naturally channelled 
towards projects of interest to these local officials and politicians. Sometimes these 
projects also happened to match the UNDP’s goals -  for example, public service 
rehabilitation in the main towns -  but they were not managed or operated in the way 
the UNDP had planned.
519 See Rao and Woolcock (2003), for example, on the methodological problems o f  measuring the 
impact o f development programmes.
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The following cases draw on evidence gathered during formal and informal 
interviews with programme beneficiaries, managers and their peers, at the 
community, local, provincial and national levels. I also draw on documentary
520evidence from donor evaluations, local newspapers and local NGO reports. On 
several issues it was necessary to travel to Ambon, Makassar and Jakarta to interview 
people who had previously been employed by, or involved with, the UNDP 
Recovery Programme. As the programme covered both Maluku and North Maluku 
provinces, some UNDP staff members only travelled to North Maluku occasionally 
and it was necessary to interview them elsewhere. Also, by 2005, many UNDP and 
NGO staff involved in the Recovery Programme had found new jobs in other 
regions.521 Interview and documentary evidence was triangulated with field 
observations of project sites in 2005.522
The following sections consider two kinds of projects corresponding to two of the 
main goals of the Recovery Programme: the rehabilitation of IDPs and restoration of 
public infrastructure. The cases discussed do not cover all the Recovery 
Programme’s goals, but they are sufficiently illustrative of the broader management 
behind and results of the Recovery Programme to draw some general conclusions. 
Each section contrasts the goals and achievements reported in the UNDP’s official 
programme ‘progress reports’ with outcomes observable in field sites. The 
disjuncture between intended and actual programme outcomes reflects several 
important points about the environment in which the Recovery Programme operated. 
However, the particularities of the region appear to have been largely ignored in the 
Recovery Programme’s design and management strategy, which the following three 
sections discuss in more detail.523
520 Unfortunately, little numerical data on Recovery Programme beneficiaries, or statistical measures 
o f programme effects, were available for examination. This reflects an overall data problem with the 
UNDP’s (and Indonesian government) post-conflict programmes in the Maluku region. Available data 
on IDPs, for example, was widely reported as inaccurate for technical and political reasons.
521 By 2005, several former senior programme staff had relocated to new programmes in Sudan and 
Afghanistan, for example. I am grateful to those who responded to my questions via e-mail.
522 Researchers face several challenges in measuring donor project corruption ex-post, especially 
when agencies responsible for these projects tend not to provide full disclosure o f project documents. 
For further research, it would be possible to request DFID documentation via various public 
information acts, for example. Accessing UNDP documentation would be much harder.
523 This was despite information available from several UNDP-financed studies o f  the regional 
government, societal and economic context in the post-conflict period, for example, Swisher et al 
(2004).
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5.2 The disjuncture between policy and practice in IDP projects
We have to watch the government because they misbehave with the 
money.
UNDP field  office staff member.524
The primary goal of the Recovery Programme was to assist the return and recovery 
of IDPs across the Maluku region and several projects were specifically intended to 
enable this process.525 In 2004, UNDP reported to the major programme donors:
Programme activities across various sectors (housing, infrastructure, 
health, education, economic recovery) have contributed directly to this 
objective through facilitating return of IDPs by reducing constraints 
that have prevented return.52
The UNDP’s final donor ‘progress report’, cited above, outlines projects funded by 
the Recovery Programme aimed at assisting IDPs. Several of these were 
implemented by the North Maluku provincial government, “under the discretion of 
the Governor and SATKORLAK.”527 As Chapter Four explained, SATKORLAK 
was the emergency coordination board run by the provincial government for 
emergency and post-conflict activities. Chapter Four also outlined the extensive 
capture of government aid projects which fell under the authority of the Governor’s 
office. Given the centralised authority of government funds in the Governor’s office 
via emergency legislation, most post-conflict aid projects fell under the Governor’s 
jurisdiction. Where UNDP funds were channelled through the provincial 
government, as many of the funds for IDPs were, similar problems of state capture
M O
therefore applied to them, as much as to central government aid.
(i) Reported IDP project results 
Around 17 per cent of IDPs in North Maluku reportedly received assistance from 
UNDP-funded activities for housing, infrastructure or shelter, though exact figures 
were unavailable (see Annex B, Table B.5 for estimates). According to UNDP, one
524 Interview, 1 July 2005, Tobelo.
525 Programme objectives summarised from UNDP (2004), p.2
526 UNDP (2004), p. 7.
527 UNDP (2004), p. 7.
528 A  substantial number o f projects funded by UNDP were run by international NGOs in North 
Maluku, who worked relatively independently and therefore managed to avoid some o f the state 
capture problems illustrated here. As these projects fell outside the government’s jurisdiction, I have 
not discussed them here.
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third of IDP families involved in UNDP-funded IDP projects in North Maluku were 
aided by SATKORLAK. The other two thirds were supported by the UN Office for 
Project Services (UNOPS), another UN agency through which UNDP channelled aid 
funds. IDP projects organised by UNOPS appeared to have been coordinated by
c o n
provincial government agencies, though this could not be confirmed in the field. 
The “illustrative indicators” used by UNDP to measure their IDP project success 
used numbers of IDP “families” and “communities” reportedly receiving assistance, 
rather than actual numbers of IDPs.530 As such, the reported figures cannot 
accurately reflect total numbers of IDPs affected by UNDP-funded projects.531
The UNDP also reported the successful housing of IDPs between 2002 and 2003 via 
“provision of housing materials and cash assistance to 530 displaced families to 
facilitate return to their communities of origin in 21 villages in nine sub-districts.”532 
It was not clear whether these were the same families as those listed in the reports 
cited above. As such, even if the reports were accurate, it is impossible to establish 
from the UNDP’s documentation exactly how many IDP families received assistance 
from the programme. Independent data on the Recovery Programme’s overall results 
with IDPs were unavailable for comparison.533 The estimate I have presented here -  
17 per cent of total IDPs receiving assistance from UNDP funded projects -  is 
therefore a best-guess.
(ii) Evidence o f state capture o f IDP projects 
In practice, IDP projects were among those most open to capture by staff in the 
provincial and local governments in North Maluku. Local and international NGOs
529 The UNOPS-organized projects were already completed by mid-2005. Information on these 
projects was available only from UNDP project staff in the field at this time and they were unclear as 
to how UNOPS had operated IDP project activities with the provincial government.
530 The UNDP reports did not explain how many people were included (on average) in IDP families. I 
therefore used an average number o f five people per family (based on discussions with former IDPs 
and project staff in the Maluku region) in Annex B, Table B.5. UNDP listed beneficiary 
“communities” separately, but again without estimating population size, so these figures were 
excluded. Other indicators used by UNDP included numbers o f IDP communities participating in 
“peace-building processes.” It was not clear what these activities were, how many people constituted a 
“community”, or what the outcomes were, so this data was also excluded. Other data showing IDP 
project results was unavailable.
531 As mentioned above, without knowing how many IDPs constitute an IDP community, one cannot 
estimate total numbers reportedly aided by the Recovery Programme.
532 UNDP (2004), p.7
533 Local newspapers and NGOs involved in monitoring emergency and post-conflict aid projects 
focused on government activities.
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working in the Maluku region following the conflict reported that IDP housing 
projects run by the provincial government were highly prone to corruption across 
both provinces. As already demonstrated, IDP projects were largely coordinated by 
the Governor’s office through SATKORLAK, the provincial agency headed by the 
Governor, his deputy or chief-of-staff, depending on provincial government 
arrangements at the time. The North Maluku provincial chief-of-staff, Thaib Armain 
(later the first elected Governor) was implicated in several major local corruption 
cases involving IDP and other aid and government funds from this and later periods.
In 2004 and 2005, local newspapers in North Maluku ran a series of articles on 
corruption cases involving IDP funds that were unresolved by the provincial legal 
system. Chapter Four outlined some of these cases, which I expand upon here. The 
Temate-based newspaper, the Malut Pos, alleged that government-provided building 
materials intended for IDPs (to enable them to build or repair their houses) had been 
stolen by officials at all levels of government, from the province to village. 
Provincial parliamentarians involved in the budget process, and local contractors 
meant to supply the materials, were also implicated.
One article followed a specific case in Morotai, North Halmahera district, where 
many IDP funds were reportedly misused by the local government. The Malut Pos 
reported:
The issues surrounding IDP aid have not yet abated. In fact, the 
distribution of aid for building materials to 68 IDP families in Tilowo,
South Morotai sub-district, is indicated as fictitious. Signatures of 
IDPs were forged and false fingerprints of the 18 families were used to 
claim they had received building materials in the village. Aside from 
this, the received value of aid for building materials by the families 
was far below the stipulated value.534
Out of the 68 families described in this particular case, in 2005, five years after the 
official end to the conflict, 50 of them had not received any of the building material 
funds allocated to them and those that had, found themselves with only one third of 
the official allocation. During a government hearing on this case, the contractors 
involved in supplying the building materials and the IDP representatives engaged in 
bitter rows. Village officials involved in the project then confessed that the building
534 Malut Pos, 9 July 2005.
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material aid received by the IDPs was indeed less than one third of the official value 
and several contractors admitted they had also paid bribes to the provincial level 
Department of Social Affairs (which had played a large role in ‘implementing’ IDP 
projects) in order to receive IDP-related building contracts. In the same case, the 
provincial DPRD was reported as acknowledging that several provincial 
parliamentarians -  who were directly involved in the parliamentary commissions 
responsible for managing IDP projects -  also ran the building companies receiving 
contracts in connection to these projects.535 No mention of these kinds of problems 
appeared anywhere in UNDP’s official project documentation.
According to the UNDP’s official reports, early in the post-conflict recovery process 
the main impediment to the return of IDPs were security fears and the lack of public 
services.536 The UNDP planned to reduce these ‘barriers’ to IDP-retum and 
resettlement:
The Programme’s approach for supporting the return of IDPs has 
situated the issue within the broader context of community-based 
socio-economic recovery. This approach has sought to address barriers 
to return, while providing supports that benefit communities at 
large.537
However, while security fears and public service restrictions may have impaired IDP 
return between 2000 and 2001, immediately following the official end to violence, 
the local environment was rather different by 2002. Field evidence suggests that the 
main factor impeding the return of the majority of IDPs after 2002 was a lack of 
funds to assist this process, not security issues. By 2005, provincial and local 
government officials, as well as local NGOs monitoring the government aid budget, 
reported that government funding for IDPs had already “finished” (as Chapter Four 
outlined). By 2005, security had been restored to most areas and the majority of 
public services were running again. While several small groups of IDPs could not 
return because of ongoing security fears -  for example, some Christian families in 
North Halmahera could not yet return to Temate or Tidore -  for the majority of
535 Malut Pos, 9 July 2005.
536 UNDP (2004), p.6.
537 UNDP (2004), p.7.
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remaining IDPs the most significant factor impeding their return or resettlement was 
a lack of funds.538
From 2003 onwards, an increasingly number of demonstrations against corruption in 
the use of IDP funds took place in Temate and elsewhere in North Maluku. IDPs 
themselves and local NGOs lobbying on their behalf demanded the investigation of 
provincial and local government corruption of aid funds, with local newspapers 
reporting on these cases.539 Funding problems were related not only to corruption of 
IDP funds, but problems tracking the IDPs themselves. Several international NGO 
and UNDP staff raised these problems in relation to IDP projects. One UNDP field 
staff member reported:
What the IDPs get from the government doesn’t fit with the money -  
they get less quality than the money available. There are still around 
2,000 in barracks in Temate waiting for money from the central 
government -  but no one knows where the funds are. Many just cannot 
go back to Tobelo or their home villages without their ‘return’ funds....
The IDP numbers haven’t been updated by Dinas Sosial (the 
provincial level Social Affairs Department) in 2005, so we are also not 
sure how many there are now.540
An international NGO staff member working on IDP projects in North Maluku -  
whose projects were partly financed by UNDP -  also reported that IDP funds had 
been poorly managed by the provincial government. As Chapter Four explained, 
independent monitoring of government aid funds was limited following the conflict -  
even by the local press, who were one of the most active groups following 
government corruption of the aid budget. The NGO staff member reported:
The IDP funds were really badly managed. People who should have 
got it didn’t get it. People got less than they should have done. It was a 
general problem across the province. Even people who did get 
something found it was much smaller than what they were (officially) 
allocated. Because of the lack of civil society groups here there was 
little protest at what happened to the IDP funds and....very little 
pressure on the local government to do something about the missing 
funds.. .Even in Temate, where there are more civil society groups, the
538 In contrast, in Maluku province in 2005, security was still an important factor affecting IDP return 
and resettlement. Even so, funding also remained a key impediment, in particular for IDP resettlement 
for groups where there was no chance o f returning to their original homes or villages.
539 Reported, for example, in Malut Pos, 30 November 2004; Malut Pos, 22 December 2004; Temate 
Pos (date obscured) 2004; Temate Pos, 27 January 2005; Mimbar Kieraha, 26 July 2003.
540 Interview, 30 May 2005, Temate.
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local newspapers find it hard to be independent and resist government 
pressures... The media is fairly toothless in Jakarta, but it’s denture- 
less here.541
Other international NGO staff members, stationed in North Maluku following the 
conflict, reported that there had been minimal monitoring of government expenditure 
on IDP projects. Deals between local government officials and businesses on 
construction projects related to IDPs were frequently made, with kick-backs to both 
parties, but dissent was minimal in the post-conflict years. However, as Chapter Four 
outlined, local political dynamics were changing somewhat through 2005, following 
the rising criticism of provincial and local government corruption by local media and 
NGOs and the onset of internal government dissent with upcoming elections.
(Hi) Changing local political dynamics in 2005 
In both Maluku and North Maluku provinces, by 2005 almost all international NGOs 
had closed down their post-conflict projects, including those targeted at the
remaining IDPs -  aside from those funded by the last phases of the UNDP’s
Recovery Programme. One local NGO activist in Ambon reported that the large 
number of remaining IDPs reflected serious political and administrative problems in 
the provincial and local government:
We watch the government process and give them feedback on the way
they allocated their budgets, or when their implementation is not fair,
or when corruption or collusion is evident. Every day there are many 
cases of it in the local newspapers....The provincial government has 
provided land and houses for the IDPs, and also some other useful 
things like small loans with local banks and help for schooling of IDP 
children...But there are three main problems with the IDP funds.
There is too much bureaucracy, the funds are taken for other purposes 
and there is constant mark-up of funds. The community knows about 
this and there is some local protest, but many are shy to come forward 
and do not want to complain.542
As with the situation in Temate, outlined in Chapter Four, whilst NGO and IDP 
protests against government corruption had increased from 2003 onwards, with the 
prospect of local elections in 2005 and upcoming gubernatorial elections, internal 
dissent over government corruption within different branches of the local 
government and parliaments also rose. In the Ambon city and provincial parliaments,
541 Interview, 4 July 2005, Tobelo.
542 Interview, 13 October 2005, Ambon.
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as in the North Maluku provincial parliament, several MPs had set up anti-corruption 
coalitions. In the Ambon parliament, the anti-corruption group faced entrenched 
corruption by and collusion between fellow MPs, government officials and senior 
military staff, who had been actively involved in capture of IDP funds during both 
the allocation and distribution phases. A founding member of the anti-corruption 
parliamentary group in Ambon reported:
The IDPs are the first problem that has to be solved. First they need 
houses, second they need work. For example, the money for the IDPs 
doesn’t go to the IDPs, but to the army and the generals in charge here 
in Ambon.543
In North Maluku, the major beneficiaries were provincial government officials, 
followed by provincial parliamentarians, with the regional military generally less 
extensively involved in state-capture than in Maluku province, though there were 
some reports of military involvement during the emergency period.544 The 
establishment of the North Maluku DPRD’s ‘IDP Investigation Committee’, 
established by the then Deputy Speaker of the DPRD (a dissenting Golkar figure), 
was part of a similar trend to the 2005 political developments in the Ambon city and 
Maluku DPRDs. This new pattern of internal monitoring from within the provincial 
and city governments and parliaments paralleled the opening up of the election 
process from 2004 onwards, rising particularly through 2005, with the establishment 
of direct local elections. This trend possibly signalled an improvement in provincial 
and local parliamentary oversight of government expenditure. It also reflected the 
use of an ‘anti-corruption’ agenda to win votes and/or target political enemies 
during the run up to and during local election campaigns.545
Many mayoral and district regent candidates ran on ‘anti-corruption’ platforms in 
the 2005 local elections, even though they themselves were former civil servants or
543 Interview, 12 October 2005, Ambon.
544 The military were smaller political and economic players in North Maluku than in central Maluku, 
as Chapters Two and Three mentioned. Historically, the military wielded much greater power in the 
Ambon political economy. Prior to 1999, North Maluku constituted only three remote districts o f  
Maluku province, which were o f limited strategic, political or economic importance. Ambon was long 
viewed suspiciously by Jakarta, dating back to the separatist movement (RMS) active following 
Indonesian independence (see Chauvel 1990). It was also a bigger city, more economically dynamic 
than North Maluku, and o f greater economic interest to the military than North Maluku. Interviews, 
provincial and city parliamentarians, Ambon and Temate, May-October 2005.
545 See Chapter Six on electoral dynamics.
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incumbent heads of local government who had been involved with managing IDP 
and other aid funds. For example, one important former civil servant in North 
Halmahera district, Hein Namotemo, ran successfully for district chief in the 2005 
local elections. Part of his campaign was based on criticising the government’s 
failure to rebuild and reconstruct North Halmahera after four years of projects 
organised by the provincial and local government. As a prominent local official, 
Namotemo had been closely involved with local decision-making and the operation 
of IDP funds and projects. However, during the 2005 elections he distanced himself 
from the problems associated with these projects. In interviews, he claimed that ten 
to 15 per cent of houses destroyed in the conflict in North Halmahera had not yet 
been rebuilt by 2005 due to corruption in IDP projects run by the government.546
Part of Hein’s local election campaign was based on his promise to complete post­
conflict reconstruction and recovery in North Halmahera district that remained 
unfinished due to “government problems” (meaning corruption). His own 
involvement in local government was both played up (he claimed he was the most 
experienced local government candidate) and played down (he minimised his role in 
local government corruption). Hein’s campaign was therefore very similar to Mayor 
Syamsir’s 2005 re-election campaign in Temate, which Chapter Six expands on, 
both in relation to local candidates’ use of aid funds captured during previous years 
in office, and the ‘anti-corruption’ platforms that were a popular feature of the 2005 
local elections.
In conclusion, while IDP resettlement and re-housing was largely a government 
sponsored programme in North Maluku (as in Maluku province), the UNDP was 
closely involved with financing government IDP projects and channelled a 
substantial proportion of its aid funds through provincial government bodies. The 
problems of ‘missing’ government IDP funds reported by NGOs and local 
newspapers -  as highlighted here -  therefore also reflects problems in projects 
financed by the UNDP. In 2005, between two and three thousand IDPs remained 
living in temporary barracks in Temate; in Maluku province the number was even
546 Interview, 5 July 2005, Tobelo.
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higher.547 While the provincial government and the UNDP officially claimed the IDP 
problem had been successfully resolved due to their assistance, the fragile situation 
of those remaining IDPs told a different story about the use of the UNDP aid funds 
than was officially reported.
5.3 State capture of public infrastructure projects
The local parliament is also involved in corruption, collusion and 
nepotism. The MPs charge fees to have something put in the budget.
They charge this to the executive. Ten per cent is the usual fee -  this is 
a very common tradition in the budget planning process. Then there is 
the nepotism between the government and the contractors over the 
bidding process. Sometimes budgets are marked up to cover this, but it 
is always done behind closed doors and so it is very hard for us to 
monitor it.
Local NGO staff member, Ambon.548
The reconstruction, or rehabilitation, of public and private infrastructure was another 
major priority in North Maluku following the conflict. This section considers two 
kinds of infrastructure rehabilitation project financed by the UNDP, but largely 
implemented by provincial and local government agencies. The UNDP was involved 
in a range of public infrastructure rehabilitation projects across the Maluku region; 
their listings included the reconstruction or rehabilitation of 50 schools, 15 health 
centres, 23 community halls, four market facilities, 185 water-sanitation projects, 60 
village electricity restoration projects, 46 road rehabilitation projects, 37 drainage 
repair projects, 18 bridge constructions, eight harbour or port rehabilitation projects, 
and 24 ‘other’ public structures.549 The UNDP’s public infrastructure data was not 
disaggregated, so it was unclear which organisation had carried out specific projects 
in which location. No individual or sampled evaluation of these 450 or so projects 
across the two provinces was available from the UNDP or other agencies. However,
547 Even more IDPs than this remained in barracks in Maluku province: some observers estimated that 
over 10,000 IDPs remained in Maluku at the end o f 2005. Several international NGO programme staff 
reported these figures, based on numbers o f IDPs remaining in Ambon city and on Seram island.
54 Interview, 13 October 2005, Ambon.
549 UNDP (2004), pp.8-9. UNDP sourced data on these public infrastructure projects from the 
following organisations:- in North Maluku, UNOPS (which worked through the provincial 
government in North Maluku), CARDI (an international NGO), World Vision (another international 
NGO), and ABP-North Maluku (it is unclear what kind o f organisation this was); and, in Maluku, 
Mercy Corps (an international NGO), the Ambon city government, Muhammidiyah (an Islamic 
organisation), and Yayasan Kartika (a national NGO).
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based on field evidence collected for this research project -  from local newspaper 
sources, field interviews and eye-witness evidence -  it was likely that a substantial 
proportion of these projects underwent state capture in ways similar to IDP projects 
and other government aid projects in the region.
State capture of aid funds in infrastructure construction or reconstruction projects is 
often visually observable. Comparisons between the materials used in rehabilitated 
buildings or roads, with the official budgets and records of materials, as well as the 
location and function of buildings, can provide indications of collusion, budget 
skimming, or other state interventions, in the contracting or (re)building process.550 
In some cases, buildings or other structures financed by the UNDP Recovery 
Programme were well-constructed, with no obvious deviation from original budgets 
or skimming from material provision. However, in these observed cases there was a 
clear rationale and interest behind the careful design and building of these projects 
for government or military officials, or their business associates. This section 
considers two cases of school ‘rehabilitation’ in North Halmahera district, and a large 
scale electricity project in Bacan Island, in the southern part of North Maluku.
(i) School ‘rehabilitation’projects 
The town of Tobelo, the capital of North Halmahera district, was one of the worst 
affected sites during the 1999-2000 conflict. According to Wilson’s (2005, 2008) 
analysis, it was particularly hard hit during the second wave of violence. Private 
dwellings, places of worship and many public buildings were destroyed during the 
riots in both the town and surrounding villages -  their destruction and only partial 
reconstruction was still evident in 2005. One of the main aims of the Recovery 
Programme was to restore or rehabilitate conflict-affected public infrastructure. In 
several areas, Programme funds were used to repair and build schools and other 
‘community-level’ public facilities.551
550 Olken’s (2007) experimental studies o f corruption in community road building projects financed 
by the Indonesian government measured road materials before and after the construction process to 
identify where and how budgets were misused, with various approaches tested in measuring the 
effectiveness o f interventions to lower the chances o f corruption.
551 Several photographs help illustrate Recovery Programme funded school facilities, observed in 
North Halmahera, showing both well-built and poorly built structures (See Annex C). All photographs 
taken by the author in Tobelo, North Halmahera, December 2005.
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On the northern edge of Tobelo town, a shiny new concrete building sprung up on 
the district military compound in late 2005, standing out amidst the area’s remaining 
burned buildings and restored but simple wooden houses (see Annex C, Photographs 
C.l, C.2 and C.3).552 This new kindergarten for local elite and military families had 
been established by the district education authorities with funding from UNDP. The 
kindergarten was not a conflict-damaged public building in need of repair, but a new 
facility on the local military compound. The proposal for the kindergarten reportedly 
came from a collective of local families, although it was not clear that any ordinary 
local and conflict-affected families had benefited from the project. The families 
using the facility were either not local (military families) or were local government 
and business elite. These groups had lobbied to obtain Recovery Programme funds 
for the new school via the district government’s education offices.553 At the time of 
observation (December 2005) the kindergarten was recently built and official project 
documentation for the site was not yet completed by the UNDP field staff team. No 
senior staff in UNDP appeared aware of the project -  although, according to 
programme rules, they should have approved it.
Informal interviews with soldiers on the base, and several families in the area whose 
children reportedly attended the facility, indicated that users were satisfied with the 
new kindergarten. It was not possible to interview the local government officials 
directly involved in the project, but general education facilities in Tobelo were poor 
-  this was the smartest looking school building observed during field research. At a 
minimum, the project appeared to have built positive relations between the military 
officers on site, local government officials involved in the project, and the UNDP 
field office staff, who were about to commence the second phase of the Recovery 
Programme. One academic observer of the North Maluku conflict commented that 
whilst the military had failed to prevent the conflict escalating, they had played a 
positive role in reconstruction:
Reconstruction in North Maluku was mostly carried out by the
government. But even the military played a big role ...They even
552 See Annex C for photographs o f the site.
553 UNDP field office staff members were understandably hesitant to discuss the kindergarten project 
as they knew it fell outside the Recovery Programme’s objectives. During informal interviews -  in 
December 2005 -  field staff implied that the project had been pushed forward by local officials and 
rushed through in the last phase o f Programme funding.
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delivered aid to the IDPs during the conflict and helped afterwards. It 
wasn’t like in Ambon, where the police and military were divided 
between the different communities.5 4
Though a small project, the kindergarten appeared to have been an expression of 
goodwill -  a returned favour -  to the local military from local officials, while at the 
same time offering elite Tobelo families pre-school education facilities unavailable 
elsewhere in the district. This particular kindergarten was well constructed using 
good quality materials.
Despite the range of possible strategic reasons for the UNDP to finance a 
kindergarten on this military site, especially given the positive relations it appeared 
to have built between UNDP staff and local officials (whether military or civilian), 
UNDP staff in Jakarta were apparently unaware of the project. Major donors to the 
UNDP Recovery Programme also appeared unaware of the project and it was not 
reported in any official documentation.555 Strategically, the kindergarten had served 
several political goals. Building contractors had also gained from the project (though 
it was not possible to trace them during fieldwork) thus reflecting further benefits for 
govemment-business partners involved in the project. The kindergarten example 
recalls the quote from the former UNDP staff member, opening this section, whereby 
ten per cent fees for officials and MPs involved in the bidding and contracting 
process for government projects were common. In Central Sulawesi, Aragon (2007) 
reported similar patterns in the state capture of IDP and post-conflict funds.
Another example of a UNDP-supported primary school, this one partially repaired 
via the Recovery Programme, was located directly across from the UNDP field office 
in Tobelo (see Annex C, Photographs C.4 and C.5). Local UNDP field staff members 
did not (or could not) reveal any information about this school project. The school’s 
head-teacher understood that the funding had come from the government, with 
support from the UNDP’s Recovery Programme for rehabilitation of the schoolyard
554 Interview, Arifah Rahmawati, Centre for Conflict and Peace Studies, Gadja Mada University, 
Yogyajakarta, 5 May 2005.
555 It was not possible to interview senior staff from the main donor organisations involved in funding 
this project, nor other projects in the area, despite repeated attempts to contact them. Senior DFID 
staff in Jakarta - who were not themselves directly involved with funding the UNDP Recovery 
Programme - were also unaware o f such projects. An earlier draft o f this chapter was sent to UNDP 
and DFID officials connected to post-conflict programming in Indonesia but no comments were 
received.
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and rooftop. The school was not directly damaged by the conflict, but was located in 
the centre of Tobelo town, in an area extensively damaged during the violence of late 
1999 to early 2000. A tour of the building revealed that a new roof and drainage 
system had been built to a basic standard, but the funds listed by the head-teacher did 
not match the low quality of materials used.556 Evidently, some of the funds had been 
used for other purposes -  whether by the district education officials involved in the 
project, school staff, or others. The project manager from an international NGO 
working on school reconstruction in the area reported:
NGO projects are so much cheaper than government projects here -  
for example in school rehabilitation. For three classrooms you need 75 
million Rupiah («approximately US$6,800) -  but it is very difficult for 
the government to imagine doing it at that price. Government projects 
for three classrooms are always at least 150 million Rupiah 
{approximately US$13,600), which is over twice the price of an NGO- 
funded school... .557
The school rehabilitation project depicted above could be counted as a partial 
success: the school facilities had been somewhat improved, thus meeting the goal of 
basic repair of public services. But, as with the kindergarten, the other benefits of the 
project (to those officials involved in funding the project) and the costs (to the 
children who lacked a properly rehabilitated school) were not measured or accounted 
for in the Recovery Programme’s official documentation.
These two examples of school projects in North Halmahera -  one of the most 
conflict affected areas of North Maluku -  financed by the Recovery Programme 
reflect state capture of the funding and building process. In these two cases it was not 
possible to contact the building contractors involved, but in both cases, it was 
indicated that they had benefited financially from the projects beyond the official 
sums involved. Given the usual pattern of business in the region, between the 
provincial and local government agencies and close business partners, these contracts 
would have been arranged with the benefits of financial or other contributions to the
556 Previous experience monitoring community infrastructure projects in Indonesia enabled me to 
identify disjunctures between reported budgets and actual spending. A  local research assistant 
accompanying me also found the reported budget inflated well above the cost o f the materials used, 
when local prices for the materials involved were checked.
557 Interview, Project Manager responsible for North Maluku and Maluku rehabilitation projects, 
partially financed by UNDP, International NGO, 10 October 2005, Ambon. Rupiah converted at July 
2007 rates.
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state officials involved. A former UNDP staff member, who had worked extensively 
on the Recovery Programme with provincial and local government across the 
Maluku region, commented:
It’s very different in regions like Kalimantan, where there are many 
private sector resources shared by the community. But in Maluku it’s 
not like that, it’s just state resources shared out between the elites. To 
understand the local political economy you have to look at 
employment and how the business sector is organised and where they 
(ibusinessmen) get their business from...and then you need to ask, is it 
(ibusiness) from the government or the private sector? Then you can 
understand how politics is organised.558
The next infrastructure ‘reconstruction’ project, on a larger scale than these small 
school projects, further illustrates the state capture process behind the allocation and 
expenditure of Recovery Programme funds.
(ii) Electricity rehabilitation projects 
The largest individual infrastructure project funded via the Recovery Programme -  
with a budget of over US$500,000 -  was a mainly EU-funded project to rehabilitate 
electricity in one of the most remote parts of the North Maluku archipelago on Bacan 
Island, in the south of the province.559 This electricity project was one of UNDP’s 
flagship public infrastructure rehabilitation sites in North Maluku. Although the 
Bacan area had not been greatly affected by the conflict, and was several hundred 
miles from the conflict’s two epicentres in Temate and Tobelo, it was one of the 
poorest in the province and electricity facilities had been reportedly damaged during 
the conflict.560 The electricity project became a show-case for the UNDP’s 
programme donors, who were observed travelling with senior officials from the 
Provincial Governor’s office to open the project in May 2005 during field 
research.561 The aims of the project were:
558 Interview, former UNDP staff member, 4 October 2005.
559 Project budget listed as US$508,929 in UNDP (2004), Annex 1, p.28. Although budgets for other 
“reconstruction, repair and rehabilitation” o f public infrastructures projects were bigger - 
$US3,387,358 was allocated to rebuild community infrastructure - this was the largest sum allocated 
to an individual infrastructure project (UNDP 2004, p.28).
560 UNDP (2004), p.9.
561 It should be noted here how rarely Jakarta-based donors and UN officials visited their funded 
projects in North Maluku. During seven months o f fieldwork, I only observed one such high-level 
mission (an EU monitoring mission) to evaluate UNDP-funded projects, in May 2005.
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...the rehabilitation of the public electricity system in East Bacan in 
partnership with the state electricity company PLN, in order to create 
conditions for enhanced security, public service delivery, and 
economic development in the Bacan area.562
Evidence of collusion and corruption in contracting for the project were noted by 
several interviewees, who focused their critique on the role of the state-owned 
electricity company, PLN, in the project. In itself, PLN’s involvement and provincial 
government capture of the funds for the project does not mean the project failed. 
Electricity reportedly functioned on Bacan following the project -  an important gain 
for local residents, government and businesses for local economic and social 
development.563 But the interests in the regional and local governments in this large 
regional infrastructure project were multiple: -  contractual deals between the state 
company and local officials, between the parliament and officials signing off on the 
project, sub-contracts to local companies involved in the operations of the project,
Another example of a PLN-provincial government project funded by the UNDP was 
the rehabilitation of electricity in North Halmahera district:
The Programme also supported major infrastructure projects including 
the rehabilitation of the electrical power system destroyed by the 
conflict, resulting in 93.5 km of new electrical lines in Tobelo Selatan 
and Galela sub-districts in partnership with the state electricity 
company (PLN).565
By collaborating with PLN, a percentage of Recovery Programme funding would 
almost certainly have gone straight into the pockets of both PLN and other 
government officials. At the same time, a new electricity system was provided to the 
community in that area, thereby aiding local economic and social recovery following 
the conflict. One of the main Recovery Programme ‘objectives’ was to promote both 
social and economic activity and the repair of public infrastructure -  the PLN 
projects promoted both these goals. However, the actors involved in the project were 
drawn solely from the provincial government and connected contractors. The
562 UNDP (2004), p.3.
563 Interviews, Bacan residents visiting Temate, June 2005, Temate.
564 Local electoral politics in Bacan can also be linked to the construction o f this electricity project, 
which connected particular local government elites to elites in the provincial capital. I do not cover 
this region o f North Maluku in any detail, but see Chapter Six on broader regional electoral politics.
565 UNDP (2004), pp. 3-4.
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provincial government elite had much to gain by repairing electricity in the Bacan 
and North Halmahera regions -  as with other public infrastructure projects -  not only 
in the gains they made by rent-seeking from project funds, but also in terms of 
political gains in the targeted regions. Thus the UNDP Recovery Programme had 
assisted post-conflict ‘reconstruction and recovery’, but it did so through enabling 
the project to be captured by the provincial and local government elite (including 
both civil servants and parliamentarians) and their contracting partners. This process 
was not acknowledged by UNDP staff either in official reports or in unofficial 
discussions.
This section closes with a quote from a senior member of the Ambon city parliament. 
He observed the making of many “new rich” in the local and provincial government 
via capture of aid funds. The widespread problems with management of aid funds 
reported by this informant -  in particular, the collusion between provincial 
parliamentarians and the provincial Social Department officials to capture IDP and 
reconstruction project funds -  were also observed with both UNDP and central 
government aid budgets provided to Maluku province. As such, state capture in 
North Maluku fitted into a broader regional pattern.
Commission D in the DPRD {provincial parliament) was investigated 
over the corruption of IDP funds. This Commission is in charge of the 
social and IDP issues in the province. Dinsos got the money for IDPs, 
but other departments and commissions were also involved. For 
example, the building for IDPs.... well, Public Works, Dinsos, all of 
them were involved and this makes many problems.... There are 
already many “new rich” in Dinsos because of the IDP projects. The 
system has to be better than before reformasi (the reform era), now 
there’s a performance budget approach, for example...but there is still 
a lot of collusion between the executive, the parliament and businesses 
at all levels.566
5.4 Overall assessment of state capture of UNDP aid funds
This penultimate section summarises the overall costs and benefits of provincial and 
local government state capture of UNDP aid funds. It starts with a summary of the
566 Interview, PDI-P parliamentarian, Ambon city DPRD, 12 October 2005, Ambon. PDI-P held 
majority control o f the city parliament at this time, and this MP did not stand to gain politically from 
criticising fellow MPs or government officials. As such, I took his observations as genuine.
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data problems, and then considers the local and national benefits of state capture to 
the government. The final part considers the severe costs of aid-fund capture to the 
remaining IDP population.
Sections 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3 highlighted several problems with tracking the use and 
impact of Recovery Programme funds in North Maluku when relying on UNDP data 
alone. This was not only because the UNDP’s impact measurement data was unclear, 
but also because many of the real effects of the funds in the field were not included 
in any official assessment. In a review of the Recovery Programme, the Dutch 
government -  the largest overall donor -  argued that the reason there was no UNDP 
data on whether programme objectives had been met, was because, “the 
programme’s objectives were never fully operationalised by the specification of 
indictors of achievement for each objective.” 567 Previous sections already 
highlighted how it was impossible to compare actual with planned results because of 
the lack of baseline and outcome data. As such, the UNDP could only provide, a 
“description of results at the subproject level.”568 The assessment provided in this 
chapter was based on triangulated field evidence, compared, where possible, to data 
presented in the UNDP’s official reports.569
Based on the field evidence presented here, the patterns of provincial and local state 
capture of UNDP aid funds were very similar to state capture of central government 
aid to North Maluku. The cases presented in Sections 5.2 and 5.3 showed that many 
projects, including those targeted at IDPs and infrastructure rehabilitation, were run 
in collaboration with, or directly through, provincial and local government agencies. 
Provincial and local government officials made the key decisions about which 
projects would be financed, where and how. As the UNDP ran the Recovery 
Programme largely through government officials, based in various state agencies, the 
major projects were designed and managed via the provincial and local governments’ 
usual procedures, using their regular contractors. The Dutch programme review team 
highlighted some of the risks of providing direct support to government agencies,
567 Royal Netherlands Embassy (2004), p.7.
568 Royal Netherlands Embassy (2004), p.7.
569 See Chapter One on research methodology.
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though their comments did not appear to have affected programme design or 
implementation:
In cases where a government agency is a recipient of direct support or 
capacity building assistance, its roles in leadership and decision­
making remains (sic) important. However, these roles do not 
automatically qualify the government agency to carry out the fiduciary 
role of managing UNDP’s funds. Indeed, given the high propensity for 
rent-seeking within the government, this role for government agencies 
should be avoided.570
Rent-seeking from the UNDP’s aid funds can be construed in either positive or 
negative terms, depending on the perspective taken. From the UNDP and major 
donors’ official perspective high levels of rent-seeking in the Recovery Programme 
was to be avoided. From the perspective of the provincial government, state capture 
of programme funds was an important and strategic gain given the struggling post­
conflict regional economy. Recovery Programme funds enabled the repair and 
rehabilitation of government buildings, infrastructure and other public services. Even 
more importantly, the rebuilding and repair process enabled the restoration of a 
provincial-local ‘elite bargain’ between officials in different branches of the state, 
and local businesses reliant on state contracts -  a bargain threatened by regional 
instability during the conflict and in the post-conflict economic crisis period.571 The 
restoration of the local state as one of the main sources of regional income (and 
therefore business contracts) restored the pre-conflict state-elite bargain, as well as 
providing urban employment. At the same time, a range of public services were 
either restored or improved alongside e the state capture process.
State capture of aid funds also had national benefits for the central government, as 
Chapter Four argued. The central government ‘bought back’ a restive region into the 
nation-state bargain by enabling this and the UNDP’s aid funds also contributed to 
this process. The local state-based elite re-built themselves in political terms, 
capturing aid funds for their personal and political use (as well as serving purposes of 
local government), thereby positioning themselves strongly for future local elections 
(explored further in Chapter Six). In some ways, therefore, the state capture of
570 Royal Netherlands Embassy (2004), p.6.
571 I draw the ‘elite bargain’ concept from Putzel (2007), drawing on Tilly (2003), Snyder (2006), and 
Khan and Jomo (2000).
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central government and UNDP aid funds enabled the restoration of ‘stability’ and 
helped to ‘re-build’ the local state -  a frequently elusive process in post-conflict 
situations, and whose importance should not, therefore, be over-looked.
The impacts of state capture of UNDP aid on ordinary (non-elite) North Malukans 
should also be accounted for. On the positive side, while life for the ordinary North 
Malukan had not improved in economic terms compared to the pre-conflict situation 
(the regional economy was still worse off in 2005 than it had been in 1999), in 
contrast to the conflict year and continued economic crisis, between 1999 and 2001, 
the local economic situation had greatly improved by 2005. The combined provision 
of government and UNDP aid had also enabled the restoration of some public 
services and infrastructure, meaning trade, travel, security and other basic public 
facilities were functioning again. As a result of directly controlling the aid funds, the 
provincial and local government was also able to pay civil servant salaries, hire staff, 
rebuild offices and so on, which had a direct impact on urban employment. Previous 
chapters have already outlined the importance of government sector employment in 
the urban economy of North Maluku. With the restoration of basic security and 
public services, many IDPs were able to return to their original villages, even without 
the full emergency funding officially allocated to them. Therefore, overall, the 
economic and social situation in 2005 was an improvement on 2000, immediately 
following the conflict. The 2004 and 2005 election results reflected a general 
satisfaction with the provincial and local government in this respect, where a 
majority of former bureaucrats and some incumbents were returned to power, as 
Chapter Six further explores.
The benefits from the UNDP’s Recovery Programme funds observed and analysed 
here were, therefore, predominantly organised via the process of state capture, rather 
than the UNDP’s stated policy methods of working through community 
organisations and targeting the most vulnerable. Four main benefits were identified: 
(1), the restoration of the local state-elite bargain, via the renewed financing of state 
contracts for construction and other projects; (2), improvement of some elite public 
educational services, and the restored (if not improved) public services for non-elite 
families; (3), restored and improved electricity supply in some areas, benefiting the 
regional economy as a whole, as well as state-elites and contractors on the projects;
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and, (4), the overall recovery of state stability and security. There were also, 
however, many costs from state capture, including the mark-ups on materials used in 
reconstruction, the personal extraction by officials of rents from projects, and other 
losses in overall efficiency due to state capture. However, reaching these overall 
results was nonetheless an important achievement in this remote post-conflict region 
of Indonesia, which had faced severe socio-economic crisis during and following the 
conflict of 1999-2000.
An important change to the (relative) independence of local civil society 
organisations was also made via access to UNDP funding, and this time directly, not 
via state-captured funds. Several new NGO forums in Temate and Tobelo worked 
with women, minority groups and IDP communities, enabling a degree of political 
inclusion for these groups that had not been previously possible. One NGO member 
reported that the establishment of an independent local radio -  with funding from the 
UNDP -  had encouraged grassroots political discussion in the region, in particular 
among the youth sector:
In Sulawesi there are at least two big cities, which mean many more 
opportunities for university education and the growth of local NGOs.
But North Maluku doesn’t have that opportunity. One good thing the 
UNDP did here was fund ’68-H’. UNDP funded two local radio 
stations -  one in Temate and one in Tobelo -  and they became part of 
the 68-H network. This meant local journalists could access training 
from the central branch of 68-H and get more experience with 
journalism. 68-H is one of the most independent, open and critical 
forms of media in Indonesia and this was something really new in 
North Maluku.572
By 2005, young activists from student, religious, peace and political organisations in 
Temate and Tobelo -  some of whom had been involved with UNDP-financed 
organisations -  vocally expressed their criticisms of the provincial and local 
government, during the local elections. The UNDP funding their organisations 
received had enabled the development of civil society organisations independent of 
government financing, which was something new in the region.573
572 Interview, 4 July 2005, Tobelo.
573 The biggest and most established student, religious and political ‘civil society’ organisations in 
Temate received the majority o f their funding from provincial state agencies.
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Finally, however, the benefits outlined above must be balanced against the costs of 
state capture of the UNDP’s aid funds (as with central government aid) for the 
displaced population, on whom the most significant costs fell. Those who remained 
displaced as of 2005, for whom there was no funding left and no source for redress, 
faced a miserable situation. Even those IDPs who had been able to return, and had 
received some funding from the government to do so, had not regained their pre­
conflict livelihood standards. Their small businesses and gardens remained 
destroyed, education possibilities were still removed, children and relatives had been 
killed, and their homes and places of worship were yet to be rebuilt. IDPs remaining 
in 2005 had no political power, and while some NGOs and local MPs claimed to 
represent their interests, these organisations and individuals had their own political 
interests to pursue. However, because the UNDP Recovery Programme had never 
been fully assessed, the state capture of resources officially intended for the 
restoration of IDP livelihoods, and the costs of this capture to the most vulnerable 
population in the region, was not acknowledged either by the UNDP or the major 
project donors.
5.5 Conclusion
This chapter outlined the patterns behind state capture of the UNDP aid funds to 
North Maluku and the main benefits and costs this had to the local elite and broader 
population. In conclusion, I summarise why UNDP aid funds -  as with Indonesian 
government funds -  were so readily captured by the provincial and local branches of 
government. Widespread government reforms following the creation of the new 
province in 1999, combined with civil emergency legislation in 2000, and the 
protracted decentralisation and re-districting process from 2001 onwards, meant the 
UNDP’s relationship with the provincial and local government was complex and 
constantly changing. However, the UNDP’s post-conflict policy demonstrated an 
organisational failure to understand the regional political economy of North Maluku, 
both in historical and contemporary terms.
Given the UNDP’s stated interest in avoiding state control of their aid funds and its 
intention to minimise corruption, the organisation did not appear to have planned
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how they would overcome the risks of operating a large reconstruction and IDP 
rehabilitation programme in the kind of governance environment they faced in the 
wider Maluku region. Within the official reports, as well as in interviews, there were 
few references to the combined difficulties of working with a new provincial 
administration, rapidly re-districting local government, and a highly centralised 
Governor’s office. The UNDP’s field team were managed from Jakarta, leaving the 
field staff with a weak bargaining position from the outset. The combination of 
channelling aid funds through the provincial and local government, limited 
government monitoring organisations and powerful local political elites enabled easy 
state capture of aid resources, just as Chapter Four outlined on the dynamics of 
government aid capture. Only one donor review cited risks of rent-seeking from the 
aid programme, and, even then, this was not a central feature of their critical 
assessment.
One of the core objectives of the UNDP’s Recovery Programme was “improving 
local governance”. But throughout the official documentation and interviews with 
programme staff, it was unclear what this actually meant in the North Maluku 
context. Government intervention in decision-making over project financing, the 
issuing of patronage-based contracts, the strong elite networks between local 
businesses and state officials, and so on, were not factors the UNDP accounted for in 
their design or management of the Recovery Programme. The absence of effective 
programme monitoring also meant it was relatively easy for their aid funds to be 
captured, without fear of identification or sanction from either the UNDP or the 
foreign donors. In contrast to the central government’s (unofficial) view on rent- 
seeking by the provincial and local government -  that it was a necessary cost of 
rebuilding and stabilising the state following the conflict -  the UNDP were 
apparently unaware of the extent to which local government officials had benefited, 
both personally and politically, from their aid budget.574
All donor-funded aid and development projects operating in the democratic transition 
period in Indonesia faced challenges in how to avoid state capture at the national,
574 This failure to understand the regional political economy did not bode well for the success o f the 
‘Second Phase’ o f the Recovery Programme, which was intended to focus on “improving 
governance.” See UNDP (2004), p.2.
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provincial or local levels of government. In this particular case, the aid programme 
was run in close collaboration with a powerful set of local state-elites, who had 
emerged triumphant from the recent conflict. Set in a weak and transitional 
governance environment, with upcoming local elections, there was a wide range of 
incentives for appropriation of aid resources by state officials, within an environment 
enabling uncontrolled state capture. Given North Maluku’s ongoing economic crisis, 
following the conflict, the incentives for state capture were even higher than in non­
conflict regions of Indonesia.575 In the official documents and in interviews with 
staff from the UNDP’s Recovery Programme, scant mention is made of these 
significant state-capture risks.
Towards the end of fieldwork in December 2005, the Recovery Programme was still 
in operation, with several project activities in the process of completion.576 ‘Phase 
One’ of the Recovery Programme -  the focus of this study -  was winding down and 
new tranches of donor money were beginning to flow into the UNDP, with new 
programme staff members arriving in the field offices, and the previous 
administrators departing.577 That the major donors had re-commissioned the UNDP 
to run a second phase of the Programme (presumably) reflected confidence in the 
Recovery Programme’s overall outcomes. UNDP staff members working on the 
second phase of the programme indicated that while the major donors had identified 
several problems with the first phase, they were confident these would be addressed 
through programme ‘re-design’ in its second phase.578
In the official UNDP and donor reviews of the Maluku region Recovery Programme 
only one review -  a report by the Dutch government -  identified the problem of rent- 
seeking and state capture by the local government, and even then, only in a small 
aside.579 It is unclear whether the UNDP’s internal review team or the major donors 
failed to observe rent-seeking and state capture of the Recovery Programme,
575See Van Klinken (2001, 2007) on patronage patterns in government and the economy in Eastern 
Indonesia; and Khan and Jomo (2000) on common rent-seeking patterns in Indonesia.
576 The kindergarten project in Tobelo - described in Section 5.2 -  had just been completed, for 
example.
577Around 2002 there was a political furore in Jakarta between UNDP and the major donors to the 
Recovery Programme over the progress and management o f the Programme. It was not possible to 
conduct explicit interviews on this topic with related persons in 2005 or 2006.
578 Interviews, Jakarta, May 2006.
579 Royal Netherlands Embassy (2004).
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strategically ignored it for political reasons, or whether other factors were involved in 
this ‘oversight’.580 However, analysing the reasons behind the absence of donor and 
UNDP acknowledgment of rent-seeking and state-capture practices by the provincial 
and local government falls outside the remit of this thesis.581
The North Maluku regional economy faced protracted crisis following the conflict in 
2000, with a collapsed agricultural and industrial sector, destroyed regional 
infrastructure and public services and major unemployment problems. State 
resources played a significant role in the post-conflict economy, and UNDP aid funds 
factored into the provincial government’s critical pool of resources -  raising their 
post-conflict revenue by another quarter, as Section 5.1 illustrated. Such a situation 
put provincial and local government officials and politicians in a very powerful 
economic and political position. On a political level, the UNDP aid programme 
offered a range of new business and political possibilities for politicians and officials 
and their business clients. Prestige infrastructure projects funded by the UNDP, 
including the ‘rehabilitation’ of electricity to outlying islands, were prime examples 
of the kind of ventures buying support for, and dependence on, the government 
officials and parliamentarians in charge of organising and disbursing aid funds in the 
local business and wider population. Whether based in the North Maluku Governor’s 
office, or serving on provincial or city parliament budget committees, or seated 
within a local line ministry agency -  government officials and their colluding 
parliamentary colleagues controlled access to vital government resources on which 
the local population was dependent.582
When the time came for local elections in 2004 and 2005 -  with all the attendant 
costs of raising funds to buy a party nomination, run an election campaign, and then 
organise supporters on election day -  state official’s access to the North Maluku 
Recovery Programme funds significantly bolstered the provincial and local 
government’s ‘election treasury’. While larger sources of revenue flowed from the 
central government’s aid budget -as outlined in Chapter Four -  the UNDP provided
580 As the introduction noted, exploring the motives behind the UNDP’s and donor’s ‘oversight’ o f  
state capture in this case goes somewhat beyond the focus o f this thesis and would require further 
research.
581 It would be interesting to explore and develop this analysis in further research projects.
582 These patterns also applied to Maluku province, but I was unable to follow up the political 
implications o f it within the scope o f  this study.
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another important income stream for the provincial and local government elite. This 
chapter therefore contributes to the thesis’ broader story of how local political elites 
in North Maluku survived the regional conflict and protracted economic crisis, and 
entrenched their political positions. The state capture of post-conflict aid funding 
enriched those in positions of state power, thereby contributing to their electoral 
success: the subject of the following chapter. While the state capture of aid funds was 
one of the key mechanisms behind the political survival of the state-based elite, and 
the operation of their political machines, it was their success in local elections that 
enabled them to thrive.
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Chapter Six -
Rice and circuses: explaining incumbents’ success in North 
Maluku’s local and gubernatorial elections 583
Better a known evil than an unknown good.
Sicilian proverb.584
Introduction
By the end of 2000, the Temate Sultan had been forced into exile, following the end 
of the most intense wave of violence in Temate. This signalled his defeat in the 
conflict, which was closely tied to his campaign to become the first governor of 
North Maluku. The southern political triumvirate -  Thaib Armain, by then 
Provincial Government Chief of Staff; Syamsir Andili, Temate Mayor; and Bahar 
Andili, district regent of Central Halamahera -  had emerged triumphant* and now 
occupied the top echelon of the regional bureaucracy. However, as Chapter Four 
outlined, the unity between these three was only temporary. Even the Sultan’s defeat 
and exile did not stop him from returning to launch several further election 
campaigns. Competition between these four figures dominated electoral politics over 
much of the next decade, with the addition of a further contestant in 2001, former 
Suharto cabinet minister, Abdul Gafur.585
This chapter considers the successes of state-based incumbents in city and 
gubernatorial elections in North Maluku between 2001 and 2008. The success of 
incumbents in successive post-conflict, post-New Order elections, contrasts with the 
failure of the Temate Sultan and other leading wow-bureaucratic political figures, 
including Gafur and Boki Nita Budhi Susanti, the Sultan’s fifth wife, to secure 
political posts.586 The chapter focuses on the gubernatorial and city elections as the 
most important in regional and local political terms; other elections are discussed
583 The chapter title alludes to Erie’s (1988) analysis o f the political tools used by Irish-American 
political machines in the US, via the provision o f ‘bread’ (patronage-based jobs and benefits) and 
‘circuses’ (popular community entertainment to rally electoral support). An earlier version o f  this 
chapter, focusing on the failed ‘return’ o f the Temate Sultan in the 2005 local elections, was 
published as Smith (2009).
584 Quoted in Chubb (1982), p.210) in reference to why the poor o f  Palermo, in Southern Italy, chose 
immediate concrete benefits from the Christian Democrats over political alternatives.
585 See Political Biographies for his background.
586 Boki is Tematean for ‘Queen’ - during her election campaigns she was known as Boki Nita.
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where relevant. Whilst electoral contests between local and provincial bureaucrats 
and their competitors were not foregone conclusions, die financial and political 
power accumulated via years at the top of the local bureaucracy -  and related 
capture of government revenue -  was definitely one of the deciding factors in 
electoral outcomes.
This chapter on electoral politics forms the penultimate chapter of the thesis because 
only once having analysed the historical roots of local elites, inter-elite conflict 
dynamics, and the role of state elites in the post-conflict regional political economy, 
is it possible to make sense of post-1998 electoral dynamics in North Maluku. As 
Chapters Two to Four outlined, the 1999-2000 conflict had lasting impacts on the 
local political and economic landscape, which this chapter highlights in relation to 
parallel and subsequent electoral dynamics. The political and financial concentration 
of power in the new Provincial Governor’s office and regional bureaucracy, 
following the conflict, as outlined in Chapter Four and further illustrated in Chapter 
Five, led to a highly centralised regional, political and economic system. This 
chapter examines how those occupying senior positions in the provincial 
government and dependent local government bodies were then able to marshal 
superior financial and political resources during elections.
The chapter proceeds as follows. The first section discusses elections between 2001 
and 2004, covering the 2001 to 2002 gubernatorial election cycle, and the 2004 
national elections, outlining Thaib’s rise to the governorship and the failure of the 
Temate Sultan and Gafur. The second concentrates on die first direct local elections 
in Temate city in 2005, contrasting the reasons behind the failure of the Sultan’s 
wife, Nita, against the success of the incumbent, Mayor Syamsir Andili. The third 
provides a prologue to the 2007 gubernatorial elections. Although in early 2009, the 
final results were still not concluded, general conclusions can be drawn from the 
overall electoral process and the provisional outcome announced in 2008. The fourth 
highlights the broader electoral patterns identified in the city and gubernatorial 
elections, in contrast to those across Indonesia, drawing on several aspects of 
machine politics theory to explain the North Maluku situation. The chapter 
concludes by summarising the patterns in the North Maluku elections between 2001 
and 2008 and connecting them to the main argument of the thesis.
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6.1 Gubernatorial and national elections (2001-2004)
Before discussing the first North Maluku gubernatorial elections between 2001 and 
2002 and the national elections of 2004, this section first briefly summarises the 
local political situation at the official end of the North Maluku conflict in mid-2000. 
The attempted ‘return’ of the Temate Sultan to local politics from the mid-1990s and 
his successful accumulation of local political posts (seen in Chapters Two and 
Three) were stalled by his involvement in the North Maluku conflict. Chapter Three 
demonstrated how the Sultan lost his rising position in local politics due to his 
support for the northern and later Christian groups during the conflict, leading to his 
eventual exile. Despite this misadventure, the Temate Sultan continued to exercise 
influence over the ethnic Temate community and other northern ethnic groups in 
2005. However, to other groups, especially the southern migrant community, the 
Sultan was seen as the root of regional instability and violence, and, along with his 
followers, was to be kept out of local politics at all costs.
In contrast to the Temate Sultan, other senior members of the local state-based 
political elite remained officially “neutral” during the conflict. Chapter Three 
demonstrated that while these three figures actually played key roles in aiding the 
escalation of violence -  on behalf of the southern ethnic groups, and, later, in 
support of the ‘Muslim’ side -  this was done via backroom channels. In subsequent 
elections, as this chapter later argues, the main southern political leaders were able 
to use their official “neutrality” during the conflict to their electoral advantage. By 
mid-2000, at the official end to the violence, the three leading southern figures had 
not only held onto their senior bureaucratic and executive posts, but forced their 
main rival, the Sultan, into exile. The contest then began within the local state-based 
elite for control over the key offices in the new province and local government. Only 
one important ‘outside’ contender, Gafur, posed a serious threat, with the Sultan and 
his wife returning later to pose their own challenge.
(i) The first gubernatorial election
Chapter Four outlined how the first gubernatorial elections in North Maluku was 
scheduled for 2000, but was then delayed by the Ministry of Home Affairs because 
of the conflict situation. Between October 1999 (when the region first became a
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province) and 2002 (following the first aborted round of gubernatorial elections in 
2001) the governorship was held by two ex-military ‘caretakers’, Surasmin (in 1999) 
and then Effendi (in 2000).587 They were appointed directly by the Ministry of 
Home Affairs, rather than locally elected, with direct political and administrative 
support from the regional military, police and justice chiefs, as declared in the 
Presidential Instruction of July 2000 outlined in Chapter Four. Regional government 
was therefore centralised in the provincial governor’s office until the region was 
deemed stable enough to hold elections and re-organise local government from 2003 
onwards. Chapter Four showed how the provincial governor and bureaucratic staff 
therefore held far greater official authority over government budgeting and 
organisation than other ‘non-emergency’ provinces at this time, with similar 
situations arising in Maluku and Central Sulawesi.
Despite the limited information available on the first gubernatorial elections -  held 
in several rounds between 2001 and 2002 -  they highlight several important features 
of local elections in North Maluku in the post-Suharto era. First, they showed the 
rising interest of national political figures in holding provincial government office in 
this remote eastern region -  positions which held very limited political or financial 
interest in the Suharto period, but which now looked increasingly lucrative. The 
contest over the North Maluku governorship therefore took place not only between 
the local state-based elite, but also drew in two other North Malukan figures, Gafur 
and the Temate Sultan, both long absent from the region and based in Jakarta. 
Second, the election followed the New Order electoral style as the central 
government, supported by the regional military, intervened directly in the election 
process when the outcome allegedly ran against both the military’s and (then) 
President Megawati’s interests.588 Other elements of the election process and the 
final results demonstrate how the Temate Sultan grew increasingly marginalised 
from local politics, as well as the importance of holding senior local bureaucratic 
office for electoral success.
587 It was not possible to uncover details o f the local political role o f these two figures during field 
research in 2005 (interviews, as well as local newspaper archives, contained limited information on 
them). I focus here instead on the activities o f Thaib, the Provincial Chief o f  Staff during this period, 
who wielded a great deal o f provincial government influence and was more widely discussed and 
reported on in interviews and newspaper archives.
588 Section 6.3 shows that Jakarta still intervened heavily in the outcome o f  the provincial election 
process in 2007, though not with direct military activity.
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A series of murky disputes took place between Gafur and the Sultan in the run up to 
the 2001 election, with both attempting to become Golkar’s candidate. According to 
Gafur, after the conflict, he was Golkar’s “natural choice”:
After the conflict, the Sultan was rejected by the whole community.
The national level also rejected him after his role in the conflict -  and 
because he had protected the Christians. Jakarta was fed up with him 
and Akbar Tanjung {then Golkar party chair) agreed with the local 
reports. So the Sultan retreated from Golkar and later joined PDK.589
Gafur’s comments must be treated with caution -  but that the Sultan was rejected by 
Golkar’s national party headquarters (DPP Golkar) implies that the national party 
leaders believed he had minimal hope of winning. The Sultan did not relinquish his 
power within Golkar easily; at this point he was still an official in the North Maluku 
district party branch, though he had lost influence since the conflict. Intervention 
from DPP Golkar in Gafur’s favour, combined with local elite Golkar support for 
Gafur, prevented the Sultan’s selection as the Golkar candidate590 and shortly after 
this he left the Party.591
Gafur then ran for Golkar against Thaib Armain in the July 2001 election. As a long­
standing regional bureaucrat, first holding senior posts in the North Maluku district 
administration, and later promoted to senior posts in the Ambon provincial 
administration, Thaib had formerly been a Golkar member, but he switched parties 
to PDI-P for this election.592 During the first round of the DPRD election (in 2001, 
gubernatorial posts were not yet directly elected), Gafur won. However, Thaib 
launched a protest, accusing Gafur of buying parliamentary votes, and thousands of 
Makian supporters briefly occupied the provincial DPRD building.593 Subsequently, 
a provincial parliamentarian admitted receiving money from Gafur and the election
589 Interview, Abdul Gafur, North Maluku DPR member, 17 October 2005, Temate.
590 It is also possible that Gafur had far greater funds to buy the candidacy than the Sultan, thanks to 
several decades in senior national political positions in the government and Golkar.
591 It was unclear whether the Sultan left Golkar forcibly or voluntarily - local accounts were 
contradictory.
592 The International Crisis Group (2009, p.3) reported that Thaib was also backed by members o f a 
‘reformist coalition’, including PK (Justice Party) and PAN (National Mandate Party) in 2001.
593 Kompas, 7 July 2007.
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was annulled.594 This triggered a long dispute and the election was re-run three 
times in 2002.595
In the next round, held in March 2002, Thaib won, but again the results were 
annulled, this time on the grounds that insufficient provincial parliamentarians were 
present for the vote. At the end of April, the DPRD voted for a merger, with Gafur 
as governor and Thaib as his deputy, but the Minister of Home Affairs again 
declared that proper procedures had not been followed and the result was annulled 
once more.596 On 28 October 2002, the DPRD voted again and Thaib was finally 
installed as the first elected North Maluku governor.597
Several anti-Thaib provincial DPRD and other political informants reported that the 
central government directly intervened in the 2001 to 2002 election process.598 
According to one source, then President Megawati intended to scupper Gafur’s 
chances owing to a long-standing feud, which dated back to when her father, then 
President Sukarno, was ‘betrayed’ by prominent student activists, including Gafur:
Abdul Gafur won the first round of the governor’s election. But 
Megawati didn’t like Gafur. There is a long story about why she 
refused to authorise Abdul Gafur’s nomination for governor.... So, in 
2002, second elections were held. So many army troops were stationed 
here at that time, ordered in by Jakarta. It was back to New Order 
times. Thaib, who used to be the provincial secretary....was set up to 
be the PDI-P candidate by Mega and the military. Thaib won of course 
and Gafur lost this second election.599
Following the implementation of civil emergency law in North Maluku in mid 2000, 
enabling greater central government and military control of the province following 
the conflict, the provincial administration remained closely tied to the military. 
Close links between Thaib Armain and the two caretaker governors (both of whom 
were ex-military), particularly in relation to their control of the post-conflict aid
594 Kompas, 18 October 2001.
595 International Crisis Group (2009), p.3.
596 Sinar Harapan, 29 April 2002.
597 Kompas, 29 October 2002.
598 Interviews, June-December 2005, Temate and Jakarta,.
599 The story behind Megawati’s apparent dislike o f Gafur related to accusations her father faced from 
student leaders, including Abdul Gafur, who claimed Sukarno was linked to the PKI (Indonesian 
Communist Party) in 1965. Interview, Deputy Speaker, North Maluku DPRD, 30 October 2005, 
Temate. Gafur also reported this story.
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funds (as outlined in Chapter Four), also meant Thaib was the natural choice of both 
the Ministry of Home Affairs officials and the military to be the first elected 
governor.600 Even without Megawati’s possible personal dislike of Gafur, financial 
links between various bodies of government meant Thaib was a stronger candidate.
Funds not only flowed from the central to the provincial government during the 
post-conflict period, they also flowed back to Jakarta, via Thaib’s control of the 
regional budget and closeness to the centrally appointed caretaker-govemors.601 This 
made Thaib the natural military and central government choice for governor, as the 
lynch-pin in the circulation of aid funds. Thus, despite central backing from Golkar, 
and across the region, Gafur’s lack of control over the provincial bureaucracy and 
the important clients of this office -  including the military and Ministry of Home 
Affairs’ officials meant that he stood little chance of successfully contesting the first 
provincial election.
(ii) The 2004 national legislative and senate elections 
Following their failure in the first gubernatorial elections, the 2004 elections brought 
the ‘outside’ elite candidates -  Gafur and the Temate Sultan -  back into play. The 
Temate Sultan and Nita ran for national parliament and senate seats for North 
Maluku, respectively, under a PDK (National Democratic Party) banner. As 
expected, the Sultan did particularly well in North Temate, his ‘traditional’ 
stronghold (see Annex D, Table D .l, for the results from Temate’s four sub-districts 
covering the three candidates who won the province overall).603 In South Temate, 
the centre of anti-Sultan forces during the Temate phase of the North Maluku 
conflict and home of the southern migrant community, the Sultan did less well, 
though still not as poorly as might have been expected. Gafur managed to gain more 
votes in South Temate, but the Sultan’s votes in the north were far higher. This
600 Thaib was also reportedly close to the military in Maluku province and Jakarta, from his time in 
the Maluku government administration, headed by a senior military figure with whom he became 
close.
601 Reported by various sources, including BAPPENAS officials (interviewed in 2006).
602 Prior to this election, Nita had not held an official political position.
603 Annex D, Table D .l, shows the Temate results rather than those for the whole province because 
these indicate the Temate Sultan’s continued presence in Temate politics, despite his previous set­
backs (the Sultan is candidate No. 6; Abdul Gafur, No. 20). Out o f  the three successful DPR 
candidates shown, Abdul Gani Kasuba later ran as vice-gubernatorial candidate against Thaib and 
Gafur in the 2007 gubernatorial elections. The Temate Sultan, Mudaffar Syah, was eliminated from 
the 2007 gubernatorial election contest before the official campaign began.
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result shows the Sultan was still not completely eliminated as a local political force. 
However, this pattern was not repeated in subsequent local elections, as Section 6.2 
explains.
Meanwhile, Nita ran for a national senate (DPD) post. Like the Sultan, she 
succeeded in North Temate. She was also successful in South Temate, competing 
relatively equally with, if not more successfully than, the other winning candidates 
in the southern migrant areas (see Annex D, Table D.2 for the Temate results of the 
four senators eventually elected from the province).604 The Temate results for the 
national senate elections were interesting as it showed that in national elections, the 
Temate Sultan and his wife were not viewed as negatively as in subsequent local 
elections, even by the southern migrant population. Nita was successfully elected to 
the DPD as one of North Maluku’s two senators in this new national body.605
The national senate results gave the Temate Sultan and his wife confidence for the 
2005 local elections for regional heads, the Pemilihan Langsung Kepala Daerah, 
known widely as pilkada.606 Although Nita had achieved a relatively prestigious 
national position in the DPD, and the Sultan held a DPR seat, neither position 
enabled them to hold much influence over local politics -  their ultimate goal. The 
Sultan proposed Nita for the Temate mayoral elections in 2005, a position he 
reportedly considered too minor to contest himself. However, his decision to select 
Nita over other members of the extended family caused internal family rifts that 
undermined the unity of the local PDK party and Nita’s campaign. The next section 
returns to these issues and Nita’s other weaknesses in the 2005 elections, when 
compared with the incumbent, Syamsir’s, greater local political influence and 
financial capital.
604 See Annex D, Table D.2 (Nita is candidate No. 4).
605Antony Sunarjo (candidate No. 12 in Annex D, Table D.2.) also won a DPD seat. He later ran 
(unsuccessfully) as the PDI-P gubernatorial candidate in 2007.
606 Pilkada refers to both gubernatorial and local level government head elections, but in North 
Maluku only local government heads were directly elected in 2005, with the direct gubernatorial 
elections following in 2007.
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6.2 The 2005 Ternate City Election
In 2005, Nita ran against Syamsir Andili, the long-standing and popular Golkar 
incumbent, in the contest for the Temate mayorship.607 The elections were the first 
time North Malukans (as with other Indonesians) had the chance to directly elect 
local mayors and regents, bringing a huge level of interest to the election 
campaigns.608 In Temate, the elections were even more tense than elsewhere in the 
province as they brought former conflict enemies into direct competition -  with Boki 
Nita (representing the Temate and northern ethnic groups) competing against the 
popular ‘local son’, Koh Syamsir (representing the Makian and southern ethnic 
groups).609 A third candidate, Sujud Siradjuddin, also ran as an ‘alternative’ to the 
dominant pair, but he lacked a substantive popular support base. Following a fierce 
campaign on both sides, Nita (and Sujud) eventually lost to Syamsir, who won over 
50 per cent of the vote (see Annex D, Table D.3 for the results).
When the preliminary results came through, Nita’s campaign team were shocked to 
realise that even in North Temate, their ‘traditional’ stronghold, Syamsir had 
received almost 5,000 more votes than Nita (see Annex D, Table D.3).610 In South 
Temate, where electoral observers had expected Nita would lose to Syamsir, the 
incumbent mayor won almost 15,000 more votes than her -  around two thirds of the 
total vote. Nita managed to beat Syamsir in one area only, Temate Island, but overall 
she lost by over 20 per cent of the vote, with Syamsir gaining more votes than his 
two competitors combined. Nita refused to accept the result for some months after 
the election, accusing Syamsir’s team of corruption and her campaign team mounted 
various unsuccessful challenges. The following two parts discuss the major factors 
undermining Nita’s campaign, and the main elements behind Syamsir’s success.
607 During fieldwork between May and December 2005, I closely followed this election with direct 
observations, interviews and informal discussions with residents, candidates, observers and officials in 
different parts o f  Temate municipality.
608 See Erb and Sulistiyanto (2009) on the introduction o f direct elections to Indonesian politics.
609 In North Maluku, the term Koh - a term o f respect in Chinese dialect among ethnic Chinese men - 
is also used as a term o f warm respect (roughly meaning ‘brother’ or ‘local son’) for non-ethnic 
Chinese. By using the prefix Koh during the election campaign, Syamsir demonstrated his local roots 
and his closeness to the local community -  to contrast with Nita’s Javanese roots and ‘superiority’ as 
the Queen.
610 I directly observed the announcement o f the preliminary results at Nita’s campaign headquarters, 
Sultan’s palace, June 2005, Temate.
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(i) Issues undermining Nita’s campaign 
One important factor undermining Nita was local concern over the role of the 
Temate Sultan in local politics. Section 6.1 showed how Temate residents were 
content to elect the Sultan and his wife as their representatives to the DPR and DPD, 
but they were not willing to take the same risks in local politics. The southern 
migrant community in Temate had been opposed to the Temate Sultan since the 
conflict, and it was expected that Nita would find it hard to win them over. Yet even 
among the Sultan’s own ‘traditional’ community many voters abandoned Nita for 
Syamsir. Several issues over the Sultan’s legitimacy were at stake. Temate residents 
were generally concerned about the Sultan’s involvement in the conflict, his defence 
of the Christian over the Muslim community, and the damage this had wrought on 
the city. The ethnic Temate community were also concerned about the role of Nita, 
who was ethnically Javanese, in undermining ethnic Tematean culture.611 These 
concerns, combined with the electorate’s unwillingness to take unnecessary 
economic and political risks (an issue explored further below), added to the 
incumbent’s comparative advantage.
Different sectors of the Temate community expressed fears during the campaign 
period that conflict would return if Nita won the election and Syamsir’s campaign 
team played to this.612 Even ethnic Temate residents in North Temate sub-district, 
the Sultan’s heartland, feared greater damage would be done to the Sultan’s position 
if they elected his relatively new Javanese wife. The conflict had already done much 
damage to the Sultan’s position locally and its memory was still fresh in June 
2005.613 Voters wanted to maintain the relative peace and security secured since the 
middle of 2000. The incumbent Golkar bureaucrat, who had emerged unscathed 
from the conflict, better represented these aspirations.
611 For the most ‘traditional’ supporters o f the Sultan among the ethnic Temate community, Nita was 
not only from the wrong ethnic group, but was also a young woman, both factors that counted against 
her as a serious political candidate.
612 Interviews and observations during the campaign period, May-June 2005, Temate.
613 National politics, on the other hand, was a far removed and abstract idea, the role o f which few 
Temate villagers understood in detail. Electing the Temate Sultan as one o f North Maluku’s national 
MPs in Jakarta, and his wife as Senator, was a relatively uncomplicated choice. If anything, these 
positions represented a continuation o f the Sultan’s ‘cultural’ leadership role over the last decades. 
Local politics was a different matter.
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The idea of Mayor Syamsir as the bearer of peace and stability was not entirely 
spontaneous. His campaign team deliberately invoked the memory of the conflict 
during their campaign rallies to raise emotions and mobilise voters against Nita. In 
the southern areas of Temate, the stronghold of the ‘white’ anti-Sultanate Islamic 
forces during the conflict, Syamsir’s campaign team frequently referred to the 
conflict during rallies.614 One local NGO member observed:
During the pilkada, Syamsir’s Tim Sukses (his campaign team) used 
rumours that if Nita’s team won they would implement adat 
(traditional Tematean law) in the local government. This looked like a 
direct threat to democracy and the migrant community from the kraton 
(Sultan’s palace). It also brought up trauma from before, from the time 
of the conflict, from the Pasukan Kuning (Yellow Troops), who were 
the Sultan’s warriors...So the people cannot support or accept Nita to 
win, if it will be like that again.615
The second factor undermining Nita’s campaign related to her ethnic legitimacy. She 
was not only not from a local ethnic group, but, being Javanese, she was perceived 
by some as ‘superior’ and ‘a loof.616 Nita had also attempted, in her words, to 
‘modernise’ and ‘improve’ some of the palace ceremonies and customs with 
Javanese influences. She did not seem to realise these changes were a serious
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liability in local politics. For example, on several occasions over the year prior to 
the election, Nita placed the palace dancers in Javanese costumes and re-organised 
‘traditional’ events as part of her attempt to ‘revitalise’ the palace. Several of these 
schemes appealed to youth groups in Temate, included by Nita in the palace 
festivals and later used as a central part of her campaign team -  she was young and 
used Jakarta dialect, which had popular youth appeal. But for the older Temate 
population who historically supported the Sultan, these moves were heresy. One pro- 
Nita student observed:
For us, Nita is modem and we don’t have a problem with her. But 
others, especially the old people, think she is so ambitious, which they 
don’t like, so they run to Syamsir as a result, because they are afraid of 
her ambition. She is also too modem for them I suppose. They prefer 
the old ways.618
614 Interviews, southern Temate voters, June 2005, Temate.
615 Interview, May 2005, Temate.
616 Interviews with local residents, May-June 2005, Temate.
617 Interview, Nita Budhi Susanti, 11 July 2005, Temate.
618 Interview, June 2005, Temate.
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The combination of concerns over the role of the Temate Sultan in the conflict and 
Nita’s attempts to ‘update’ Temate traditions damaged Nita at the polls, even in die 
Sultan’s heartland. But there were bigger problems for Nita’s campaign team, which 
lacked the financial and political resources, networks and local party organisation 
that Syamsir enjoyed.
Nita’s campaign team relied on networks of ‘traditional’ support across the outlying 
areas of Temate. She was backed by PDK, a relatively small and newly established 
party, which did not have an extensive regional network and certainly not one that 
matched Syamsir’s Golkar team. Travelling around the outlying areas of Temate, 
Golkar’s network was clearly marked by flags, posters, campaign t-shirts and so 
forth. Nita’s network did not display the same party resources, which became clear 
as they struggled to set up a single computer to monitor the vote counts on election- 
day, and shared cellular phones between members, with volunteers tallying results 
with pencils on scraps of paper.619 Nita was further undermined by internal rifts in 
her campaign team.
During the selection process for the electoral candidate for mayor, rifts split the 
Sultan’s palace. The Sultan officially proclaimed his support for Nita over his 
brother, Ismunandar Syah, the deputy head of the city parliament and head of PDK’s 
Temate organisation, who had planned to run for mayor for PDK. The Sultan’s sons 
by his other marriages and younger brothers did not support his choice; dissent was 
already rife in the palace over Nita’s “modem ways”, her ethnic background, and her 
interference with palace customs. Even though PDK officially supported Nita’s 
candidacy, party elites worked against her. According to a member of Peteratu, a 
youth organisation supporting Nita’s campaign:
Her campaign team consisted of informal people. They organised her 
campaign, not the PDK elites. So in the elections the PDK’s party 
machine did not work well for her.
Despite these setbacks, Nita’s campaign team organised several popular electoral 
‘circuses’, with huge campaign rallies and festivals on the palace grounds and in 
local stadiums. But Nita relied too heavily on these few circuses and the support of
619 Observed at the Sultan’s palace, June 2005, Temate.
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the Sultan’s ‘traditional’ community, who ultimately abandoned her at the polls. Her 
campaign team did not have the financial, organisational or political networks or 
experience to offer sufficient ‘rice’ to her constituency or to appeal to the wider 
population.
(ii) Factors enabling Syamsir’s success
Syamsir acts like Tuan Rumah (chief, or wise and respected man). He 
has already had many years in power so has a lot much money to buy 
people off. He’s very popular here.
Local businessman, Temate.620
Aside from the fact that Syamsir campaigned against a candidate with several 
important disadvantages, four key factors enabled Syamsir’s successful re-election 
in the Temate city elections of 2005: a superior patronage network; superior 
campaign financing due to over six years in city office with control of local aid 
funds; efficient and strategic local party machine organisation; and, political and 
economic protection for local businesses.
During the local election campaign, Syamsir and his campaign team promised 
certain groups in Temate the continuation of favourable job and contractual 
arrangements. Local construction and distribution businesses based in Temate had 
been some of the main beneficiaries of contracts from the city government during 
the post-conflict period. State employees in the city government administration -  
one of the few sources of stable urban employment since the conflict (as Chapter 
Three showed) were also loyal to Syamsir, as were their families and associates. To 
the wider population, the possibility of state jobs and contracts was one of the few 
local routes to economic stability and personal success. Syamsir had headed the 
Temate city government for over six years by the 2005 election, and had held 
several local government positions prior to that. He was seen as far more likely to 
deliver the social and economic benefits to his major clientele, than a new candidate 
with no experience in local government and the whiff of conflict about her.
620 Interview, July 2005, Temate.
230
Political resources for the campaign were drawn from the tight patronage networks 
Syamsir’s team had with the local civil service, business community and wider 
population hoping for future benefits. His campaign team included city parliament 
members, local businessmen and local Golkar party bosses. Syamsir held the purse 
strings of local government in terms of both jobs and contracts. In political theory 
terms, these are what Erie (1998) describes as the “output” dimensions of political 
machine systems:
The centralised big-city machines organised and linked the “input” and 
“output” dimensions of the local political system. On the input side, 
precinct captains mobilised the electorate. Local bosses controlled 
party caucuses and conventions and thus nominations to local office.
By controlling voters and officeholders, the machine could control the 
output side of politics -  patronage jobs, contracts, franchises, and 
services...The machine sustained itself by exchanging material 
benefits for political support.621
Temate city politics was not a political machine in all the senses outlined in Erie’s 
American machines -  for example, personal, not party state connections, mediated 
through government office, were much more important in the Temate case than in 
Erie’s examples. However, Syamsir’s control of both the local administration and 
local Golkar party meant he could act as dual intermediary for patronage benefits, as 
in the American cases.622 First, he mediated between local businesses and the 
opportunity for government contracts and, secondly, between the wider population 
seeking employment and the opportunity of jobs in either local government or the 
private sector, which was itself dependent on the state for its income, a situation 
exacerbated by the conflict. Given Temate’s fragile economic situation following 
the conflict, holding the central role as intermediary between local state resources 
and the population strengthened Syamsir’s electoral position.
Here, it should be noted that the two previous chapters stressed the control wielded 
by the provincial (not local) government over government resources in the post­
conflict period, including the important aid budgets. However, they also highlighted 
how, under Syamsir’s authority, the Temate city government held a special position
621 Erie (1988), p.26.
622 This was not a unique feature o f  Temate or North Malukan politics; across Indonesia personal 
networks rather than party organisations played central roles in the local elections o f 2005 (see 
Mietzner 2006; 2007). However, the Golkar party still played an important role in determining 
electoral outcomes in Temate, as further sections discuss.
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in relation to the provincial government. Not only had Syamsir been in power long 
enough that he held a stronger negotiating position with the provincial 
administration than other local government heads, the city administration was a 
long-established local body of government from when it was a municipality on the 
northern margins of Maluku province. The Temate government was therefore more 
autonomous -  both administratively and politically -  than the new local government 
bodies, established quickly after 2003, but still barely functioning by 2005. As a 
political figure, Syamsir had also been at the top of the regional bureaucratic elite for 
many years, in alliance with his influential older brother, Bahar (until his death in 
2001). Syamsir’s lobbying position with Thaib, as Governor, was therefore 
relatively strong compared to other local government heads. By these means, the 
Temate city administration had successfully captured post-conflict aid funds, further 
adding to Syamsir’s extensive patronage network. The 2005 elections followed five 
years of his control of these funds.623
Glaeser and Goldin (2005) argue that the career costs for ‘corrupt politicians’ are 
dependent on how willing voters are to vote them out. Corrupt officials are re­
elected -  they argue -  either because the benefits of corruption are funnelled back to 
voters, or, “because voters are sufficiently cynical (or realistic) that they think that 
political challengers are likely to be no less corrupt than the incumbent.”624 In 
Temate, patronage-based business deals funnelled benefits directly back to state 
officials, party players in Syamsir’s Golkar network, and local businesses, none of 
which stood to gain any more from the alternative candidates in 2005. For the wider 
population, their best chances appeared to lie in Syamsir’s continued control of the 
city government. Heading the city government, and representing the city branch of 
Golkar, whose network extended across the regional bureaucracy, Syamsir was 
therefore in a similar situation to the top officials in the Christian Democrats’ (DC) 
in post-war Southern Italy. Chubb argues:
.. .by means of its control of local government, (the DC) has used the 
bureaucratic powers of licensing and interdiction to weave a network 
of clientelist bonds linking the party solidly to the leading sector of the
623 Figures on aid funds transferred to the city from the provincial government between 2000 and 2005 
were unavailable.
624 Glaeser and Goldin (2005), p. 12.
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local economy and through it to a broad cross-section of the urban 
population.
Syamsir’s extensive patronage networks flowing from control of the city 
government also gave him access to far superior campaign financing than his 
competitors. In the new system of direct local elections in Indonesia from 2005, 
substantial financial capital was required for three key phases in the election process: 
candidate selection, campaigning, and election-day itself.626 Due to many years at 
the top of the city administration, Syamsir was able to raise campaign funds far 
beyond the resources of his competitors. One local NGO member reported:
We know that local businesses are the biggest financiers of political 
campaigns. There are no real outside investors in North Maluku, so all 
local businesses are totally dependent on government contracts.
Worse, 80 per cent of government contracts go to two local businesses 
only. There is no real tendering process here. For example, new 
government buildings, hospitals, roads -  all these big projects go to the 
same two companies run by two big businessmen. When it comes to 
direct elections, these businesses finance the campaigns of the key 
people.627
Securing medium and long term business contracts was a priority for local 
businessmen in Temate in 2005, as the local economy was only just recovering five 
years after the conflict. Syamsir was already a patron of ethnic Chinese and other 
local businesses in the city.628 Reportedly, internal disputes within the Temate 
Sultan’s extended family during the campaign also discouraged those business 
supporters who had previously backed the Sultan.629 Aside from superior patronage 
networks and campaign financing, Syamsir also had superior local party 
organisation.
During the Temate election, Syamsir’s campaign team was not only supported by 
extensive patronage networks and flush with funds, it was also highly organised via
625 Chubb (1982), p.158.
626 Thanks to Syarif Hidayat (LIPI) for many discussions on electoral financing in Indonesia.
627 Interview, local NGO member, 30 September 2005, Temate.
628 During the worst phases o f violence in Temate in late 1999 many ethnic Chinese families (who 
were predominantly Christian) sought protection from the Temate Sultan, who historically protected 
the North Malukan Christian minority, and sought refuge near the Sultan’s palace as they prepared to 
leave the city. However, by 2005, the Sultan could no longer be relied on for protection. Some 
prominent local businessmen reportedly funded both Syamsir and Nita’s campaigns, in order to buy 
favour from both candidates as they were not sure who would ultimately win. Others switched solely 
to backing Syamsir.
629 During the campaign period, rumours over the palace campaign to undermine Nita were rife.
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the experienced Golkar party cadre system and local political machinery extending 
out from the city government. The cadre system ran from hamlet to city level, 
rallying supporters, handing out cash and encouraging people to vote.630 Syamsir’s 
campaign team ran a finely-tuned logistical operation involving fleets of cars,
£ •5  1
speedboats and trucks, all of which were expensive in North Maluku. The 
campaign team also distributed satellite phones to its network of party activists 
across the Temate archipelago to help them coordinate their activities. In Golkar’s 
city party headquarters, computer operators ran sophisticated vote-mapping software 
as predicted results came in.632 The local Golkar party organisation also called in 
resources from Jakarta: then Vice President and Golkar national chairman, Jusuf 
Kalla, flew to Temate as part of a regional Golkar rally two days before the local 
elections.633 At the grassroots level, hamlet-based party members organised local 
rallies. Syamsir’s patronage network extended right across the local archipelago and 
favours were also called in during the campaign to support his re-election. In 
contrast, Nita’s team had only a small and fractured party network behind her.
The fourth factor working in Syamsir’s favour was his capacity to claim that he was 
the only candidate who could provide protection to local businesses, in both 
economic and security terms. As Chapter Four outlined, few local businesses had 
managed to survive the conflict without damage; most were shut down for its 
duration and sometimes afterwards, due to infrastructure damage and restricted 
movement in the city and across the province. By 2005 many local businesses had 
re-opened, but a lot of them were reliant on the local government for contracts. 
Chapters Four and Five showed how government funds for the reconstruction 
process and for building new government offices following local government 
deregulation in 2003 (when civil emergency status was lifted), had provided a 
lifeline to local businesses, as well as a source of income to state officials and 
politicians. To protect themselves from future risks, local businesses (re-)established 
tight links with the local government and political elite. The exchange of material
630 On the campaign tour around outlying islands in Temate municipality, I witnessed the distribution 
o f cash-filled envelopes from the campaign team to local Golkar members and sub-district and village 
officials for “campaign purposes”.
631 Though these were not as expensive as gubernatorial campaigns, which also required hiring 
helicopters and small planes to take campaign teams to outlying regions o f North Maluku - only the 
best financed contenders could afford such campaign tools.
632 Observed at the Sultan’s palace, June 2005, Temate.
633 Reported in Temate, June 2005.
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benefits from local branches of the state to the community in Temate -  and the 
wider North Maluku region -  ranged from jobs and contracts to the provision of 
security.
In a region wracked by social and economic crisis as a result of conflict, the memory 
of more or less 30 years of relative regional stability under the New Order served as 
a powerful tool during the 2005 election campaign. As the Golkar candidate, and 
with New Order experience in local government, Syamsir had the greatest claim to 
invoke this legacy. The irony in Syamsir’s capture of the ‘security’ and ‘stability’ 
message was, of course, that he was one of the state-elites in power during the 
conflict. He had actively prevented security sector intervention to mitigate the 
violence, and the electorate could have decided to hold him responsible for failing to 
curtail the damage. However, local voters held the Sultan’s forces more responsible 
for the violence, a feeling Syamsir’s team played on during the campaign. Southern 
migrants, particularly from the Makian and Tidore ethnic groups, were keen to select 
the candidate who had defended their community during the conflict.634 Capturing 
the southern ethnic vote by invoking the conflict was an important part of Syamsir’s 
success.
Several factors had therefore combined to ensure Syamsir’s re-election to the 
Temate Mayor’s office. He combined a well-financed and strategic political 
campaign with years of experience in local government. His party position allowed 
him to mobilise the Golkar political machine, and his local government one enabled 
him to draw on political and financial patronage networks across the city -  and 
beyond -  to support his campaign. Above all, he offered the best possibilities of 
continued patronage via government funds for local businesses, state employees, 
party members and other local elites. To the wider community, he represented 
economic stability and security above the other candidates, one of whom was a 
relative unknown and the other a definite risk. During the election campaign, 
Syamsir was thus able to provide both the ‘circuses’ and the promise of the
634 The southern vote appeared to have become a less important factor by the 2007 gubernatorial 
elections -  perhaps because it longer after the conflict, but also because no candidate directly 
represented the Temate Sultanate.
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continued provision of ‘rice’, the concrete economic benefits flowing from his 
control of the local government during the post-conflict period.
6.3 Prologue: the 2007 gubernatorial election
The 2007 North Maluku gubernatorial election -  the first direct election for the 
governorship -  was a protracted and controversial affair.635 The International Crisis 
Group (2009) described the election as, “one of the most bitterly contested since 
direct elections for local government heads were introduced in 2005.”636 The contest 
pitted the two former rivals from the 2001-2002 elections against each other again: 
Gafur (running again for Golkar) and Thaib (the incumbent, formerly backed by 
PDI-P, but now running on a coalition party ticket). According to the initial results, 
the two candidates won almost equal votes in the November 2007 elections. The 
final difference was a matter of between 863 votes in Thaib’s favour (according to 
the recalibrated Provincial Election Commission result, see Annex D, Table D.5) 
and 2,869 votes in Gafur’s favour (as shown by the initial District Election 
Commission result, see Annex D, Table D.4).637
Following over ten months of legal appeals and deliberation by various national 
government bodies over the official result, Thaib was inaugurated as second-term 
Governor in September 2008. However the results still faced legal challenges in 
March 2009 and awaited a final decision from the Constitutional Court.638 Final 
results notwithstanding, several preliminary conclusions can still be made on the 
overall election process, in line with the electoral patterns observed in the previous 
sections.
635 1 describe this section as a ‘prologue’ because the election came after my fieldwork and is therefore 
based solely on secondary research, conducted by a local researcher, M. Syahril Sangaji, along with 
national and local newspaper analysis.
636 International Crisis Group (2009), p.l.
637 See Annex D, Tables D.4 and D.5 for the disputed results.
638 As such, I treat Thaib as the most recently declared winner o f the gubernatorial election (as o f  
March 2009).
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(i) Main electoral candidates 
The Temate Sultan had not yet given up his campaign to become governor. He 
initially proposed himself as a contender for PDK (who he represented in the DPR), 
but failed to get support from the national party headquarters and then turned to a 
coalition of smaller parties.639 The Sultan’s candidacy was then declared ineligible 
by the KPUD (Provincial Election Commission) as the coalition of small parties 
behind him failed to meet the official support threshold.640 Given his age -  he would 
have reached his eighties by the 2012 gubernatorial election -  the Temate Sultan 
was unlikely to run again for the governorship, meaning his decade long attempt 
(1997-2007) to achieve official local political power in North Maluku was finally
641over.
The four main candidate pairings who actually contested the election were as 
follows. Incumbent Governor Thaib was the lead candidate, standing for a broad 
party coalition.642 As previously outlined, Thaib had been the most senior North 
Maluku bureaucrat over the previous ten years; and had been Governor since 2002. 
This career history secured him superior funding and patronage networks in the 
provincial bureaucracy and local business community, thereby enabling him to run 
the best financed campaign of all the candidates. Thaib’s Makian roots also 
delivered at least part of the ethnic Makian vote, though it was partially split by 
Gafur’s selection of a Makian running mate. Thaib’s promotion of fellow Makian 
into the top echelons of the provincial bureaucracy had triggered resentment from 
non-Makian groups who were by this point eager to unseat him during the election, a 
factor which may also have turned some voters towards Gafur -  his main rival.643
Thaib’s running mate, Abdul Gani Kasuba, came from a Tobelo-Galela ethnic 
background, aiding his campaign in North Halmahera district. Abdul Gani was an
639 Malut Pos, 24 July 2007.
640 The election law stated that parties, alone or in coalition, required 15 per cent o f  parliamentary 
seats, or 15 per cent o f the vote, in order to field a candidate. The coalition o f small parties behind the 
Temate Sultan and Rusdi Hanafi (the Sultan’s proposed vice-governor) failed to meet this threshold 
(Malut Pos, 24 July 2007). See also, International Crisis Group (2009), p.4.
641 However, it was reported that Nita planned to run for a national parliamentary seat in 2009, 
signifying that she would continue to carry the political baton on behalf o f the Sultan. See 
International Crisis Group (2009).
642 It was not clear why Thaib left (or failed to secure) the support o f PDI-P, who backed the 
alternative candidate, Antony Sunaijo.
643 See ICG (2009).
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ustadz (Islamic priest) and held one of North Maluku’s DPR seats. 644 His combined 
positions therefore brought Thaib both local Muslim credentials and national 
parliamentary connections, which would later prove useful during the contentious 
process to secure Thaib’s victory in Jakarta. Also, importantly for the local 
campaign, Gani’s brother was the regent in South Halmahera, and Thaib was also 
supported by the North Halmahera district regent, Hein Namotemo.645 These two 
guaranteed Thaib victory in their respective districts.
The second most popular candidate was Gafur, North Maluku DPR member since 
2004 and Thaib’s main competitor in the 2001-2002 gubernatorial contest. Gafur 
was backed by a coalition of Golkar, PAN and PDK.646 Gafur’s Patani descent -  an 
ethnic group from Central Halmahera -  guaranteed him fiercely loyal support from 
that district, and enabled him to claim ‘local’ status, though he had long lived and 
worked in Jakarta.647 His long career in the cabinet with Golkar, and as the Golkar 
DPR member for North Maluku, ensured financial and political backing from the 
national branch and leaders of Golkar when Jakarta figures later threatened to award 
Thaib with victory.648
During the election campaign, Gafur’s most important source of support -  in 
logistical, financial and political terms -  came from Syamsir, who headed Gafur’s 
campaign team, acting as local kingmaker. Syamsir’s command over the North 
Maluku Golkar network and local business connections formed a vital backbone to 
Gafur’s campaign. Syamsir’s support for Gafur also signalled the final split in the 
southern political faction (formerly united against the Temate Sultan), a contest 
which had been brewing throughout the post-conflict period.
644 See Annex D, Table D.l .
645 Hein and Thaib’s political ties went back to the 1999 lobbying process to make North Maluku a 
new province -  as outlined in Chapters Two and Three -  when prior to the worst waves o f the North 
Maluku, they had worked together to promote Thaib as the first governor.
646 PDK abandoned the Temate Sultan (their North Maluku DPR member) and switched to Gafur. 
Internal reasons for this decision were unclear, though it is likely because Gafur offered a better 
chance o f winning and greater financial incentives to the party.
647 Interviews by M. Syaril Sangaji, North Maluku, 2007.
648 Although Gafur was not popular among the newer (more reformist) wings o f  Golkar nationally, he 
still commanded respect among the old guard. Interviews, Burhan Magenda and Syarif Hidayat, May 
2006, Jakarta. Once he had secured the Golkar candidacy for the election, this also guaranteed him the 
highest levels o f support from Vice President Kalla, which aided his appeal against Thaib’s claim to 
the governorship at the national level (though this was eventually unsuccessful).
238
Gafur’s vice-gubernatorial candidate, Abduhrahim Fabayano, a Makian from Tidore, 
also helped Gafur to split the Makian vote. As head of Muhammidiyah for North 
Maluku (one of the most powerful religious organisations in the province) and Vice 
Chair of the North Maluku parliament, Fabayano had widespread social and political 
networks across the province. His senior position in the provincial parliament also 
helped Gafur to counter Thaib’s persistent challenges to his (initial) electoral 
victory, though ultimately it did not secure him the post.
Running against Thaib and Gafur were two other candidates. Antony Sunaijo (PDI- 
P) was the only Christian candidate. An ethnic Chinese businessman from Tobelo 
(in North Halmahera), and DPD member since 2004, he was paired with Amin 
Drakel, a Muslim of Sanana ethnicity (from the Sula region of North Maluku), and 
PDIP member of the North Maluku parliament. Although Sunaijo competed very 
strongly in North Halmahera, overall he was not well known and could not match 
the resources of either Thaib or Gafur during the campaign. The fourth candidate 
was Irvan Edison, running for a coalition of small parties. A former military advisor 
to President Yudhoyono, and Muslim convert from Morotai, Edison ran with Ati 
Ahmad, a Muslim from Tidore, and career civil servant formerly posted in Papua. 
Again, while Edison had useful national contacts, he had neither the regional 
popularity nor the resources of the two lead candidates.
It is important to highlight here that all the four leading gubernatorial candidates 
came from within ‘the state’, in a broad sense: Thaib, as the incumbent; Gafur, as 
former cabinet minister and DPR member; Sunaijo, as one of North Maluku’s 
national senators; and Edison, as former military advisor to the President. But it was 
the candidate’s position within the local state bureaucracy and dominant local party 
machine that mattered most and it was here that Thaib and Gafur showed their 
dominance. Thaib held the strongest position in the regional bureaucracy and Gafur 
had access to the most powerful political machine in local politics -  thanks to 
Syamsir’s support of his candidacy and election campaign. These two candidates 
therefore commanded the largest election campaign war chests, as well as holding 
widespread provincial political presence.649
649 Interviews by M. Syahril Sangaji, November 2007-November 2008, North Maluku.
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(ii) Controversial election results 
The initial election result was tight overall, with Thaib or Gafur winning all eight 
district and municipal electoral counts. According to the original results, presented 
by the city and district election commissions, Thaib won North and South 
Halmahera districts by large majorities, but Gafur won the other six (see Annex D, 
Table D.4 for the results). However, the West Halmahera district result (one of the 
closest) was challenged by Thaib’s campaign team, leading to a year-long dispute 
over the final result.
The West Halmahera District Election Commission declared Gafur the district 
winner by 5404 votes (see Annex D, Table D.4) leading to him being declared 
overall winner, by 2869 votes. Thaib’s team challenged this result, alleging that 
voting irregularities had taken place in three sub-districts of West Halmahera, and 
that 2507 of Gafur’s votes should have gone to another candidate, Antony Sunaijo. 
The Provincial Election Commission accepted Thaib’s protest, and overturned the 
West Halmahera District Election Commission’s result, recalibrating the voting 
results such that Antony Sunaijo was awarded 2507 of Gafur’s votes (only the West 
Halmahera voting results were changed, all the rest remained the same: see Annex 
D, Table D.5). Even though this still left Gafur the winner of West Halmahera 
district, it meant that overall Thaib had won the province by just 863 votes.
The announcement by the Provincial Election Commission that Thaib was the 
overall winner based on the West Halmahera recalibration was fiercely disputed by 
the West Halmahera District Election Commission (KPUD), supported by Gafur’s 
team. The West Halmahera KPUD subsequently appealed to the National Elections 
Commission (KPU), asserting malpractice by the Provincial Election Commission. 
The KPU accepted the District Commission’s results and suspended the provincial 
result and its team. However, the Provincial Election Commission argued this was 
unconstitutional and went on to declare Thaib the winner, creating great local 
confusion. Almost one year of protests, appeals and deliberations between the 
district, provincial and national level of government ensued.
Appeals were subsequently made to the Ministry of Home Affairs and the Supreme 
Court, controversies within which remained unsettled by the time the whole affair
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was turned over to the President’s office for a final decision in mid 2008.650 Whilst 
Gafur had the support of Vice President Kalla and various senior Golkar members of 
the national parliament, his counter-challenge to Thaib was not secured in the 
Ministry of Home Affairs or the Supreme Court, the main government branches 
deciding the case.651 Following a Presidential decision in September 2008, Thaib 
was declared winner and officially inaugurated as the new Governor. In early 2009, 
the Constitutional Court had yet to declare on the legality of the case, but it appeared 
unlikely that the Presidential decision would be overturned.
The close result of -  and following appeal process over -  the gubernatorial elections 
highlighted several important features of North Malukan politics, seven years after 
the conflict. First, Gafur had won half the electoral votes, which indicated a degree 
of change in local political dynamics -  the state-based incumbent finally faced a 
significant challenge owing to a changing local political mood. Even though Gafur 
ultimately lost the election, local informants claimed that the size of the vote behind 
him -  and his narrow defeat -  indicated the frustration with provincial government 
corruption and continued dominance of the Makian elite in the provincial 
bureaucracy, which voters now felt able to express though the electoral process.
However, several features of the local political landscape remained unchanged. The 
contest for provincial power still took place solely within the state-based elite. Only 
with the support of the second most powerful local bureaucrat (Syamsir) was the 
‘outside’ candidate (Gafur) able to rally such extensive regional support. Even if 
national level politicians and figures entered the contest, the system remained 
effectively closed to other ‘outsiders’, especially local level ones. Furthermore, the 
most significant factor determining the eventual electoral outcome was the holding
650 It was alleged by sources close to, and campaign team members from, both Gafur and Thaib’s 
teams that Thaib’s payments to the Minister and senior officials in the Home Affairs Ministry were 
much larger than Gafur’s. Several sources reported sums upwards o f  three billion rupiah (almost half 
a million $US) changing hands multiple times between different officials and the Thaib campaign 
team. These sources argued that one o f the main reasons Gafur failed to secure the Ministry o f Home 
Affair’s or Supreme Court’s support was because he had paid insufficient ‘fees’. Research conducted 
by M. Syahril Sangaji, November 2007 - November 2008, North Maluku and Jakarta.
651 Thaib was alleged to have close connections to the Minister o f Home Affairs and important figures 
in the military based on his previous posting in the Ambon government, which, aside from superior 
‘contributions’ to these bodies, had helped secure support o f both these bodies. Further research 
would be necessary to substantiate this.
652 International Crisis Group (2009).
653 Interviews conducted by M. Syahril Sangaji, November 2007-November 2008, North Maluku.
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of state office at the regional level, which determined who had the best financing 
and resource networks to contest the election through to the end.654
6.4 How the incumbents survived the crisis
In a situation of resource scarcity like that of Southern Italy and in the 
absence of a competing political force that can offer concrete resources 
to replace those controlled by the machine, most people will continue 
to support the possibility, however slim, of immediate gain from the 
machine as opposed to the abstract prospect of long term change.
Chubb (1982).651
This section sets Syamsir and Thaib’s electoral success -  as state incumbents -  in 
the context of the North Malukan political economy following the conflict. Drawing 
on analysis from studies of enduring political machines in other countries, several 
comparative points help to explain the North Maluku situation -  where state 
incumbents survived periods of crisis and widespread corruption allegations, and 
subsequently entrenched their powerful local state positions via popular elections. 
First, I highlight how these North Maluku electoral patterns may contrast with others 
identified elsewhere in Indonesia.
In contrast to the North Maluku situation, Mietzner (2006) observed that, across 
Indonesia, by the 2005 local elections, local government incumbents could no longer 
rely on their control of state resources to bring them back to power. In an analysis of 
50 local elections, he commented:
...Widespread fears that incumbents would storm to office 
unchallenged did not materialise. Their dominance over government 
resources and patronage networks was certainly an advantage, but it 
did not translate into automatic victory at the ballot box, with close 
to 40 per cent o f incumbents standing fo r  re-election losing their 
jobs....voters paid close attention to the track records of incumbents 
and did not hesitate to throw out poor performers and reward those 
who had delivered better public services. Some of the most
654 This mattered even more for national level lobbying, because o f the larger costs involved in 
securing the support o f national government figures during the protracted legal case over the election 
result.
655 Chubb (1982), pp.5-6.
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controversial governors who had constantly faced allegations of 
corruption and mismanagements were removed from office.656
Mietzner (2006) also reported that the Golkar political machine, once strong all over 
Indonesia, was considerably weakened during the 2005 elections for similar reasons. 
In contrast, Hadiz (2003) argues that the reorganisation of political power in 
Indonesia at the local level, following democratisation, has not led to great change in 
terms of who ultimately wins elections and holds political power. The critical role 
Hadiz ascribes to officials acting within, and elites connected to, the ‘predatory’ 
state bears more resemblance to the North Maluku case than the elections Mietzner 
observed.
Unlike the Indonesian elections Mietzner analysed, in the first direct Temate city 
and North Maluku gubernatorial elections, the electorate chose to re-elect 
incumbents despite widespread corruption allegations, particularly against the 
incumbent Governor. Furthermore, whilst no longer the New Order vote delivery 
machine it once was, Golkar still played an important role in North Malukan 
political dynamics in 2005. The long-standing Golkar bureaucrat won a landslide 
victory in Temate, Golkar-backed candidates captured half of the total local 
executive positions contested in the 2005 local elections in the province, and the 
Golkar candidate competed strongly in the 2007 gubernatorial elections.657 The 
continued powerful role of the Golkar party machinery, when it was closely linked 
to control of state resources (as in Syamsir’s case), was evident in the election of 
Syamsir to the Temate Mayorship in 2005, and with Syamsir’s almost-successful 
backing of Gafur for governor in 2007. However, running on the Golkar ticket no 
longer guaranteed candidates electoral success. Gafur failed in both the 2001-2002 
and 2007 gubernatorial elections, though he came a close second in each. Holding 
the incumbency position therefore mattered more for electoral success than backing 
from the Golkar party.
656 Mietzner (2006), p. 18. My italics. See also Mietzner (2007).
657 Golkar backed candidates won the Tidore city (Achmad Mahifa - also the incumbent), Sula district 
(Ahmad Hidayat - the chair o f  Sula DPRD and a wealthy businessman) and North Halmahera district 
(Hein Namotemo -  prominent local civil servant) elections, giving Golkar four out o f eight local 
government executive positions in 2005. As in Temate, Golkar formed coalitions with other parties as 
necessary, but it was the sole party behind the Tidore and North Halmahera candidates. Data sourced 
from KPUD Maluku Utara, Temate, 8 December 2005; KPUD Halmahera Barat, 19 December 2005.
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The North Maluku conflict had several critical effects on the local political 
economy. First, the continued contraction of the economy following the conflict’s 
devastating impact on regional infrastructure and the major economic sectors had 
increased the local population’s dependence on the resources of the local 
government. Second, the social and economic impacts of conflict raised fears of 
further change and instability in the local political system. Third, the conflict led to 
emergency legislation which concentrated government resources in the hands of a 
few state officials. This three-fold effect meant senior state officials became even 
more powerful as patrons than they had been previously. With the collapse in key 
economic sectors (outlined in Chapter Four), and a historical reliance on civil 
service employment (discussed in Chapters Two and Four), the local and provincial 
government -  and therefore the officials that ran it -  became the sole mediators 
between the limited economic resources and the population. This put them in a very 
strong electoral position in 2005 and 2007.
Chubb’s (1982) analysis of post-war local politics in Southern Italy shows similar 
patterns to post-conflict North Maluku. According to the ‘classical’ model of 
political machines, economic crisis destabilises entrenched machines because of a 
reduced flow to their resources. In contrast, Chubb (1982) argues -  as does Erie 
(1988), discussed below -  that, contrary to these expectations, during the economic 
crisis in the Italian post-war period, the Christian Democrat (DC) political machine 
increased its share of the vote. Patron-client bonds endured during economic 
depression through the state-based party’s management of resource shortages:
The essence of clientelism lies less in the distribution of plenty than in 
the skilful manipulation of scarcity. The key to understanding the 
patron-client bond is that it depends not on a continual stream of 
benefits, but rather on sustaining the expectation of rewards for the 
maximum number of people with the minimum payoff in concrete 
benefits.658
Chubb’s clientelist model shows that neither an exogenous crisis, such as a post-war 
depression, nor an internal crisis, such as exhaustion of the machine’s resource base 
via patronage spending, necessarily undermines an entrenched political machine. In 
certain circumstances, economic hardships serve to strengthen the popular support
658 Chubb (1982), p.5.
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base of a state-based political machine. Similar patterns took place in Temate city 
and in the provincial government, with state officials (who later ran for office) 
holding the reins of limited resources.
Also relevant to the North Maluku case, Chubb makes the important point that it is 
not the quantity of public spending, or provision of actual jobs and other patronage 
benefits, that matters during elections, but the discretionary powers over these 
resources. The ability of a political machine to control access to economic resources 
in the context of economic depression or crisis makes the crucial difference in 
election periods. Applying Chubb’s analysis to Temate city politics following the 
conflict helps explain why the majority of voters were loath to take political and 
economic risks on alternative candidates. The experience of several major social and 
economic shocks made further risk highly unappealing, and the incumbent’s main 
competitor was unpredictable. No one knew how she would deliver economic 
benefits, which, combined with the possibility of a repeated conflict, persuaded 
voters against her. As one Temate student observed:
It’s true that Syamsir was no longer qualified to rule Temate due to his 
adverse performance. He was dreadful in organising the city and has a 
manipulative bureaucracy as well as corruption cases against him.
That’s why I chose Nita for Mayor. To me, better to choose a junior 
devil that could probably be guided to do good things, than a senior 
devil that has more experience in doing bad things. But others cannot 
take this risk. They trust Syamsir and they are afraid of more trouble 
from the Sultan.659
For many voters, the ‘bad things’ the student feared from Syamsir were actually 
‘good things’ -  the prospects of patronage jobs, preferred contracts, and familiarity 
with the local government’s ways of distributing resources (i.e. via clientelist 
networks).
Syamsir’s electoral tactics were based in promising the provision of ‘rice’-  that is, 
concrete economic benefits, based on patronage connections- to the local 
population. In Erie’s (1988) American case studies, urban political machines 
strategically chose whether to offer ‘bread’ or ‘circuses’ during elections depending 
on what they could get away with. Minimal expenditures on circuses were preferable
659 Interview, July 2005, Temate.
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to real expenditures on patronage jobs in the local government or in businesses 
supported by the government, if this was sufficient to guarantee an election. All the 
Temate city election candidates provided ‘circuses’ -  in the form of campaign 
rallies, with music, singers, actors, comedy shows, banners, and other forms of 
popular entertainment, but only Syamsir’s team, through his control of the local 
government and extensive party network, could convincingly offer the ‘rice’.
For similar reasons, Gafur failed in the 2007 gubernatorial elections because the 
incumbent, Thaib, commanded far greater financial resources via his long-term 
control of the provincial government.660 Eight years in the provincial governor’s 
office, as Chief-of-Staff and then Governor, had given Thaib control over the 
distribution of the steady inflow of post-conflict aid from Jakarta and he was easily 
able to capture funds for his own patronage and political purposes. Even though 
Gafur had national backing from the Golkar party, and Syamsir’s influence at the 
local level, Thaib’s resource base was superior, both for the electoral campaign and 
in the expensive appeal process following the disputed election result.
6.5. Conclusion
I conclude here by summarising the key points of this chapter that explain why state 
incumbents succeeded in the Temate mayor and North Maluku governor elections 
following the conflict. First, by the 2007 gubernatorial elections, there were several 
indications of changes in local political dynamics. However, these indications of 
change did not offset the fact that state incumbents had the best chances of winning 
the most important regional elections due to their superior access to resources and 
stronger claims to providing ‘stability and security’. Third, electoral competition 
took place within the state-based elite; thus, fourth, while electoral rules had 
changed, successful candidates were barely different to those under the previous 
regime. Fifth, contest within the state-based elite showed that this elite was not a 
seamless whole (indeed, had never been one), but was sharply divided by factional
660 Other factors also came into play in the 2007 gubernatorial contest, involving national elite 
dynamics and ‘money politics’, but further research would be necessary to establish the details o f 
these processes.
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politics. Finally, although the state-based elite had first failed to prevent conflict and 
then captured the reconstruction process, they still appeared the best choice for voters 
given the North Maluku political economy.
By the gubernatorial election of 2007, more than half the voting population appeared 
to have had enough of the incumbent. This result indicated that local political 
dynamics were shifting in North Maluku -  the incumbent could no longer rely on his 
control of state resources to determine election results. The population were 
reportedly fed up with ethnic Makian dominance of the provincial government and 
upper echelons of the civil service, as well as the severe levels of corruption reported 
in the Governor’s office. Gafur’s success -coming a very close second to Thaib -  
also showed that the regional divide along north/south ethnic lines was no longer the 
dominant regional political divide that it had been during the 1999-2000 conflict, 
reflecting changing ethnic dynamics in politics as the contest shifted at the elite 
level. Furthermore, the contest between Thaib and Syamsir- the two most powerful 
regional state figures, at different levels of government -  showed that intra state- 
based elite competition had increased. These were all potentially important signs of 
political change.
However, these signs of change were not reflected in who eventually won local 
elections. State incumbents were still the most important mediators between state 
resources and promised economic ‘stability’ in a province recovering from conflict. 
The incumbents positioned themselves as the neutral harbingers of stability and 
recovery, despite the irony that they were the ones in charge both during the conflict 
itself and the post-conflict exacerbation of regional economic crisis. The 
determining factor in their success was superior access to the state’s financial 
resources, which they could then use for political ends. Comparative cases of 
enduring political machines presented here highlighted similar cases where the 
discretionary power of state-based political machines over increasingly limited 
resources, in the context of economic depression, enabled the success of incumbents. 
The North Maluku case differed from these comparative studies of urban political 
machines in that holding certain state positions and relative strength of personal 
networks were more important factors than the role of a party machine in 
determining electoral outcomes.
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Electoral competition in North Maluku between 2001 and 2007 took place solely 
within the state-based elite -  only these figures had sufficient legitimacy and funds 
to contest the elections. Even candidates emerging from the Temate Sultanate, the 
Sultan and Nita, who superficially appeared as figures emerging from within 
‘society’, also emerged from the state, just the wrong part of it. The Sultan’s failure 
to hold a senior bureaucratic position under the New Order contributed to his later 
downfall, as even though he had gained a local parliamentary and party role in North 
Maluku district just prior to the conflict, this failed to provide him with sufficient 
patronage or a strong enough financial resource base. This political weakness then 
combined with a crisis of legitimacy over his political role during the conflict and 
his wife’s controversial interventions in local culture. Eventually, the patronage, 
financial, organisational and popular resources of the incumbents overwhelmed the 
Sultan’s electoral team in successive gubernatorial and city elections.
The only ‘alternative’ candidate strong enough to compete through to the final round 
of the gubernatorial election against the incumbent was Gafur, who emerged from 
the national level of government. From his senior position among the old guard in 
Golkar, and with his position of influence in the national parliament, he commanded 
sufficient resources to win the Golkar candidacy for both the 2001 and 2007 
gubernatorial elections. He maintained sufficient national level support to support 
him through successive legal challenges over the 2007 election results, and also the 
backing of the top local kingmaker in Temate, Mayor Syamsir. However, these 
advantages proved insufficient to compete against Thaib’s superior resource and 
patronage base.
The two incumbents at different levels of regional government -  Thaib in the 
provincial government and Syamsir at the city level -  managed to convince large 
portions of their respective electorates of the benefits of re-electing them, despite 
several years of protest against their management of government resources 
(particularly targeted at Thaib and the Governor’s office). Thaib’s successful 
challenge to Gafur during the 2007 election showed he was capable of buying local, 
provincial and national support to hold his position following eight years in the 
Governor’s office. Thaib’s superior campaign war-chest, derived from his capture of
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the state budget, combined with a wide range of support from regional businesses, 
provincial parliamentarians and other lead players in the provincial political 
economy, therefore determined his electoral success.
The North Maluku situation meant that even when electoral rules changed, with the 
introduction of open elections in 1999 and direct elections in 2005, those who 
already held power were in the best position to maintain it. The most senior state 
bureaucrats from the New Order regime period rose towards the most powerful local 
political positions in the post-New Order era. Their survival was rooted in particular 
local conditions linked to the impact of conflict and their ability to act as the sole 
intermediary between limited state resources and the community. While by 2005 
North Malukan residents were better able to freely and directly elect their local 
leaders, they did not necessarily have better choices available to them, given local 
socio-economic conditions, the regional political economy, and the resultant limited 
range of favourable candidates to choose from.
The increased contest between the two leading incumbents and regional government 
figures also showed that ‘the state-based elite’ was not a seamless whole. Several 
different streams emerged within the dominant southern political elite, largely split 
between the provincial and local government level. Political parties behind the 
candidates were also not unified forces, containing factions which split during 
election campaigns and sometimes worked against their official candidates. As such, 
at the city and provincial level, Golkar was not a unified party machine in control of 
the state, in the sense of the Irish American or Italian Christian Democrat machines. 
Instead it was a more factional and personalised organisation. North Malukan 
politics was more about individual empires built up within the local bureaucracy at 
different levels of government, and competition within them, than cohesive party 
machines operating across the state at various levels.
Linking back to the literature discussed in Chapter One, the North Malukan crisis 
did not herald significant political change or the collapse of the state. The state- 
based elite maintained control of regional government purse strings, which gave 
them a powerful role in the regional economy, and their state positions allowed them 
to maintain and deepen their hold on political power. The incumbents used the social
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and economic impacts of conflict to their advantage, combining the effects of their 
increased control of limited available economic resources with increased risk 
aversion among the electorate. This political logic meant incumbents succeeded in 
situations where they might have been expected to fail. While in other parts of 
Indonesia, local electorates were willing, by 2005, to throw out corrupt mayors and 
governors, the majority of North Malukan voters preferred the devil they knew to 
one they did not. The political alternatives did not offer sufficiently clear benefits to 
the population, and could not guarantee social or economic improvements.
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Chapter Seven - 
Conclusion
It is a salient feature of the Indonesian experience that the oligarchy 
and its beneficiaries, the products of the Suharto era, have reconstituted 
their social and political power within a new democracy .. .old relations 
of power may survive, and even find new life, within a range of 
institutional frameworks very different from those in which they had 
originally emerged.
Robison and Hadiz (2004).661
Introduction
The central question examined in the thesis was how, through a year-long violent 
conflict following the official transition to democracy, subsequent socio-economic 
crisis and significant government and electoral reforms, the North Maluku state- 
based elite survived, thrived even, through this turbulent period. As Robison and 
Hadiz (2004) have argued, the survival of old relations of power, and old members, 
was a prominent feature of the Indonesian transition to democracy. This thesis has 
explored and explained die dynamics behind the survival of a particular faction of 
state-based elites in one conflict-ridden region.
The main argument put forward in the diesis can be summarised as follows: under 
the New Order, the central state expanded its authority throughout the territory, 
establishing structures of rule -  the local state -  in the furthest reaches of the country. 
These were populated by what came to be the local state elite (drawn from both old 
and new power brokers). Their social and economic position was dependent on 
access to, and control over, central state resources. These state-based local elites 
survived the transition -  one sub-set of them in particular -  illustrating the staying 
power of the state constructed during the New Order period. Other members of the 
state-based elite, more weakly linked to the local New Order bureaucratic structures, 
did not. This thesis explored the dynamics of this process at the local level through 
mapping the political architecture of the local state and tracing the sources and 
dynamics of local power, both historically and in the contemporary period.
661 Robison and Hadiz (2004), p.xiv.
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Three main research propositions were explored in this thesis to explain both the 
transitional conflict and the survival of the state-based political elite. The first was 
that an apparently ethnic and religious conflict in North Maluku, taking place during 
the immediate years of democratic transition, reflected a power struggle over the 
local state between different state-based elites and their affiliated factions/proxy 
groups. The second proposition was that the main political leaders of competing 
factions during and following the conflict were all located within the state, in one 
shape or another. The conflict therefore reflected an intense phase of contest within 
an ongoing process of competition over control of the local state, taking place within 
the state elite. The third was that one sub-set (or faction) of the local state elite 
(containing several affiliated groups) survived the conflict and subsequent socio­
economic crises through maintaining discretionary control over state resources and 
therefore the best patronage networks, which positioned them most favourably to 
contest subsequent competitive elections.
In the North Maluku case considered here -  a region with limited economic 
development outside of the state sector prior to democratic transition and the 
subsequent conflict -  local state elites found their opportunities to capture and 
control state resources increased following democratic transition. This was due to a 
combination of their expanded discretionary control over state resources and a 
conservative political environment following the conflict, which enhanced their 
appeal to the electorate.662 The following section summarises the empirical findings 
in more detail, in relation to the central argument and these central propositions, 
starting with the pre-1998 political roots of the local state elite, and ending with the 
2007 gubernatorial elections. I then return to the alternative explanation presented in 
the thesis for both the transitional conflict (seeing it as a contest within the state elite) 
and the survival of the bureaucratic faction of the local state-based elite 
(understanding this as taking place via their discretionary control of state resources). 
Finally, I consider several of the wider implications raised by this study.
662 To clarify again, by ‘conservative’, I mean the tendency o f the local population to fear further 
political, social or economic change following an intensely destabilising year o f violent conflict, 
social disruption and economic contraction.
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7.1 The main empirical findings
This section summarises the main empirical findings of the thesis, which I organise 
here along the core thematic lines presented in the chapters: the political history and 
origins of the local political elite; the evolution from local state-elite alliance to 
intra-elite sponsored violence during democratic transition; the post-conflict 
economic and political dynamics behind the strength and survival of the bureaucratic 
elite; further patterns of state capture explored through examining the ways local 
state officials used the UNDP donor funds; and finally, the factors behind 
incumbents’ success in the post-conflict local and gubernatorial elections.
(i) Political history and origins o f  the local political elite 
Several different political factions within the contemporary political elite, contesting 
local power by the end of the New Order, had been created during separate regime 
periods. Within each faction, external authority had played a central role in 
legitimising and empowering the local elite in its various forms. Under both Dutch 
colonial rule and the Suharto regime, local elites were deeply integrated into 
powerful, authoritarian, external state structures. As this central authority weakened 
towards 1998, and as factional politics increased locally (and nationally), the main 
factions within the North Maluku political elite saw their chance to renegotiate, 
(re)claim and consolidate their local power bases. This rising factional contest set the 
stage for the violent events that followed the official end of the New Order in May 
1998. External sources of authority therefore played an important local political role, 
not just historically, but into the post-Suharto era, whereby the political faction with 
the greatest external support was able to maintain power in the post-conflict period.
Four main regime periods shaped the North Malukan political elite in ways relevant 
to events between 1998 and 2008. The first, from the mid-fifteenth century arrival of 
Islam to subsequent European colonisation between the sixteenth and eighteenth 
centuries, centralised local political power and concentrated it in the four North 
Malukan sultanates. This took place, first, via their conversion to Islam, and, then, 
through their relationships with the rising colonial powers. The eventual dominance 
of the Dutch, over the Portuguese, Spanish and British forces, enabled the rise of the 
pro-Dutch Temate Sultanate above the other three. From this point, the Temate
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Sultanate relied on the financial and political legitimacy gained via the Dutch regime 
to maintain local authority. Without such extensive external support under later 
regimes, the Temate Sultan failed to return to the prominence of this period.
During the second regime period, from the late colonial to early republican era, the 
Temate Sultan’s role declined, falling first towards a minor regional role, and then 
being gradually incorporated into the central state, and slowly losing prominence in 
local politics. The 1950s also saw the outbreak of several regional rebellions against 
the new unitary republic in Eastern Indonesia. While North Maluku was not directly 
involved in these rebellions, the region was denied independent provincial status by 
the central government. This meant the northern part of the greater Maluku province 
continued to be governed from Ambon, as it had been under the late colonial period, 
proving a source of frustration to the North Malukan elite, which remained 
unresolved under the New Order regime. Sukarno’s Guided Democracy period, the 
policies of which were extended under the New Order, led to the triumph of ‘state’ 
over ‘societal’ political organisations in North Maluku, alongside the dual-policy of 
exclusion and incorporation of Muslim and aristocratic organisations into state-run 
political organisations.
During the third regime period, the establishment of the New Order regime from 
1966 to the late 1980s, the central state’s presence was extended across the region 
through the expansion of the state bureaucracy and public services. This enabled the 
rise of a ‘new’ local elite, from previously marginalised groups, via improved access 
to education and civil service employment (something which had taken place earlier 
in other parts of Indonesia). The expansion of the Golkar political organisation 
nationally also extended into North Maluku, tying the new local political elite to the 
state bureaucracy, rather than local forms of ‘traditional’ (colonial) authority. In 
contrast, the Sultan was increasingly co-opted into the centre. The combination of an 
expanding state bureaucracy, extensive regional development policies and the rise of 
the civil service and Golkar as the dominant mode for local mobility, meant the state 
took on an increasingly important role in the local political economy. Later, the 
Sultan struggled to reclaim a place in local politics without the local economic and 
political power base his rivals had accumulated via their roles as local state officials 
during the New Order.
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Finally, during the late New Order period of the 1990s, a class of educated urban 
Muslims rose through the national political ranks and the New Order shifted its 
position on Islam. This national shift changed local political opportunity structures. 
The local Golkar governing coalition grew increasingly divided as different 
bureaucratic factions competed more openly over control of the local state. The 
dominant ‘southern’ faction, led by Bahar Andili, the district chief of Central 
Halmahera district, was deeply embedded in senior ranks of the local bureaucracy. 
This faction’s wide network of supporters was based in its capacity to disburse 
central state resources, providing its members with a solid political base. However, 
another national political shift, whereby ‘traditional’ elites were ‘reclaiming’ 
political roles across Indonesia, led to a rising challenge from the Temate Sultan. 
While the Sultan was also networked through Golkar, his faction was less strongly 
linked to the local bureaucracy and more dependent on ‘traditional’ communal ties to 
the northern ethnic groups and Christian minority. When the Sultan ‘returned’ to 
North Maluku, gaining a Golkar parliamentary position in the North Maluku district 
legislature in 1997, this was his official challenge to the southern bureaucratic elite.
(ii) From local state-elite alliance to intra-elite sponsored violence 
Rising competition within the North Maluku political elite at the end of the New 
Order led directly into regional transitional conflict as Indonesia moved from a one- 
party military regime to an official multi-party democracy. The increasingly 
competitive local state-elites were temporarily unified during the lobbying process to 
establish a new province, which only became possible with the introduction of 
regional autonomy by Suharto’s successor, President Habibie. Factional conflict then 
sharpened again as competition over control of the new province intensified. Each of 
the four leading political figures - all situated within branches of the local executive 
and legislature by this point - sought greater power by securing leadership over the 
new provincial branches of the state. The eventually violent conflict between the elite 
factions did not therefore reflect a political clash between rising societal forces and 
the state, or societal groups against each other. Instead, it reflected an intra-elite 
political contest between different factions, with ethnic and religious alliances 
playing a mobilising and dividing role in the escalating violence.
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During the process of conflict escalation, the political elite saw opportunities in 
localised ethnic conflicts and sponsored clashes between opposing groups. As the 
contest grew in intensity, these clashes escalated towards wider ethnic and, later, 
religious confrontations -  moving from clashes over ‘soil to God’ (Wilson 2008). 
Violence thus served a productive function to the political elite, though not all 
ultimately benefitted from it. The composition of the state-based elite was 
reconfigured by the eventual outcome of the conflict, with the defeat of the northern 
faction led by the Sultan. By early 2000, the ‘southern’ triumvirate of three career 
bureaucrats - Bahar Andili (Central Halmahera district regent), Thaib Armain (rising 
local bureaucrat) and Syamsir Andili (recently appointed Temate Mayor) -  had 
triumphed.663
The promise of greater local government autonomy and reform had thus triggered a 
fierce intra-state elite contest in North Maluku. The stakes involved were high as 
they entailed securing control of state resources, already important in terms of local 
power, and which were likely to grow substantially following the creation of a new 
province, as well the establishment of the Gosowong goldmine in Halmahera. Both 
promised greater local revenues due to regional autonomy legislation, which would 
reallocate government resources and mining revenues to provincial and local 
governments. The process by which intra-elite contest spiralled into mass violence 
was not a spontaneous response by previously passive communities to ethnically or 
religiously charged events. Instead, the rapid escalation of violence was deliberately 
organised by political leaders, as the social and political elite saw the gains to be 
made by mobilising ethnic and religious supporters in ‘communal’ riots and attacks. 
Furthermore, by preventing security force intervention, small riots rapidly escalated 
towards wider conflicts between groups that would otherwise have been contained to 
small street clashes. Through the manipulation of these events, local elites were able 
to secure victory against their political opponents.664 The theoretical implications of 
this finding are reviewed further in the following section.
663 For further details on these figures, see Chapters Two, Three and Six.
664 See Chapter Three for further details on the escalation o f smaller scale clashes to full-blown 
communal riots.
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(in) Economic and political dynamics behind the strength and survival o f  
the bureaucratic elite
Socio-economic crisis followed the official end of the conflict. While this crisis 
caused great hardship for many, thus posing a further challenge to state stability, it 
also led to substantial benefits for those holding state positions. The socio-economic 
crisis triggered by the conflict exacerbated problems in the already contracting 
economy in the wake of the 1997 national economic crisis. The displacement of 
between one third and one fifth of the local population caused widespread social and 
economic disruption, along with security-related restrictions on travel, trade and 
transport, which devastated the agricultural sector. The destruction of regional 
infrastructure and businesses further added to economic crisis and led to high levels 
of urban unemployment. The urban sector was already highly dependent on state- 
sector employment, due to the legacies of New Order economic development 
patterns, and the crisis led to even greater dependence on the provincial and local 
government for employment and overall welfare, as well as economic and physical 
reconstruction.
Those in senior positions of the state bureaucracy were well placed after the conflict 
to benefit from the regional socio-economic crisis because they held the purse-strings 
to regional recovery. While the opening of the ‘reform’ era heralded big shifts in 
other regions, in terms of which level of government held fiscal and political power, 
the civil emergency legislation imposed on North Maluku concentrated power in the 
new Governor’s office as a means of restoring political control over the region. This 
legislation thereby temporarily overruled the anticipated decentralisation process, 
retaining a ‘New Order style’ of regional government, with the provincial 
government firmly in charge of both political and fiscal activities, to an 
unprecedented extent, and local governments and the new provincial parliament 
subordinate to it.
The emergency and reconstruction aid funds, provided by the central government 
after the conflict, formed a substantial part of the new provincial government budget, 
which itself constituted a far larger part o f regional economic product than in other 
regions. With the overall regional economy in crisis, centralised and unregulated 
control over substantial aid revenues gave the provincial government enormous
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regional political and fiscal power. Senior officials in the Governor’s office -  
especially Thaib Armain, by this point the most senior local bureaucrat, and rapidly 
rising towards the governorship -  were thus able to use to their political and personal 
advantage the funding made available because of the conflict and post-conflict crisis.
Central government aid was officially intended to assist the displaced population and 
aid reconstruction. However, while some of it was used for this purpose, field 
evidence showed that the way the aid was organised demonstrated extensive capture 
by provincial government officials, who held discretionary power over its use. 
Central government officials reported that allowing the provincial government to 
capture aid funds served several central government interests. Above all, it restored 
regional stability and security by ‘buying back in’ central state control of an 
apparently restive region. This was at a time when at least three other regions of the 
country were experiencing serious levels of violent conflict and the central 
government was keen to minimise further troubles in Eastern Indonesia. In effect, the 
central government overruled its own reform legislation, and concentrated power in 
the Governor’s office in order to restore central state control.665
Collusion between the new provincial parliament and the executive and legal 
branches of the state further enabled the process of state capture at the provincial and 
local levels. Civil society organisations, who otherwise might have confronted state 
officials more actively, were also restricted by the 2000-2003 emergency legislation. 
After reviewing the dynamics of state capture of foreign donor aid, I return to 
summarise how local political dynamics began to change following the lifting of 
emergency legislation and the approach of local elections from 2004 onwards.
(iv) Further patterns o f state capture around the UNDP’s aid funds 
By following specific projects, as well as outlining more general patterns of state 
capture (observed by legislators, NGO staff and newspaper reports across North 
Maluku and Maluku provinces), it was clear that the patterns of provincial and local 
state capture of UNDP funds repeated the picture of local state capture of 
government aid funds. The UNDP’s aid funds formed the largest foreign donor aid
665 It also potentially benefitted central government officials (involved in the capture process), though 
insufficient evidence meant I was unable to develop that line o f enquiry further in this study.
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programme in the region, and a substantial proportion of them were channelled 
through, and run in cooperation with, the provincial and local government. There 
were substantial benefits to the local elite, and both costs and benefits to the broader 
population, from this state capture process.
The UNDP had a stated interest in avoiding state control and minimising corruption 
of their aid funds -  unlike the central government’s (unofficial) interest in enabling 
this process. However, the organisation did not appear to have planned how it would 
overcome the likelihood of this happening. Operating a large reconstruction and IDP 
rehabilitation programme in the North Maluku governance and political environment 
posed several risks of state capture, but within the official reports, as well as in 
interviews, there were few references to these. The combined difficulties of working 
with a new provincial administration, a transitional local government structure 
complicated by emergency legislation, and a highly centralised Governor’s office 
were not accounted for. The added factors of limited government and UNDP 
budgetary and programme monitoring structures, with powerful local political elites 
in charge of aid disbursal, enabled easy state capture of aid resources. In the official 
reviews, only the Dutch government, one of the major donors to the UNDP aid 
programme, cited risks of rent-seeking, and only then in a small aside.
Overall, the Recovery Programme’s design for North Maluku could not deliver its 
stated goals via the intended means because it failed to account for the particular 
regional political economy and political architecture of the local state. In contrast to 
the central government’s (unofficial) view on the benefits of rent-seeking by the 
provincial and local government -  that it was a necessary cost of rebuilding and 
stabilising the state following the conflict - the UNDP were apparently unaware of 
the extent to which local government officials had benefited, both personally and 
politically, from their aid budget.666 I return to consider whether the UNDP might 
have indirectly enabled regional reconstruction and recovery through enabling the 
state-capture process in the final section of this chapter.
666 Analysing the reasons behind the absence o f donor and UNDP acknowledgment o f rent-seeking 
and state-capture by the provincial and local government fell beyond the scope o f this thesis, but it 
would be interesting to analyse this in further research.
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Intra-govemmental and local political dynamics, in relation to provincial control and 
capture of government aid and budgetary resources, had begun to change by 2004. 
This followed the lifting of emergency status in 2003 and the 2004 legislative 
elections. These post-emergency elections (unlike the gubernatorial election in 2001) 
were more open and finally gave the provincial parliament and eight local 
parliaments (five of them new) a degree of independence from the provincial 
government. Political manoeuvrings preceding the 2005 local executive elections 
further added to a change in atmosphere and activism, with increased dissent among 
various bodies of provincial and local government, and increased activism by local 
non-governmental groups over ‘missing’ aid funds. With popularly elected, rather 
than centrally appointed, leaders in place by the end of 2005, city and district 
government heads then started to demand greater access to and control over their 
budgets from the provincial government (which, by this point, they were legally 
entitled to, but, in practice, did not have).
By the end of the decade examined here (1998-2008), as the local political system 
evolved, a general rise in parliamentary, local governmental and civil society 
activism had begun to take place -  particularly in relation to disputes over the 
‘corruption’ and ‘misuse’ of aid funds by the provincial government. Fissures 
appeared between the different levels of government, and within and between 
political rivals over claims to local budgets and political authority. This finding 
underlines one of the central issues of the diesis: that is, the importance of 
understanding the factional dynamics of local politics within and between different 
layers and bodies of government in order to interpret local political patterns. I return 
to this broader finding in the final section.
(v) Incumbents ’ success in post-conflict local and gubernatorial elections
After analysing regional patterns of aid capture, by the provincial and local 
government, it was possible to account for local electoral dynamics and the patterns 
of state-based elite success in the post-conflict period. State-based incumbents had 
considerable success in the gubernatorial and Temate city elections, which occurred 
despite increasingly open intra-elite competition and political activism within the 
local political system from 2004 onwards. Here, I re-summarise the reasons for state
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incumbents’ success, why electoral competition took place solely within the state- 
based elite, and the importance of factional competition within this elite.
State incumbents went into the two key regional elections - for the Temate 
mayorship in 2005 and governorship in 2007 -  with major advantages over their 
opponents: superior access to state resources and stronger claims of providing 
‘stability and security’ as experienced heads of local government. Five years after 
the conflict, state incumbents remained important mediators between state resources 
and the jobs, benefits and contracts flowing from them. In a province still recovering 
in economic and social terms from conflict, during the 2005 and 2007 elections 
controlling these positions enabled not only strong patronage networks, but also the 
promise of future benefits. The incumbents also campaigned as the harbingers of 
stability and recovery against their rivals - despite the irony that they were the ones 
in charge during the conflict and post-conflict regional crisis. The discretionary 
power of these senior bureaucrats over the state budgetary and patronage machine, 
in the context of economic depression and social crisis, directly enabled the success 
of incumbents.
Thus, the two incumbents at different levels of regional government -  Thaib in the 
provincial government and Syamsir at the city level -  managed to convince large 
portions of their respective electorates of the benefits of re-electing them. When 
challenged, they also had the resources to secure victory. Thaib successfully 
competed against Gafur during the 2007 election, despite Gafur’s extensive backing 
from the Golkar party at national, regional and local levels, the mobilisation of 
support from Syamsir’s long-established local network and those disillusioned by 
extensive corruption exposed during Thaib’s first term. Thaib’s success showed he 
was capable of maintaining not only local and provincial support due to his control 
of the provincial government machine, but that he was also able to buy national 
support. Thaib’s superior campaign war-chest, derived from eight years in provincial 
government during the post-conflict aid years, and a wide-range of patronage-based 
support from businesses, parliamentarians and other lead players in the provincial 
political economy, therefore determined his electoral success.
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Despite important electoral reforms towards direct elections for the local executives, 
electoral competition still took place largely within the state-based elite. Only state- 
based figures had sufficient funds and standing to contest the elections, but even 
then this was not enough. The main challengers to the incumbents, emerging from 
within other branches of the state, could not mobilise the same political and 
economic resources. The Temate Sultan, and his wife, Nita, were not senior or long­
standing enough within the local state bureaucracy. The Sultan’s failure to gain and 
retain sufficiently senior bureaucratic positions led to his political downfall, which, 
combined with a crisis of legitimacy over his role in the conflict and Nita’s Javanese 
background, discredited his electoral campaigns. Simultaneously, the patronage, 
financial, organisational and popular resources of the incumbents overwhelmed the 
Sultan’s electoral team in successive gubernatorial and city elections.
The other ‘alternative’ candidate, Abdul Gafur, was the only one strong enough to 
contest the gubernatorial election against the incumbent. His senior position among 
the national old guard in Golkar meant he commanded sufficient resources to win 
the Golkar candidacy in both the 2001 and 2007 gubernatorial elections. Gafur 
maintained sufficient national level support to take him through successive legal 
challenges over the 2007 election results and secured him backing from local 
kingmaker, Mayor Syamsir. But these advantages still proved insufficient against 
Thaib’s superior regional resource and patronage base derived from his discretionary 
control over the provincial budget for eight years.
Overall, then, while electoral mles had changed dramatically by the 2005 and 2007 
local elections, with the introduction of direct elections (pilkada), the successful 
candidates remained the same as those elected (via different means) under the 
previous regime. Those already holding state power were in the best position to 
maintain it. The most senior state bureaucrats from the New Order regime period 
therefore rose into the most powerful local political positions in the post-New Order 
era. Their survival was rooted in the particular local political economy created by 
conflict and post-conflict crisis and legislation, which provided them with the ability 
to act as the main intermediaries between state resources and the population.
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However, there were several important signs of increased intra-state elite conflict by 
the 2005 and 2007 elections, when the local political system was beginning to open 
up. The increased contest between the two leading incumbents, Governor Thaib and 
Mayor Syamsir, formerly united within the southern political alliance before and 
during the conflict, showed that the ‘state-based elite’ was far from a seamless whole 
and that increasingly competitive and open elections could drive it further apart. By 
the 2007 gubernatorial election, more than half the voting population appeared to 
have had enough of the incumbent, providing further indication that the incumbent 
might not be able to rely solely on his control of state resources and regional 
patronage networks to determine election results in the future. Gafur’s relative 
success -  coming a very close second to Thaib - also showed that the north/south 
regional ethnic divide (so powerful during the conflict) was no longer the dominant 
regional political fracture line, reflecting changing local dynamics in politics as the 
contest shifted at the elite level. These were all important signs of potential political 
change in the future.
Finally, the North Maluku election processes and outcomes demonstrated that 
political parties acted as candidate vehicles, rather than unified political organisations 
controlling access to the local state.667 Parties contained factions that split during the 
candidate selection and campaigning periods and sometimes even worked against 
their official candidates. At the city and provincial level, there was no unified party 
organising state resources (in the sense of the Irish American or Italian Christian 
Democrat party political machines). Instead parties were much more factional and 
personalised organisations. Machine politics in North Maluku was therefore more 
about individual empires built up within the local bureaucracy, at different levels of 
government, and competition within and between these personal patronage empires. 
The following section returns to this analysis of local ‘machine politics’ and re- 
situates the empirical findings presented here within the literature.
667 See Mietzner (2007) on post-Suharto problems in party cohesion in Indonesia.
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7.2 An alternative explanation for conflict and political continuity
Here, I link again the main empirical findings of the thesis to the literature on 
transitional conflicts in Indonesia, the two main arguments of which I find limited in 
their capacity to explain the North Maluku case. I then reconsider the core issues 
behind the survival and strengthening of state-based elites through conflict, crisis and 
reform. To do so, I return to my alternative explanation for local political dynamics, 
with the conflict seen as part of an ongoing contest within the state-based elite, and 
the survival of the bureaucratic faction of the state-based elite understood via the lens 
of ‘machine politics’.
(i) Conflict as intra-elite competition 
By tracing the roots, roles and factions within the local political elite prior to the
conflict, through the conflict, and into the post-conflict era, I showed how the leading
local officials in the most senior regional branches of the New Order bureaucracy
rose into even more senior positions in the post-New Order era. The empirical
evidence showed that they managed to do this not in spite of, but because of conflict,
the subsequent socio-economic crises and the stalled and complex government and
electoral reform process that took place during and following the emergency period.
The state-based bureaucratic elite took advantage of the political opportunities
opened up by the national democratic transition - and its related crises - and used
them to accumulate power via their control of local state resources.
There are two main arguments put forward in the literature to explain rising violence 
and political conflict during democratic transition in Indonesia: the ‘rising society’ 
and ‘weak state’ arguments. This literature is hampered in its ability to explain the 
North Maluku scenario by several problems. First, while ‘societal forces’ played a 
role in the violence, this was only possible due to backing from the state-based 
political elite, which included the Sultan. Second, no genuinely independent societal 
forces entered the political realm during the conflict and stayed there to contest post­
conflict elections. Third, the state-based elite in North Maluku not only survived the 
conflict and immediate transition period, they also enabled the conflict for their own 
political interests -  this did not reflect a ‘weak’ state, but a strong state-based elite. 
When considered over the ten-year democratic transition period, rather than just the
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immediate years of reform, neither ‘weakness’ of the state (in terms of its control 
over elites), nor the ‘strength’ of society, was therefore evident in North Maluku.
The Temate Sultan led the apparently ‘societal’ or ‘traditional’ challenge to state 
power in North Maluku during the transition. But historical evidence showed the 
Sultanate was a colonial creation from the early modem period onwards. The 
Sultan’s local authority flowed from his relationship with external state authority 
from the early colonial period, which was first undone when the Dutch moved their 
regional power base (and economic production centre) from Temate to Ambon. The 
situation was then exacerbated by successive post-independence governments, and 
culminated in the New Order regime’s co-option of the Sultan in Jakarta. Through 
successive post-independence regimes, the Sultan’s local authority was thereby 
largely reduced to a cultural role outside the local state, though he maintained a 
degree of local influence, and an official role in Jakarta. When the Sultan ‘returned’ 
to North Maluku, at the end of the New Order, seeking to ‘reclaim’ local political 
power, his challenge thus came not from within local society, but from within an 
older form of the state.
Other apparently strong and mobilised sectors of society, active during the build up 
to, and eventual outbreak of conflict -  the ethnic and religious student organisations, 
community and religious militia groups who acted to ‘defend’ their communities 
during the key periods of conflict escalation -  were encouraged, funded and 
defended throughout by the local political elite. These were not deeply rooted 
community organisations, but groups quickly created during the most intense periods 
of conflict. Those groups that did not secure sufficient elite protection and financing 
were eventually marginalised or defeated. Without protection and support - both 
political and financial - from the state-based elite, it is unlikely that local 
organisations would have been able to carry out violent actions to the extent that they 
did. This is just as Brass (2003) has argued for the Indian case of apparently 
‘communal’ riots. Furthermore, these ‘social forces’ largely faded from the political 
scene after the violence had subsided, and were not sustained into electoral politics, 
failing to compete for positions in government against the state-based elites. The 
apparently ‘powerful’ set of competing social actors, whether ethnic or religious, 
who engaged in mass violence, disappeared as quickly as they had arisen. This
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finding supports the alternative argument that these organisations were only active 
insofar as they were actively supported and protected by the political elite, for as 
long as it served elite interests.
In this way, mass violence following the official transition to democracy in North 
Maluku was not a question of state failure or weakness, but the state-elite using 
violence for productive political ends. This same elite actively prevented security 
sector intervention to prevent or reduce violence. Those in charge of the security 
sector also appeared to find it in their interests to let the violence play out, even 
though they had the ability to have prevented conflict escalation. The triumphant 
faction within the state elite (the local bureaucrats) then actively captured post- 
conflict aid resources, and ran relatively sophisticated electoral campaigns, to 
maintain their power bases. An analysis of conflict viewing violence as a productive 
(as well as destructive) force, and as part of an elite-centred game over control of the 
local state and its resources, as I have presented here, therefore sheds greater light on 
the North Maluku conflict than understanding it as some form of primordial, 
spontaneous, socially-embedded or state-breakdown process.
Furthermore, in response to the argument that the conflict reflected the rise of long- 
suppressed or deep-rooted ‘ethno-religious’ divides in North Maluku, the evidence 
showed that even during the conflict, these divides shifted in response to changing 
political dynamics. For example, as the conflict escalated from Tobelo sub-district to 
a province-wide affair, formerly pro-Sultan Muslims from northern ethnic groups 
(who had backed the northern Kao in the first phase of the conflict), shifted their 
support to the southern anti-Sultan Muslim groups attacking Christians (including the 
Kao).668 As Moore (1991) argues, it is impossible to explain such shifts in social 
behaviour in terms of culture alone, as society reacts to changes in political or 
economic circumstances: in this case, to the shifting political dynamics of the 
conflict.
After the violence had subsided, ethno-religious dynamics shifted again, in response 
to other political and structural changes. At several points during the post-conflict
668 Wilson (2008) explores these shifting dynamics in far greater depth.
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years, new and renewed political alliances crossed what had previously appeared to 
be ‘absolute’ ethnic or religious boundaries.669 This took place, for example, when 
various members of the ‘northern’ ethnic faction from north Halmahera, headed by 
the district regent, allied with the incumbent, Thaib, an ethnic Makian (from the 
south), in the 2007 gubernatorial elections. Former ‘ethnic’ allies from within the 
southern alliance also morphed into political rivals when electoral and political 
circumstances changed -  as when Syamsir acted as Gafur’s campaign manager in his 
campaign against Thaib, also during the 2007 gubernatorial election.
In light of the wider debate on ethno-religious conflict, the findings of this chapter 
therefore support the theses of Snyder (2000), Mann (2005) and Brass (1997; 2003). 
Political competition over control of the local state played the critical role in enabling 
‘ethno-religious’ tensions to escalate towards mass violence. The political elite 
played an essential role in escalating localised tensions to the point of mass violence, 
by actively encouraging group violence and preventing government and security 
sector intervention. Snyder (2000), in particular, stresses that under conditions where 
democratic institutions are weak, but the bureaucracy is strong, this kind of 
‘communal’ violence evolves rapidly and forcefully. This is not to say that the state 
was weak, but that the democratic rule systems within the state were, and could not 
contain violent actions by the elite. Transitional North Maluku, with its powerful and 
competing bureaucratic and political elite, and weak democratic institutions to 
manage such situations, therefore confirms propositions about the dangers posed by 
rapid democratisation, advanced by Snyder (2000) and Mann (2005).
To explain the political dynamics observed in this study, an alternative interpretation 
was necessary, one that could account both for the North Maluku transitional conflict 
(and central role of the state-based political elite in engineering this conflict), and the 
continued strength of the local state-based elite during post-conflict crisis. The 
explanation presented in the thesis considered the period of transitional violence not 
as an anomaly, but as part of a longer-running re-negotiation of state power within 
the state-based elite. The continuity of the bureaucratic faction of the state-based 
elite beyond the conflict was based on their discretionary control over state resources
669 This links to the argument that conflict produces religious and ethnic boundaries and group 
identification, rather than the other way around.
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during the post-conflict crisis period. Those that held the greatest control over state 
resources (in particular, the leading members of the southern bureaucratic elite, 
Thaib and Syamsir) accumulated and maintained political power, and those without 
that access (the Temate Sultan, Nita and Gafur) failed to do so.
(ii) The role o f machine politics 
In North Maluku, individual empires built up within the regional bureaucracy played 
a crucial role in political success, rather than the strictly party-based machinery 
usually associated with machine politics. The North Maluku case did not exactly fit 
the patterns of machine politics described in regions undergoing economic crisis 
elsewhere, for example, in Southern Italy (Chubb 1982) or the United States (Erie 
1988). Instead, North Maluku displayed its own Indonesian and local variety of 
machine politics.
Machine politics is broadly about the trading in particularistic benefits, with elections 
won via the use of patronage, contracts and franchises.670 In its ‘classical’ sense, it 
reflects the early stages of political transition from a ‘traditional’ to ‘modem’ 
political system, with the party organisation becoming the patron (over the 
‘traditional’ notable), and the resources of the state the source of personal economic 
and social power.671 But political machines can take different forms, draw on 
different political structures, and have varying impacts, depending on the local 
context, and stage of political and state development.
In this thesis, ‘machine politics’ serves as short-hand for a specific form of political 
competition and voter mobilisation, revolving around the use of state resources and 
positions for personal patronage, and the exchange of money and benefits (the ‘rice’) 
for votes. Arguing that machine politics provides a useful lens to understand local 
political dynamics in North Maluku (from 1998 to 2008) does not imply that a 
specific party political machine occupied and controlled given levels of government 
-  that is, in the sense of a coherent party organisation, with a clear hierarchy and set 
of embedded political and economic structures enduring over time and imposed
670 Erie (1988), p. 192.
671 Chubb (1982), p.4. Scott (1969, pp.l 145-1148, 1155) argues that political machines arise in 
“transitional social contexts” where traditional peasant society patron-client relations have broken 
down, but where ‘modem’ loyalty systems, based in occupation or class, are not yet established.
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consistently over the city or provincial government. Whilst Golkar, under the New 
Order, took on aspects of such an organisation in North Maluku’s local government 
bodies, acting as the major conduit for economic and political success, this changed 
when the New Order ended. Golkar evolved into a much more fluid organisation, 
reflecting changes in national political and electoral structures, as politics became 
more personalised and less party-structured.672
Thus, while at the end of the New Order all four major political actors in North 
Maluku - Thaib, Syamsir, the Sultan, Bahar and Gafur - were embedded within the 
Golkar party and the state, at different levels, by the 2001 gubernatorial elections 
they competed for state positions from within different party organisations. More 
important to their political success than party affiliation was their position within the 
local state bureaucracy. Whilst, at first, Golkar remained the major party conduit for 
regional political power this soon changed. By 2001, securing Golkar backing did 
not automatically lead to securing the gubernatorial election, as Gafur learned to his 
political cost. By the 2005 and 2007 direct local elections, parties played even less of 
a role (though the major ones were not irrelevant). Personal networks within the state 
bureaucracy grew to be a far more important component of machine politics in North
fH'XMaluku than party-based networks.
The bureaucratic faction of the local state elite maintained control of regional 
government purse-strings (at the provincial and local levels of government) during 
and following the conflict. This gave them powerful roles as major patrons in the 
regional economy, by which they were able to maintain and deepen their hold on 
political power. The incumbents therefore used the social and economic impacts of 
conflict to their advantage, combining their increased control of the limited available 
regional economic resources with appeals to an increasingly risk-averse mood
672 This o f  course reflected the immaturity o f Indonesia’s party system, given the constraints imposed 
upon the evolution o f  a party system, first by Sukarno, then by Suharto, and further undermined by 
post-New Order electoral reforms. On the impact o f post-New Order electoral reforms on the 
Indonesian party system, see Buehler and Tan (2007), Mietzner (2007), and Tomsa (2009).
673 My argument here has evolved since Smith (2009), where I argued that the Golkar party was the 
determining force in the 2005 Temate city elections, due to its control o f  state resources. Whilst this 
appeared to be the case at the city level o f politics, it was not so in subsequent gubernatorial elections. 
By broadening my analysis here, to the gubernatorial elections, it became clear that Syamsir's personal 
bureaucratic network within and across the state was a more important factor in determining his 
electoral victory than his party network, though Golkar played a contributing role.
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among the electorate. This political logic meant state incumbents succeeded in 
situations where they might have been expected to fail, given the severe socio­
economic impacts of the conflict. By 2005, in other parts of Indonesia, local 
electorates were willing to throw out corrupt mayors and governors, but the majority 
of North Malukan voters were not yet willing to take such risks. The political 
alternatives to the bureaucratic elite failed to offer sufficiently clear benefits to the 
local population, including the provision of patronage based jobs, contracts and 
other social and economic goods, which the ‘machine’ politicians, Thaib and 
Syamsir, offered in abundance.674
Recalling the comparative cases of the survival of state-based political machines 
during economic depressions from the US and Italy - raised in Chapters One, Four 
and Six - the North Maluku case echoed similar patterns, but with its own local 
variations, particularly due to the impact of conflict and changes in party dynamics. 
For example, in the post-war Southern Italian cases analysed by Chubb (1982), local 
government bureaucrats -  who were embedded within a strong party machine - 
benefited politically from periods of economic depression and social crisis because 
of their discretionary control over increasingly limited state resources.675 Economic 
hardships served to strengthen, rather than undermine, the popular support base of 
the Christian Democrat political machine holding power. This took place via the 
discretionary power of the party machine over government spending, and the 
provision of jobs and other patronage benefits in a shrinking economy, where 
government resources were increasingly important to the local population.
In urban Temate, as across other urban areas of the Maluku region, by the time of the 
conflict, the local population was already dependent on state-based employment and 
business contracts provided by the New Order state.676 The dependency of the urban 
population on the provincial and local government then increased following the 
conflict, as other sources of revenue and employment dried up due to prolonged 
agricultural and industrial sector contraction, as well as severe problems in the
674 It would be interesting to examine the North Maluku case comparatively in further research and 
see what factors explain incumbents’ success in regions o f Indonesia unaffectedly  conflict.
675 See also Erie (1988) on American political machines.
676 As outlined in Van Klinken (2001).
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informal sector.677 This process underlined, rather than undermined, the power of the 
bureaucratic state-based elite in North Maluku via two means, both of which are 
captured by the idea of ‘machine politics’. First, it positioned these bureaucratic 
figures as the primary mediators between the population (looking for state jobs, 
business contracts and other services) and state resources, providing them with 
extensive patronage networks. Second, it provided them with an unmatchable source 
of revenue to finance later electoral campaigns. Their electoral rivals could not 
compete with such campaign war-chests, even with backing from national sources, 
such as Gafur’s from the most senior branches of the Golkar party.678 As such, the 
machine politics lens has provided a useful way of examining local political 
dynamics in North Maluku, and understanding the political survival and 
entrenchment of the bureaucratic faction of the local state elite.
7.3 Broader findings of the thesis
The findings of this thesis have generated three potentially wider implications, 
which, via additional research, could further contribute to understanding political 
dynamics in other regions undergoing democratic transitions. First, the factional and 
contested nature of the state led to a particular democratisation process, centred on 
intra-state elite contest. Understanding the local architecture of the state and political 
factions within it could help inform the better design of ‘democratisation’ and 
government reform programmes. Second, by tracing the local history of the political 
elite it was possible to see the transitional conflict as part of a longer-run elite contest 
over control of the local branches of the state, rather than a purely societal or 
destructive process. Third, the survival of the state-based elite should be interpreted 
in a positive, rather than morbid, light, given the violent and socio-economically 
devastating nature of the democratic transition process.
677 See North Maluku Provincial Government (2002); Swisher et al (2004); and Adam (2008), on post­
conflict decline in the major economic sectors in the Maluku region.
678 In the run-up to the 2009 national elections, and following defeat in most direct gubernatorial 
elections, DPP Golkar was determined to gain the North Maluku gubernatorial seat and provided 
extensive financial and political support to Gafur, from the Vice-President’s office downwards. 
However, according to several informants, even this was insufficient to unseat the incumbent, Thaib, 
whose superior campaign war-chest outclassed Golkar’s national party resources. See Chapter Six for 
more detail.
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(i) Understanding the political architecture o f  the local state
The thesis demonstrated the value of analysing the factional nature of the state at the
local level in order to understand contemporary political dynamics. It showed how
these factional divides within the local state evolved under successive external state
fn Q
regimes imposed on the region, from the early colonial period onwards. These 
findings raise an important critique of macro-level ‘technical’ approaches to 
democratic and government reforms, which view ‘the state’ as a homogenous and 
apolitical entity stretched across a country. The Indonesian state at the regional 
(provincial and local) level was far from homogenous at the end of the New Order, 
with both a powerful local state faction created by the Suharto regime, rooted in the 
local bureaucracy, and another surviving from previous regime periods, most notably 
Dutch colonial rule, and both claiming local legitimacy. These factions both saw the 
transition to democracy as their chance to renegotiate and accumulate local power.
The central government applied a technical, rather than political, and nationwide, 
rather than regionalised, reform approach to (re)building a ‘democratic state’ in 
Indonesia (with support from major foreign donors). This took place via the 
nationwide application of decentralisation and electoral reforms from 1999 onwards. 
But these two policies failed to account for the contestation for power within the 
local state. As Robison and Hadiz (2004) have argued:
There is something strangely abstracted and timeless in this (the neo­
liberal) view of change as a process of institutional engineering driven 
by far-sighted technocrats and politicians operating above the 
maelstrom of vested interest. The issue of power seems curiously 
neglected and abandoned....680
Changing the rules of local government and electoral procedures without accounting 
for internal political dynamics of the state proved ineffective at eliminating powerful 
elites based within the state, or changing the regional political economy such that 
patronage networks would not affect electoral outcomes. Political power was thus 
handed to the better resourced faction within the local state elite, empowering one 
state faction over another, but without significantly opening up the political process.
679 Chapter Two pointed out that this process began during the pre-colonial Islamic period o f  North 
Malukan history, but discussion o f  that process falls beyond the scope o f the thesis.
680 Robison and Hadiz (2004), p.xiii.
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(ii) Understanding conflict as a contest over control o f  the state
The thesis also showed the long-lasting effects of external regimes (from the colonial 
and post-independence periods) on the patterns within and between the local elite, 
state, and political economy. Taking a longer-term view of local politics therefore 
helped unravel some of the widespread assumptions about the ‘revival’ of 
‘traditional’ culture and ‘society’ in the Maluku region during the democratic 
transition, and re-situated these phenomena within a contest over the state. It also 
helped to show how the transitional conflict was part of an ongoing contest within 
the local state elite. When the violence subsided this did not mean that conflict was 
over, instead it continued via other means: internal factional fighting and electoral 
contests. Both these findings showed the conflict was part of a series of ongoing 
political negotiations about achieving, controlling and maintaining senior positions 
within the local state, which continued eight years after the end of the violence.
That the contest over control of the state was so fierce, demonstrated the central role 
the state had played in local political and economic life through different regime 
periods, from the colonial to New Order period. While studies of regional economies 
and society in Eastern Indonesia appreciate this, the majority of the literature on the 
transitional violence does not.681 In order to understand why political elites acted as 
they did during the contemporary transition, it is important to understand how the 
evolution of the local state had affected economic and political life. Much of the 
analysis of the violence accompanying the Indonesian transition to democracy 
overlooks these dynamics, as too did foreign donors planning their ‘post-conflict’ 
reconstruction programmes. However, the central government had a better 
understanding of these dynamics, leading to its particular approach to post-conflict 
reconstruction via (quite literally) ‘aiding’ the local state elite.
(iii) Interpreting survival o f  the bureaucratic elite as a ‘good thing’
The final issue to consider is whether the political survival of the bureaucratic state 
elite in North Maluku -  through the dramatic ten-year period following the official 
transition to democracy - was a negative or positive outcome in terms of democratic
681 See, for example, Gamaut and Manning’s (1974) study o f Papua, which traces colonial and New  
Order patterns o f regional economic development in order to explain the contemporary socio­
economic patterns that underlie the region’s particular political dynamics (and much o f its conflicts). 
See Van Klinken (2001) on the Maluku region.
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transition. On the transition between the imperial and modem state in Germany, 
Gramsci wrote:
This crisis consists precisely in the fact that the old is dying and the new
cannot be bom; in this interregnum a great variety of morbid symptoms
682appear.
On the contemporary democratic transition in Indonesia, Robison and Hadiz (2004) 
use Gramsci’s image to illustrate their discussion of the deep-rooted nature and 
survival capacities of oligarchic power through economic crisis and political 
transition.683 Elsewhere, Hadiz (2003) invokes a similar idea, arguing that no real 
change could take place in Indonesian politics following the democratic transition as 
the old state elite had neither given up power nor relinquished the means by which 
they sustained their powerbase. The idea of a ‘morbid’ interlude between two regime 
periods -  where old elites survive, and new elites cannot emerge -  resonates in this 
thesis, but it is important to reflect on how ‘morbid’ such a situation really was in the 
North Malukan context.
For some observers, the North Maluku situation between 1998 and 2008 was 
depressing -  local activists and government watchdogs had hoped for more 
substantial political change ten years after the end of Suharto’s reign. While 
numerous electoral and local government reforms had been applied, no real political 
change had taken place -  except that the reins of power had been transferred from the 
Jakarta and Ambonese based state-elite, to the local state elite. There was little room 
for new leaders from outside the state to enter local politics because the state-based 
elite was so deeply embedded in the structures of state power that mattered during 
the crisis of transition. Furthermore, those who had been displaced by the conflict 
and suffered from violence received no form of justice from those who had wreaked 
the havoc and benefitted from it.
However, in other ways, the survival of the state-based elite in power enabled a 
degree of stability and security to return to the region during a highly contested 
transition period. This process of post-conflict ‘recovery and reconstruction’ was not 
one the foreign donors appeared to have envisaged, but the central government
682 Gramsci (1971), p.276.
683 Robison and Hadiz (2004), p.3.
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understood what was necessary. While the long-term effects of this process on local 
society and the economy cannot yet be known, many features of prolonged violent 
transition were avoided by the political survival of the state-based bureaucratic elite.
For example, in contrast to situations in other regions emerging from rapid and 
violent democratic transition, as analysed by Snyder (2000) and Mann (2005), the 
end to violence in North Maluku and the ‘return’ to state control and stability was 
relatively fast. When viewed comparatively, even within Indonesia - for example, 
with the prolonged violence and local devastation in Central Sulawesi - this was no 
small achievement. The violence did not repeat itself in cycles of revenge and 
counter attacks; the displaced were largely able to return home; roads, ports, markets, 
houses, churches and mosques were slowly repaired and rebuilt; the regional 
economy gradually stabilised and local businesses started to operate again; the 
military largely retreated; and the militia groups disbanded. In many, comparable, 
transitional situations, violence, displacement and destruction has endured for 
decades.
In the final analysis, therefore, the North Maluku situation ten years after the official 
transition was far from gloomy. By maintaining the political and economic status quo 
of the bureaucratic wing of the state-based elite, whilst allowing other state elites to 
be eliminated, political and socio-economic stability was restored following a 
devastating year of violent conflict. The local state capture of central government and 
foreign donor aid served to preserve the power base of the state-based elite in ways 
the foreign donors appeared not to have foreseen. The local state was thus rebuilt, the 
pre-conflict patronage patterns with the local population were restored, and a 
semblance of socio-economic recovery enabled. For a region devastated by violent 
conflict and overwhelmed by dramatic government reforms, having some 
experienced bureaucratic elites retain power throughout this period was, by this 
account, no bad thing -  though it was far from ideal.
I conclude with a note of cautious optimism. By the 2005 local elections, the local 
political system was beginning to open up. While the figures holding local power and 
winning elections were largely the same as those under the late New Order, local 
political dynamics had begun to change. By the 2005 local elections, although the
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city incumbent won by a landslide, the electorate, local political groups, political 
competitors, local newspapers and other non-governmental organisations were all 
more vocal in the contest and more dissenting in their opinions than ever before. By 
2007, the electorate had grown even more vocal and political groups even more 
active. Whilst the incumbents still held the reins of power (by controlling and 
capturing the state budget) it was not clear that they would be able to maintain such 
unfettered control for long. In this sense, a ten-year analysis of the democratisation 
process is too short to determine where North Malukan politics may eventually go.
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Annex A -
Data for Chapter Four
Table A.1 National and regional growth rates (1994 -  2001)
Year Indonesia North Maluku
Per cent growth (%)
1994 7.5 8.3
1995 8.2 6.3
1996 7.8 4.7
1997 4.7 3.8
1998 -13.1 -4.2
1999 0.8 -16.7
2000 4.9 -9.4
2001 3.4 4.0
Sources: IMF (2003); North Maluku Provincial Government (2002).
Table A.2 Comparative estimates of central government emergency and post­
conflict aid budgets to North Maluku province (1999-2007)684
Figures in millions o f  rupiah at current market prices
Phase of 
emergency
National agency 
responsible 
(official phase)
Provincial
coordinating
agency
Years
covered
North Maluku 
Aid Budget
Low
estimate
High
Estimate
1 Military
emergency
BAKORNAS
(Emergency)
SATKORLAK
(Governor)
1999-2000 25,000 50,000
2 Civil
Emergency
MOHA
(Civil
Emergency*)
SATKORLAK
(Governor)
2001-2002 15,000 19,000
3 Post­
conflict 
(prior to  
Inpres 6J
BAPPENAS/ 
other ministries 
(Reserve budget 
funds**)
Line
ministries to
province
(Governor)
2003-2004 220,000 220,000
4 Post­
conflict 
(following 
Inpres 6)
BAPPENAS
('Post-conflict')
Line
ministries to
province
(Governor)
2005-2007 1,580,000 1,580,000
Total (in millions Indonesian Rupiah) 1,840,000 1,869,000
Total (in millions US Dollars) 202 206
Sources: North Maluku BAPPEDA and BAPPENAS data (2006); BAPPENAS interviews (May 2006);
BAPPENAS personal correspondence (2006).685
684 This table uses National Development Planning Board (BAPPENAS) data to approximate the aid 
budget allocated for each stage. Data for 1999 to 2003 was imprecise: low and high estimates are 
presented here. The North Maluku parliament provided different figures for aid between 2002 and 
2005, illustrated in Tables A. 5 and A. 6.
685 *Unclear whether Civil Emergency funds ended 2002 or 2003 (included as 2002); **BAPPENAS 
estimated Reserve Budget funds. Conversion rates: IDR 10,000 to US$1.1 (July 2007 rates, actual 
rates varied).
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Table A.3 Comparative Gross Domestic Regional Product (GDRP) and 
provincial government budgets for North Maluku, West Java and NTT 
provinces (2000-2004)
Figures in millions o f  rupiah at current market prices
Year North Maluku West Java NTT
GDRP Govt.
budget
GDRP Govt.
Budget
GDRP Govt.
Budget
2001 1,929,802 56,899 193,296,580 821,933 7,510,671 244,992
2002 1,986,346 199,353 214,302,247 1,265,653 8,684,299 408,779
2003 2,060,123 339,062 234,450,804 2,247,933 9,627,271 581,149
Sources: BPS Maluku (2005); BAPPENAS (2006).
Table A. 4 Comparative provincial government budgets as percentages of 
GDRP for North Maluku, West Java and NTT provinces
Year Provincial government budget as percentage of 
GDRP (%)
North Maluku West Java NTT
2001 2.9 0.4 3.3
2002 10.0 0.6 4.7
2003 16.5 1.0 6.0
Sources: BPS Maluku (2005); BAPPENAS (2006).
Table A.5 Comparative North Maluku GDRP, provincial government budget 
and aid budget estimates
Figures in millions of rupiah a t current market prices
Year GDRP Provincial 
govt, budget
DPRD estimate 
provincial aid 
budget
BAPPENAS 
estim ate provincial 
aid budget
2001 1,929,802 56,899 - 9,500
2002 1,986,346 199,353 90,275 9,500
2003 2,060,123 339,062 172,026 110,000
2004 - 415,546 103,315 110,000
Sources: BPS Maluku (2005); North Maluku Provincial Parliament 
(2005); North Maluku BAPPEDA (2006); BAPPENAS (2006).
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Table A.6 Comparative North Maluku GDRP, provincial government budget 
and aid budget estimates
Year Provincial 
govt, budget 
as
percentage 
of GDRP (%)
DPRD aid budget data BAPPENAS aid budget data
As percentage 
of provincial 
govt budget (%)
As percentage 
of GDRP (%)
As percentage 
of provincial 
govt budget (%)
As percentage 
of GDRP (%)
2001 2.9 - - 16.7 0.5
2002 10.0 45.3 4.5 4.8 0.5
2003 16.5 50.7 8.4 32.4 5.3
2004 - 24.9 - 26.5 -
Sources: BPS Maluku (2005); North Maluku Provincial Parliament (2005); North Maluku BAPPEDA (2006);
BAPPENAS (2006).
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Annex B -
Data for Chapter Five
Table B .l Comparative GDRP, GOI and UNDP aid budgets for North Maluku 
(2001-1004) 686
Rupiah
(millions)
us$
(millions)
Aid budget as 
percentage of GDRP (%)
Gross Domestic 
Regional Product 
(GDRP)
8,180,000 910.0
GOI emergency and 
post-conflict funds
239,000 26.5 3.4%
UNDP Recovery 
Programme
82,500 7.5 1.2%
Sources: BPS Maluku (2005); BAPPENAS (2006, 2007); UNDP (2004).
Table B.2 UNDP North Maluku and Maluku Recovery Programme funds 
(2001-2005)
Figures in millions US$
Programme National agency Provincial agency Start date UNDP
Funding
1 Community
Recovery
Programme*
UNDP Conflict 
Prevention and 
Recovery Unit
-
2001 1.23
2 Kei Islands 
Peace 
Building 
Programme*
UNDP Conflict 
Prevention and 
Recovery Unit
-
June 2001 2.20
3 North
Maluku and
Maluku
Conflict
Prevention
and Recovery
Programme
UNDP Conflict 
Prevention and 
Recovery Unit (CPRU) 
with Ministry of 
Human Settlem ent and 
Regional Infrastructure 
(KIMPRASWIL)
Provincial, city & 
district 
governm ent 
agencies-  
with UNDP field 
offices, UNOPS, 
INGO & 'local 
NGO partners'
Septem ber
2001
12.00
to
15.70
Low Estimate Total 15.43
High Estimate Total 19.13 1------------- . .  _
Sources: DFID (2003); Royal Netherlands Government (2004); UNDP Jakarta (2006).
686July 2007 Rupiah US$ conversion rate, actual rates varied; North Maluku GDRP from 2004 
estimated at 2,204,331 million rupiah, calculated from GDRP o f previous year with nominal growth 
rate o f 1.07 (7 per cent growth); high estimate o f GOI aid budget from BAPPENAS used here (see 
Table A.2. for details); for details o f UNDP Recovery Programme funds see Tables B.2, B.3 and B.4.
687 DFID reported contributions o f UK£1.2 million (US$2.4 million) to UNDP Jakarta in ‘central 
support’ and a further UK£3 million (US$5.9 million) towards the Maluku region field programme
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Table B.3 Approved and committed funds for UNDP Recovery Programme 
projects (2004)
Figures in US$
Province Approved
projects
Committed
funds
Total project funding
North Maluku 6,501,770 985,000 7,486,770
Maluku 3,473,497 340,345 3,813,842
SE Sulawesi 1,088,506 n/a 1,088,506
Total 11,063,773 1,325,345 12,389,118
Source: UNDP (2004).
Table B.4 Donor contributions to the UNDP Recovery Programme (2004)
Figures in US$
No Donor Com m itm ents Receipts
1 Netherlands 8,000,000 6,300,000
2 European Union (EU) 2,934,704 1,955,193
3 Japan UN Trust Fund 1,415,529 1,415,529
4 United Kingdom (DFID) 1,000,000 1,000,000
5 Italy 896,787 896,787
6 Sweden 570,115 570,115
7 New Zealand 271,440 271,440
8 Australia 257,550 257,550
9 Norway 207,906 207,906
10 Japan 110,000 110,000
Total 15,664,033 12,984,520
Source: Adapted from UNDP (2004) donor contributions table.
(DFID 2003) -  but UNDP documented other figures, see Table 5.3 below (converted at July 2007 
exchange rate). The table uses UNDP figures for DFID contributions to the field programme. The 
Netherlands government provided US$8 million (Royal Netherlands Embassy 2004) and was the sole 
funder to the Community Recovery and Kei Islands Programmes. The total project budget was 
reported as $US12 million by the Royal Netherlands Embassy (2004), while UNDP reported $15.7 
million (interview with UNDP Country Office staff, May 2006). According to UNDP staff, the 
variation in figures was due to the inclusion o f different costs in the total figures, the details o f  which 
were not available. Low and high budget estimates are therefore included here.
688 UNDP (2004). p.3
689 UNDP (2004), p.3. DFID (2003) separately reported a contribution o f US$5.4 million to the 
Maluku field programme, but without further confirmation, I have used the UNDP figure here.
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Table B.5 North Maluku IDPs aided by UNDP Recovery Programme
Provincial
'implementing'
partner
Reported
activity
Reported 
number IDP 
beneficiaries 
(families)
Estimated 
number of 
assisted IDPs 
(family size of 
five)*
Total 
number of 
IDPs 
(UNDP)
IDPs 
aided by 
UNDP 
funds 
(%)
SATKORLAK
(Provincial
coordinating
agency)
Housing 520 2,600
UNOPS 
(UN agency)
Housing/
Infra­
structure
1,400 7,000
Total 9,600 166,318 17%
Source: Adapted from UNDP (2004).690 * Estimate based on field interviews (2005).
690 UNDP (2004), Annex 1, p.30.
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Annex C -
Photographs of UNDP Recovery Programme funded projects (North 
Halmahera district, North Maluku)
Photographs C.l to C.3 (below) illustrate a kindergarten built with UNDP Recovery 
Programme funding on the northern edge of Tobelo town, North Halmahera district, 
North Maluku.691 Photograph C.l shows the entrance to the site of the Tobelo Banau 
military compound, home to Infantry Battalion 732, where the kindergarten was 
located. Photograph C.2 shows two soldiers guarding the new building, beside the 
donor plaque displaying the nine flags of the major international donors.692 
Photograph C.3 is a close-up of the donor plaque.
Photograph C .l: Soldiers at the entrance to the Infantry Battalion 732/Banau 
compound (site of the ‘K artika Jaya’ kindergarten), W ari Village, Tobelo sub­
district, North Halmahera
691 All photographs taken by the author in Tobelo, North Halmahera, December 2005.
692 A DFID civil servant in Jakarta reported that it was not DFID policy to display flags on DFID 
funded projects, but in this case, the British flag was displayed proudly on the kindergarten.
298
Photograph C.2: Soldiers at the ‘K artika Jaya’ kindergarten, TNI compound, 
W ari Village, Tobelo sub-district, North Halm ahera
Photograph C.3: The UNDP plaque, ‘K artika Jaya’ kindergarten (with flags of 
the nine major donors), W ari Village, Tobelo sub-district, North H alm ahera
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Photographs C.4 and C.5 (below) illustrate a schoolyard and building that had been 
‘rehabilitated’ with UNDP Recovery Programme funding in the centre of Tobelo 
town, North Halmahera district, North Maluku.
Photograph C.4: Prim ary school building ‘rehabilitated’ with UNDP funds, 
Tobelo, North Halm ahera
Photograph C.5: Sign outside the prim ary school rehabilitated with UNDP 
funds, Tobelo, North Halmahera
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Annex D -
North Maluku national, local and gubernatorial election data
Table D .l National Parliament (DPR) Election Results for the three successful 
candidates in Ternate municipality (2004)
Cand.
No.
Successful DPR 
candidates 
(parties)
Voting results by sub-district 
(validated votes) Final
Result
South
Ternate
North
Ternate
Ternate
Island
Moti
6 Mudaffar Syah 
(PDK)
2,891 9,034 4,193 66 16,184
16 Abdul Gani Kasuba 
(PKS)
2,795 2,501 65 64 5,425
20 Abdul Gafur 
(Golkar)
3,266 1,992 244 168 5,670
Source: Regional Election Commission (KPUD), Ternate, April 2004.
Table D.2 National Senate (DPD) Election Results in Ternate municipality 
(2004)
No. Senate Candidates
Voting results by sub-district 
(validated votes) TOTAL
South Ternate
North
Ternate
Ternate
Island Moti
1 Juanda Bakar 4,171 2,670 188 702 7,731
4 Nita Budhi Susanti 5,701 12,999 7,823 146 26,669
6 Djafar Syah 5,636 3,609 367 210 9,822
12 Anthony Charles Sunarjo 283 347 237 14 881
Total Number of Valid Votes 30,279 30,144 10,165 2,247 72,835
Source: Regional Election Commission (KPUD), Temate, April 2004.
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Table D.3 Ternate City Local Election Results (2005)
No
Candidates for 
Mayor 
and 
Vice-Mayor 
(Parties)
Voting results by sub-district 
(validated votes) Final
Result
Per
cent
(%)South
Ternate
North
Ternate
Ternate
Island
Moti
1 Syamsir Andili and 
Amas Dinsie 
(Golkar, PD, PBR)
18,858 15,610 2,715 1,180 38,363 52.8%
2 Sujud Siradjuddin 
and
Rustam Konoras 
(PAN, PKPB)
6,138 3,423 718 1,186 11,465 15.8%
3 Nita Budhi Susanti 
and
Sidik Dero Siokona 
(PDK)
4,510 10,900 7,328 42 22,780 31.4%
Total Number of Valid Votes 72,608 100%
Source: Regional Election Commission (KPUD), Temate, December 2005.
Table D.4 Initial North Maluku 2007 gubernatorial electoral results (District 
and City Election Commission results)
District or 
Municipality
Governor/Vice-Governor Candidates
Winner
Antony
Sunarjo/
Amin
Drakel
Thaib 
Armain/ 
Abdul Gani 
Kasuba
Abdul
Gafur/
Abdurahmin
Fabayano
Irvan
Edison/
Ati
Ahmad
Ternate 2,495 28,318 35,670 3,855 Abdul
Gafur
Tidore 1,400 17,887 25,955 2,932 Abdul
Gafur
W est Halmahera 9,124 16,512 21,556 4,922 Abdul
Gafur
North Halmahera 29,091 32,056 16,248 18,627 Thaib
Armain
Central Halmahera 2,893 4,342 11,848 1,286 Abdul
Gafur
South Halmahera 9,734 62,353 23,700 2,054 Thaib
Armain
East Halmahera 7,119 8,516 13,179 3,150 Abdul
Gafur
Sula 11,754 9,396 33,733 9,155 Abdul
Gafur
Total 73,610 179,020 181,889 45,981 Abdul
Gafur
Source: Temate Pos, 9 November 2007
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Table D.5 Recalibrated North Maluku 2007 gubernatorial electoral results 
(Provincial Election Commission results)
District or 
Municipality
Governor/Vice-Governor Candidates
WinnerAntony
Sunarjo/
Amin
Drakel
Thaib 
Armain/ 
Abdul Gani 
Kasuba
Abdul
Gafur/
Abdurahmin
Fabayano
Irvan 
Edison/ 
Ati Ahmad
West Halmahera 11,631 16,512 17,824 4,922 Thaib
Armain
Total 76,117 179,020 178,157 45,981 Thaib
Armain
Source: Ternate Pos, 9 November 2007.
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